Pending Legislation that Might Impact Your Chancery Practice
January 24, 2018 § 3 Comments
Every year the judges receive updates from the Administrative Office of Courts (AOC) of pending litigation that could affect the judiciary. This year’s first roll-out consists of 49 pages. That may not be a record, but it impresses me as more than usual.
Here is a list of introduced bills that I believe may affect chancery court, based solely on the descriptive statement in the material provided to us. I have not read these bills because many of them will fall by the wayside as the session rumbles along. Some may not even pertain to chancery.
You can access links to the texts of these bills at this link.
HB 132 Adverse possession cases; require losing party to pay court costs and attorney’s fees.
HB 238 Mineral interests; revert to surface owner after certain period of time.
HB 270 PERS; no benefits to retiree while serving as consultant or advisor to state. (Will this affect Senior Judges?)
HB 277 Power of attorney; authorize to become effective upon a future event.
HB 282 Child support arrearage; require electronic house arrest as punishment for contempt.
HB 419 Mental Health Courts; authorize to be established throughout the state.
HB 434 Authorize AOC to fund mental health courts
HB 471 Create task force to address the disparity of African-American males in the judicial system.
HB 528 Uniform Partition of Heir Property Act.
HB 546 Require possessor to notify chancery clerk before title vests by adverse possession.
HB 548 Revise Landlord-tenant law re non-payment of rent.
HB 549 Authorize cemeteries to acquire a convenient right-of-way for relatives.
HB 550 Authorize jointly-owned real property to be sold by a realtor.
HB 554 Require chancery clerks to maintain a will registry.
HB 579 Require chance for borrowers to modify loans before foreclosure.
HB 606 Previously-married applicant must provide divorce or annulment judgment for marriage license.
HB 609 Contracts must be written in large print.
HB 632 Courts prohibited from requiring identification.
HB 648 Chancery court may commit certain persons to a mental facility.
HB 671 Arbitration clauses nonbinding in certain contracts.
HB 674 Chancery clerk to remove SSN from deeds.
HB 681 Revise home study and residence requirements in adoptions.
HB 692 Abolish the tort of alienation of affection.
HB 762 Allow opt-out of arbitration in certain consumer cases.
HB 777 Revise certain evidentiary standards.
HB 797 Increase value of homestead exemption.
HB 801 Allow emergency placement of children in home of relative.
HB 810 Clarify service of process on in-state charities (Statutory revision of MRCP 4?)
HB 908 Revise appeals from domestic abuse protection orders (DAPO’s).
HB 913 Add a chancellor to the Third District.
HB 930 Require continued grandparent visitation rights when visitation unreasonably withheld.
HB 962 Revise requirements to file petition for grandparent visitation rights.
HB 1002 Repeal adverse possession.
HB 1022 Require recorded instruments to be in English.
HB 1081 Clarify venue for nonresident corporations.
HB 1084 Terminate parental rights for children conceived of rape.
HB 1090 Revise deadline for recording deed when deadline occurs on a weekend.
HB 1092 Restrict certain technologies from accessing personal communications and information.
HB 1151 Revise withholding and payment of child support.
HB 1169 Define personal property.
HB 1170 Authorize chancery court to award sibling visitation.
HB 1186 Owner of separate, nonproducing mineral interest liable for portion of ad valorem taxes.
HB 1218 Civil actions against real estate appraisers are barred.
HB 1231 Establish fundamental right to direct upbringing of children (parental rights).
HB 1237 Suspend child support obligation during incarceration.
HB 1245 Court may assess costs against dismissed party.
HB 1281 Same as HB 1084
HB 1287 Revise grounds for TPR.
HB 1291 Limitations on imprisonment for contempt for non-payment of child support.
HB 1292 Authorize debtor’s prison for non-payment of fines, fees, and assessments.
HB 1293 Revise power of attorney delegating care and custody of children.
HB 1296 Additional chancellor for the Tenth District.
HB 1300 Director may not withhold admittance of patient with mental commitment order.
HB 1308 Power of attorney exception for certain designation of spouses.
HB 1320 Revise fees for successful paternity action.
HB 1340 Add separation as 13th ground for divorce.
HB 1410 Revise factors for award of child support.
HB 1440 Require DHS recipients who receive child support to provide list of expenses.
HB 1446 Make child advocacy center information confidential.
HB 1465 Establish domestic abuse court program.
SB 2044 Expand authority of Chief Justice to appoint special judges.
SB 2067 Failure to pay GAL fees enforced as any other civil debt.
