VANISHING ATTORNEY’S FEES IN A PATERNITY ACTION
March 21, 2013 § 2 Comments
Tash Solangi filed suit against Kasey Croney to establish paternity and to obtain custody of the parties’ minor child, Caleb. Much of the trial was devoted to the parties’ custody conflict. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court awarded Kasey physical custody, gave the parties joint legal custody, changed the child’s name, and assessed child support. The chancellor also awarded Kasey a judgment in the sum of $14,000 in attorney’s fees. Tash appealed.
Much of the COA’s opinion in Solangi v. Croney, handed down March 12, 2013, addresses the chancellor’s findings on the Albright factors, which the COA did not disturb. It is the court’s handling of the attorney’s fee issue to which we turn out attention. Judge Fair’s opinion states:
¶28. The chancellor awarded Kacey approximately $14,000 in attorney’s fees and costs. The award was based on Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-9-45 (Rev. 2004), which provides that the defendant in successful paternity actions shall pay costs and attorney’s fees. There are two problems with this award. The first is that the trial from which the award largely derives was for custody rather than paternity, with paternity being admitted by the parties in their initial pleadings. The second problem is more fundamental: the statute states that costs and fees shall be assessed against the defendant. Given that Kacey was the defendant, section 93-9-45 does not authorize an award of costs and fees against Tash.
¶29. We recognize that the issue of attorney’s fees in domestic cases is largely entrusted to the sound discretion of the chancellor. McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764, 767 (Miss. 1982). Therefore we must also consider the possibility that the award can be justified under the McKee factors. However, that would require that Kacey be unable to pay her own fees. See Dunaway v. Dunaway, 749 So. 2d 1112, 1120 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). No such finding was made by the chancellor, nor would the record support it given that Kacey and Tash were of similar means, with Kacey earning approximately $72,000 per year.
¶30. We conclude that the award of fees and costs to Kacey is unsupported by the record and must be reversed and rendered.
Two points: (1) if you rely solely on the paternity (parentage) statute for authority to award an attorney’s fee, you’d better be representing the plaintiff; and (2) if the case is not for contempt, you must prove inability to pay. and although Judge Fair does not mention it here, he has said recently in another opinion, that in every case you should put on proof of the Mckee factors; otherwise there is nothing in the record to show how the chancellor arrived at a decision that the dollar amount awarded was reasonable.
And another point: I would have offered proof of how much time was devoted to the custody action and how much was devoted to the paternity action. That way, if the judge finds only part allowable, she has a record on which to base a partial award.
If you will click on that category search button up there on the right side of the page and again click on “Attorney’s Fees,” you will find a slew of posts on proving attorney’s fees and protecting the award on appeal.
THE CONSERVATOR AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
March 20, 2013 § Leave a comment
Angela and Brian filed a joint complaint for divorce on the sole ground of irreconcilable differences. While the 60-day waiting period was running, Angela was involved in a car wreck, suffering a broken neck and brain damage. Because she was no longer able to handle her business, a conservator was appointed and authorized to proceed with the divorce action.
On January 10, 2000, the trial court entered the final judgment of divorce. It included a provision that Brian reimburse Angela for $5,500 she had paid toward purchase of an automobile. In a subsequent proceeding brought by the conservator for enforcement of the judgment, Brian was ordered to pay the money, and the court awarded a judgment with interest, entered January 9, 2001.
In January, 2011, nearly ten years after the 2001 judgment, Angela’s conservator sought and obtained a writ of garnishment. After back-and-forth series of rulings, the trial court cancelled the writ because the judgment had expired due to the statute of limitations in MCA 15-1-47. The court rejected the conservator’s claim that Angela’s incapacity had tolled the statute of limitations as provided in MCA 15-1-59 because the “conservator is fully authorized to employ attorneys and bring actions on the [ward’s] behalf,” citing USF&G v. Conservatorship of Melson, 809 So.2d 647, 654 (Miss. 2002).
Angela’s conservator appealed.
