TAMING THE HYDRA
March 7, 2011 § 2 Comments
Tom Freeland’s NMissCommentor blog yesterday had a post entitled Judge Primeaux and the Hydra, which referenced my THE BEST DEFENSE IS A BOILERPLATE post immediately below. It prompted a flurry of comments about pleading affirmative defenses. The comments are worth reading, but the graphic alone is worth following the link.
Looking at the comments on NMC, the humor fault line appears to run a jagged course with the circuit and federal practitioners on the “not funny” or “I don’t get it” side, and the lawyers with chancery experience on the other, humorous, side. Those with chancery experience recognize that most of those defenses could never have any applicability in a divorce case, no matter what, and raising them is as ludicrous as a defendant raising recrimination or condonation as a defense to an automobile accident complaint, or unclean hands in a slip and fall case. [A side question … if you did raise those classic chancery defenses in a circuit court case, reckon the lawyer on the other side would file for Rule 11 sanctions? My money says he/she would.]
I recognize that we in chancery inhabit a strange and alien world for those who seldom venture here. We deal with matters where the shades of gray have their own shades of gray, and in the absence of juries that are always in danger of being infected by legal poisons, we usually take a somewhat more relaxed approach. That ambiguity unsettles some, I know. [I was at a rules committee meeting last week discussing some chancery matters with another member and I heard a lawyer next to me say to another, “I’m glad I don’t practice in chancery court.”] In circuit court the rules are the rules. Period. In chancery, the rules are the rules until they run up against the best interest of a child or ward. And without juries the rules of evidence can sometimes be like the speed limit in Italy — merely a suggestion.
As for the absurd divorce defenses, we chancery denizens here on the eastern edge of Mississippi civilization have had a good laugh about them over the past few months, and the perpetrators have good-naturedly endured the ribbing about them. No pleadings were ever in danger of being dismissed. I never really put anyone to a hearing for those ridiculous pleadings.
Tame the hydra and she will be your friend.
THE BEST DEFENSE IS A BOILERPLATE
March 4, 2011 § 8 Comments
boil•er•plate. n 3. Inconsequential, formulaic or stereotypical language.
Here is the SECOND DEFENSE from a pleading styled Answer and Defenses to Complaint for Divorce filed last September in my court:
The facts having not been fully developed, the [defendant] would affirmatively plead any and all affirmative defenses as may be applicable in this action: accord and satisfaction; antenuptial knowledge; arbitration and award; assumption of risk, condonation, connivance, contributory negligence, consent, discharge and bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, failure to mitigate damages, fraud, illegality, insufficient process, insufficient service of process, injury by fellow servant, laches, lack of capacity to commit the offense, license, payment, pre-existing injuries or damages, provocation, reconciliation, recrimination, reformation, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.”
Whew. Fortunately, after a spate of such monstrosities having been filed last fall, they dropped off drastically after I threatened to require hearings on all of those defenses before any temporary hearing. After all, don’t we need to know whether the adultery was a result of an injury by a fellow servant before we proceed? Or was the plaintiff contributorily negligent when the defendant slipped off to the Motel 8 in Philadelphia with his paramour? We need to know these things. Or, I guess we need to know them because they were pled.
Some of these defenses, foreign as they are to chancery court, do stir the imagination …
- Accord and satisfaction should be available when the defendant claims that the plaintiff should be happy with her Honda automobile.
- Assumption of risk. If you knew she was crazy when you married her, well …
- Failure of consideration. Most people are pretty inconsiderate of each other in the context of the hostility that leads up to a divorce, but should that be a defense?
- Failure to mitigate damages. My personal favorite. Shifts the whole burden of blame, doesn’t it?
- Laches. So much for the public policy of Mississippi that encourages folks to stay in a marriage as long as possible.
- Lack of capacity to commit the offense. This is actually a viable defense to some marital offenses involving biological functions, but how does it apply in equitable distribution?
- Pre-existing injuries or damages. Another one with some wondrous possibilities. “She hasn’t been harmed by my moving in with my girlfriend and leaving her penniless because she was already broke.”
- Release. As in “Please release me; let me go, I don’t love you any more?” Nah.
- Res Judicata. Don’t laugh. There are possibilities here for folks who have remarried each other after a prior divorce judgment.
- Statute of frauds. Since Mississippi did away with common-law marriages in 1956, this one is a long shot today.
