Rules of Reformation

March 15, 2016 § Leave a comment

A 1979 deed included the language that “Grantee herein retains all mineral rights on said land and property.”

After Michael and Amy Ward had entered into a gas, oil, and mineral lease in 2007, they discovered to their chagrin that the royalties they had contracted for were not being paid to them, but rather to Carolyn Harrell, a successor in title to the grantor of the 1979 deed. The Wards were successors in title to the grantees.

The Wards filed suit to quiet and confirm and remove cloud from title, and to recover the payments made to Harrell. Harrell counterclaimed to remove cloud, and to cancel the Wards’ mineral lease.

At trial, the Wards argued that the 1979 deed must be construed according to its plain meaning. Harrell countered that the 1979 deed should be reformed to state that Grantor retains, due to mutual mistake and scrivener’s error. The chancellor applied the three-tiered rules of contract construction of an ambiguous instrument set out in Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So.2d 349, 352-53 (Miss. 1990). The Wards appealed.

In Ward v. Harrell, handed down February 23, 2016, the COA affirmed the chancellor, holding that, although the trial court applied the wrong legal standard, it reached the correct result. Judge Lee writing for the court, distinguished between contract construction and reformation:

¶13. In reforming the 1979 warranty deed, it appears that the chancellor relied solely on Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 349 (Miss. 1990). In that case, our supreme court set out a three-tiered approach for construing and interpreting written instruments when an ambiguity exists. [Fn 5] Id. at 351-53.

[Fn 5] (1) The court is to look solely to the language contained within the “four corners” of the instrument; (2) if the language within the instrument’s “four corners” is ambiguous, the court applies the relevant canons of construction in a discretionary manner; and (3) if the intent of the parties is still unknown, the court looks to extrinsic evidence. Pursue Energy Corp. v. Perkins, 558 So. 2d 349, 352-53 (Miss. 1990).

¶14. However, contract construction, or interpretation, is distinguishable from contract reformation. Essentially, reformation is a remedy—the changing of words—to a contract- formation defense. In contrast, rules of construction, or interpretation, do not change the actual words of the contract but determine the meaning of those words.

¶15. Although an ambiguous deed may be reformed, [Fn 6] when a deed is unambiguous, “the party asserting reformation must prove (1) a mistake on the part of both parties; or (2) a mistake on the part of one party with fraud or inequitable conduct on the part of the other party; or (3) an error on the part of the scrivener.” In re Estate of Summerlin, 989 So. 2d 466, 480 (¶47) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Bacot v. Duby, 724 So. 2d 410, 417 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998)). “Moreover, the mistake must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

[Fn 6] Estate of DeLoach v. DeLoach, 873 So. 2d 146, 150 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2004).

¶16. Here, we do not find the language at issue in the 1979 warranty deed to be ambiguous. See Cypress Springs LLC v. Charles Donald Pulpwood Inc., 161 So. 3d 1100, 1104 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (finding an instrument is ambiguous if one or more terms or provisions are susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning). Therefore, the chancellor’s reliance on the standard set forth in Pursue Energy Corp. was erroneous. See 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 386 (2011) (The “[r]ules of construction may be used only where the language of the contract, or a portion of it, is ambiguous.”).

¶17. As such, we do not give deference to the chancellor’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Brooks [v. Brooks], 652 So. 2d [1113,] at 1118 [(Miss. 1995)]. Instead, we review the record de novo. See id.

The court went on to find that there was a scrivener’s error because only a grantor can make a reservation out of the estate granted (citing Thornhill v. Ford, 213 Miss. 49, 56 So.2d 23,29 (1952), and MCA 27-31-77.

The main things to take away here are that: (1) there are specific rules governing reformation of a deed; and (2) the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt.

 

Redefining Unauthorized Practice

March 14, 2016 § Leave a comment

Up for comment at this link are some new rules proposed to redefine the practice of law in Mississippi vis a vis unauthorized practice and “interloping” by lawyers from other states. Your comments are welcome through March 28, 2016.

