Tell us What You’re Really Thinking

April 7, 2020 § Leave a comment

We all know that it’s some times better just to keep your thoughts to yourself. And we all know, too, how difficult that may be.

Imagine then what a mighty struggle it can be for a chancellor to suppress the urge to expound on the folly on parade in her court room. Exasperation can overwhelm the best intentions of self control.

When that intemperate outburst is a statement that varies from the legal standard the court is supposed to apply, is that error?

In a recent COA case, the court held that it did not. In Smith v. Bellville, decided March 24, 2020, Judge Greenlee wrote the majority opinion:

¶14. Tiffany does not dispute that there was a material change in circumstances, but she claims that the chancellor applied an erroneous legal standard in awarding sole physical custody to Nathan. Specifically, Tiffany argues that the chancellor did not make the custody determination based on the child’s best interest but instead on who “lived up to” the initial custody agreement. Tiffany cites to Bell v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841 (Miss. 1990), for the proposition that a custody agreement that requires a parent to live in a certain location is unenforceable. And she argues that the chancellor imputed such a term into the initial custody agreement and punished her for moving by awarding sole physical custody to Nathan.

¶15. A review of the record shows that during the trial the chancellor was reluctant to modify custody. She explained that she had encountered too many parties who agreed to joint custody “just to get what they need[ed,] when they want[ed] it.” The chancellor asked why Nathan and Tiffany initially agreed to joint physical custody, and Tiffany’s attorney responded that there were “a lot of reasons.” However, Nathan’s attorney stated that when the divorce on the grounds of uncondoned adultery was pending, Nathan was “pursuing full custody” of B.B. The chancellor then stated, “I know that when I have a divorce on grounds and the parties come in and they agree and they do it – – and I don’t know why they do it because they feel they might lose or whatever. Then they come back within five years wanting to change it, I have difficulties with that.” The chancellor further stated, “[T]his [c]ourt does not like it when people . . . enter into an agreement to keep one party from getting paramount physical custody . . . without anticipating what your ages are[,] . . . what your jobs are, [and] your abilities to move. And then you come back to me and say, oh, well, I moved and I want to change things.”

¶16. From the bench, the chancellor discussed enforcing the initial custody agreement until B.B. was in the first grade and repeatedly stated that Nathan and Tiffany would have to “figure out how to make [joint custody] work.” [Fn omitted] However, when the chancellor entered her written “Opinion and Final Judgment,” the chancellor found that the move was a material change in circumstances and, after conducting an Albright analysis, found that it would be in B.B.’s best interest to award sole physical custody to Nathan.

¶17. At the hearing on Tiffany’s post-trial motion, the chancellor expressed her belief that joint physical custody “is impossible in today’s society.” Additionally, she stated that joint physical custody was not in a child’s best interest because children become “victims” who “live with the backpack[s] on their back[s].” But the chancellor noted that Nathan and Tiffany initially agreed to joint physical custody and that she would have to determine how to make them “live up to” that agreement. But later, the chancellor stated several times that it was her responsibility to determine the best interest of the child, and she declined to enforce the initial joint physical-custody agreement. Rather, the final judgment, which awarded sole physical custody to Nathan, remained in place.

¶18. Although the chancellor made various remarks throughout the proceedings, the chancellor ultimately concluded that her decision must be based on the best interest of the child and conducted an Albright analysis before finding that it was in B.B.’s best interest to award sole physical custody to Nathan. Accordingly, we conclude that the chancellor did not apply an erroneous legal standard in awarding sole physical custody to Nathan.

I’m with the judge that too often joint custody is an easy way out for the lawyers. They can sell the idea that their client isn’t really “losing” on the custody issue, particularly in fractious cases. The problem comes after the divorce when the already-combatant parties concoct innovative, devilishly clever, and creative way to obstruct, antagonize, and frustrate each other using the child as bait, pawn, and cudgel. After a few years of this mutual agony, with several trips back before the judge for contempts, one party has to make an employment-related move to another state, and then the real fun begins.