- Statute of limitations. The lawyer who discovers how to make SOL apply in a divorce case will have struck gold.
- Waiver. “But she told me it was okay for me to go out with Doris.”
Maybe you can come up with some imaginative offensive or defensive theories of your own. If they’re as goofy as these, though, you’d probably be better off keeping them to yourself.
“QUOTE UNQUOTE”
March 4, 2011 § Leave a comment
“Those who dance were thought to be quite insane by those who could not hear the music.” — Angela Monet
“Dancing madly backwards
Dancing on a sea
Racing on my memories
I’m glad I set my dreams
Tip toe, tip toe quickly
Forget about your cares
And remember underneath you
Is just a sea of air” — Captain Beyond
“Perhaps sound is only an insanity of silence, a mad gibber of empty space grown fearful of listening to itself and hearing nothing.” — Steven Millhauser
NEW PECKING ORDER AT THE COA
March 3, 2011 § Leave a comment
Chief Justice Waller has appointed Judge L. Joseph Lee as Chief Judge of the COA.
New Presiding Judges are Judge Tyree Irving and Judge Kenny Griffis.
LAYING THE FOUNDATION FOR A BUSINESS RECORD
March 3, 2011 § 1 Comment
Business records play a role in many chancery court matters. Getting them into evidence can sometimes be crucial to your case.
MRE 803(6) allows introduction of business records, and states that they are “not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness.” Before you can get the records into evidence, however, you must lay a foundation that the records come within the rule. The four elements of foundation are:
- The record was made and kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity;
- The record is one that is routinely made and kept in the course of business, in the business’s usual practice;
- The record was made at or near the time of the event that it records; and
- The record was made by a person with knowledge, or from information transmitted by a person with knowledge, and who reported such knowledge in the regular course of business.
The witness who establishes the four elements will be either the record custodian or “other qualified witness,” who may be any person who can testify that the records satisfy the four elements. The witness need not have personal knowledge of the contents, nor is it required that the witness was custodian at the time the record was made. All that is required is that the witness have knowledge of the procedures under which the records were made and maintained. In H & E Equipment v. Floyd, 959 So.2d 578, 581 (Miss. App. 2007), the trial court properly excluded the invoices upon which the plaintiff sought to sue on open account because the custodian failed to explain how the invoices, many of which were reprints, were created, or that the invoices relied on were created at the time the charges were incurred.
Under the rule, the focus is on when the documents were created, their trustworthiness, and whether they were created in the course of regularly conducted business. Ferguson v. Snell, 905 So.2d 516, 519-520 (Miss. 2004). In Bower v. Bower, 758 So.2d 405, 414-415 (Miss. 2000), husband offered the monthly internet bills to prove wife’s internet usage, and the husband’s testimony was the only authenticating testimony offered. The supreme court held that the trial court properly excluded them as not being proven to be business records; if you click through the criteria above, you can see that husband’s testimony did not meet them.
The fact that the records are maintained on a computer or in a data file does not require any additional foundation requirements.
The person who generated the information in the record must have had personal knowledge, but the person who entered or recorded the information need not have personal knowledge. For example, an employee of the business observes a chemical process and records the temperatures, reactions and times involved in hand-written notes, which she then tenders to a stenographer who turns the notes into a typed record that is maintained by a custodian. The employee who observed must have had first-hand knowledge when the notes were made and if called as a witness, but neither the stenographer nor the custodian are under the same requirement simply to authenticate the documents as business records. In Dillon v. Greenbriar Digging Service, 919 So.2d 172, 174 (Miss. App. 2005), it was held that the trial court properly let in an inspection report, even though the inspector/custodian who testified was not the inspector who performed the documented inspection, because he adequately authenticated it as a business record.
If the record includes a statement by a person who is not a part of the business and is under no duty to make the report, and the statement is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it will be treated as hearsay that is inadmissible, unless it can be shown to come within an exception to the hearsay rule. An example: The business’s employee reports the contents of a conversation he had with a customer. If the statement is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted by the customer, it is hearsay and will not be allowed in unless it comes within an exception, such as the customer’s own statement offered against him. In Bingham v. State, 723 So.2d 1189, 1190 (Miss. App. 1998), the court of appeals held that a police officer’s report may be admitted only to prove matters observed by the officer, but not to prove inadmissible matter such as the hearsay statements of persons interviewed by the officer. Copeland v. City of Jackson, 548 So.2d 970, 975 (Miss. 1989). But see, Watson v. State, 521 So.2d 1290, 1294 (Miss. 1990), where the supreme court upheld admission of letters of complaint from customers maintained by a bank on the basis that the documents were made a part of the ban business records.