In the case of Conservatorship of Lewis v. Smith, rendered March 5, 2012, the opinion has some key observations about the duties of a conservator when it comes to enforcing and protecting the rights of the ward:
¶8. Lewis contends that the chancellor erred in finding that section 15-1-59 does not toll the statute of limitations in regard to the judgment’s expiration under section 15-1-47. Under section 15-1-47, a judgment lien expires after seven years from the entry of the judgment.
¶9. In her August 26, 2011 order, the chancellor found that section 15-1-59 was “inapplicable to the present matter as it concerns persons with disabilities and minor children; when a conservator was appointed to protect the legal rights of the mentally incapacitated Angela Ann Lewis, thus invoking the provisions of Miss[issippi] Code Ann[otated] [s]ection 15-1-53.” Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-53 (Rev. 2012) states:
When the legal title to property or a right in action is in an executor, administrator, guardian, or other trustee, the time during which any statute of limitations runs against such trustee shall be computed against the person beneficially interested in such property or right in action, although such person may be under disability and within the saving of any statute of limitations; and may be availed of in any suit or actions by such person.
It is important to note that “the duties, responsibilities and powers of a guardian or conservator are the same.” Harvey v. Meador, 459 So. 2d 288, 292 (Miss. 1984). See also Miss. Code Ann. § 93-13-259 (Rev. 2004).
¶10. From the language of the order, the chancellor found that the right vested in the conservator and not in Lewis. Lewis contends that this contention is contrary to Weir v. Monahan, 67 Miss. 434, 7 So. 291 (1890). The Mississippi Supreme Court in Weir found that section 15-1-53 only applies “where the legal title to property or the right of action, at law or in equity[,] is in the guardian, and not the infants.” Weir, 67 Miss. at 455, 7 So. at 296. The court noted that “[w]hen the legal title to the property is vested in a trustee who can sue for it, and fails to do so within the time prescribed by law[,] . . . his right of action is barred . . . .” Id.
¶11. Under Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-13-38(1) (Rev. 2004), “All the provisions of the law on the subject of executors and administrators[] relating to settlement or disposition of property limitations . . . shall, as far as applicable and not otherwise provided, be observed and enforced in all guardianships.” Also, Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-13-38(2) (Rev. 2004) states: “The guardian is empowered to collect and sue for and recover all debts due his said ward . . . .”
¶12. From the language of section 93-13-38, the conservator had a fiduciary duty to pursue the $5,500 owed to Lewis. Therefore, the right of action was in the conservator and not Lewis. The conservator was appointed prior to the entry of the judgment of the divorce. The conservator brought the motion to hold Smith in contempt for failure to pay. It was the conservator’s fiduciary duty to file a writ of garnishment when Smith failed to pay. Under the plain language of section 15-1-53, if the right is in the guardian, in this case the conservator, the statute of limitations runs against the guardian and not the ward.
¶13. The right in action is in the conservator, therefore making the savings clause of 15-1-59 inapplicable, because “[t]he purpose of the savings statute is to protect the legal rights of those who are unable to assert their own rights due to disability.” Rockwell v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 710 So. 2d 388, 391 (¶11) (Miss. 1998). Lewis has a court-appointed conservator who is able to assert rights on her behalf. Therefore, Lewis does not require, nor is subject to, the protections provided by the saving clause.
If you are representing a conservator — or a guardian, executor or administrator, for that matter — make sure that your client is doing what is necessary to protect the legal interests of the ward or beneficiary, and is not allowing statutes of limitation to run.
the burden of responsibility of a fiduciary is a heavy one, as I have emphasized here before. This case points up yet another way in which your fiduciary may make a “perilous mistake” in handling the ward’s business. It’s your job to steer your client in the right path, and to help avoid the common mistakes that fiduciaries commit.
A MINORITY CONUNDRUM
March 19, 2013 § 2 Comments
I posted here about a case pending in my court in which a lawyer had filed a motion to void two agreed judgments for custody that had been executed by a 19-year-old mother. The basis for his motion was that the mother lacked the legal capacity to execute the judgments, and that they were not binding on her in any way.
