January 16, 2018 § 2 Comments
In the spirit of the new year, which is always a good time to reassess and reevaluate, I offer you MCA § 73-3-37, with which I am sure you are familiar, but perhaps would like to read anew:
It is the duty of attorneys:
(1) To support the constitution and laws of this state and of the United States;
(2) To maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers;
(3) To employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to them, such means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead by any artifice or false statement of the law;
(4) To maintain inviolate the confidence and, at every peril to themselves, to preserve the secrets of their clients;
(5) To abstain from all offensive personalities, and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which they are charged;
(6) To encourage neither the commencement nor continuance of an action or proceeding from any motives of passion or personal interest;
(7) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to themselves, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed.
January 15, 2018 § Leave a comment
January 12, 2018 § Leave a comment
January 10, 2018 § 21 Comments
Back in November I reported that the BCPB had come in second overall in the Expert Institute’s Best Legal Blogs contest. As I posted here on November 8, that is quite an achievement thanks to all of you.
I reckoned that that was the end of that, but I was wrong.
During the holidays a package arrived in the mail from the Expert Institute. Inside was an attractive box adorned with a blue ribbon.
Inside was this letter …
As promised also enclosed was an iPad, new and unopened, sealed in its own packaging. Wow. Something I never expected. Oh, and add in two pens, a journal, and a t-shirt.
So, once again, thanks to all of you who voted. You brought the blog this recognition and earned me this prize. And to whomever made the nomination and started this process, thank you.
It’s heartening to know I have a loyal readership. I hope each of you gets a sound return on the investment of time you make reading here. Thanks again.
January 9, 2018 § Leave a comment
The Joneses filed suit against the Pruitts claiming that they had acquired title to two parcels of the Pruitt’s land. They claimed adverse possession as to one part, and a prescriptive easement as to another.
The chancellor ruled in favor of the Pruitts, and the Joneses appealed.
in Estate of Jones, et al. v. Pruitt, decided September 26, 2017, the COA affirmed. For purposes of this post, we will focus on the permissive nature of the use. Judge Irving wrote for a more-or-less unanimous court (two judges “concur in part and in result without separate written opinion”):
¶13. The Joneses argue that the chancery court erred in denying their claims for adverse possession or a prescriptive easement with respect to the 455-foot roadway, and for adverse possession with respect to the deer-camp structure. Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-13(1) (Rev. 2012) provides:
Ten (10) years’ actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land, uninterruptedly continued for ten (10) years by occupancy, descent, conveyance, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title . . . .
“The standard and burden of proof to establish a prescriptive easement is the same as a claim for adverse possession of land.” Morris v. W.R. Fairchild Constr. Co., 792 So. 2d 282, 284 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted). In either claim, the following elements must be proven: that use of the property is “(1) under a claim of ownership; (2) actual or hostile; (3) open, notorious and visible; (4) continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten years; (5) exclusive; and (6) peaceful.” Webb v. Drewrey, 4 So. 3d 1078, 1082 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). “The person claiming the possession has the burden of proving each of these elements by clear and convincing evidence.” Biddix v. McConnell, 911 So. 2d 468, 475 (¶18) (Miss. 2005) (citation omitted).
¶14. First, the Joneses maintain that the chancery court erred in finding that their use of the 455-foot roadway was permissive—and therefore insufficient to satisfy the hostility requirement of adverse possession or a prescriptive easement—on the basis that the Pruitts had given them verbal permission to use the roadway. In support of their argument, the Joneses cite this Court’s decision in Delancey v. Mallette, 912 So. 2d 483, 489 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), in which we held that “[w]hen a use of the lands of another for roadway purposes has been open, visible, continuous and unmolested since some point in time anterior to the aged inhabitants of the community, such use will be presumed to have originated adversely.” (Quotations omitted). Further, the Joneses argue that “[r]equiring a litigant who is attempting to establish adverse possession or a prescriptive easement to prove that there was no permission for use would be unreasonable. The law typically frowns upon requiring a party to prove a negative averment.” Morris, 792 So. 2d at 284 (¶9).
¶15. In response, the Pruitts contend that one of the most basic principles in establishing adverse possession or a prescriptive easement is that the use must be hostile, and that “permissive use by the possessor of the property in question defeats the claim of adverse possession.” Ellison v. Meek, 820 So. 2d 730, 735 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted). In support of their argument, the Pruitts cite the testimony at trial that the Pruitts and Joneses had a friendly relationship up until this dispute. The Pruitts further argue that the fact that Sidney kept the gate locked is consistent with Bocee’s testimony at trial that she allowed him to cross into her land as long as he watched out for her property. Additionally, the Pruitts argue that the fact that Sidney never gave Bocee a key is irrelevant, as Sidney, himself, admitted that the Pruitts did not need a key to access the Joneses’ property.