It sometimes happens that records generated by third parties become part of a business’s records. An expert’s report and recommendations, for instance, may be included in the records of a project. The expert’s testimony would not be required for introduction of the report if: (1) the custodian can establish that the expert’s report was incorporated into records kept in the normal course of business; (2) that the business keeping the record relies on its accuracy in the conduct of its business; and (3) “other circumstances” indicate the trustworthiness of the document. Documents that are prepared for litigation or “litigation inspired” are generally found to lack trustworthiness. Jones v. Hatchett, 504 So.2d 198, 201 (Miss. 1987); See, e.g., Gilbert v. Ireland, 758 So.2d 1050, 1053-1054 (Miss. App. 2000)
When the source of the information is an outsider who is not a member of the business organization, the statement may be admissible if there is proof that there is a regular practice of verification by an employee so that the outsider’s statements are adopted by the business and become its own statements. An example of an admissible outsider record would be an invoice submitted by an outside company that is verified by an employee, matched to a purchase order of the business, and attached to records in the business’s files. An example of an inadmissible outsider statement would be a letter from someone not connected with the business that is merely placed in the files of the business.
Objections that the records include ambiguous or inaccurate statements or that they are incomplete go to the probative weight and not to admissibility.
Proof of matters based on absence of entries in business records and admissibility of public records are subjects of other posts.
MRE 902 addresses self-authentication, which may apply to some business records.
OVERNIGHT GIRLFRIENDS: NOW WELCOME?
March 2, 2011 § 3 Comments
And boyfriends, too, for that matter.
It has long been a widespread practice in chancery court to enjoin the parties from having a girlfriend or boyfriend spend the night when the minor children are present. This language is lifted from a recent judgment in this district:
“The parties are each enjoined from having a person of the opposite sex, to whom the party is not related by blood or marriage, present at any time between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m. when the minor children are present.”
The expected beneficial effect being that the children are not exposed to an inappropriate relationship and modelling of improper behavior. Seems like a worthwhile goal.
I have heard it questioned from time to time whether the court has authority to enter such an injunction in the face of some case law that discourages restrictions on visitation.
The matter may have been resolved in Howell v. Turnage, decided March 1, 2011. In that case, the chancellor had applied the familiar injunction, and the COA reversed his decision. Here’s what the COA said:
“At the close of the modification hearing, the chancellor voiced concern regarding Hannah’s visiting Mitchel’s home when his girlfriend was also spending the night. Consequently, the chancellor restricted Mitchel’s visitation with his teenaged daughter, Hannah. Specifically, the chancellor prohibited overnight visitation with Hannah “in any dwelling where a member of the opposite sex, to whom [Mitchel] is not related is also spending [the] night.”
¶16. The chancellor has broad discretion in determining visitation and imposing restrictions upon it. Dunn v. Dunn, 609 So. 2d 1277, 1286 (Miss. 1992). However, absent a finding of ‘actual danger or other substantial detriment to the children,’ a chancellor may not restrict a non-custodial parent’s visitation. Id. There was absolutely no evidence in the record that overnight visits in the presence of Mitchel’s girlfriend adversely affected Hannah. Therefore,the chancellor abused his discretion in placing a restriction on Mitchel’s visitation.”
Dunn, you may recall, is the case where the chancellor had entered a broad injunction against the husband ever having the minor children in the presence of the woman with whom he admitted having an adulterous affair. The injunction lumped together innocuous conduct such as attending church or a concert, dining out at MacDonald’s, or grocery shopping, with questionable and even outrageous conduct such as kissing, sleeping in the same bedroom, engaging in sex, and walking around the house in negligees. No rational person can question that there is a considerable distinction between the two kinds of conduct.
The Howell v. Turnage case was not remanded for the chancellor to hear whether there might be any such proof. It was rendered outright on the point. So the message we are to draw, apparently, is that the door is closed on such injunctions unless there is proof that the girl/boyfriend’s presence adversely affects the child.
