A Law Library in Your Pocket
October 10, 2013 § 1 Comment
MC Law scores again in the “Useful Things for the Practice of Law Department.” This time, it’s an almost-app you can add to your home screen on your mobile phone, tablet, or even your laptop.
I say “almost-app” because it’s really a link to a web site you access via your mobile, but the text is maximized for mobile use.
The link is http://law.mc.edu/mlr/. Enter it in your browser and follow the instructions to add an app-like link to your home screen.
Here’s what you will find in this mini-library:
- MRCP
- MRE
- MRAP
- Rules of Professional Conduct
- MCA 1972
- MSSC Opinions
- MCA Opinions
- All Court Rules
- Constitutions of 1890, 1868, 1832, and 1817.
- MC Law Library Online Catalog
- Judicial Data Project
- Legislative History Project
It also includes the federal rules and even has access to PACER.
MC Law continues to lead the way in innovations that are not only useful and helpful for pratitioners, but also in a readily-accessible form. Almost everyone carries a cell phone around, even to court. When the judge says, “If you would read Rule 81, you would know what I am talking about …” you can whip out your cell phone, tap a couple of screens, and scroll to the very subsection in question.
And when you’re sitting in the back of the courtroom for a couple of hours waiting to present your case, it’s comforting to know that you can spend that time reading (or re-reading) the Constitution of 1817.
We’ve talked here before about MC’s ingenious Judicial Data Project. It’s a treasure trove of appellate information, including a database of briefs, videos of oral arguments, decisions, and more.
The Legislative History Project is a video archive of legislative debate over individual bills and select resolutions as they actually took place on the floor of the Mississippi House of Representatives and Mississippi Senate. Searchable by bill number, bill author, and bill description. The site says, “Provided with each video clip is a summary of legislative action taken that day. The project also links to the Mississippi Legislature Web page where more information may be obtained regarding the individual bills and their principal author.”
A Curveball for Minor’s Settlements
October 9, 2013 § 5 Comments
For those of you who handle minor’s settlements, here is what should be a familiar scenario:
Minor’s arm broken in a car wreck. Insurance company is to pay policy limits of $25,000. Medical bills to the local hospital in amount of $17,500 are to be paid from the proceeds. Minor is to receive balance of $7,500.
Not much to it, right?
Well, there just might be quite a lot to think about after you read Memorial Hospital at Gulfport vs. Guardianship of Proulx, decided by the MSSC on September 12, 2013.
In that case, the minor was injured in a car wreck and the parents were appointed his guardians. They petitioned the court to approve a policy-limits settlement of $50,000. They also petitioned the court to disapprove claims against the proceeds asserted by several medical providers, including Memorial, that totalled more than $80,000. Memorial’s claims alone were $71,000. The chancellor disapproved the claims, and Memorial appealed.
Justice Chandler wrote for a unanimous court, beginning in ¶ 7:
… Memorial has no lien against the funds. Unlike some other states, Mississippi has no statutory hospital lien, nor has this Court recognized a common-law lien under these facts. Indeed, Memorial does not argue that it has a lien, or does it assert a right to recovery through a contract or under an implied-contract theory. It does not assert that it is the beneficiary of an assignment of the settlement proceeds. Memorial cited no authority for its argument at the hearing that it has a right to a pro rata share of the settlement proceeds.
¶8. Memorial’s position in this case is comparable to that of the hospitals that sought payment of medical bills in McCoy v. Preferred Risk Ins. Co., 471 So. 2d 396 (Miss. 1985), and Methodist Hospital of Memphis v. Guardianship of Marsh, 518 So. 2d 1227 (Miss. 1988). In McCoy, a minor, David James McCoy, was hospitalized after a car accident, and his parents executed an assignment of all liability insurance benefits in favor of the hospital. Id. at 397. Later, the parents disputed the validity of the assignment, and the insurer interpleaded the benefits, which consisted of $20,000 in uninsured-motorist liability benefits and $4,000 in medical benefits. Id. The Court held that the parents had lacked authority to assign the uninsured-motorist benefits due to David. Id. at 397-98. However, because the medical-expense benefits under the policy authorized Preferred to pay all reasonable medical expenses to the entity rendering medical services, the Court permitted the hospital’s recovery of the $4,000 in medical benefits. Id. at 397.
¶9. In Methodist, another minor, Stephen B. Marsh, was injured in a car accident. Methodist, 518 So. 2d at 1228. At the hospital, his mother signed a document entitled “Hospital Lien” in which she agreed to pay Stephen’s medical expenses from any insurance settlement or judgment she recovered. Id. The insurer settled for the policy limits of $25,000 in liability coverage and $2,000 in medical-payments coverage, and the hospital claimed a lien on those funds. Id. This Court rejected the claimed lien on the liability coverage because the mother had no legal authority to execute any document binding Stephen’s estate without prior chancery court approval. Id. (citing McCoy, 471 So. 2d at 396). The Court remanded for a determination of whether the hospital was a direct beneficiary under the medicalpayments coverage and “due these benefits irrespective of any lien or assignment.” Methodist, 518 So. 2d at 1228.
