“Quote Unquote”

January 4, 2019 § Leave a comment

“In spite of despair staring me in the face on the political horizon, I have never lost my peace. In fact, I have found people who envy my peace. That peace, I tell you, comes from prayer; I am not a man of learning, but I humbly claim to be a man of prayer. I am indifferent as to the form. Every one is a law unto himself in that respect. But there are some well-marked roads, and it is safe to walk along the beaten tracks, trod by the ancient teachers. Well, I have given my personal testimony. Let every one try and find that as a result of daily prayer, he adds some thing new to his life, something which nothing can be compared.” – Mahatma Gandhi

“Prayer seems to me a cry of weakness, and an attempt to avoid, by trickery, the rules of the game as laid down. I do not choose to admit weakness. I accept the challenge of responsibility. Life, as it is, does not frighten me, since I have made my peace with the universe as I find it, and bow to its laws. The ever-sleepless sea in its bed, crying out “how long?” to Time; million-formed and never motionless flame; the contemplation of these two aspects alone, affords me sufficient food for ten spans of my expected lifetime. It seems to me that organized creeds are collections of words around a wish. I feel no need for such. However, I would not, by word or deed, attempt to deprive another of the consolation it affords. It is simply not for me. Somebody else may have my rapturous glance at the archangels. The springing of the yellow line of morning out of the misty deep of dawn, is glory enough for me. I know that nothing is destructible; things merely change forms. When the consciousness we know as life ceases, I know that I shall still be part and parcel of the world. I was a part before the sun rolled into shape and burst forth in the glory of change. I was, when the earth was hurled out from its fiery rim. I shall return with the earth to Father Sun, and still exist in substance when the sun has lost its fire, and disintegrated into infinity to perhaps become a part of the whirling rubble of space. Why fear? The stuff of my being is matter, ever changing, ever moving, but never lost; so what need of denominations and creeds to deny myself the comfort of all my fellow men? The wide belt of the universe has no need for finger-rings. I am one with the infinite and need no other assurance.” – Zora Neale Hurston

“Just to be is a blessing. Just to live is holy. And yet being alive is no answer to the problems of living. To be or not to be is not the question. The vital question is: how to be and how not to be? The tendency to forget this vital question is the tragic disease of contemporary man, a disease that may prove fatal, that may end in disaster. To pray is to recollect passionately the perpetual urgency of this vital question.” – Abraham Joshua Heschel

Playing Cat and Mouse Games Can Cost

January 2, 2019 § Leave a comment

Most chancellors get testy when a party plays coy with financial information that is needed to decide a case. It usually happens in discovery where a party with financial assets gets vague with requests for information about account balances and the like. A recent case illustrates how that kind of tactic can cost a party dearly.

Julia and Steven Dauenhauer consented to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences and left it to the chancellor to distribute the marital estate. Julia had some retirement accounts, but in discovery she did not produce statements and at trial she did not list all of them and their values on her 8.05. When the chancellor included them in the marital estate, Julia first filed a motion to “reconsider,” which was treated as a R60 motion because it was filed later than ten days after entry of the judgment. When she proved to be unsuccessful in that endeavor, she appealed claiming the accounts  were separate property.

In the case of Dauenhauer v. Dauenhauer, decided November 13, 2018, the COA affirmed the chancellor’s ruling on the point. Judge Carlton wrote the unanimous opinion:

¶36. Julia next argues that the chancellor erred in classifying the following as marital property: (1) the money she withdrew from her PERS retirement account and (2) the contributions she made to her Empower 401K after the entry of the order for separate maintenance.

¶37. This Court employs a limited standard when reviewing a chancellor’s division and distribution of property in a divorce. Phillips v. Phillips, 904 So. 2d 999, 1001 (¶8) (Miss. 2004). “This Court will not disturb the findings of a chancellor unless the chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Id. Upon review, we examine the chancellor’s application of the Ferguson factors. Id. In so doing, we do not conduct a new Ferguson analysis; rather, we “review[ ] the judgment to ensure that the chancellor followed the appropriate standards and did not abuse his discretion.” Id.