¶16. This Court held in Cleveland v. Killen, 966 So. 2d 848, 851 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007):
As a general rule, permissive possession of lands, even if long continued, does not confer title in the person in permissive possession until a positive assertion of a right hostile to the owner has been made known to him. If there was never a request or a grant of permission to use the land, however, the use would not be permissive, but would be adverse. It is a fact question for a chancellor to determine whether a use is prescriptive or permissive.
(Internal citations and quotations omitted). Furthermore, we reiterated:
Use of property by permission does not evolve into a hostile or adverse use until the permission ends. The time period for obtaining adverse possession or a prescriptive easement, when express or implied permission is previously given, does not begin to run until some form of objection to the use is made by the landowner.
Id. at 852 (¶15).
¶17. Chancellor Harvey-Goree, in her order, found that “all the testimony revealed that the use [of the roadway] was peaceable and permissive.” Chancellor Clark made similar findings in his order on the Joneses’ motion for reconsideration or for a new trial, and affirmed Chancellor Harvey-Goree’s holding with respect to the roadway. We affirm. The record is void of any evidence suggesting that the Joneses’ use of the roadway was anything but peaceful. Furthermore, Irozenell even testified at trial that she never sought to bar the Joneses from using the roadway; rather, she merely sought to have them remove their lock from the gate on the roadway. As such, the Joneses have failed to establish that their use of the roadway was hostile, and their claim for adverse possession or a prescriptive easement thereto is unsuccessful.
That language in the statute, ” … in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued … ,” simply does not embrace occupancy that was commenced or continued by permission because it is not hostile or adverse.
Here the Pruitts gave the Joneses permission to be on the property. The same result would obtain if the occupancy were commenced pursuant to a lease. Both Judge Mason and I have had adverse possession cases involving leases.
Another important point to leave with is that the elements of adverse possession must all be proven by clear and convincing evidence in order to establish a prescriptive easement.
January 8, 2018 § 2 Comments
Section 9(A) of the MEC administrative procedures imposes a duty to protect sensitive information of parties and children in filings with the court. Social Security numbers, names of minor children, dates of birth, and financial account numbers are prohibited and must be redacted. Attorneys are directed to use caution with personal identifying numbers (e.g., driver’s license numbers), medical records, employment history, individual financial information, and proprietary or trade-secret information.
There are exceptions, however, set out in Section 9(B). It states:
The redaction requirement shall not apply to the following:
- The record of an administrative or agency proceeding.
- The record of a court or tribunal, if that record was not subject to the redaction requirement when originally filed. See Section 5(D) for a listing of restricted access cases.
- Documents filed under seal.
- Documents filed as Restricted Access if the private information is necessary and relevant to the case. See Section 5(D) for listing of restricted access cases.
Section 5(D) designates certain cases as “Restricted Access” (RA), meaning that persons other than the attorneys of record and clerks will only be able to view remotely the case’s docket page; as with other unsealed cases, the public may view documents on file in RA cases at the terminal in the clerk’s office.
Cases designated as RA include:
Debt Collection; Garnishment; Replevin; Child Custody/Visitation; Child Support; Divorce, both fault and irreconcilable differences; Modification; Paternity; Termination of Parental Rights; Birth Certificate Correction; Conservatorship; Guardianship; Minor’s Settlement; Protection from Domestic Abuse Law.
Note that adoption is not listed. That’s because adoptions are under seal, and so are exempted under 9(B)(3), above.
Also not listed are estates. That means that the redaction requirements do, indeed, apply to them.
Even if your case is not designated in the rule as an RA case, you may still move the court to restrict a document or the entire case for good cause, per Section 5(D)(3).
Just because your case falls in an RA category does not mean that can or should ignore your client’s right to privacy. Social Security numbers, financial account numbers, passwords, and personal identifying numbers should always be scrubbed from documents filed with the court, exchanged in discovery, and introduced into evidence, unless your client has specifically authorized you to release that specific information.
And remember that MRCP 5.1 extends the MEC privacy rules to districts using non-MEC electronic filing.
January 5, 2018 § Leave a comment
“The core and the surface
Are essentially the same
Words making them seem different
Only to express appearance.