Strictly my own opinion: This kind of living arrangement is probably standard operating procedure in the “sophisticated” big cities like Jackson, but I don’t think this will go over too well with the more respectable folks in New Hebron and Monticello, or in Quitman, Meridian, Zero or Shubuta, for that matter. Folks in these more “backwards” areas think that exposure of children, especially impressionable children in their early teenage years, to that kind of situation is per se harmful to them. And I guess I am old fashioned enough to see their point. I wonder why the COA could not have simply said that such a restriction, minor as it is, is reasonable.
Ironically, if the chancellor is weighing the best interest of the child under the Albright factors, she can consider behavior such as allowing an overnight guest of the opposite sex in the presence of the children as a negative under parenting skills or moral fitness, but when it comes to proscribing such conduct, now we are going to tie the chancellor’s hands? Maybe it’s just me, but that doesn’t make much sense. And it certainly doesn’t seem to put the best interest of the child first.
From a practice standpoint, if you’re pursuing that injunction, don’t just assume some harm to the children. Put on some proof about how it is harmful from a behavioral, moral and any other standpoint. At least that way there will be proof in the record to support a finding, and the appellate court will have to decide whether behavioral or moral harm to a child is something that the public policy of Mississippi wants to guard against or not.
There is nothing in the holding of this case that says that agreed injunctions can’t be enforced. Negotiating such a provision now, however, will likely be more difficult.
FINAL THOUGHTS ON THE JUDICIAL PAY RAISE (UNTIL NEXT YEAR)
March 1, 2011 § 1 Comment
Please pause a minute in your busy day and think back on the legislature’s slapdown of a judicial pay raise last week and its ramifications for your practice of law. Yes, whatever affects the court system directly affects how effectively you can represent your clients and what your future in the legal profession will be. You should be as vitally interested in the judicial system as a doctor is in the viability of the local hospitals and medical support system.
The courts are where you do your work, whether you are a court room lawyer or not. You need judges to get your job done. And you need good judges. Good judges are diligent, know the law and hold you to high standards. Bad judges leave you open to complaints and worse from your clients, neglect their work, and make your job considerably more difficult.
Our courts are the place where people bring their knotty problems — ones they can’t find a way to settle on their own. In chancery court, those problems include those that are at the very heart of the family, that involve inheritance and care for those who can’t take care of themselves, that deal with people’s real property rights, and even that involve dissolution of businesses, among many others. The judicial function is a critically important service provided by the state. It gives people a civilized way to resolve conflicts without bloodshed. Our courts are crucial to commerce.
But when it comes to funding this essential service, Mississippi treats the judicial branch like an afterthought. The judicial branch receives less than one-half of one percent of the entire state budget. That means that the legislative and executive branches feed off of 99.996% of your tax dollars. If it is true that government is a burden on taxpayers, as some maintain, the judicial branch in Mississippi is a featherweight.
When we underfund the judiciary, we aren’t simply starving the judges, we are depriving our citizens of the best value they can enjoy from an independent, competent, dedicated judiciary.
Down below you can read how Mississippi’s judicial pay ranks 51st in a nation of 50 states. How can we be proud of lagging behind places like Arkansas and Alabama, of all places? How can we set our sights so low when we have so much going for us? Is that really what we aspire to — to be the last or worst; to be like an Arkansas or Alabama — or worse?
I’m proud to live in Mississippi. I got my college and law school education here, raised and educated my three children here, go to church here, pay taxes here, and work as hard as I know how to be a good judge here. There is so much to treasure in Mississippi: wonderful people; our musical heritage; hunting, fishing and the outdoors; a small-town sense of community; world-class research facilities; a literary legacy no other state can match; beaches, the Delta, the hills, the Black Belt; and so much more. I could go on and on, but you get the point. How could any true Mississippian stand to be second to anyone else?
A lawyer I know suggested that the legislators voted against the pay raise (some legislators believe it or not voted against any appropriation for the courts) because they were afraid of voter reaction in November. If that’s the case, then why don’t they just pass a bill to tie judicial pay to a percentage of federal judge pay and be done with it? That way, they could absolve themselves of all blame as the pay would set itself in relation to federal pay. And if it is a fear reaction in an election year, what was their rationale in all those non-election years when they said “now is not the time.” I hate to think that there’s really simply a control issue here. I mean, don’t we make our decisions based on what’s best for the citizens we serve? Or are there some other dynamics at work? And should there be?
While you’re taking a few minutes to ponder all of this, I recommend that you check out Philip Thomas’s take on this issue at his Mississippi Litigation Review & Commentary blog.
Another chancellor sent the following thoughts. They’re worth mulling over.