¶38. Furthermore, “the party arguing to classify an asset as nonmarital property has the burden to demonstrate to the court the asset’s nonmarital character.” Wheat v. Wheat, 37 So. 3d 632, 640 (¶26) (Miss. 2010). The supreme court explained that meeting this burden requires going “beyond a mere demonstration that the asset was acquired prior to marriage.” Id. [My emphasis]

¶39. Julia explains that the $56,484.90 “withdrawals from retirement” listed in the Schedule of Marital Assets represents a PERS retirement account in the amount of $46,732.68 and a Great-West Retirement Services account in the amount of $9,752.22. In his judgment, the chancellor included a footnote explaining that the “total of the funds Julia withdrew from her retirement accounts is also a marital asset subject to equitable distribution.” However, Julia argues that she testified at trial that her PERS retirement was “originally acquired when [she] was divorced” from Steven the first time. Julia admitted at trial that contributions to the account had been made during their second marriage, but she now maintains that a portion of the total value of her PERS retirement account should be considered separate property.

¶40. At trial, the record shows that during cross examination, Steven’s attorney questioned Julia about whether she provided a statement showing the value of the PERS account on the date of her 2003 marriage to Steven. Julia responded that she was not requested to produce such a document. Steven’s attorney responded, “Well, ma’am, I definitely requested it in request of production documents, and you didn’t produce them, and I’m going to go through that.” The record shows that on her Rule 8.05 financial declaration, Julia attached a W-2 form indicating the value of the PERS account amounted to $46,732.68 when she cashed it out in 2015.

¶41. Regarding the $17,000 in her Empower 401K account, Julia asserts that the majority of the value of the Empower account constituted separate property. The chancellor’s judgment reflects that he divided the assets in the Empower account equally between the parties. In so doing, the chancellor also provided that “Julia voluntarily contributes approximately twenty percent of her income from West Jefferson [Medical Center] to her 401K retirement account.” Julia asserts that the three trial exhibits, including two of her pay stubs from April 2016, which the chancellor referenced as support for that amount, do not reflect contributions of twenty percent. Rather, Julia argues that her April 2016 pay stubs show that she only contributed fifteen percent of her monthly income to the account. Julia further submits that her contributions made to the account after the order for separate maintenance should be classified as separate property.

¶42. Steven argues, however, that Julia failed to produce a statement for the Empower account, despite being requested to do so in discovery. The trial testimony reflects that Steven’s attorney asked Julia if she had a pension plan. Julia responded, “Yes, I do.” Steven’s attorney asked, “But you didn’t put it on [your Rule 8.05 financial statement]?” Julia answered, “Correct.” Julia testified, however, that she started accumulating funds in
her Empower account in 2014.

¶43. Our review shows that the chancellor set forth the following findings with regard to Julia’s retirement account and Empower account:

Julia voluntarily contributes approximately twenty percent of her income from West Jefferson to her 401K retirement account.

. . . .

Prior to the separation, Julia purchased a home located at 209 Blue Heron Cove, Waveland, MS 39567, as well as a 2015 Mazda. When Julia purchased this home, she used $9,752.22 of her retirement funds from West Jefferson Medical Center to pay off the loan for the Honda Ridgeline. (See Exhibit 14, Page 10). Julia testified that she cashed in additional retirement savings in the amount of $46,732.68 and used these funds to purchase various items and appliances for her new home. (See Exhibit 14, page 8). Through post trial submissions, Julia has detailed how she spent $43,855.23 or this withdrawal.

¶44. The chancellor then performed a Ferguson analysis and found that “no non-marital property” existed. Under the factor of “the income and earning capacity of each party,” the chancellor made the following determination regarding Julia’s retirement accounts:

Both Steven and Julia have advanced degrees and therefore an ability to earn. However, because Steven has stated the desire to return to school to earn a teaching license, and Julia is currently working as a nurse practitioner, Julia’s current earning capacity is much higher than Steven’s. Julia also has the income and funds available to voluntarily contribute twenty percent (20%) of her income from West Jefferson to her retirement. This contribution is significantly more than required, and a much greater than Steven is saving towards his retirement through his PERS account.