SB 2232 Allow protection of pets in a DAPO.
SB 2246 Revise landlord-tenant law.
SB 2317 Retired judges may perform marriages and obtain a free pistol license.
SB 2347 Court may order disbursement of ward’s funds under certain circumstances.
SB 2348 Court may waive annual accounting in guardianships under certain circumstances.
SB 2392 Same as HB 471.
SB 2423 Clarify right of parent to nominate GAL in a TPR case and clarify the fictive kin disposition alternative.
SB 2473 Revise the landlord-tenant act to give more protection to landlords.
SB 2493 Establish the State Truth Commission.
SB 2508 Revise definition of personal property.
SB 2522 Revise guidelines for child support.
SB 2542 Allow chancellors to increase child support based on financial ability of parties.
SB 2544 Expand authority of Chief Justice to appoint special judges.
SB 2557 Revise age of majority.
SB 2617 Create civil and criminal liability for unlawful disclosure or promotion of “intimate visual material.”
SB 2620 Bona fide separation as ground for divorce.
SB 2657 Same as HB 548.
SB 2662 Statute of limitations for actions re real estate appraisals.
SB 2682 Require birth certificates to show biological parent as well as spouse.
SB 2685 Prohibit noncompete clauses in physician contracts.
SB 2765 Allow third-party visitation in certain circumstances.
SB 2782 Revise parties entitled to notice in muniment of title.
SB 2802 Prohibit application of foreign law in courts.
SB 2809 Allow administrative suspension of child support for incarceration longer than 180 days.
False Pleadings
January 23, 2018 § 2 Comments
In case you hadn’t noticed, MRCP 11(a) requires every pleading to be signed by one of the attorneys of record. But it doesn’t stop there. It goes on to say that …
“The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate that the attorney has read the pleading or motion; that to the best of the attorney’s knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.”
R11(b) provides sanctions for non-compliance.
The Advisory Committee Note says that, “Good faith and professional responsibility are the bases of Rule 11.” And it points to R8 pertaining to general denials, which is expressly subject to R11, “meaning only when counsel can in good faith fairly deny all the averments in the adverse pleading should he do so.”
So how do the following comport with R11?
- Attorney prepares and files an affidavit of diligent inquiry stating that the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. The attorney is relying solely on the word of the affiant-client. Turns out that the affiant has two sisters in another state.
- Attorney files an affidavit on behalf of the client taking the client’s word that she looked everywhere for her daughter to take custody of her child, and the daughter is not to be found in Mississippi. A simple Facebook search would have located the daughter in Gulfport.
- Attorney files a verified application for injunction swearing that efforts have been made to give notice, but that notice should not be required. On inquiry by the judge it is disclosed that counsel has been in discussions about the matter with an attorney representing the opposing party, and that attorney’s office is directly across the street from the courthouse.
- Attorney signs off on a divorce complaint alleging HCIT and adultery knowing from interviews with the client that there is not enough evidence to support either ground.
If good faith and professional responsibility are the fundamental considerations behind R11, then I think it requires more than taking your client’s word for it and filing pleadings that prove to be wrong. Notice that I said wrong, and not fraudulent. But that’s a thin line.
Restrictions on Visitation
January 22, 2018 § Leave a comment
Chancery courts are frequently called upon to limit a parent’s visitation with a child, usually because that parent has had limited contact with the child up to that point. Aside from the fact that the proposed solution only seems to add to the distance between parent and child, what does Mississippi law require in such a situation?
The recent COA decision in Michael v. Smith, decided January 9, 2018, includes some helpful information on point. Judge
¶25. Here … there is no indication that standard visitation would be detrimental to the child. … The chancellor awarded Michael overnight visitation and further awarded standard summer- and holiday-visitation privileges. While the chancellor did not place the same restrictions at issue in Fields, he did in fact restrict Michael’s visitation, as Michael’s weekend visitations did not include Friday.
¶26. “Except in unusual circumstances, a noncustodial parent is entitled to unrestricted standard or liberal visitation.” Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 5.08[2] (1st ed. 2005) (citing Cox v. Moulds, 490 So. 2d 866, 870 (Miss. 1986)). Standard visitation includes “two weekends a month until Sunday afternoon and at least five weeks of summer visitation[,] plus some holiday visitation.” Id. (citing Messer v. Messer, 850 So. 2d 161, 167 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003); [Fields v.] Fields, 830 So. 2d at 1269 (¶12); Chalk v. Lentz, 744 So. 2d 789, 792 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)). “Awarding less is an abuse of discretion unless there is concrete proof of actual harm to a child.” Id. “Appropriate visitation restrictions often relate to abusive behavior, drug or alcohol abuse, or mental illness.” Id. at § 5.08[4].