One salutary goal is to clarify who may come into Mississippi from other states to handle legal matters here, including litigation, arbitrations, mediations, etc., and the myriad other transactions that have lawyers flitting from state to state, and dipping into our jurisdiction.

An important provision, as I see it, is Section 2(f), which reiterates longstanding Mississippi law that preparation of agreements, contracts, pleadings, deeds, and the like does constitute the practice of law. The obvious reason is that selection of the proper documents, their terms, and when and how to use them require legal judgment and analysis beyond the skill level conferred by Google searches.

We all have seen far too many dreadful computer-generated pleadings and documents that people purchase online from papermills. Likewise, it seems that every county has one or several backwoods, shadowy characters who, for a “modest” fee, will prepare the paperwork parties need to file ID divorces and simple matters. In most cases, the likelihood of damage is small, but there are no ethical bounds on those document-preparers, and there is always the possibility that some legal issue with later, larger ramifications, will go overlooked.

Whether these changes will do the job remains to be seen. It seems to be an elusive problem.

 

Dispatches from the Farthest Outposts of Civilization

March 11, 2016 § Leave a comment

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Some Pending Legislation that Might Affect Your Chancery Practice

March 10, 2016 § 4 Comments

HB 571
*

Firearms; clarify meaning of courthouse and courtroom for purpose of carrying.
03/02 (H) Transmitted To Senate

Gipson

HB 713

Public lands; revise certain provisions on Secretary of State’s duties regarding conveyances of.
02/29 (S) Referred To Public Property;Accountability, Efficiency, Transparency

Monsour

HB 716

Jointly held property; authorize to be sold by broker in a commercially reasonable manner.
02/29 (S) Referred To Judiciary, Division A

Reynolds

HB 767

Trespassers; codify duty of care to.
02/29 (S) Referred To Judiciary, Division A

Hood

HB 786
*

“Mississippi Church Protection Act”; create.
02/19 (H) Transmitted To Senate

Gipson

HB 868

Supreme Court Districts; revise boundaries of.
02/25 (H) Transmitted To Senate

Baker

HB1240

Termination of Parental Rights.
02/29 (S) Referred To Judiciary, Division A

Lamar

HB1261

Title insurance company; authorize to record affidavit to release mortgage that is paid off.
02/29 (S) Referred To Business and Financial Institutions;Judiciary, Division A

Baker

HB1284
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Trooper school; require sex offenders who are required to register to pay registration fees to fund.
03/02 (H) Transmitted To Senate

Monsour

HB1289

Missing children; require law enforcement agencies to establish procedures relating to.
03/03 (H) Passed

Campbell

HB1375

Alcoholics and drug addicts; DMH shall try to arrange for supportive services upon discharge from treatment facility.
03/01 (H) Transmitted To Senate

Barker

HB1410
*

Asset Forfeiture Transparency Act; create.
03/02 (H) Transmitted To Senate

Brown

HB1413
*

Child abuse; provide that a trafficked child is an abused child.
03/03 (H) Transmitted To Senate

Hood

HB1511
*

MS Consumer Alternative Installment Loan Act; create.
03/03 (S) Returned For Enrolling

Zuber

HC 23

Mississippi Access to Justice Commission; recognize service.
02/12 (H) Enrolled Bill Signed

Baria

SB2130

Domestic abuse protection orders; revise appellate procedure.
02/25 (S) Transmitted To House

Wiggins

SB2132
*

Witness Protection Program; create.
03/03 (S) Transmitted To House

Wiggins

SB2138

Child abuse; expand to include a trafficked child.
02/25 (S) Transmitted To House

Wiggins

SB2156

Human trafficking; clarify offenses against children.
02/25 (S) Transmitted To House

Doty

SB2179
*

Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services; establish.
02/26 (S) Transmitted To House