¶45. Next, the chancellor set forth a schedule distributing the marital assets. Under Julia’s assets, the chancellor listed the $56,484.90 from the withdrawals from retirement as well as $8,500, which constituted one-half of her Empower account. The chancellor awarded Steven one-half of Julia’s Empower account, amounting to $8,500.

¶46. As stated, Julia bore the “the burden to demonstrate to the court [an] asset’s nonmarital character[,]” which requires going “beyond a mere demonstration that the asset was acquired prior to marriage.” Wheat, 37 So. 3d at 640 (¶26). Julia admitted that she did not produce a statement for her Empower account in discovery, nor did she produce a statement showing the value of the PERS account on the date of her 2003 marriage to Steven. Therefore we cannot say that the chancellor abused his discretion in classifying as marital property the money Julia withdrew from her PERS retirement account and the contributions she made to her Empower 401K after the entry of the order for separate maintenance.

So when you leave it up to the judge to make her best guess about the information you didn’t make clear in the record, you get what you get. If that gap in the record comes about from a cat-and-mouse strategy of non-disclosure, it can bite your client in a most sensitive and painful part of the anatomy.

December 31, 2018 § Leave a comment

State Holiday

Courthouse closed

Next post January 2, 2019

A Fond Farewell

December 28, 2018 § 4 Comments

Today we bid adieu to a host of chancellors who are leaving the bench, most for retirement, some for other careers.

It’s bittersweet to have to say good-bye because I have come to know them all as dedicated, intelligent, honorable, brave, wise, and diligent. Some are studious and serious. Some are carefree and humorous. All are successful.

Those who never go behind the scenes of chancery can not appreciate the relationship between the practitioner and his or her chancellor. Lawyers look to their chancellor for wise counsel, guidance, and a firm hand. They expect the chancellor to hold them to high levels of professionalism. They expect the same when the chancellor is on the bench.

In my 45 years in the law, I have never seen this many judges leave the bench at the same time. We are losing a treasure of wisdom, knowledge, and talent. And so we note our parting with John A. Hatcher, Jr., H. David Clark, II, William H. Singletary, Edward C. Fenwick, Jon Barnwell, Sandy Steckler, Marie Wilson, Jane Weathersby, Johnny L. Williams, M. Ronald Doleac, Jerry G. Mason, Kenneth M. Burns, H. James Davidson, Dorothy W. Colom, Edward E. Patten, Jaye A. Bradley, Michael L. Fondren, V. Glenn Alderson, and John S. Grant.

Best wishes, bon voyage, and good luck.

December 24, 2018 § Leave a comment

State Holiday

Courthouse closed

Next post December 28, 2018

Dispatches from the Farthest Outposts of Civilization

December 21, 2018 § Leave a comment

Sorry, but I couldn’t find any Christmas items. I hope you enjoy these instead …

I hope all of you have a happy, peaceful Christmas.

Judge Griffis Appointed to the MSSC

December 20, 2018 § Leave a comment

Press Release from the office of Governor Bryant:

JACKSON – Gov. Phil Bryant announced today he has appointed Mississippi Court of Appeals Judge Kenny Griffis to the Mississippi Supreme Court. He replaces Chief Justice William L. (Bill) Waller, Jr., of District 1, Position 1, who is retiring Jan. 31, 2019. Griffis’ appointment is effective Feb. 1, 2019.

Mississippi Supreme Court District 1 is comprised of Bolivar, Claiborne, Copiah, Hinds, Holmes, Humphreys, Issaquena, Jefferson, Kemper, Lauderdale, Leake, Madison, Neshoba, Newton, Noxubee, Rankin, Scott, Sharkey, Sunflower, Warren, Washington, and Yazoo counties.

“Judge Griffis has served exceptionally on the Mississippi Court of Appeals, and his wealth of experience on the bench will prove very valuable as he moves into his new role,” Gov. Bryant said. “He has an outstanding legal mind and is highly respected among his peers. I have full faith Judge Griffis will be a real asset to the Mississippi Supreme Court. Additionally, I am thankful for Chief Justice Waller for admirably serving the people of Mississippi for more than 22 years on the state’s highest court, and I wish him well in retirement. The people of Mississippi owe him a debt of gratitude.”