¶27. Here, there is no evidence of actual harm to E.M.S., nor is there evidence of abusive behavior, drug or alcohol abuse, or mental illness by Michael. Instead, the chancellor found Michael’s lack of bonding with E.M.S. as the reason to restrict Michael’s visitation. However, such restriction seems counterproductive. Indeed, it is unclear how limiting visitation between Michael and E.M.S. would strengthen the parent-child bond. Moreover, the record shows that at the time of the amended judgment, Michael had been “bonding” with E.M.S. for at least four hours per week for almost one year.
¶28. “Our courts have adopted a policy of maintaining relationships between parents and their children even though the parent may be non-custodial.” Fields, 830 So. 2d at 1267 (¶6). The best interests of the minor child should be the paramount consideration . . . while respecting the rights of the noncustodial parent and the objective of creating an environment conducive to developing as close and loving a relationship as possible between parent and child. Bell on Mississippi Family Law at § 5.07[1] (quoting Chalk, 744 So. 2d at 792 (¶9)).
¶29. “[A]bsent evidence that the child [would be] harmed by standard visitation, the chancellor may not impose limitations on the visitation privileges of the non[-]custodial parent.” Fields, 830 So. 2d at 1268 (¶8). Here, as in Fields, there is no evidence to support the chancellor’s restrictions on Michael’s visitation with E.M.S. See id. at 1269 (¶12). Moreover, there is no evidence that E.M.S. would be harmed by standard visitation. Accordingly, we find the chancellor abused his discretion in restricting Michael’s visitation, and reverse and remand with instructions to award Michael standard visitation with E.M.S., to include Fridays.
If you’re looking to limit visitation, you’ve got to have evidence that amounts to concrete proof of harm to the child. That will often relate to abusive behavior, drug or alcohol abuse, or mental illness. It’s not enough to suggest that the child will suffer.
Also, if it is necessary to build a relationship, I suggest you ask the court to graduate the visitation schedule over a reasonable period, building toward full, standard visitation. If you will notice above, at ¶27, the court noted that Michael had gone through just that sort of familiarization period. In your case, give some thought to what would be reasonable and offer a proposed visitation schedule in writing through your client’s testimony. Your client should be prepared to testify in defense of the proposal, and why it is the way it is. In making a decision, the judge will decide how reasonably to graduate it, and the length of time required, which will depend on the facts of the case, but you should not expect it to be a lengthy, drawn-out process.
Judge Greenlee, joined by Irving and Carlton, wrote a spirited dissent arguing that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion and that the COA should not substitute its judgment for that of the chancellor.
Idling is the Devil’s Workshop
January 19, 2018 § 2 Comments
Some time in November of last year, I began to notice vehicles parked outside the courthouse, their engines idling. People apparently were leaving their car engines running while they ran into the courthouse to conduct some brief (I suppose) business. I would say on average I observed this phenomenon once a day up to Christmas.
It would have been more or less understandable if the perpetrators were suffering through some of our more recent sub-zero weather, but before Christmas the weather was mostly balmy.
At the time, I wrote it off as simply a silly thing to do. Since then, however, I have discovered that there are some legal implications. Consider MCA 63-3-909:
No person driving or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition and removing the key, and, when standing upon any perceptible grade, without effectively setting the brake thereon and turning the front wheels to the curb or side of the highway.
MCA 63-3-201 makes failure to comply with the above a misdemeanor.
The illegality of unattended idling vehicles came to my attention recently when I read of Mississippians in Jackson and Biloxi being ticketed for the offense. One of those cases was on private property.
Now, I am not privy to the legislature’s thinking when it decided to adopt this measure, but I am willing to bet that environmental concerns were somewhere near the bottom of the top-ten reasons behind it. Most likely it was the product of the liability insurance lobby trying to address res ipsa loquitur and per-se-negligence liability insurance implications. The law is in the chapter on “Rules of the Road” — not the private driveway, and refers to the “curb” and “side of the highway,” connoting public ways. So I doubt that the lawmakers intended to make criminals of private citizens warming up their cars in their own garages on a frosty December morn.