The lawyers have settled the case, and the now-22-year-old mother has signed an agreed order that has the effect of supplanting the previous agreed judgments. So the concern about her legal capacity is moot in that case.
Still, the state of the law has me concerned. I did not find any authority for an unmarried minor to enter into an agreed judgment in a case of this sort. Neither did my staff attorney or even other judges who took the time to answer my query on our listserv. I found no authority, either, for subsequent ratification or approval by the court, although other states have addressed the ratification issue.
The reason for my concern is that a married minor is considered emancipated for the purpose of dealing with divorce, custody and support, but an unmarried minor is in a legal limbo vis a vis his or her offspring. Is there any legal or policy reason, given Mississippi’s high rate of unmarried parenthood, why we do not go ahead and recognize that young, unmarried parents, at least in the 18-21 age group, should not also be considered emancipated for the purpose of dealing with child custody and other parentage issues? Young people in that age group are emancipated by law to deal with their choses in action, so why do we not emancipate them by statute to deal with their parentage issues?
I wish that the legislature would look at this issue in light of the reality many of see every day in our state: children are having children. We have to have effective ways to deal with that.
MUCH ADO ABOUT SOMETHING
March 18, 2013 § 2 Comments
Forbes v. St. Martin, et al., decided March 5, 2013, by the COA, is a tour de force on contingent fee contracts and their enforceability. If you do any contingent-fee work, this is a must-read for you. Actually, it’s a good opinion to read and examine as a case study in ethics.
The 41-page majority opinion was penned by Judge Griffis. The rest of the court went this way: “ISHEE, ROBERTS, CARLTON AND FAIR, JJ., CONCUR. BARNES, J., CONCURS IN PART AND THE IN RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. MAXWELL, J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED IN PART BY ROBERTS, J. IRVING, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY LEE, C.J. JAMES, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.”
James Forbes had suffered catastrophic injuries in a gas-station explosion in Biloxi. Through a series of events he came to be represented in his personal injury claim by St. Martin, a Louisiana lawyer. Rather than qualifying to proceed pro hac vice, St. Martin instead associated a Mississippi lawyer and kept a rather low profile in the case, advising Forbes and his wife in the background and letting Mississippi counsel, with whom he corresponded regularly, take the lead in the record of the litigation.
The PI case was settled eventually for $13.6 million, and St. Martin’s fees, which were to be divided with Mississippi counsel, were $4.6 million.
Forbes filed suit against St. Martin and the Mississippi lawyer, and their respective firms, seeking to void the contingent-fee contract. The complaint asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, fraud and misrepresentation, conversion, rescission, imposition of a constructive trust, quantum merit, attorney’s fees, and actual and punitive damages. The Mississippi lawyer and his firm were dismissed, and St. Martin’s malpractice carrier was added as a defendant.
Both Forbes and St. Martin filed motions for summary judgment, and the chancellor ruled in favor of St. Martin.
The COA reversed and remanded. The ruling is too involved to go into detail here, but the court ruled that Forbes had presented enough evidence that there did exist a genuine issue of material fact so that summary judgment should not have been granted. Some of the findings of the COA:
- St. Martin made over $100,000 in “cash advances” to the Forbes, which they spent on a Bahamian vacation, a Caribbean cruise, a car, a cell phone, and “other personal expenses,” in violation of Rule 1.8(e) of the Rules of Professional Coduct;
- Unauthorized practice of law by St. Martin in Mississippi;
- The first contingent-fee contract was made while Forbes was under influence of narcotics;
- The second contract may have been the product of misleading or even fraudulent advice;
- Portions of the contract pertaining to ability to settle without counsel and ability to terminate counsel were in violation of Mississippi’s professional conduct rules.
