Williams v. Williams: Waiving Your Client’s Ability to Tell Their Entire Story
August 13, 2026 § 1 Comment
By: Judge Troy Farrell Odom, Rankin County Chancery Judge, Place 2
On January 27, 2026, the Court of Appeals for the State of Mississippi issued the Williams v. Williams, 428 So. 3d 463 (Miss. Ct. App. 2026) opinion, which contained a curious edict: When the parties agree to divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the court may no longer consider marital fault in property division—and by extension, alimony determinations—when those issues are left to the court’s determination by stipulation.
Scott Williams filed a fault-based divorce complaint against his wife, Lana, in the Chancery Court of Lamar County, Mississippi. Lana counterclaimed for a fault-based divorce. Custody was not at issue, though division of marital property and alimony was. Id. at 467.
The trial court bifurcated the issue of fault from the remaining issues and proceeded to trial. Following Mr. Williams’s case-in-chief on fault, the court granted Lana’s Rule 41(b) motion for involuntary dismissal. The court then reset the trial for Lana’s fault grounds for divorce.
Prior to a final trial on Lana’s fault grounds, the parties agreed to an irreconcilable differences divorce, but left the issue of division of marital property and alimony to the court’s determination. Id. The court signed an agreed order dismissing the fault grounds and proceeded with the remaining issues. Id. at 472.
At the outset of trial, the court made clear that it would not consider fault in dividing the marital property despite fault being a factor for consideration under Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928 (Miss. 1994). Addressing this issue, the appellate court stated: “In this case, the parties had dismissed their fault grounds, making fault irrelevant in the division of property.” Williams, 428 So. 3d at 472.
The trial court analyzed the Ferguson factors, minus fault, and divided the marital property accordingly. Id. at 475. The trial court also denied the request for alimony, finding that the distribution of assets alleviated the need for alimony. Id.
Scott appealed on numerous grounds, but did not appeal the issue of whether the trial court erred by refusing to admit evidence of fault when determining division of marital property. Id. at 476. Instead, Mr. Williams’s appeal focused on the trial court’s denial of a divorce on fault grounds and the ultimate division of marital property. Id.
The opinion is lengthy, but the treatment of whether evidence of marital fault can still be presented at trial on division of marital property and alimony is terse. All the appellate court said is “[i]n this case, the parties had dismissed their fault grounds, making fault irrelevant in the division of property.” Id. at 472.
In Lowrey v. Lowrey, 25 So. 3d 274 (Miss. 2009), the Mississippi Supreme Court stated that “[m]arital misconduct is a viable factor entitled to be given weight by the chancellor when the misconduct places a burden on the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship.” Id. at 285. This consideration falls under the first Ferguson factor: substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property, including contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationships as measured by quality, quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of the marriage. See Williams, 428 So. 3d at 472 n.3.
Likewise, in Gussio v. Gussio, 371 So. 3d 734 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023), the appellate court reminded the trial courts that “the law is settled that a chancellor must consider fault when determining alimony.” Gussio, 371 So. 3d at 750 (quoting Gerty v. Gerty, 265 So. 3d 121, 133 (Miss. 2018)) (emphasis in original).
Prior to the Williams decision, this chancellor understood that the parties could still present evidence of marital fault in relation to property division and alimony despite their agreement to proceed on irreconcilable differences. Fault in relation to the Ferguson factors, division of marital property, and alimony, is arguably separate and distinct from an agreement of the parties to amicably terminate their marital status. In fact, courts should encourage parties to agree to the extent they can, but still allow them the ability to present relevant evidence on the issues on which they cannot agree. However, the unmistakable language of Williams is this: once the parties agree to dismiss fault grounds and proceed on irreconcilable differences, fault becomes irrelevant to property division, and by extension, alimony.
The wily practitioner should be prepared to object to evidence of marital fault once the parties agree to proceed on irreconcilable differences grounds:
“Objection! The parties have moved to dismiss their fault grounds, thus making fault irrelevant to the issue of division of property and alimony. Therefore, marital misconduct is no longer a viable factor entitled to be given weight by this court, per Williams v. Williams. I have a copy of the case for your honor and have highlighted the pertinent language. I also have a copy for your staff attorney.”
MARITAL FAULT AS SOMETHING ELSE
October 8, 2012 § Leave a comment
I’ve talked here before about how lawyers on appeal often argue that the chancellor’s decision should be reversed on the basis that he or she used custody as a sanction for marital misconduct. And there is case law that supports that argument. Brekeen v. Brekeen, 880 So.2d 280, 287 (Miss. 2004); Smullins v. Smullins, 77 So.3d 119, 129 (Miss.App. 2011); Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983).
The thing is that custody may not be used to punish the misconduct, nor may the misconduct be the sole basis, but misconduct may properly be considered as one among the other several applicable Albright factors, and it may be considered as proof of several other factors.