Attorney’s Fees in Lieu of Punitive Damages

April 6, 2020 § Leave a comment

Allen Cronier got into a property dispute with two businesses owned by the Rainwater brothers. The dispute spilled into chancery court, and, following a trial, in which the chancellor ruled against him and awarded attorney’s fees, Cronier appealed. The COA affirmed in part, but reversed in Cronier v. ALR Partners L.P., 248 So. 3d 861, 864 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017), cert. denied, 247 So. 3d 1264 (Miss. 2018). The court remanded for a determination by the chancellor whether the award of attorney’s fees against Cronier was in lieu of punitive damages.

Here is a recap of the case from Cronier v. ALR Partners, et al., decided by the COA on March 10, 2020:

¶2. Cronier purchased a parcel of land in Jackson County in July 2012. Id. at 865 (¶¶2-3). [Fn omitted] At the time, Cronier believed that the parcel comprised eighty acres, though he did not have the property surveyed before he purchased the property to verify that understanding. Id. Cronier had the property surveyed later. Id. at (¶3). The survey revealed that the parcel he had purchased was only about seventy acres and that there was a boundary issue with the adjoining property owned by the Rainwaterses. Id. at (¶¶3-5). The survey also indicated that the property corners and boundaries were marked with posts, the remains of old fences, and yellow paint blazes on trees. Id. At a post-survey meeting between Cronier and the Rainwaterses, before Cronier abruptly left, Cronier announced that “he had paid for eighty acres and said, ‘by God I’m going to get eighty acres . . . . I know what I’ve got to do.’” Id. at 866 (¶6). Following this meeting, the Rainwaterses went to inspect the property and found that certain old boundary markers were missing. Id. at (¶7). In March 2013, Cronier informed the Rainwaterses that he had conveyed the disputed property to his minor granddaughter. Id. at (¶8). The Rainwaterses visited the property again and discovered that more boundary markers had been removed or defaced. Id. at (¶9). Cronier later built a fence and gate around the perimeter of the property, including the disputed ten-acre parcel. Id. at (¶11).

¶3. This litigation ensued. Id. at (¶¶10-11). The Rainwaterses asserted claims against Cronier for trespassing, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. Id. In March 2016, the chancellor ruled in favor of the Rainwaterses on their claim of adverse possession of the 9.57 acres at issue, and the court entered a final judgment to this effect in April 2016. Id. at 868 (¶19). On December 12, 2017, we affirmed the court’s judgment regarding adverse possession, but we reversed and remanded in part “for clarification of whether punitive damages were awarded in the form of attorney fees.” Id. at 871-72 (¶39) (citing Pursue Energy Corp. v. Abernathy, 77 So. 3d 1094, 1102 (¶26) (Miss. 2011); AquaCulture Tech. Ltd. v. Holly, 677 So. 2d 171, 184 (Miss. 1996)).

¶4. On January 29, 2018, before the mandate issued from this Court, [Fn omitted] the chancery court entered a final judgment on remand, finding that “Cronier acted with actual malice” and ordering Cronier to “pay the Rainwaters[es’] attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,790.00 in lieu of punitive damages.” Cronier filed a motion to set the judgment aside based on the chancery court’s lack of jurisdiction pending the final disposition of his appeal. On February 14, 2018, the chancery court entered an agreed order setting aside its January 29, 2018 final judgment.

¶5. On October 1, 2018, after the appeal was final, the chancery court entered its final judgment. In it, the chancellor adopted and incorporated the findings contained in the January 29, 2018 final judgment. Specifically, the chancellor found that Cronier had “acted with actual malice, and [Cronier] shall pay the Rainwaters[es’] attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,790.00 in lieu of punitive damages.” Relying on Pursue Energy and Holly, the chancellor clarified that attorney’s fees were awarded in lieu of punitive damages “due to [Cronier’s] actions, which included erecting a fence around the property in clear disregard of the Rainwaters[es’] rights and conveying property to his minor granddaughter when he knew there was a serious claim for the subject property.” Cronier now appeals from this judgment.