So St. Martin returns to trial in chancery unless he can convince the MSSC to take the case on cert. That could happen if the MSSC wants to clarify the law in this area. Or, the high court could let the case finish its run through the trial court and then entertain it later. With millions at stake, it’s inconceivable that a later appeal would not result no matter what the ultimate trial outcome.
An interesting aspect of this case is that it is in essence a malpractice claim based on breach of fiduciary duties, which is not the usual and customary avenue that plaintiffs pursue in these cases.
The question at the heart of this appeal is whether an out-of-state lawyer may enter into an agreement with a Mississippi lawyer for joint representation of Mississippi litigants in a way that the out-of-state lawyer may avoid coming within the restrictions of the Mississippi rules of professional conduct and the scrutiny of our courts. The answer of the COA is “no.”
A subsidiary question is raised in Judge Maxwell’s partially concurring opinion, which challenges the majority’s definition of the practice of law. Judge Maxwell would not define it as expansively as did the majority. In my opinion, if the supreme court decides this phase of the case merits a look, this will be the battleground issue.
WICKED MISSISSIPPI TRIVIA REDUX
March 15, 2013 § 5 Comments
Back again for your consternation and obsession: Wicked Mississippi Trivia.
The original Wicked Mississippi Trivia can be found here.
Answers to this quiz in a week or so.
1. McKinley Morganfield and Chester Burnett are two world-renowned Mississippians. What were they famous for, and by what names did we know them?
2. What was the name of US President James K. Polk’s plantation in what is now Grenada County?
3. What and where was the second oldest military academy (after West Point) in the US, and the first educational institution in the Mississippi Territory?
4. What now-nationwide organization was first established in 1909 in Crystal Springs?
5. The first franchised Holiday Inn was located in which Mississippi city?
6. Where does the “Southern cross the ‘Dog?” and what does that phrase mean?
7. Casey Jones, a resident of Jackson, Tennessee, met his famous death in Vaughn, Mississippi. In what Mississippi town did he reside from 1893-1896?
8. The adjoining towns of Pittsburgh and Tullahoma were consolidated on July 4, 1836, to form which Mississippi city?
9. Jesse James robbed a bank in which Mississippi city?
10. A traditional belief of the Choctaw people is that they first appeared on earth when they emerged from a cave near the “Mother Mound” in Mississippi. What is the mound called, and where is it?
11. Avalon, a defunct village in Carroll County, is the home town of which famous Mississipian?
12. When he raided CSA President Jefferson Davis’s Brierfield plantation near Vicksburg, Ulysses Grant stole – or “confiscated” – one of Davis’s horses that the Union commander used through the rest of the Civil War. What did the General name his stolen horse?
13. Name the community founded in the Mississippi Delta in 1887 by descendants of Davis Bend, a utopian slave community established by Joseph Davis, older brother of Jefferson Davis.
14. What was the original name of the site that became Jackson before it was known as LeFleur’s Bluff?
15. Which Laurel native became an internationally acclaimed soprano with the New York Metropolitan Opera?
16. Which of Mississippi’s yacht clubs has the distinction of being only the second to be established in the U.S.?
17. Who is “The Sage of Tippo?”
18. Ronald Reagan launched his 1980 campaign for President as the Republican party nominee at what Mississippi event?
19. On May 26, 1736, a combined force of 1,200 French and Choctaws, under command of Bienville, was defeated by Chickasaw defenders in the Battle of Akia, in what present-day Mississippi county?
20. The fictional Dr. Leonard “Bones” McCoy, chief medical officer of the Starship Enterprise in the original Star Trek series, had a Mississippi connection. What was it?
21. Just before the Civil War, 92.5% of this Mississippi county’s total population were slaves–the highest concentration of slaves in the United States.
22. What is the oldest newspaper published in Mississippi?
23. At 86.5%, this Mississippi county has the highest percentage of African American population of any county in the United States. Which is it?
24. What was the historic, now defunct, road that entered Mississippi from Alabama in what is now Lowndes County, crossed Noxubee, Kemper, Newton, Jasper, Jones, Marion, and Pearl River Counties before crossing into Louisiana at the Pearl River twenty miles west of Poplarville, Mississippi?