“Facts about the vote of SB 2253 and judicial pay:
11 Republicans voted to pass the bill. 40 Republicans voted against the bill. 2 Republicans were either absent or not voting.
48 Democrats voted to pass the bill. 18 Democrats voted against the bill. 2 Democrats were either absent or not voting. 1 Democrat voted Present.
22 attorneys voted to pass the bill while 3 attorneys voted against the bill.
Under Rep. Blackmon’s amendment, salary increases would have been phased in over a 4 year period. The first increase was scheduled for July 1, 2012, with subsequent increases occurring on July 1, 2013, July 1, 2014, and July 1, 2015.
The salary increases were fully funded by user fees, yet the so-called conservative opposition says “We don’t have the money.”
The last salary increase for state judges, other than justice court judges, took effect January 1, 2004.
It has now been 8 years since the last salary increase, with no relief in sight.
The salary for trial and appellate court judges in Mississippi ranks 51st in a nation with 50 states. Salaries for judges in the District of Columbia exceed those for judges in Mississippi. In addition, judges in the American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are paid more than Mississippi Judges. The only judges paid less than Mississippi judges are the judges of the pie eating contest at your local county fair, if you still have one.
‘These people are the salt of the earth who have dedicated their lives to serve the people of Mississippi,’ said Rep. Bo Eaton, D-Taylorsville. 58 members of the Mississippi House of Representatives were not at all impressed.”
I want to emphasize that no tax dollars were to be used to fund this raise, and even with the proposed raise in court costs, Mississippi’s would still be the lowest court costs of all the southern states. It would have been strictly a user’s fee.
I urge you as a member of the legal profession to give this issue some serious thought. Where do we want our court system to be? Do we really want to be last, or do our citizens deserve better? What can or should you as a lawyer do to help the situation? Do we want the best government we can afford or the cheapest we can get by with?
UNDUE INFLUENCE IN INTER VIVOS GIFTS BETWEEN SPOUSES
February 28, 2011 § 6 Comments
Mansfield and Patricia were married in 1994, when both were in their 40’s. It was the second marriage for each, and they had children by the previous marriages. Patricia suffered health problems during the marriage, and she received a Phen-Phen settlement in 2001.
On March 15, 2002, Patricia executed a will devising her entire estate to her three adult children and her sister. The will included this language: “Mansfield Langston, my husband, has his own estate in his name, therefore no provision for him is made in this will.”
Soon after in 2002, there was a series of transactions between the parties that ultimately resulted in a home being titled in joint ownership between Mansfield and Patricia, with right of survivorship. The home had formerly been in her sole name. There were other related transactions, the most significant of which was that a $200,000 CD was converted to joint tenancy with right of survivorship.
On May 11, 2005, Patricia died of a sudden illness, and Patricia’s estate was opened by her mother. The estate sought to set aside the joint tenancies in the marital home and the certificate of deposit in order to bring those assets into the estate for distribution to the will beneficiaries, who were Patricia’s adult children and Patricia’s sister.
Following the trial, the chancellor found that a confidential relationship existed between Mansfield and Patricia. Therefore, the chancellor ruled that the burden shifted to Mansfield to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the creation of the joint tenancies was not the result of undue influence. The chancellor held that Mansfield did not meet this burden, and both joint tenancies were set aside and brought into Patricia’s estate.
In the case of Estate of Langston, in a well-reasoned, authoritative opinion by Judge Griffis, the COA on March 30, 2010, reversed the chancellor and held that the presumption of undue influence did not apply to inter vivos transactions between husband and wife. The ruling in effect extended the prior rule that the presumption of undue influence did not apply to testamentary dispositions between spouses.
On February 24, 2011, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the COA in the case of Estate of Langston v. Williams in an opinion authored by Justice Dickinson and joined by all but Graves, who has departed for his federal gig in New Orleans, that concludes with this key language:
“A confidential relationship between spouses does not create a presumption that one spouse used undue influence over the other to obtain an inter vivos gift. And one who claims the gift was the product of undue influence bears the burden of proof.”
The burden of proof is by clear and convincing evidence.
The case was remanded to Sunflower County Chancery Court to allow the estate to make a record on the issue, since the chancellor had ruled (properly under the law in effect at the time) that such a presumption did exist, so that the estate was neither required to prove, nor was it given the opportunity to prove, undue influence.