In his second appeal, Cronier argued that the chancellor erred in awarding attorney’s fees in lieu of punitive damages, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the judge’s findings. Judge Greenlee wrote for the 9-1 court:

¶7. On appeal, Cronier contends that the chancellor erred in awarding attorney’s fees in lieu of punitive damages. Specifically, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the chancellor’s finding that he acted with “actual malice,” such that the award of attorney’s fees in lieu of punitive damages was improper.

¶8. “Mississippi follows the general rule that, in the absence of a contractual agreement or statutory authority, attorney’s fees may not be awarded except in cases in which punitive damages are proper.” Tunica County v. Town of Tunica, 227 So. 3d 1007, 1027 (¶49) (Miss. 2017) (citing Grisham v. Hinton, 490 So. 2d 1201, 1205-06 (Miss. 1986)). Generally, punitive damages may only be awarded when a plaintiff proves “by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant against whom punitive damages are sought acted with actual malice, gross negligence which evidences a willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others, or committed actual fraud.” Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65(1)(a) (Rev 2014); see also Wise v. Valley Bank, 861 So. 2d 1029, 1034 (¶15) (Miss. 2003) (“[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate a willful or malicious wrong, or the gross, reckless disregard for the rights of others.”). “[A]n actual award of punitive damages is not a prerequisite for an award of attorney’s fees; rather, attorney’s fees are warranted where ‘the awarding of punitive damages would have been justified,’ even if punitive damages are not awarded.” Tunica County, 227 So. 3d at 1029 (¶54) (quoting Holly, 677 So. 2d at 185). Thus, “attorney fees may be awarded instead of punitive damages.” Cronier, 248 So. 3d at 871 (¶39).

¶9. On remand, the chancellor found that Cronier acted with actual malice based on Cronier’s actions, “which included erecting a fence around the property in clear disregard of the Rainwaters[es’] rights and conveying property to his minor granddaughter when he knew there was a serious claim for the subject property.” Cronier responds that attorney’s fees are not proper and that the “conduct or conditions” required to award punitive damages are not present in this case. After reviewing the record, we find no manifest error in the chancellor’s finding of actual malice.

¶10. The record thus supports the chancellor’s finding that Cronier’s conduct justified an award of punitive damages. After Cronier’s surveyor revealed that the property Cronier purchased was only seventy acres, the parties met to discuss the issue. Cronier declared that he had paid for eighty acres and said, “[B]y God I’m going to get eighty acres . . . . I know what I’ve got to do.” Thereafter, the Rainwaterses discovered that boundary markers had been removed or defaced, and Cronier informed the Rainwaterses that he had conveyed the parcel, including the disputed land, to his minor granddaughter. Cronier also proceeded to erect a fence and gates around the property despite the dispute over title. The chancellor’s findings that Cronier acted with “actual malice” and in “clear disregard of the Rainwaters[es’]rights” are thus supported by substantial evidence, and the chancellor did not err in awarding attorney’s fees in lieu of punitive damages.

Two thoughts:

  • I see requests for attorney’s fees in all kinds of suits that aren’t divorce-related or contempts. Seldom does the proof rise to the level spelled out by Judge Greenlee in ¶8. If you are serious about pursuing that claim for fees, you’ve got to put adequate proof in the record. Paragraph 8 tells you what you need to prove.
  • And the moral of this story is: Although it’s true that self-help is always an option, it can cost you.

 

“Quote Unquote”

April 3, 2020 § Leave a comment

“Civilization is a perishable commodity.”  —  Helen MacInnes

“Society is indeed a contract … It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue, and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.”  —  Edmund Burke

“Every generation plants a seed that will not germinate, flower, and fruit until a later generation. What grows from that seed may be a noxious, poisonous weed that kills and destroys. Or it may be a beautiful, fragrant flower that gives pleasure, inspires, and illuminates. Or it may be nourishing fruit that gives and enhances life. It is the responsibility of each generation to decide what kind of seed it will plant and what kind of seed it will allow to be planted.”  — Daedalus

 

Reprise: A Fool Returneth to his Folly

April 1, 2020 § Leave a comment

Reprise is replaying an April Fool post from several years ago:

What Kind of Fool do You Think I am?