Griffis has served since 2003 on the Court of Appeals for District 3, Position 2. He recently was named Chief Judge of the Court after the retirement of Chief Judge L. Joseph Lee.

“I thank Governor Bryant for this appointment, and I am humbled by his expression of confidence in me,” said Griffis. “It has been an honor and a privilege to serve the people of Mississippi on the Court of Appeals for the last sixteen years. I look forward to the opportunity to serve on the Supreme Court. I am committed to the rule of law, to apply the law fairly and impartially and to uphold the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the state of Mississippi.”

Prior to being elected to the Mississippi Court of Appeals, Griffis was in private law practice at the Griffis Law Firm, PLLC, in Ridgeland, Miss., from 2001-2003. Additionally, he was in private practice from 1995-2000 with Lingle, Griffis & Southern, PLLC, in Jackson, Miss.

Griffis has served as an adjunct professor of law for both the Mississippi College School of Law and the University of Mississippi School of Law. He has also been an adjunct professor and instructor at Belhaven University and Meridian Community College.

He is a member of The Mississippi Bar, the Magnolia Bar Association, the Madison County Bar Association, the Capital Area Bar Association, and the Rankin County Bar Association. Griffis is also a member of the Downtown Jackson Rotary Club and is a Paul Harris Fellow.

He currently serves as a member of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s Committee on Continuing Judicial Education and has also served on the Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, as Chair of the Bench Bar Committee of The Mississippi Bar, and the Committee on Electronic Filing and Case Management Systems.

He earned his Bachelor of Accountancy and Juris Doctorate from the University of Mississippi and was a Certified Public Accountant from 1984 through 2007.

Griffis and his wife, Mary Helen, are the parents of five boys. They live in Ridgeland, Miss., and attend Christ United Methodist Church.

 

Rehearing of Rehearing (aka “Reconsideration of Reconsideration”)

December 19, 2018 § 1 Comment

You only get one shot at a R59 rehearing (aka incorrectly as “reconsideration” among many lawyers and even in many appellate court opinions).

That means that, once the chancellor has ruled on your R59 motion, you can’t file a R59 motion asking for rehearing on that motion.

Here’s how I put it in a previous post:

In the case of Edwards v. Roberts, 771 So.2d 378 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000), the COA held that there is one round of R59 motions, and only one round. You do not get to file for rehearing after the judge has ruled on the motion for rehearing. If that were not so, one could almost permanently toll the time for appeal by filing serial R59 motions after every ruling on previously-filed R59 motions, ad infinitum. There has to be finality of judgments.

And here is how the MSSC put it in the said Edwards v. Roberts:

¶ 20. Nothing in the civil rules authorizes a motion to reconsider the denial of a motion for a JNOV or for a new trial. Motions for JNOV are governed by Rule 50(b) while motions for new trials are controlled by Rule 59. Under these rules, each motion must be filed within ten days of the entry of the judgment. M.R.C.P. 50(b) & 59(b). That initial motion for a JNOV was timely filed eight days after the 1991 judgment. However, the sua sponte “motion” to reconsider the just-entered order occurred over one year after the 1991 judgment. We must decide whether once a motion under Rule 50 is filed by a litigant, then denied by the court, any window of opportunity opens for the trial judge to act on his own initiative to reconsider the denial.

¶ 21. We start with the settled law that after a motion for new trial has been denied, no right exists to file for reconsideration. We find that reasoning equally applicable to motions for JNOV. “When the procedure authorizing a motion for a new trial has been followed and, pursuant to proper notice, the parties have made their representations to the court, and the court has duly considered and made his decision upon that motion, that completes both the duty and the prerogative of the court.” Griffin v. State, 565 So.2d 545, 550 (Miss.1990) (emphasis added). In Griffin, the lower court sustained two criminal defendants’ motion for new trial as to two of the counts, and overruled as to one count. Id. at 545. The defendants fled and were captured several years later. Id. At that time the State moved to set aside the order granting a new trial. Id. The judge sustained the State’s motions because he believed that he had made an error at law in granting a new trial. Id. On appeal, the Supreme Court found that the judge had no authority to revoke his earlier order for a new trial. Id.