Kirby

SB2211
*

Trust law; make technical corrections.
02/29 (S) Transmitted To House

Doty

SB2287

Missing-child reports; require policy adoption.
02/25 (S) Transmitted To House

Bryan

SB2344
*

Writs of garnishment; limit liability of garnishee if garnishee is a financial institution.
02/29 (S) Motion to Reconsider Entered

Parks

SB2364
*

Juvenile Detention Facilities Licensing Act; create.
02/26 (S) Transmitted To House

Wiggins

SB2418

Divorce; domestic violence as additional ground for.
02/25 (S) Transmitted To House

Doty

SB2483
*

Articles of incorporation; revise.
02/25 (S) Transmitted To House

Parks

SB2493
*

Supporting and Strengthening Families Act; create.
02/26 (S) Transmitted To House

Parker

SB2511

Appropriation FY2017; pilot programs for legal representation for indigent parents in child abuse cases.
02/08 (S) Referred To Appropriations

Dearing

SB2574
*

Mississippi Uniform Power of Attorney Act; create.
03/03 (S) Transmitted To House

Tindell

SB2660

Senior status judges; revise service qualification.
02/26 (S) Transmitted To House

Tindell

SB2680
*

Child support; modifications retroactive up to one year.
03/03 (S) Transmitted To House

Tindell

Some Talking Points on Firearms in the Courthouse

March 9, 2016 § 12 Comments

  • Security is a site-specific issue. Minimum security standards will always be governed by design, traffic, and countless other considerations specific to the site. Questions of the reasonableness of any particular security measure are not capable of being codified on a uniform basis and are best left to those who are charged with the protection of the courthouse and the conduct of proceedings in the courthouse.
  • There are many good reasons for banning weapons in courthouse parking lots. In many counties, state inmates and county prisoners are transported by vans, by the dozens, to public courthouse parking areas and marched into the courtroom. This provides the opportunity for armed people to either assist in escape or exact vengeance if they are allowed to be armed in the parking lot.
  • Sheriffs are charged with the safekeeping of prisoners and courthouse property. Judges are charged with the orderly administration of justice. Both should have the tools and flexibility to address situations that may arise.
  • Some trial require extraordinary security measures. This bill is a blanket prohibition.
  • Participants, including jurors, need to know that they are under the protection of the court the moment they enter court property.
  • The legislature and other state offices enjoy point-of-entry security, as they should. County workers deserve the same sort of security in their very volatile workplaces.
  • Clerks, deputy clerks, bailiffs, and other courthouse workers are often the intended targets of violent reprisals. The courthouse does not become “safe” merely because courtroom proceedings are not taking place.
  • Many offices in the courthouse contain significant amounts of cash and are potential robbery targets.
  • Historically, mixing armed citizens and criminal defendants has allowed some terrible things to occur in our state and many others.
  • Local officials are elected and empowered to solve local problems. This bill attempts to remove from two other constitutional branches of government the power to carry out their respective duties. The legislature is not well-equipped to devise security measures for the many  court facilities in this state.

 

Proposed Changes to MRCP 4 and 81

March 8, 2016 § 4 Comments

The MSSC is seeking comments on a proposal to amend MRCP 81 to clarify it, and moving its process provisions to R4.

You can access the proposed changes at this link.

These changes were recommended by the Conference of Chancery Judges in 2013, and then analyzed and studied by the MSSC’s Civil Rules Advisory Committee, which passed them on to the MSSC, which has been considering them since.

If you have any comments, pro or con, it will help the process if you will follow the instructions at the link. Deadline is April 1, 2016.

Fire Zone

March 7, 2016 § 20 Comments

After the  legislature made it legal a couple of years ago to carry firearms in courthouses, except for courtrooms, some judges reacted by extending the protection of the courtroom out into external areas.