April 1, 2015 § 4 Comments

Let us today depart from our customary annual April Fool’s Day practical jokes, and instead focus our attention on that Everyman of the present era – the Fool. This is, after all, his (or her) day.

The information age is a paradisiacal era for Fools, what with social media, faux journalism, opinion outlets, and, yes, I daresay – blogs – that are fabulously fertile ground for Fools to grow and disseminate their fecund Foolishness.

Fools are in the news headlines daily. It’s the heyday of Foolishness and folly.

The birthmark of a Fool is lack of good sense and judgment. It’s a topic we’ve discussed here before.

On this their own special day, then, let’s ponder what wiser men have said of them:

“The trouble ain’t that there is too many Fools, but that the lightning ain’t distributed right”  —  Mark Twain

“A Fool always finds a greater Fool to admire him”  —  Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux

“I have great faith in Fools — self-confidence my friends will call it”  —  Edgar Allen Poe

“A man may be a Fool and not know it, but not if he is married”  —  H.L. Mencken

“A Fool must now and then be right by chance”  —  William Cowper

“A Fool sees not the same tree that a wise man sees”  —  William Blake

“For, as blushing will sometimes make a whore pass for a virtuous woman, so modesty may make a Fool seem a man of sense”  —  Alexander Pope

“A prosperous Fool is a grievous burden”  —  Aeschylus

“Even a Fool, when he holdeth his peace, is counted wise”  —  Proverbs, 17:28.

“The greatest men may ask a Foolish question, now and then”  —  John Wolcot

There is actually a patron saint of Fools. Saint Simeon, the Holy Fool, a sixth-century monk, is revered as the patron saint of “holy fools and puppeteers.” Holy Fools, as I understand it, are those who are “Fools for Christ’s sake” (1 Cor. 4:10), rejecting riches and other worldly things for spiritual pursuits. I am not here to judge, but Simeon’s activities seem to be of the more outré variety: dragging a dead dog through the gate of a city, inciting schoolchildren to call him crazy; pretending to have a limp, and other times jumping around; dragging himself along on his buttocks; tripping people walking by; baying and staring at the new moon; thrashing about; extinguishing lights in church and throwing nuts at women; overturning the tables of pastry chefs; and doing other similar capers that got him insulted, beaten, and abused, all of which he endured with good patience. By today’s foolish standards, those kind of stunts seem more mildly eccentric than foolish, but, hey, I guess that’s what made him a holy Fool as opposed to a wholly Fool.

Oh, and I still don’t understand what puppeteers did to be dragged into this discussion.

While we’re on the subject of saints, I should mention that April 1 is the feast day of St. Hugh of Grenoble, per the Catholic calendar. Although he lived in the eleventh century, he sounds like the kind of guy who faced down some of the same kinds of foolishness that nettle us today. This from a Catholic web site:

Hugh, who served as a bishop in France for 52 years, had his work cut out for him from the start. Corruption seemed to loom in every direction: the buying and selling of Church offices, violations of clerical celibacy, lay control of Church property, religious indifference and/or ignorance. After serving as bishop for two years, he’d had his fill. He tried disappearing to a monastery, but the pope called him back to continue the work of reform.

That just goes to show that, when it comes to Fools and foolishness, the passage of centuries does not appear to have any significantly remedial effect. Jonathan Swift spoke in 1726 of a Fool’s Folly in Gulliver’s Travels:

“He had been eight years upon a project for extracting sunbeams out of cucumbers, which were to be put in phials hermetically sealed, and let out to warm the air in raw, inclement summers.”

Come to think of it, that sounds suspiciously like the prospectus for a 2015 Silicon Valley IPO offering that would likely attract billions from investors.

Which brings to mind the old adage, “A Fool and his money are soon parted.”

Have a happy and prosperous April Fool’s Day.

Modifiability of an Agreed Judgment

March 31, 2020 § Leave a comment

In 2012, Elizabeth Pumroy and her ex-husband, Michael Sisco, presented an agreed judgment to the chancellor. It modified the child support provision of the parties’ divorce judgment and included the following language:

” [the amount] is based upon [Sisco’s] current income … and shall not be modified absent a substantial decrease in [Sisco’s] income through no fault of his own.”