25. Name the four official sites of the state capital through its history.
Bonus Question: What was the unusual object that fell from the sky in an 1887 hailstorm in Bovina?
SHAMELESS CLE PLUG
March 14, 2013 § Leave a comment
As I have urged here many times, I encourage you to attend Professor Deborah Bell’s Family Law CLE each and every year. I push this particular seminar because it is by far the best, most complete and most insightful summary and analysis of the preceding year’s case devlopments in Mississippi domestic relations law. You will find yourself referring back to the materials from time to time, and I guarantee you will come away with more than a few nuggets that you will find useful in cases you try.
This year’s dates and locations:
- April 25, Jackson, Mississippi Sports Hall of Fame
- May 3, Oxford, Oxford Conference Center
- May 10, Biloxi, Imperial Palace
You can register online by clicking here.
While you’re at it, you should invest in Prof. Bell’s BELL ON MISSISSIPPI FAMILY LAW, 2d ED., which is the definitive reference work for Mississippi family law practtioners. If you are going up in court against colleagues who use this book and you don’t, you will be at a distinct disadvantage.
Disclaimer: I have no interest, financial or otherwise in the seminar or the book. My only interest is in a better-informed and more skilled bar.
MRCP 59 AND APPEALABILITY IN CHANCERY
March 13, 2013 § 3 Comments
In Forbes v. St. Martin, et al., handed down March 5, 2013, from the COA, the appellants’ first issue on appeal was “Whether the chancellor erred in denying the post-judgment motion of the [appellant] pursuant to MRCP 59.” Judge Griffis, for the majority, said:
¶15. There is actually only one issue in this appeal — whether it was error to grant the summary judgment. A chancellor’s judgment is final and appealable, and there is no requirement that a post-judgment motion be filed to perfect an appeal from chancery court.
¶16. In chancery court, a Rule 59(a) motion may be filed: (i) “for any of the reasons for which rehearings have heretofore been granted in suits in equity in the courts of Mississippi,” or (ii) for a new trial so “the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment.” A Rule 59(e) motion would allow the chancellor to “alter or amend the judgment.”
¶17. Forbes’s brief contends that the chancellor erred in the denial of the motion for reconsideration. “[A] motion to set aside or reconsider an order granting summary judgment will be treated as a motion under Rule 59(e).” Brooks v. Roberts, 882 So. 2d 229, 233 (¶15) (Miss. 2004) (citation omitted). “[T]he movant must show: (i) an intervening change in controlling law, (ii) availability of new evidence not previously available, or (iii) need to correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice.” Id. (citation omitted). A chancellor’s decision to deny a Rule 59 motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Brooks, 882 So. 2d at 233 (¶15). Forbes has offered no argument that the chancellor abused his discretion in the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, we find no error as to the second issue, and we only consider whether it was proper for the chancellor to grant a summary judgment as to all claims. [Emphasis added]
I’ve made the assertion here before that an MRCP 59 motion is not required as a prerequisite to an appeal in a chancery court proceeding where the case was tried to the judge. A case tried to the judge without a jury does not require such a motion. That is the opposite of the rule when a jury has rendered a verdict in circuit and county courts; in those cases a motion for a directed verdict or JNOV under MRCP 50 would be required as a prerequisite to appeal.
The language above is also a good survey of what must be shown to get relief under R59.
WHEN IS THE RETURN DOOR TO THE COURT ROOM LOCKED?
March 12, 2013 § Leave a comment
Some lawyers are confused about when and how a judgment precludes a return trip to court by operation of res judicata. The confusion is somewhat understandable, since in chancery court we often deal with return trips for modifications and contempts. It’s been discussed here before.
There are chancery cases, however, such as divorce judgments as to property and grounds, property disputes, suits for rescission and specific performance, actions to contest wills, and the like where res judicata can operate as a bar — or not.