If name be needed, wonder names them both:
From wonder into wonder existence opens.” — Laozi
“Wonder is the beginning of wisdom.” — Socrates
“Philosophy is the product of wonder.” — Alfred North Whitehead
January 3, 2018 § 1 Comment
The qualifying period for judicial elections is now open, and will be until the first Tuesday in May, 2018. General election is in November, 2018.
I am hearing that there will be a significant number of positions that will come open by retirement or resignation. In my local courts, for instance, one chancery position will be open due to Judge Mason’s retirement at the end of the year, as will one circuit position due to Judge Williamson’s retirement. Another circuit court slot is being held by an appointee who must stand for election, as is one county court position. Of course, all trial judges in office stand for election this year and may face opposition.
We are not unique over here in East Mississippi. I understand that there will be openings and contested elections across the state. In one district, the 14th, all three chancellors are stepping aside (unless there is a change of heart).
There is a saying: “May you live in interesting times.” It’s a pleasant-sounding but ironic statement actually intended to be a curse, the subtlety being that interesting times are often dangerous, fraught with uncertainty, and full of often unpleasant surprises.
2018 will be an interesting time for Mississippi’s judiciary.
December 22, 2017 § Leave a comment
Next post January 3, 2018
December 20, 2017 § 4 Comments
The Night Before Christmas
Whereas, on or about the night prior to Christmas, there did occur at a certain improved piece of real property (hereinafter “the House”) a general lack of stirring by all creatures therein, including, but not limited to a mouse.
A variety of foot apparel, e.g. stocking, socks, etc., had been affixed by and around the chimney in said House in the hope and/or belief that St. Nick a/k/a/ St. Nicholas a/k/a/ Santa Claus (hereinafter “Claus”) would arrive at sometime thereafter.
The minor residents, i.e. the children, of the aforementioned House, were located in their individual beds and were engaged in nocturnal hallucinations, i.e. dreams, wherein vision of confectionery treats, including, but not limited to, candies, nuts and/or sugar plums, did dance, cavort and otherwise appear in said dreams.
Whereupon the party of the first part (sometimes hereinafter referred to as “I”), being the joint-owner in fee simple of the House with the party of the
second part (hereinafter “Mamma”), and said Mamma had retired for a sustained period of sleep. (At such time, the parties were clad in various forms of headgear, e.g. kerchief and cap.)
Suddenly, and without prior notice or warning, there did occur upon the unimproved real property adjacent and appurtenant to said House, i.e. the lawn, a certain disruption of unknown nature, cause and/or circumstance. The party of the first part did immediately rush to a window in the House to investigate the cause of such disturbance.
At that time, the party of the first part did observe, with some degree of wonder and/or disbelief, a miniature sleigh (hereinafter the “Vehicle”) being
pulled and/or drawn very rapidly through the air by approximately eight (8) reindeer. The driver of the Vehicle appeared to be and in fact was, the
previously referenced Claus.
Said Claus was providing specific direction, instruction and guidance to the approximately eight (8) reindeer and specifically identified the animal co-conspirators by name, to-wit: Dasher, Dancer, Prancer, Vixen, Comet, Cupid, Donder and Blitzen (hereinafter the “Deer”). (Upon information and belief, it is further asserted that an additional co-conspirator named Rudolph may have been involved.)
The party of the first part witnessed Claus, the Vehicle and the Deer intentionally and willfully trespass upon the roofs of several residences located adjacent to and in the vicinity of the House, and noted that the Vehicle was heavily laden with packages, toys and other items of unknown origin or
nature. Suddenly, without prior invitation or permission, either express or implied, the Vehicle arrived at the House, and Claus entered said House via the chimney.
Said Claus was clad in a red fur suit, which was partially covered with residue from the chimney, and he carried a large sack containing a portion of the aforementioned packages, toys, and other unknown items. He was smoking what appeared to be tobacco in a small pipe in blatant violation of local ordinances and health regulations.
Claus did not speak, but immediately began to fill the stocking of the minor children, which hung adjacent to the chimney, with toys and other small gifts. (Said items did not, however, constitute “gifts” to said minor pursuant to the applicable provisions of the U.S. Tax Code.) Upon completion of such task, Claus touched the side of his nose and flew, rose and/or ascended up the chimney of the House to the roof where the Vehicle and Deer waited and/or served as “lookouts.” Claus immediately departed for an unknown destination.
However, prior to the departure of the Vehicle, Deer and Claus from said House, the party of the first part did hear Claus state and/or exclaim: “Merry
Christmas to all and to all a good night!” Or words to that effect.