In 2018, DHS sued for downward modification due to emancipation of the oldest of the three children. Pumroy objected on the basis that their 2012 agreement was a binding contract. Following a trial, the chancellor did modify the child support based on a finding that one of the three children was, indeed, emancipated. Elizabeth appealed.

In Pumroy v. Sisco, handed down March 17, 2020, the COA affirmed. Judge Cory Wilson wrote the opinion for a unanimous court:

¶12. Pumroy renews her contention that the parties’ 2012 agreement could not be modified because it was a binding contract. She asserts that under the “clear and unambiguous” terms of the contract, Sisco was obligated to pay $500.00 per week in child support “until such time as the minor children are emancipated by the laws of the state of Mississippi.” Pumroy contends that under the language of the 2012 agreed order, no modification is proper until
all of the children are emancipated, as opposed to when each of the children is emancipated. The chancellor declined to read the prior order this way, stating that the court would not “read anything more into their agreement,” so as “not [to] allow a modification when one of the children has become emancipated.”

¶13. We find no error in the chancellor’s determination that a modification in child support was warranted in this case. “[S]upport obligations most certainly can be modified when there is a finding of a material change in circumstances, which was not foreseeable at the time of the judgment of divorce.” Short v. Short, 131 So. 3d 1149, 1151-52 (¶¶7-8) (Miss. 2014) (finding that language in the parties’ divorce agreement stipulating that father should never pay less than $3,000 per month in child support was modifiable upon showing that a material change in circumstances had occurred); see also Collado v. Collado, 282 So. 3d 1239, 1242 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (stating that court-approved child support agreement is subject to modification when a party seeking modification shows a material change in circumstances). “Our supreme court has also made it clear that ‘a parent is relieved of the
legal duty to support his child once the child is emancipated whether by attaining the age of majority or otherwise.’” Andres v. Andres, 22 So. 3d 314, 317 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Houck v. Houck, 812 So. 2d 1139, 1142 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 93-11-65(8)(a) (Supp. 2008).

¶14. As in Short, we find that the parties’ 2012 agreement, as embodied in the chancery court’s October 3, 2012 order, was indeed modifiable upon a showing that a material change in circumstances had occurred. In 2017, Sisco requested that DHS file a “Petition to Modify Final Judgment,” alleging a material change in circumstances because of the parties’ eldest child’s emancipation. Pumroy did not dispute that their child had been emancipated; instead, she simply contended that the chancery court could not modify the 2012 agreement until all of their children were emancipated. Based on the undisputed fact that the parties’ eldest child was emancipated, the chancellor granted Sisco’s requested modification and held that “the child support obligation of [Sisco] be reduced to the statutory guidelines.” Based upon the record before us, we find that the chancellor was not manifestly wrong in so ordering. We therefore affirm the child support modification.

Thoughtlings:

  • Don’t forget that child support may either be global (one amount for all children) or per-child (a set amount for each child). When the child support is global, whether to decrease child support on emancipation of one child is discretionary with the judge. The chancellor could find that the remaining children still need the same amount and refuse to decrease it.
  • Judgments for child support and alimony are modifiable, period. It matters not whether they were agreed. The chancellor probably wished he had a do-over in approving that 2012 agreed judgment. But sometimes, being human, we need to approve things we’d rather not after the parties have negotiated away a day of trial and everyone wants to go home.

Reprise: Avoiding RFA Catastrophe

March 30, 2020 § Leave a comment

Reprise replays posts from the past that you may find useful today.

The Price of Admission

August 17, 2016 § 1 Comment

Chancery court can be a strange land for strangers who spend most of their time in law courts. There, things tend to be pretty black and white; here, well, not so much. One of the things that circuit lawyers find particularly frustrating is that chancellors sometimes seem to look past the black letter of the rules in some of their rulings.

It can cut both ways, though.

In the recent case of Randallson v. Green, a COA case decided June 21, 2016, Arthur Randallson and his wife, April, argued that the chancellor erred in relying on their deemed answers to requests for admission in determining custody.

