Williams v. Williams: Waiving Your Client’s Ability to Tell Their Entire Story

August 13, 2026 § 1 Comment

By: Judge Troy Farrell Odom, Rankin County Chancery Judge, Place 2

On January 27, 2026, the Court of Appeals for the State of Mississippi issued the Williams v. Williams, 428 So. 3d 463 (Miss. Ct. App. 2026) opinion, which contained a curious edict: When the parties agree to divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the court may no longer consider marital fault in property division—and by extension, alimony determinations—when those issues are left to the court’s determination by stipulation.

Scott Williams filed a fault-based divorce complaint against his wife, Lana, in the Chancery Court of Lamar County, Mississippi. Lana counterclaimed for a fault-based divorce. Custody was not at issue, though division of marital property and alimony was. Id. at 467.

The trial court bifurcated the issue of fault from the remaining issues and proceeded to trial. Following Mr. Williams’s case-in-chief on fault, the court granted Lana’s Rule 41(b) motion for involuntary dismissal. The court then reset the trial for Lana’s fault grounds for divorce.

Prior to a final trial on Lana’s fault grounds, the parties agreed to an irreconcilable differences divorce, but left the issue of division of marital property and alimony to the court’s determination. Id. The court signed an agreed order dismissing the fault grounds and proceeded with the remaining issues. Id. at 472.

At the outset of trial, the court made clear that it would not consider fault in dividing the marital property despite fault being a factor for consideration under Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994). Addressing this issue, the appellate court stated: “In this case, the parties had dismissed their fault grounds, making fault irrelevant in the division of property.” Williams, 428 So. 3d at 472.

The trial court analyzed the Ferguson factors, minus fault, and divided the marital property accordingly. Id. at 475. The trial court also denied the request for alimony, finding that the distribution of assets alleviated the need for alimony. Id.

Scott appealed on numerous grounds, but did not appeal the issue of whether the trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence of fault when determining division of marital property. Id. at 476. Instead, Mr. Williams’s appeal focused on the trial court’s denial of a divorce on fault grounds and the ultimate division of marital property. Id.

The opinion is lengthy, but the treatment of whether evidence of marital fault can still be presented at trial on division of marital property and alimony is terse. All the appellate court said is “[i]n this case, the parties had dismissed their fault grounds, making fault irrelevant in the division of property.” Id. at 472.

In Lowrey v. Lowrey, 25 So. 3d 274 (Miss. 2009), the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that “[m]arital misconduct is a viable factor entitled to be given weight by the chancellor when the misconduct places a burden on the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship.” Id. at 285. This consideration falls under the first Ferguson factor: substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property, including contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationships as measured by quality, quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of the marriage. See Williams, 428 So. 3d at 472 n.3.

Likewise, in Gussio v. Gussio, 371 So. 3d 734 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023), the appellate court reminded the trial courts that “the law is settled that a chancellor must consider fault when determining alimony.” Gussio, 371 So. 3d at 750 (quoting Gerty v. Gerty, 265 So. 3d 121, 133 (Miss. 2018)) (emphasis in original).

Prior to the Williams decision, this chancellor understood that the parties could still present evidence of marital fault in relation to property division and alimony despite their agreement to proceed on irreconcilable differences. Fault in relation to the Ferguson factors, division of marital property, and alimony, is arguably separate and distinct from an agreement of the parties to amicably terminate their marital status. In fact, courts should encourage parties to agree to the extent they can, but still allow them the ability to present relevant evidence on the issues on which they cannot agree. However, the unmistakable language of Williams is this: once the parties agree to dismiss fault grounds and proceed on irreconcilable differences, fault becomes irrelevant to property division, and by extension, alimony.

The wily practitioner should be prepared to object to evidence of marital fault once the parties agree to proceed on irreconcilable differences grounds:

“Objection! The parties have moved to dismiss their fault grounds, thus making fault irrelevant to the issue of division of property and alimony. Therefore, marital misconduct is no longer a viable factor entitled to be given weight by this court, per Williams v. Williams. I have a copy of the case for your honor and have highlighted the pertinent language. I also have a copy for your staff attorney.”

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§ One Response to Williams v. Williams: Waiving Your Client’s Ability to Tell Their Entire Story

  • donutimpossiblya709ce4582 says:

    Do you think the court of appeals realized they were upending long-standing law and practice? Can parties stipulate to a no fault divorce AND stipulate that fault may be considered in determining equitable distribution and alimony thus end-running the Williams problem?

    Susan Steffey
    WATKINS & EAGER PLLC
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