¶ 22. The Griffin court relied on other states that had addressed the same question. Among other authorities, the court quoted the California Supreme Court’s holding that, “It has long been the rule that ‘A final order granting or denying [a motion for a new trial], regularly made, exhausts the court’s jurisdiction, and cannot be set aside or modified by the trial court except to correct clerical error or to give relief from inadvertence….’ ” Griffin, 565 So.2d at 549 (citing Wenzoski v. Central Banking Sys., 43 Cal.3d 539, 237 Cal.Rptr. 167, 736 P.2d 753, 754 (1987)). Once a motion for new trial has been ruled upon:

[I]f the party ruled against were permitted to go beyond the rules, make a motion for reconsideration, and persuade the judge to reverse himself, the question arises, why should not the other party who is now ruled against be permitted to make a motion for re-re-consideration, asking the court to again reverse himself? … This reflection brings one to realize what an unsatisfactory situation would exist if a judge could carry in his mind indefinitely a state of uncertainty as to what the final resolution of the matter should be.

Griffin, 565 So.2d at 549–50 (citing Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, 663–64 (1966)).

¶ 23. Though Griffin is a criminal case, the Supreme Court’s principal authorities for holding it improper to move for reconsideration of a motion for new trial were civil cases under versions of Rule 59. The Supreme Court’s conclusion that ruling on one motion for new trial exhausts the power of the court to entertain another such motion, certainly has an impact here. Until a judgment is final, a court has the authority to amend it. Griffin v. Tall Timbers Development, Inc., 681 So.2d 546, 552 (Miss.1996). Conversely, once it is final the authority is lost. The court’s initiating it own reconsideration removes the finality of the judgment after an earlier motion was denied. That creates the same difficulties that were discussed in Griffin v. State. Just as a second motion under Rule 59(a) cannot be brought by a party after an earlier Rule 59(a) motion has been denied, neither can the trial court itself entertain its own reconsideration under Rule 59(d) or Rule 50(b).

¶ 24. This is not to say that the finality of the judgment created by the denial of the first motion for new trial is absolutely unchangeable. Griffin v. State itself says that one last tool remains—correcting clerical error, relieving inadvertence, responding to newly discovered evidence, or otherwise considering the grounds for a Rule 60 motion. Griffin, 565 So.2d at 549. Since the state and federal versions of Rule 60 are similar, we can seek a better understanding of what can be achieved under Rule 60 by examining an explanation of federal caselaw. The Mississippi Supreme Court has said “the federal construction of the counterpart rule will be ‘persuasive of what our construction of our similarly worded rule ought to be.’ ” Bruce v. Bruce, 587 So.2d 898, 903 (Miss.1991) (citation omitted). The following section of an eminent treatise on the federal rules first explains that a denial of a new trial motion cannot be reconsidered, and then suggests what remains:

Term time as both a grant and limitation upon the district court’s power over its final judgments has been eliminated. [Fn omitted] In lieu thereof and in the interest of judgment finality a short time period, that is not subject to enlargement, has been substituted, within which a party may move for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment. When the court has decided such a motion in a way that the finality of the judgment has been restored, then relief, if any, should come by appeal or by a motion under Rule 60(b), which does not affect the finality of the judgment or suspend its operation. It would be destructive of the general aim of the Rules to permit successive attacks upon final judgments on motions to reconsider orders that deny new trial, or that deny or grant an alteration or amendment of the judgment.

6A JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 59.13[1], at 59–278 (2d ed.1993) (emphasis added).

¶ 25. The relevant motion here was not a Rule 50(b) motion for a JNOV, since that motion had already been denied and there cannot be a second such motion. Instead, this was at best a Rule 60 motion initiated by the judge himself soon after he entered the February 24 judgment. There is no counterpart in Rule 60(b) to what is set out in Rule 59(d), namely, that the trial court itself may initiate a motion. In one somewhat distinguishable case, the Supreme Court held that a trial judge could not on his own motion grant relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). State ex rel. Mississippi Bureau of Narcotics v. One Chevrolet Nova Automobile, 573 So.2d 787, 789 (Miss.1990). However, that was a judge’s sua sponte setting aside of a Rule 55 default judgment five years after the default had been granted. Id. at 788–89. The court stated that no motion was made by any party to set aside the five year old default and the judge could not himself do so. Id. at 789.