The COA case of Rodgers v. Moore, et al., decided last November by the COA, is one of those cases. In 2004, the Moores filed suit to remove cloud on title against Mary Rodgers. In 2006, the suit was dismissed by the court without prejudice pursuant to MRCP 41(d) for failure to prosecute. In 2007, the Moores filed yet another suit, and Mary Rodgers, proceeding pro se, answered that the suit should be dismissed as res judicata due to the prior dismissal. There are some other procedural wrinkles in the case that do not directly pertain to my point here.
The chancellor ruled that the 2004-filed proceeding was not res judicata, and Mary appealed.
Judge Roberts, writing for the court that affirmed the chancellor’s ruling, gave us a handy exposition on the principles of res judicata and why they did not bar the 2007 suit:
¶10. Rodgers first asserts that the chancery court erred in finding that the doctrine of res judicata was not triggered in the current case. The doctrine of res judicata requires the presence of four identities before it is applicable, and the absence of any of the identities is “fatal to the defense of res judicata.” Hill v. Carroll Cnty., 17 So. 3d 1081, 1085 (¶10) (Miss. 2009) (citations omitted). The four identities are as follows: “(1) identity of the subject matter of the action; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties to the cause of action; and (4) identity of the quality or character of a person against whom the claim is made.” Id. (citing Harrison v. Chandler-Sampson Insurance, Inc., 891 So. 2d 224, 232 (¶24) (Miss. 2005)). Additionally, a fifth requirement is that there must be a final judgment adjudicated on the merits. See Harrison, 891 So. 2d at 232 (¶22); Beene v. Ferguson Auto., Inc., 37 So. 3d 695, 698 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). If these five things are established, then res judicata bars any claims that were brought in the prior action or could have been brought in the prior action. Hill, 17 So. 3d at 1084-85 (¶¶9-10).
¶11. Rodgers submits that the four identities are present. She also claims that the chancery court’s dismissal of the case filed in 2004 without prejudice was a final judgment on the merits. According to Rodgers, the plaintiffs in the first suit failed to show ownership of the property, thereby failing to establish superior title. We agree with Rodgers’ contention that the first, second, and fourth identities are present; however, we do not find that the third and fifth identities are necessarily present. The first identity is met because the subject matter of both suits was to remove a cloud on the title of a specific piece of land. The second is the identity of a cause of action. This “is found where there is a commonality among the ‘underlying facts and circumstances upon which the present claim is asserted and relief sought.’” Studdard v. Pitts, 72 So. 3d 1160, 1162 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Riley v. Moreland, 537 So. 2d 1348, 1354 (Miss. 1989)). The causes of action in both cases are the same. Fourth is the quality of the persons against whom the claim is made, which are also the same.
¶12. In dispute are the third identity and the fifth requirement. The third identity is whether the parties in both actions are the same or are in privity with the original parties. See Little v. V & G Welding Supply, Inc., 704 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (¶15) (Miss. 1997); Williams v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc., 825 So. 2d 685, 689 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). It is clear that the original parties to the suit are also parties in the second suit. However, the second suit contains several additional parties not in the original suit. What is unclear from the record is whether these additional parties were in privity with the original parties; nonetheless, the determination of this identity is not dispositive, as the fifth requirement is clearly not met.
¶13. The fifth requirement is that there has been a final adjudication on the merits in the original suit. We do not agree with Rodgers’s claim that the chancery court’s dismissal without prejudice of the 2004 case was an adjudication on the merits. In its October 11, 2010 opinion, the chancery court stated that the original case was dismissed “without ruling on any of the issues brought by either party[.]” In Williams, 825 So. 2d at 688 (¶12) (citing Stewart v. Guar. Bank & Trust Co. of Belzoni, 596 So. 2d 870, 872-73 (Miss. 1992)), this Court stated: “A voluntary dismissal taken without prejudice is not an adjudication on the merits and does not operate as res judicata in subsequent suits.” See also Ladnier v. City of Biloxi, 749 So. 2d 139, 156 (¶69) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). The chancery court’s dismissal of the 2004 case without prejudice was not an adjudication on the merits. The dismissal was on the ground that the “pleadings did not establish the [p]laintiffs as the proper parties to the litigation.” No issue involving the ownership of the disputed property was addressed by the chancery court; therefore, the chancery court was correct in finding that res judicata did not bar the second suit.