Now the legislature is responding with an amendment to HB 571, which has passed the House and is on the way to the Senate. It limits the definition of courtroom to ” … the actual room in which a judicial proceeding occurs, including any jury room, witness room, judge’s chamber, office housing the judge’s staff, or similar room” The law specifically allows firearms in ” … hallways, courtroom entrances, courthouse grounds, lobbies, corridors, or other areas within a courthouse which are generally open to the public for the transaction of business outside of an active judicial proceeding.”

If you agree this is good policy, then you may do nothing and see whether the Senate concurs.

If, however, you wonder what effect this will have on the safety of litigants involved in heated domestic matters who have to wait their turn in the hallways and corridors of our outdated and crowded courthouses, then you might consider contacting your Senator(s).

“Quote Unquote”

March 4, 2016 § 3 Comments

“This and no other is the root from which a tyrant springs; when he first appears he is a protector.”  —  Plato

“If Tyranny and Oppression come to this land, it will be in the guise of fighting a foreign enemy.”  —  James Madison

“Tyranny is always better organized than freedom.”  —  Charles Péguy

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Privacy in Court Filings

March 3, 2016 § 17 Comments

Back in April, 2015, the MSSC amended the MRCP to add a new R5.1 imposing privacy protections for court filings in both paper- and electronic-filing districts. Consternation among bar, bench, and clerkdom ensued, and the high court suspended R5.1 pending further study. A committee was appointed to study the issue, and a new R5.1 was proposed, with application limited to electronic filings. On February 11, 2016, the new R5.1 went into effect. Here it is in its entirety:

Rule 5.1. Privacy Protection for Filings Made with the Court

Beginning July 1, 2016, all courts and offices of a circuit or chancery clerk that maintain electronic storage or electronic filing of documents, as defined under section 9-5-51 of the Mississippi Code, and make those documents accessible online must conform with the privacy provisions of the Administrative Procedures for Mississippi Electronic Courts — specifically, Sections 5 and 9 therein.

Even if MEC has not reached your particular district yet, if you file in an MEC county you will be bound by its rules. You can find them at this link.

Here are some highlights:

  • You must not include in documents filed with the court, and must redact, any personal data identifiers.
  • If Social Security numbers appear, only the last four digits may be shown.
  • Only the initials of minor children, and not their full names, may be used.
  • When stating a date of birth, only the year may be used.
  • Only the last four digits of financial account numbers may be stated.
  • No street addresses or apartment numbers may be stated; only city and state are listed.
  • “The responsibility for redacting these personal identifiers rests solely with counsel and the parties. The clerk will not review pleadings for compliance with these provisions.”
  • Failure to comply can subject one to R11 sanctions.

It’s not just in the pleadings you draft that you will find sensitive information; it’s also in the documents you attach as exhibits to your pleadings, and in discovery filings. Almost every day, I have to admonish an attorney to redact Social Security numbers, birth dates, and financial account information. In fact, I directed the chancery clerk to keep a china marker — one of the best redaction tools I have found — in her desk for lawyers to use.

In my court, I extend the privacy protection practice to exhibits in evidence. I make the lawyers redact personal information from documents in evidence. Tax returns, financial documents, 8.05’s, pay stubs, credit card statements, and many other documents are chock-full of sensitive information that can be used for identity theft and other nefarious purposes.

You have a duty to your clients to protect them from being harmed by the information you put into the record. Now MRCP 5.1 makes that duty official.

Who Pays the Bills?

March 1, 2016 § 2 Comments

Back in 2013, I posted about the MSSC’s decision in Memorial Hospital v. Proulx, which held that medical providers do not have a lien against the proceeds of a minor’s settlement. I think I aptly described that case as a “curveball for minor’s settlements.” You can revisit that post at this link.

Then last week, when I reprised “An Outline for Minor’s Settlements,” Randy Wallace picked it up, linked it, and did a nice piece on ERISA and subrogation that you should read and have in your minor’s settlement arsenal. You can access it at this link. His piece, which is well-researched and supported by authority, adds another dimension to the law of minor’s settlements, which on the surface appear simple, but can prove to be deceptively complex.