¶ 26. What we find more in point is the general interpretation of federal Rule 60(b) that “the court has power to act in the interest of justice in an unusual case in which its attention has been directed to the necessity for relief by means other than a motion.” CHARLES ALLAN WRIGHT AND ARTHUR R. MILLER AND MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRAC. & PROC. 226 § 2865 (2d ed.1973). If within three days of the February 24 order the trial judge became aware of something that he thought was cognizable under Rule 60, then the absence of a motion might not by itself bar consideration. Griffin v. State in dicta recognizes the right to correct inadvertent error. Griffin, 565 So.2d at 549.

¶ 27. We now look at what grounds for relief were appropriate. There are two sections to Rule 60 that allow relief from judgment. The first is for clerical mistakes, which may be corrected on the court’s own initiative. M.R.C.P. 60(a). However, this rule “can be utilized only to make the judgment or other document speak the truth; it cannot be used to make it say something other than was originally pronounced.” M.R.C.P. 60(a) cmt. The trial judge cannot on his own initiative change his mind and decide under Rule 60(a) that he should have granted the motion for JNOV instead of denying it. However, the rules seemingly permit a judge to decide that he always meant to sign an order that granted a motion but inadvertently signed a draft order denying it. This is the specific issue of Rule 60(b)(2), which is relief from judgment because of “accident or mistake.” …

¶ 28. Under Rule 60(b), the trial court on perhaps his own motion may decide that the original motion was entered by mistake, fraud of a party, or for other reason justifying relief from judgment. M.R.C.P. 60(b). Had the trial court believed that one of the grounds for Rule 60(b) existed and explained which one it was, then we could evaluate the validity of the exercise of discretion on February 27. Instead, the trial judge has informed us that no proper Rule 60 grounds existed.

¶ 29. Before leaving the procedure that was followed, we consider the propriety of the original trial judge’s addressing in these proceedings what he had done several years earlier. In a collateral attack on a former judgment, voidness is decided solely from what appears on the face of the record. Bolls v. Sharkey, 226 So.2d 372, 376 (Miss.1969). However, in a Rule 60 claim brought before the same court and involving the same parties, evidence beyond the pleadings and order themselves can be utilized. The comment to Rule 60(a) states that evidence outside the record can be considered. M.R.C.P. 60(a) cmt. No such explicit statement appears as to Rule 60(b), but the nature of the claims that can be made would require extraneous evidence. Accident, mistake, or fraud could not be shown except in the most unusual circumstances strictly from the record. In one case evidence was introduced at a Rule 60 hearing that an automatic stay in bankruptcy had been entered before the state court judgment was entered. This made the state court order void. Overbey v. Murray, 569 So.2d 303, 307 (Miss.1990). In another Rule 60 proceeding, evidence was admitted that the named corporate plaintiff did not exist, as it had sued under an incorrect name—“Mississippi Sand & Gravel” instead of the correct “South Mississippi Sand & Gravel.” The Supreme Court declared the earlier order void and set it aside. Southern Trucking Service, Inc. v. Mississippi Sand and Gravel, Inc., 483 So.2d 321, 324 (Miss.1986). See generally, Fred L. Banks, Jr., “Trial and Post Trial Motions,” in 1 JEFFREY L. JACKSON, MISSISSIPPI CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 13:15—13:21 (1999).

¶ 30. Though evidence outside the record is admissible, this still does not mean under Rule 60(b) the judge himself should state what his reason had been for signing an order. Had the original trial judge not been ruling on the motion, the question would even more emphatically arise of whether evidence should be sought from the issuing judge of his reason for entering an order. We defer that issue since we find that even if Judge Hilburn had not been available for an explanation, the outcome would be the same. Since a trial judge does not have the authority to reconsider his denial of a motion for a JNOV, the court’s jurisdiction was exhausted after the February 24 denial. After jurisdiction was exhausted another order appeared. That order should be viewed as were orders under pre-Rules practice that were entered after the term of court. Formerly, once the term of court ended in which the final judgment was entered, a court lost control over its judgment. McNeeley v. Blain, 255 So.2d 923 (Miss.1971). Entering a new order after the expiration of the term was a nullity. McDaniel Bros. Const. Co. v. Jordy, 254 Miss. 839, 851, 183 So.2d 501, 506 (1966). There is no need to reacquaint ourselves with the intricacies of such rules other than to note that ending the power of the trial court to issue orders in a case is not a novel idea. A court does not have jurisdiction to enter orders indefinitely. Once the case is over, as with the end of the term of court in former practice or some other terminal event as under the civil rules, later orders by the court are not presumed valid because jurisdiction facially has been lost. We find that the Supreme Court has addressed this question:

[t]he doctrine, that a judgment however erroneous of a court having jurisdiction may not be collaterally assailed, is only correct when the court proceeds, after acquiring the jurisdiction, according to established rules governing the class to which the case belongs, and does not transcend, in the extent or character of its judgment, the law which is applicable to it.

Jones’ Estate v. Culley, 242 Miss. 822, 831–832, 134 So.2d 723, 726–727 (1961).

¶ 31. Since, the present suit is not a collateral attack but a claim under Rule 60 for relief from the court that issued the order, the right to set aside the order is all the clearer.

¶ 32. In the present case the circuit court initially had jurisdiction, but after entering the denial of the motion for a JNOV, jurisdiction ended. A similar defect in a court’s ruling occurs when a judge improperly alters a criminal sentence after his jurisdiction to do so has ended. See generally, Mississippi Comm’n on Judicial Performance v. Russell, 691 So.2d 929, 937 (Miss.1997).

So, could one get relief from a R59 ruling via R52(b)? Edwards v. Roberts goes on to answer in the negative:

¶ 34. … The dissent implies that the action was under Rule 52(b). That is a Rule for amending findings, not reversing decisions. A decision that “no” should be “yes” was the difference between the February 24 and February 27 orders. Though a Rule 52(b) can be made in tandem with Rule 50 and Rule 59 motions, once those motions are denied Rule 52(b) is not a means to ask for or for a judge to initiate reconsideration. Regardless, to presume that the court was acting under this Rule after its authority had otherwise expired—and of course the trial judge has since stated that he was not—is as speculative as any other possible means to justify the second order. Under the dissent’s analysis, Rule 52(b) becomes the opening for reconsidering a denial of reconsideration that Griffin said was beyond the court’s jurisdiction.

A R59 motion in chancery court is the equivalent of a motion for JNOV in a circuit or county court jury trial. Everything above pertaining to JNOV applies equally to R59 in chancery.

Tried by Consent

December 18, 2018 § Leave a comment

C.V. and Livia Sue Glennis sued their neighbors, Donald and Nerissa Booker for destruction of the Glennis’s shrubs. The chancellor awarded $1,320 in damages, and the Bookers appealed charging that the destruction of the shrubs had not been properly pled, and so was not an issue for trial.

In Booker v. Glennis, handed down October 30, 2018, the COA affirmed the award of damages. Here is how Judge Tindall, writing for a more or less unanimous court, addressed the issue:

¶12. The Bookers argue that the destruction of the shrubs was not an issue properly before the court and therefore was improperly determined.  The Bookers assert that they never consented to trying the claim for damages for the death of the shrubs. The record, however, reveals otherwise. At trial, upon request by the Bookers’ counsel, the chancellor allowed testimony beyond that of the Glennises’ contempt pleadings and treated all pleadings as amended to conform to the evidence tried and “to include the granting of any affirmative relief regarding the two parties . . . so as to minimize the future conflicts between them.” Later in trial, Bookers’ counsel again asked to go further into issues with his examination of Mr. Booker, and the chancellor allowed the expansion because “those issues are before the Court in the complaint and counter-complaint, requesting for affirmative relief filed pro se by the Bookers . . . .”