An MRCP 41(d) dismissal, then, is not a dismissal on the merits, is without prejudice, and will not operate as res judicata, because it is not a final judgment disposing of all claims in the case. Neither is a voluntary dismissal or any dismissal without prejudice. Don’t overlook, though, that a statute of limitations may run in the time that the case lies dismissed.
Modifications and contempts are not barred by res judicata because (1) the court retains jurisdiction to consider modification of certain issues, and to enforce its judgments, and (2) they are not a relitigation of the prior action, and they are based on and limited to matters occurring post the final judgment.
This case does not add anything substantive to my previous post on the subject, other than some additional authority that you can cite as needed, but it does illustrate the character of judgment that is necessary to operate as a bar.
HOW THIS WORKS
March 11, 2013 § 4 Comments
Those of you who receive updates to this blog by email got one from me last week with some Mississippi trivia questions. That was a mistake. It was meant to be published at the end of this week and I apparently hit the wrong button, prematurely publishing it. So it appeared on the web site only briefly before I took it down, but the email went out regardless.
Here’s the way WordPress works: I compose posts at my convenience, on days when trials have been settled, or between conferences with attorneys, or at other slack times, and save them as drafts, or save them with a setting to be published at a later time. For example, I am writing this on Friday, and it is set to be published Monday of next week.
Two lawyers have asked me whether I am up at 6:00, a.m., typing feverishly away in an effort to make a post to my blog. No, that’s not the case. The posts are written in advance and appear when I schedule them to do so. Otherwise there is no possible way I could take care of my trial and other business schedule and this, too.
That’s the way it works here at Chancery12.
ADDICTED TO BRAKE FLUID
March 8, 2013 § Leave a comment
In a gesture to make up for the last miserable helping of puns I dished out to you, I donned a haz-mat suit and dug down to the stratum where the vein of these monstrosities is found, and mined this lode for you …
You still have to supply your own rimshots.
Here they are …
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I stayed up all night to see where the sun went. Then it dawned on me.
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I’m reading a book about anti-gravity. I can’t put it down.
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All the toilets in New York’s police stations have been stolen. Police have nothing to go on.
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I tried to catch some Fog. I mist.
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When chemists die, they barium.
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Jokes about German sausage are the wurst.
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I know a guy who denies he’s addicted to brake fluid. He says he can stop any time.
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How does Moses make his tea? Hebrews it.
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This woman said she recognized me from the vegetarian club, but I’d never
met herbivore.
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I wondered why the baseball was getting bigger. Then it hit me!
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I did a theatrical performance about puns . It was a play on words.
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They told me I had type A blood, but it was a Type-O.
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A dyslexic man walks into a bra and ordered a martini.
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Class trip to the Coca-Cola factory, to be followed by a pop quiz.
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Energizer bunny arrested. Charged with battery.
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I didn’t like my beard at first. Then it grew on me.
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Did you hear about the cross eyed teacher who lost her job because she couldn’t control her pupils?
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When you get a bladder infection, urine trouble.
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What does a clock do when it’s hungry? It goes back four seconds.
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Broken pencils are pointless.
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What do you call a dinosaur with a extensive vocabulary? A thesaurus.
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England has no kidney bank, but it does have a Liverpool.
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I used to be a banker, but then I lost interest.
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I dropped out of communism class because of lousy Marx.
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I got a job at a bakery because I kneaded dough.
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Haunted French pancakes give me the crepes.
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Velcro – what a rip off!
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Cartoonist found dead in home. Details are sketchy.
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Venison for dinner? Oh deer!
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I used to think I was indecisive, but now I’m not so sure.
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Be kind to your dentist. He has fillings, too.
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