The case came before the chancery court on a complaint filed by Randall and Laura Green seeking legal and physical custody of Aeva, the daughter of Arthur and April. The Greens filed requests for discovery which were not answered by the Randallsons until 51 days after they were served on them. The chancellor awarded custody to the Greens, and the Randallsons appealed.

Their first assignment of error was that the chancellor erred in relying on their deemed MRCP 36 admissions (RFA’s) to determine custody. Judge Lee wrote for a unanimous court:

¶19. This Court has strictly enforced the application of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 36 according to its terms. Boyd v. Boyd, 83 So. 3d 409, 416 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). “The rule states that a party has thirty days in which to submit a response to a request for admission, or within forty-five days after service of the summons upon a defendant.” Id. (citing M.R.C.P. 36(a)). “Matters will be deemed admitted after this time period, unless the court allows for either a shorter or longer period of time in which to answer.” Id.

However, the trial court, on motion, has the discretion to “permit withdrawal or amendment [of a matter admitted] when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.”

Id. (quoting M.R.C.P. 36(b)).

¶20. The record is clear that Arthur and April filed untimely responses to Randall and Laura’s requests for admissions. See id. at (¶21). They failed to request a withdrawal or amendment of the admissions prior to trial. See id. Thus, the operation of the rules deems the matters admitted. Id. (citing M.R.C.P. 36(a)). “Matters admitted by default under Rule 36(a) are established unless and until the trial court allows amendment or withdrawal by motion under Rule 36(b).” Id. (quoting DeBlanc v. Stancil, 814 So. 2d 796, 799 (¶17) (Miss. 2002)).

¶21. However, in Gilcrease v. Gilcrease, 918 So. 2d 854 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), we held that “child custody is a judicial determination, and is never to be regarded as a merely evidentiary matter.” Boyd, 83 So. 3d at 417 (¶23). Thus, basing a determination of child custody solely on a Rule 36 admission is improper. Id.

¶22. In her bench ruling, the chancellor considered Arthur and April’s admissions. But then the chancellor stated:

[T]his [c]ourt is a court of equity and the attorneys for the plaintiffs know that. They did not . . . rest their case [after the admissions were deemed admitted and] ask me to find by clear and convincing evidence that the parents [were] unfit . . . . They went on to present evidence to this [c]ourt, which gave the [c]ourt some . . . very real concerns.

After discussing the evidence, the chancellor stated that she “considered the totality of the [r]equest for [a]dmissions, the guardian [a]d litem report, [and] the testimony . . . from all of the witnesses” and found “that the [natural-]parent presumption [had] been overcome.”

¶23. Upon a thorough review of the record, we do not find that the chancellor abused her discretion. See id. at 418 (¶28). It is clear that the admissions were not the sole basis for the custody decision. See id. The chancellor heard all of the testimony at trial and used the GAL’s report as part of her consideration, in addition to the admissions by Arthur and April. See id. Therefore, this issue is without merit.

You can take away at some points:

  • Failure to answer RFA’s can have as significant effect in a chancery court as in a law court.
  • The chancellor in a child custody case may not rely solely on admissions to make its custody decision.
  • The only way a chancellor (or any other judge operating under the MRCP) may relieve your client of the effect of admissions, whether deemed or expressly made, is if you timely file a motion and put on proof that (a) the merits of the case will be served by granting the motion, and (b) there is not prejudice to the other party. Fail to do that, and your client is stuck. Wait until the day of trial, and you probably will fail on (b).
  • Don’t forget that you can move to “withdraw” or amend even when your client wholly failed to respond at all. You just have to go through the motion routine above.
  • But, hey, instead of putting all your chips on a rescue procedure that relies on the possibly sketchy discretion of the judge, why not focus instead on your office procedures? Have a protocol in place that the minute a RFA appears in your email inbox, or is served with process, or is hand-delivered, or arrives in the mail, your staff knows to give it top priority and get it to your immediate attention. Calendar the due date. Make an immediate appointment with the client to come up with responses ASAP. Get the answers filed within a reasonable time.
  • Resist the temptation to answer every question with something like, “Defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief …” unless that really and truly is the case. On a bad day the judge could find that sort of response sanctionable.