It’s not uncommon for issues like these to surface in second marriages of older couples where there are children by a prior marriage. If you find yourself being presented with undue influence claims in a similar case, I encourage you to read Judge Griffis’s COA opinion. It’s about as good an exposition of all the applicable case law that you will find.
AND THE OSCAR GOES TO …
February 25, 2011 § 8 Comments
Oscar weekend is nigh, which got me thinking about movies depicting lawyers, courts and the law. So I made a list of my own, personal favorites to share with you.
- TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD. (1962) Small-town lawyer Atticus Finch accepts the almost impossible task of representing a black man accused of assaulting a white woman in 1930’s Alabama. The nobility, integrity and perserverance with which he carries out his duty as an officer of the court earn the mythical Finch universal admiration and respect. Gregory Peck is branded in our mind as Finch.
- INHERIT THE WIND. (1960) Remarkable rendering of the infamous Scopes “monkey trial” in Dayton, Tennessee, that pitted Clarence Darrow, (Spencer Tracy) aka Drummond in the movie, against William Jennings Bryan (Frederic March) aka Brady. Tracy and March were phenomenal in their portrayal of the two courtroom warriors. The trial was about the right to teach evolution in the public schools, but the movie was a fairly transparent criticism of and parable about McCarthyism.
- JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG. (1961) The courtroom scenes reverberate with drama in this depiction of the post-World War II trials of Nazi officials in Germany. Perhaps the most compelling acting is that of Maximilian Schell as a German defense attorney who raises some troubling questions about individual responsibility in the milieu of a criminal state. Spencer Tracy portrays an all-too-human American presiding judge who is singlemindedly devoted to the rule of law. Burt Lancaster, James Widmark, Marlene Dietrich, Judy Garland and Montgomery Clift all deliver powerful performances.
- THE VERDICT. (1982) Paul Newman is a boozy, broken-down lawyer on the downside of a mediocre career. He takes on a medical malpractice case hoping for a big payday, but learns as the case develops that he has a chance, perhaps the last in the twilight of his career, to accomplish something really good.
- 12 ANGRY MEN. (1957) The dynamics of jury deliberation in a murder case. Henry Fonda is the holdout who will not vote to convict, and as tension builds, with some jurors only wanting to finish their job and go home, the discussion begins to change minds. Lee J. Cobb plays a juror determined to convince the others to convict.
- MY COUSIN VINNY. (1992) Hilarious depiction of a rural Alabama murder trial that is anything but routine, with Fred Gwynne as the trial judge and Joe Pesci as the improbable, inexperienced lawyer who stays on the wrong side of the judge. Marisa Tomei won an Academy Award for best supporting actress for her role as Pesci’s cute girlfriend who unexpectedly holds the key to the case.
- ANATOMY OF A MURDER. (1959) Jimmy Stewart is a trial lawyer defending a veteran charged with murder, and as the trial unfolds, so does his understanding of his client, the man’s wife, the victim and his family. The trial judge was played, somewhat woodenly, by an actual state trial judge. You may have to suspend your disbelief at some of the court room scenes, but the drama is worth it.
- THE CAINE MUTINY. (1954) It’s a case of the victim becoming the villified in the court martial trial for mutiny aboard the USS Caine. The ship’s captain, Humphrey Bogart, becomes the one on trial for all of his flaws and lapses in judgment at sea. José Ferrar is brilliant as defense lawyer Lieutenant Barney Greenwalt, who ably and zealously defends the mutineers, even though he despises them.
- PHILADELPHIA. (1993) Tom Hanks is a young and upcoming lawyer who finds his career at an end when he is diagnosed with AIDS. One of the first Hollywood films openly on the subjects of HIV and homosexuality. Hanks, as Beckett the lawyer, finds his work being sabotaged by his homophobic colleagues, and his legal career itself placed on trial when charges are brought against him.
- A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS. (1966) Sir Thomas More, Chancellor of England in the reign of Henry VIII, has come to epitomize the lawyer who is faced with having to resolve conflicts between his duty to the law and government, and his duty to faith and his conscience. Paul Scofield gives a powerful performance as the man who would not be swayed by political intrigues and conniving men.
- THE PAPER CHASE. (1973) Once you have recovered from the post-traumatic stress following your law school graduation, you may be able to relax and enjoy this now somewhat dated look at what it is like to suffer through being a student at Harvard Law School.