In the case of Collins v. Collins, decided by the COA on October 2, 2012, the chancellor had proof of Kim Collins’ adulterous relationship with a man (Haley) other than her husband, Jarrad. The evidence was that she took trips to rendezvous with the man, leaving her son Conner with someone else, presumably her husband. She spent dozens of hours talking on the phone with her paramour and texting him. Judge Russell’s opinion says:
¶18. It appears from the record that Kim’s adultery was important to show how her behavior with the minor child changed during that period. There was testimony that since her involvement with Haley, Kim appeared to be gone more often and was not around Connor as much as Jarrad. Jarrad’s mother testified that Kim had not been a good mother the last two years because Kim put her relationship with another man before her son.
* * *
¶20. As in Smullins, the chancellor expressed concern over Kim’s involvement with another man because of its impact on her relationship with Connor. Thus, the chancellor’s findings “were not a sanction against an adulterous parent . . . .” Smullins, 77 So. 3d. at 129 (¶46).
When you present your child custody case, don’t put all your eggs in the adultery or other misconduct basket without adding how you want the judge to fit that testimony into the other Albright factors. For instance, when your client testifies about the misconduct, ask why that behavior concerns him or her vis a vis custody, and prepare the witness to address continuity of care, stability, parenting skills, demonstrated willingness and capacity to provide care for the child, physical and mental health, emotional ties, and any other conceivable relevant factors. Only after you have done that should you harp on the moral fitness factor.
in Collins, the chancellor had an ample basis to find that Kim had undercut her own case for custody by choosing to put her relationship with the other man ahead of her attention for her son. When the chancellor put it in those terms, the COA had no way to go but to affirm.
EQUITABLE DIVISION AND MARITAL FAULT
August 24, 2011 § 5 Comments
It is almost a platitude of Mississippi law that, “Courts may divide marital assets between divorcing spouses in a fair and equitable manner — equal division is not required.” Bell, Mississippi Family Law, § 6.01[4].
The sticking point is where to draw the line between “fair and equitable” and “equal.” The appellate decisions come in all sizes, colors and flavors.
Bond v. Bond, decided by the COA August 16, 2011, is the latest iteration on the point. In that case, Jimmie Lee proved that his wife, Donna, had committed adultery during their four-year marriage. The chancellor awarded Jimmie Lee 90% of the equitable division, and gave Donna the remaining 10%. Jimmie Lee appealed, aggrieved that Donna got such a generous share, and charged that the chancellor erred in failing to make sufficient findings of Donna’s adultery.
Judge Maxwell’s opinion sets out the applicable law about as clearly as can be done:
In ordering an equitable distribution of property, chancellors must apply the Ferguson factors, which include:
(1) contribution to the accumulation of property, (2) dissipation of assets, (3) the market or emotional value of assets subject to distribution, (4) the value of assets not subject to distribution, (5) the tax and economic consequences of the distribution, (6) the extent to which property division may eliminate the need for alimony, (7) the financial security needs of the parties, and (8) any other factor that in equity should be considered.
Hults v. Hults, 11 So. 3d 1273, 1281 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 928-29 (Miss. 1994)). Chancellors should also consider each party’s marital fault. Singley v. Singley, 846 So. 2d 1004, 1013-14 (¶26) (Miss. 2002). There is a presumption that “the contributions and efforts of the marital partners, whether economic, domestic or otherwise are of equal value.” Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994). In reviewing a chancellor’s findings, we do not conduct a Ferguson analysis anew. Goellner v. Goellner, 11 So. 3d 1251, 1264 (¶45) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, we examine the chancellor’s judgment and the record to ensure the chancellor applied the correct legal standard and did not commit an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1266 (¶52).
In Carrow v. Carrow, 642 So. 2d 901, 905 (Miss. 1994), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a chancellor erred in finding a wife’s “adulterous conduct precluded her from being entitled to any form of equitable distribution of the property upon divorce.” The Carrow court instructed that chancellors should not view equitable distribution as a means to punish the offending spouse for marital misconduct. See id. at 904 (citing Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So. 2d 850, 863 (Miss. 1994)). Rather, “marital misconduct is a viable factor entitled to be given weight by the chancellor when the misconduct places a burden on the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship.” Id. at 904-05 (citing Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 927).
The court found that the chancellor had, indeed, taken into consideration Donna’s fault when he considered the Ferguson factor dealing with the parties’ relative contributions to the stability and harmony of the marriage. The chancellor had found under that factor that:
“Neither Jimmie nor Donna did all they could to provide stability and harmony to the family. Donna became infatuated with another man and her romantic relationship with this third party caused the dissolution of the marriage.”
So here are a few points to ponder about this decision:
- The rule that equitable division does not require an equal division, but only a fair division, is alive and well.
- A 90-10 split in equitable distribution will be found fair if the judge addresses all of the Ferguson factors and justifies the decision.
- The judge is only required to address all of the Ferguson factors, not to analyze them in excruciating, lengthy detail. In this case, the chancellor’s two-sentence recitation was found adequate to support the award.
This case reminded me of the student who got a 90 on a test and wanted the teacher to re-grade it in hopes of an even better grade. Jimmie Lee’s “grade” stayed the same after the appeal, but it’s somewhat of a head-scratcher why he appealed in the first place, given the pretty clear holding in the Carrow case.
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