¶10. In McCoy and Methodist, once the assignment or lien was found to be invalid, the hospitals had no further rights against the liability insurance proceeds due the minor, and the claims were denied. McCoy, 471 So. 2d at 399; Methodist, 518 So. 2d at 1228. Memorial does not claim that it has a right to recovery under a lien, an assignment, or a contractual theory. Memorial’s sole argument supporting its claim of a right to the settlement proceeds is that it has a legal duty to seek recovery from any legally liable third party prior to billing Medicaid. This argument does not avail Memorial. The third-party insurers were not legally liable to pay Memorial for the medical bills. McCoy, 471 So. 2d at 397-98; Methodist, 518 So. 2d at 1228. The third-party coverage at issue here was general liability coverage, not medical-pay coverage that reimburses the hospital for medical bills. See McCoy, 471 So. 2d at 397; Methodist, 518 So. 2d at 1228. Memorial does not dispute this basic fact. Because no law entitled Memorial to payment from the settlement proceeds, we affirm the chancery court’s dismissal of Memorial’s claim.
If your minor’s settlements don’t look like what happened in Proulx, you might read it carefully several times and start trying to figure out whether you need to do anything differently.
There are lots of ramifications flowing from this opinion. A few you might want to consider:
- Shouldn’t you open a guardianship and publish notice to creditors before presenting the final settlement proposal to the chancellor? I sent some lawyers back to the drawing board several weeks ago to do that very thing in a case remarkably close to what happened in Proulx. Why? Well, it just didn’t seem right to me that the parents could negotiate away their children’s money like that.
- If you represent the insurance company in a case where the settlement amount is under the statutory amount required to present to a chancellor, how are you going to advise the parents about all of this when (a) you don’t represent them, and (b) you have an insurmountable conflict of interest that precludes you from advising them?
- Why should children be required to pay their own medical bills? And if they should not, don’t the parents have a built-in conflict of interest in serviing as guardians, since they will likely be held responsible via guaranty?
- Would Memorial have been successful in its argument if the third-party coverage in this case was med-pay (¶ 10)?
You need to read this case and be ready to discuss it with the next chancellor you go before on a minor’s settlement. That chancellor will likely be ready to discuss it, too.
Maxims: To Protect Property Rights
October 8, 2013 § Leave a comment
From the earliest days of equity, property disputes were matters for chancery. The concept of property, however, is much broader than the dirt upon which we stand and live.
Judge Griffith explains:
Property and property rights only are within the domain of equitable interference, there being included however not only all those interests in real and personal property which are, or can be, the subject of individual ownership, but also those other interests of quasi-ownership which are the equitable equivalents of property in some form, such, for instance, as the right to labor and engage in a lawful business, the right to health and reputation, the right to the physical senses of sight, hearing and the like, which will make labor, business or property profitable or enjoyable; the right to free speech, free movement and thr right to all the civil privileges which make all those other rights real and preserve them unimpaired — all these are not only in a party’s own right but in behalf as well of all those of his family who are legally dependent upon him. Griffith, § 44, pp. 47-48.
He distinguishes the mentioned matters from “Questions of partisan politics, religious or fraternal controversies, crimes and the like, except when property is directly involved …” as issues that are reserved for jury courts.
The common thread running through the list of equitable matters is that to effect a remedy in each the court must take coercive measures or look past the parties’ current situation and legal forms, and put the parties in a proper relationship to one another. Money damages alone will not cure the problems arising in those matters.
Maxims: If You Seek Equity, You Must Do Equity
October 7, 2013 § 1 Comment
“He who seeks equity must do equity.”
Judge Griffith characterizes this maxim as “one of the oldest of equity principles.” He says (paragraphing added):
… the court in extending its aid will require as a condition thereof that the complaining party shall accord and render to the adversary party all the equitable rights to which the latter is entitled in respect directly to the subject matter of that suit, and this is true even as to many of those things which the defendant could not compel by an independent suit.
It is through the peration of this maxim that tender or the equitable equivalent thereof is required; the restoring of benefits received and the placing of the opposite party in statu quo, and the like; and that without the necessity of cross demand [note: counterclaim in modern parlance], the decree [read judgment] may often be so drawn and rendered that each party may be given, in respect to the identical transaction, what in equity and in good conscience he ought to have and in the approximate manner in which he ought to have it — settling the whole matter by making any decree at all in complainant’s [read plaintiff’s] behalf conditional upon the allowance of the cognate rights of the defendant: provided, these latter rights are so intimately connected with the transaction as to be equitably inseparable therefrom, and provided that no express principle of the law stands in the way. Griffith, §43, pp. 45-46.
When a litigant invokes jurisdiction of the chancery court, that litigant is thereby bound by all equitable principles. Hooks v. Burns, 168 Miss. 723, 152 So. 469 (1934). It applies only to one seeking affirmative relief. Burton v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 171 Miss. 596, 625, 158 So. 474 (1935). It protects the substantive rights of a defendant, and may not be extended to impose moral duties. Gaston v. King, 63 Miss. 326, 332 (1885).