Strange Days Indeed

March 27, 2020 § Leave a comment

Nobody told me there’d be days like these
Nobody told me there’d be days like these
Nobody told me there’d be days like these
Strange days indeed
most peculiar
Mama

John Lennon recorded those prescient words in 1980; that’s 40 years ago. But he might as well have written them last week.

Since last week in our little corner of the Milky Way, we have had a chancellor shot and almost killed, we have been besieged by coronavirus with the result that court dockets have been turned topsy-turvy, and an active attorney with numerous cases on the chancery court docket dropped dead Wednesday evening from a heart attack.

Forgive us around here for thinking that there is some vast cosmic conspiracy at work against us in the Spring of the first year of the second decade of the 21st century.

You, of course, have your own travails. You are under the same epidemic cloud that infests us. And, like us, you have your own everyday woes that are simply the stuff of life regardless of epidemics, et al. It’s a wonder we haven’t all gone stark, raving. I don’t know how we endure it.

But we must not only endure, we must prevail, as a famous Mississippian once said.

There are various strategies. Some fall back on faith, others reason. Some dig deeper into work, others curl up into a fetal ball. Some rage, others shrug. Whatever fills your sails, but just keep sailing ahead.

We will get through this, I am sure. When you have survived as long as I have, you see some strange days, indeed, and these are right up there with the strangest I have ever seen. Most peculiar, mama.

 

 

 

R.I.P Attorney Leslie C. Gates

March 26, 2020 § Leave a comment

Attorney Gates of Meridian died unexpectedly last evening, March 25, 2020.

Another HCIT Spousal Domestic Abuse Case

March 25, 2020 § Leave a comment

Yesterday we visited the 2017 amendment to MCA 93-5-1 that added “spousal domestic abuse” as a form of HCIT. In that case the chancellor had denied a divorce, finding that the proof was not sufficient.

In another case dealing with the 2017 amendment, the COA affirmed a chancellor’s finding that the evidence did support award if a divorce to the injured wife. The decision is in the case of Williams v. Williams, decided March 17, 2020. You can read Judge McCarty’s opinion for yourself.

I agree that the chancellor’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. I doubt any chancellor would have found differently. Most importantly, the chancellor specifically found the plaintiff-wife’s evidence credible. Remember, and this is vital, that the statute requires credible evidence. It’s crucial for the chancellor to make a finding of credibility so as to avoid the corroboration requirement. If your chancellor renders an opinion in a case with no corroboration, and has not made such a finding, file a timely R59 motion and ask that she do so.

Pleading the Spousal Domestic Abuse HCIT Ground

March 24, 2020 § Leave a comment

Ever since the legislature amended MCA 93-5-1 in 2017 to add “spousal domestic abuse” as a form of HCIT there has been a lingering question whether one is required to plead the enhanced ground, or whether it is sufficient simply to plead HCIT and nothing more. A recent MSSC decision comes close to answering the question.

Karrah Wangler filed her Complaint for Divorce against her husband Richard on January 3, 2018. On October 16, 2018, the day before trial, she moved the court to amend her complaint to track the 2017 amendment verbatim. The chancellor denied her motion. On appeal, she charged that the chancellor erred in denying her motion.

In Wangler v. Wangler, handed down March 12, 2020, the court affirmed. Justice Griffis wrote the 7-2 majority opinion:

¶6. “[M]otions for leave to amend are left to the sound discretion of the trial court. This Court reviews such determinations under an abuse of discretion standard and unless convinced that the trial judge abused his discretion, we are without authority to reverse.” Church v. Massey, 697 So. 2d 407, 413 (Miss. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McCarty v. Kellum, 667 So. 2d 1277, 1283 (Miss. 1995)).

¶7.

[Mississippi] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 15(a) declares that leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires”; this mandate is to be heeded . . . if the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such
as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of the amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require, be “freely given.”