¶13. Both the Glennises’ counsel and the Bookers’ counsel elicited, on a number of occasions, witness testimony regarding the destruction of the shrubs. Further, during the cross-examination of Mr. Glennis, the chancellor indicated her understanding that “from listening to the testimony and looking at the photograph the shrubs that have been testified [about], [which] were not raised in the pleadings but have been testified [about,] [are being] tried by the consent of the parties . . . .” No party objected to this issue being tried. In fact, at the end of the trial, the Glennises’ counsel moved for their pleadings to be conformed to the proof submitted, and the Bookers’ counsel asserted, “[w]e would make the same motion, Your Honor.” Thereafter, in the subject order of July 5, 2016, the chancellor ordered “all of said pleadings . . . [be treated as] amended to conform to the evidence presented at the conclusion of trial due to multiple issues tried that were not pleaded.”

¶14. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 15(b) permits issues to be tried by express consent of the parties.

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by expressed or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment, but failure to so amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues.

M.R.C.P. 15(b); Weiss v. Weiss, 579 So. 2d 539, 542 (Miss. 1991). As reflected in the record, counsel for both parties put on evidence regarding the shrub destruction, and counsel for both requested and consented to this amendment of the pleadings. Therefore this issue is without merit.

The record was abundantly clear that the lawyers intended, and the judge ruled, that the pleadings were amended to conform to the proof. That’s good lawyering and judging when the record leaves no doubt.

SOL in a Suit to Set Aside a Deed

December 17, 2018 § 1 Comment

Bryant was administrator of Cooley’s estate. She filed suit to remove cloud from title and to set aside a deed signed by Cooley, alleging undue influence, lack of capacity, and fraud. She also claimed the deed was void due to the fact that Cooley’s wife had failed to execute it.

A chancellor dismissed Bryant’s suit, finding it barred by the the three-year general SOL (statute of limitations). The judge found that Bryant had not maintained a possessory interest in the property, and so the three-year statute applied. Bryant appealed.

The COA, in Bryant v. Dent, et al., decided September 18, 2018, reversed and remanded, holding that the ten-year statute applied. Judge Lee wrote for a unanimous court:

¶11. Actions to recover land are subject to the ten-year statute of limitations found in Mississippi Code sections 15-1-7 and 15-1-9. In relevant part, section 15-1-7 provides:

A person may not make an entry or commence an action to recover land except within ten years next after the time at which the right to make the entry or to bring the action shall have first accrued to some person through whom he claims, or, if the right shall not have accrued to any person through whom he claims, then except within ten years next after the time at which the right to make the entry or bring the action shall have first accrued to the person making or bringing the same.

Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-7 (Rev. 2012). Similarly, section 15-1-9 provides:

A person claiming land in equity may not bring suit to recover the same except within the period during which, by virtue of Section 15-1-7, he might have made an entry or brought an action to recover the same, if he had been entitled at law to such an estate, interest, or right in or to the same as he shall claim therein in equity.

Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-9 (Rev. 2012). “A suit to remove a cloud on title is considered an action to recover land.” Lott v. Saulters, 133 So. 3d 794, 799 (¶8) (Miss. 2014).

¶12. We find the chancellor’s reliance upon O’Neal Steel Inc v. Millette, 797 So. 2d 869 (Miss. 2001), is misplaced. There, O’Neal sought to enforce a judgment lien, not title or possession of the property at issue. Id. at 874 (¶15). The supreme court stated that a “judgment lien does not create in O’Neal a possessory interest in the real property,” and “absent any possessory interest in the subject property, O’Neal cannot claim that this
litigation is an action to recover land.” Id. at 873 (¶¶12,13).

¶13. Here, Bryant, as administrator for Cooley’s estate and individually as a possible heir of Cooley, seeks possession of the real property deeded away by Cooley, allegedly due to undue influence. In a similar situation, the supreme court held that the ten-year statute of limitations applied. See In re Estate of Reid, 825 So. 2d 1, 6 (¶¶16-19) (Miss. 2002). There, the decedent’s potential heir alleged undue influence in an attempt to set aside the decedent’s transfers of real property to her adopted son. Id.

¶14. Because the ten-year statute of limitations applies, Bryant’s suit is not barred. Thus, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The court affirmed the chancellor’s dismissal of Bryant’s fraud claim, agreeing with the chancellor that that the pleading did not meet the requirements of MRCP 9(b).

The court also noted that, due to the remand, Bryant could pursue the claim of failure to join Cooley’s wife on in the transaction on remand if she chose to do so.