I used to tell clients that we wanted to be the ones “wearing the white hats” in court. In part that was a nod to the wisdom behind this maxim. And, it was a recognition of the fact that the judge is always ready to aid the one in the right, and to set right the one in the wrong.
Declaratory Judgment vs. Injunction
October 3, 2013 § Leave a comment
Samuel Bray, an assistant professor at UCLA School of Law, sent me a link to an article, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, that he has authored on the distinction and relationship between declaratory judgment and injunction. It’s a topic you might find helpful (a) when making strategic decisions about litigation, and (b) if you have to prepare a trial memo or appellate brief on the subject.
Here’s an abstract of the article:
Maxims: Clean Hands
October 2, 2013 § Leave a comment
“He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.”
This maxim is the source of the so-called “Clean Hands” doctrine that every chancery practitioner has encountered at one time or another.
Judge Griffith’s description is apt today. Here’s what the judge said (paragraphs added):
” … [N]o person as a complaining party can have the aid of a court of equity when his conduct with respect to the transaction in question has been characterized by wilful inequity, or illegality.
“It does not exclude a party because in some other matter his conduct may have been reprehensible; it refers only to the subject matter of the particular suit in hand.
“The wrongful conduct which will bar the complainant need not be so gross as to be a crime punishable as such, nor so positive as within itself to form the basis of a legal action. It may be described as such wilful misconduct, inequity or fraud with respect to the immediate transaction as would be condemned and pronounced wrongful by homest and fair-minded men.” Griffith § 42, p. 44.
As Judge Griffith goes on to say, the doctrine of clean hands is purely defensive in nature, and can not be used by a party to acquire rights to which he or she would otherwise not be entitled. It is not required that it be pled, and the court may apply it, even on its own motion, at any time that it becomes evident in the course of litigation that it has come into play.
The doctrine acts as a form of estoppel. A former wife was estopped from obtaining a judgemnt of contempt against her ex-husband when it was established that she had failed to comply with the judgment herself. Brennan v. Brennan, 605 So.2d 749, 752 (Miss. 1992). See also, Banks v. Banks, 648 So.2d 1116, 1126 (Miss. 1994).
Laches
October 1, 2013 § Leave a comment
We discussed yesterday the maxim that “Equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.” Equity will not act where one party gains an advantage by delaying taking action.
The maxim is embodied in the equity doctrine of laches. Although it resembles the effect of statutes of limitation, laches is not based on, limited to, or bound by any statute of limitations. Judge Griffith explained it this way (broken into paragraphs):
“It is a rule peculiar to and inherent in courts of equity; and it applies where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the applicant has by his conduct done that which might be fairly regarded as a waiver of his remedy, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were to be afterward asserted.
“A long or protracted delay in the prosecution of rights is presumed to have produced the situation last mentioned and equity looks with so little favor upon such prosecutions that it will not entertain them, although no express statute of limitations is available, — unless facts are shown which will rebut the preseumption of injustice arising out of the apparently undue delay, or which will excuse the same.” Griffith, § 33, pp. 35-36.
Laches is independent of any statute, and gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of unfairness. It is within the discretion of the chancellor. Griffith, § 33, p. 36, fn. 24a.
Maxims: Aiding the Vigilant
September 30, 2013 § Leave a comment
“Equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.”
Judge Griffith puts this about as well as it can be said (I’ve broken it down into separate paragraphs):
“Those diligent find equity always ready to extend just aid, but the slothful are not favored.
“There is no principle of equity sounder or more conservative of peace and of fair play than this, which requires a party who has a claim to prefer or a right to assert to do so with a conscientious promptness while the witnesses to the transaction are yet available and before the facts have faded from their memories.
“It is a fact of universal experience that men will generally use diligence to get what rightfully belongs to them, and will unreasonably delay only as to false or ineuqitable claims, — thus in the hope that fortuitous circumstances may improve their otherwise doubtful chances.
“If therefore a party delay the bringing of a suit, or delay the taking of some particular step therein, to such an unreasonable time that to allow him so late to proceed would work an injustice and injury upon the opposite party, it will require a much stronger case to move the court to action than if the matter had been seasonably presented; and if on account of the delay a serious injustice would result to the opposite party the court may decline to proceed at all.
“The maxim does not apply however to those under disability such as infants, nor can it be invoked by one who has lulled his adversary into repose by deceit, false promises, concealment and the like.” Griffith, § 41, p. 43.
Equity, then, treats rights that are not asserted within a reasonable time as having been abandoned, or as surrendered to the other party. Magee v. Catching, 4 George 672, 1857 WL 2672, (Miss. Err. App. 1857). [Note: Magee is still good law, despite its antiquity, and despite the fact that it involved a mortgage secured by slaves.]
Equity is all about fairness. Equity looks askance at a complaining party who delays taking action to gain an advantage because of the inherent unfairness of the situation.
This maxim is the basis for the doctrine of laches, which we will address tomorrow.