Webb v. Braswell, 930 So. 2d 387, 393 (Miss. 2006) (quoting Moeller v. Am. Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co., 812 So. 2d 953, 962 (Miss. 2002)).

¶8. Karrah argues that the chancellor should have granted her motion to amend the complaint because under Rule 15(a), “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Miss. R. Civ. P. 15(a). This Court disagrees and finds that the amendment was futile. Alternatively, any error by the chancellor was harmless.

¶9. Mississippi Code Section 93-5-1 (Rev. 2018) provides twelve causes for divorce. Among those causes is habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1. Effective July 1, 2017, the Legislature amended Section 93-5-1 to include “spousal domestic abuse” as a form of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. S.B. 2680, Reg. Sess., 2017 Miss. Laws ch. 427, § 6 (codified as amended at Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-1 (Rev. 2018)).

¶10. Karrah filed her complaint for divorce on January 3, 2018, and alleged that Richard was “guilty of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.” More than nine months later, on October 16, 2018, Karrah moved to amend her complaint to allege spousal domestic abuse, specifically,

that Richard . . . ha[d] engaged in a pattern of behavior against [her] of threats of intimidation, emotional or verbal abuse, forced isolation, and false accusations of marital infidelity, coupled with episodes of abandoning [her] at all times of the day or the night on the sides of public highways and in public places which pattern of behavior rises above the level of unkindness or rudeness or incompatibility or want of affection.

According to Karrah, “[o]ut of an abundance of caution and so as to avoid any ‘surprises’ or misunderstandings, [she] . . . filed her motion to amend to explicitly and almost verbatim track the language of amended section 93-5-1 . . . .” Karrah explained that she moved to amend her complaint in order “to spell out the new . . . standard for habitual cruel and inhuman treatment . . . .”

¶11. But as previously noted, the legislative amendment to Section 93-5-1 was effective July 1, 2017, approximately six months before Karrah and Richard separated and Karrah filed her complaint for divorce. Thus, Karrah had ample time to include in her complaint any
allegation of spousal domestic abuse. Notwithstanding her failure to do so, the 2017 amendment to Section 93-5-1 was still applicable to Karrah’s complaint alleging habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. In other words, because Karrah filed for divorce on the ground
of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment after July 1, 2017, the effective date of the amendment, the amended language of Section 93-5-1 applied to her complaint. Additionally, the record shows that the parties participated in discovery and exchanged documentation
regarding Karrah’s allegations of spousal domestic abuse. Thus, Karrah’s last-minute motion to amend the complaint to “track the language of amended section 93-5-1” and to “spell out” the new standard was futile. Accordingly, the chancellor did not err by denying the motion.

¶12. Alternatively, even if the chancellor’s denial of Karrah’s motion to amend the complaint was erroneous, such error was harmless. The record shows, and Karrah admits, that “Karrah had already spelled out her evidence in her responses to discovery.” Moreover,
the record shows that Karrah testified at trial regarding her allegations of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, including spousal domestic abuse. At the conclusion of Karrah’s case-in-chief, the chancellor granted her motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b). As a result, the chancellor considered all of the testimony and evidence offered by Karrah in support of her claim for divorce on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment, including spousal domestic abuse. Therefore, as acknowledged by Karrah, any error by the chancellor in denying the motion to amend the complaint was harmless.

Random thoughts:

  • One of the key advantages of the 2017 amendment is to do away with the strict corroboration requirement. It replaces corroboration with a determination of credibility by the court. So the concern of practitioners has been over how much is necessary to be pled in order to preserve the no-corroboration advantage.
  • This decision seems to say, without coming right out and saying it, that all you need to do is plead HCIT and the spousal abuse amendment is invoked.
  • As a practice consideration, if I were you, I would plead both HCIT and HCIT/spousal abuse, and I would probably spell out as much of the offensive behavior as applies. Why? Well, it eliminates the argument that the other side was not put on notice, and if you don’t choose to invoke it at trial it is mere surplusage in the pleading.
  • I did rule in the only case that has come before me with this issue that it was adequate to plead HCIT without the other language, but I still think that the better, most airtight way to approach it is to plead in detail.