- A FEW GOOD MEN. (1992) Another court martial film. Prosecutors Tom Cruise and Demi Moore have to conquer a conspiracy of silence and misplaced loyalties to win the conviction of two Marines charged with murdering a fellow Marine. Jack Nicholson is diabolical in his depiction of Colonel Nathan Jessep, who defends the soldiers’ actions.
- AND JUSTICE FOR ALL. (1979) A suicidal trial judge packing a .45, a lawyer who admits — no, insists — during trial that his client is guilty, and the unforgettable line, “You’re out of order! You’re out of order! This whole trial is out of order!” Al Pacino is a trial lawyer amidst a justice system careening crazily out of control.
- A TIME TO KILL. (1996) Violence begets violence in a racially charged Mississippi murder trial. Based on the first novel by John Grisham.
- AMISTAD. (1997) Courtroom drama set in 1839 showing the trial over ownership of a slave vessel that had been commandeered by rebellious slaves. Based on a true story, in which both Martin Van Buren and John Quincy Adams participated. Retired Supreme Court Justice Henry Blackmun played the role of Justice Joseph Story.
- THE MAGNIFICENT YANKEE. (1950) Bio-pic showing the life of Oliver Wendell Holmes from his acceptance of a seat on the U.S. Supreme Court at age 61, through the next 25 years.
- INTOLERABLE CRUELTY. (2003) George Clooney and Catherin Zeta-Jones in a zany Coen Brothers movie about a cagy divorce lawyer who sets and springs traps on opposing parties, only to find himself trapped in one of his own devices. Or is he?
- ERIN BROCKOVICH. (2000) This one is for the paralegals. Julia Roberts plays the indomitable Brockovich, who takes on Pacific Gas & Electric on behalf of an indigent woman who is powerless (no pun intended) against the energy giant. The movie crackles with energy and idealism.
- THE PEOPLE VS. LARRY FLYNT. (1996) It’s hard to find anything to like about Larry Flynt (Woody Harrelson), the publisher of Hustler magazine. Yet his battle to defend his First Amendment rights, all the way to the US Supreme Court, in which he was a victim of a crippling assassination attempt, is a fascinating chapter in American law.
- A CIVIL ACTION. (1998) John Travolta is a lawyer who starts out to clean up a local water supply only to find himself engaged in an epic battle against big business that leaves his legal career and personal life in ruins. He ultimately prevails, but was the cost worth it?
- GHOSTS OF MISSISSIPPI. (1996) Hollywood’s version of the Byron de la Beckwith trial for the murder of Medgar Evers is instructive for its glimpse into Mississippi’s ascent from the abyss of violent racism, even though the film relies on stereotypes and cliches to make its points. It’s interesting to view the film 16 years after the event knowing that the protagonist who brought the assassin to justice, Bobby DeLaughter (Alec Baldwin), would later suffer his own downfall.
- ADAM’S RIB. (1949) Spencer Tracy and Katherine Hepburn in a farcical legal tangle. Tracy is a prosecutor, and Hepburn, his wife, is defending a woman that Tracy is prosecuting. The competitive couple use every ploy possible to prevail in the case, and the manic competition naturally infects their personal lives.
- KRAMER VS. KRAMER. (1979) It would not likely turn out the same way under Mississippi law, but in this story Dustin Hoffman gets custody of his son so that his ex-wife, Meryl Streep, can “find herself.” He later loses custody to her in a court fight based on a finding that she has indeed “found herself.” Great Academy Award-winning acting and a heart-tugging story.
- MICHAEL CLAYTON. (2007) George Clooney is Clayton, a lawyer whose sole job is to clean up messes made by his large firm’s clients and the lawyers themselves. When he gets too close to the truth after one of his law partners is found dead of an apparent suicide, Clayton finds himself in the crosshairs.
- YOUNG MR. LINCOLN. (1939) Lincoln the lawyer, played by Henry Fonda. The court room scenes are supposedly authentic re-enactments of the practice and procedure of the period, although the story itself is apocryphal.
There are some others that could make the list. The court room scenes in A FISH CALLED WANDA are some of the best ever, but the movie is not really about the law and courts. LEGALLY BLONDE has some great chuckles about law school, but it’s more about a young woman’s pursuit of her botfriend. And THE WAR OF THE ROSES is an outrageous tragi-comedy about the atrocities committed against each other by a divorcing husband and wife, but the lawsuit is merely the framework for the conflict.
Any other nominees?