If the goal of the law is to criminalize silly, even stupid behavior, then I think that it has zeroed in on a worthy target. Leaving your car idling while you run into Winn-Dixie to pick up a few things, or into City Hall to pay your water bill, or into the courthouse to buy your tag, just strikes me as a self-indulgent, unnecessary exercise (I do, however, plead guilty to leaving my truck running in 22° cold while I picked up my dry cleaning on the frigid morning that I wrote this).
The folly of leaving your car running idle was brought home to me back in the 1990’s when the Mayor of Meridian emerged from a downtown restaurant after lunch and discovered a city police patrol car idling in a parking space in front of the establishment, with the keys in the ignition. The Mayor hopped behind the wheel and drove the car three blocks to the police station, where he parked and locked the car, pocketing the keys. When the officer returned to where he had parked his vehicle and discovered it missing, he radioed in that it had been stolen, and an APB was issued. A frantic search ensued, and in an hour or so the misplaced car was found right in front of the police station. Somehow the keys were located in the Mayor’s office, and in order to recover his wayward key ring the sheepish officer had to submit to the Mayor’s tongue-lashing. Considering the scope of unpleasantries that could have occurred if some malefactor had gotten hold of his car rather than the Mayor, the officer was lucky to get off so lightly.
That incident highlights something we all have observed: law enforcement officers often leave their official vehicles running while they step away to tend to other business. I suppose it’s a time-saving measure in the event of an emergency. Other first responders do, too, even with their private vehicles, although that can get carried to extremes. As I finished fueling my truck one day, an SUV pulled up to the pump behind me, and out jumped a young woman in EMT gear. An EMT tag adorned the front of the vehicle. She kept her engine running as she began pumping. I was happy to exit the scene as promptly as I could before everything went up in a Hollywoodesque blaze of glory.
But don’t blame the perpetrators. We are governed by the Law of Unattended Consequences.
An Approach to Due Execution of the Will
January 17, 2018 § 2 Comments
The subscribing witness has an important responsibility in connection with execution of the will. The witness’s duty is four-fold:
First, the testator must request them to attest the will [Green v. Pearson, 145 Miss. 23, 110 So. 862, 864 (1927)]; second, they must see the testator sign the will [Matter of Jefferson’s Will, 349 So.3d 1032, 1036 (Miss. 1977)]; third, they must know that the document is the testator’s last will and testament [Estate of Griffith v. Griffith, 20 So.2d 1190, 1194 (Miss. 2010)]; and finally, they must satisfy themselves that the testator is of sound and disposing mind and capable of making a will [Matter of Jefferson’s Will, Id.]. Estate of Holmes, 103 So.3d 1150 at ¶ 10 (Miss. 2012).
I blogged about the concept here.
As the attorney, you have a duty above that of the witnesses to ensure that your client, the testator, is competent to make decisions that result in a valid will.
But how do you do that?
In a recent post on the Expert Institute Blog, a geriatric psychiatrist offered a template for assessing your testator’s testamentary capacity:
1) Awareness of the situation/communicating a choice:
Can you tell me the purpose of today’s meeting?
What have you decided to do regarding your Will?
2) Factual understanding of the issues:
Can you tell me what a Will is?
Do you know or can you approximate the extent of your estate?
Who in your family may survive you?
Can you tell me in your own words what you would like to happen to your estate after you die?
3) Appreciation of likely consequences:
Do you believe that a Will is necessary? What do you believe would happen if you do not have a Will?
Can you tell me how your Will may affect your family?
How well does this Will represent your wishes?
4) Rational manipulation of information:
How did you reach your decisions when you thought about your Will?
What was important to you in reaching your decision?
What are the advantages and disadvantages of your decision?
Were there other possibilities that you considered but decided against? What were your reasons? What makes Person A a better choice as your heir than Person B?
As the blog states:
As the population ages, lawyers will increasingly need to detect intact versus impaired decision-making capacities. Lawyers can directly screen for decisional capacity … . In so doing, they rely on more than simple impressions of their clients, or on family members’ subjective, at times conflicted, views. Clients can mask their deficits and family members can misjudge the severity of those deficits, or be motivated by self-interest. Primary care physicians are often asked to determine competency, but they may not be trained to assess cognition, and their opinions may lack validity. This explains why physician competency evaluations often disagree. Unless a client’s decision-making capacities are specifically assessed, the presence or absence of those capacities cannot be presumed.
If you will conduct this inquiry in the presence of the subscribing witnesses, you can ensure that they can competently testify later if necessary about the testator’s testamentary capacity.
I suggest you make this template a form that you keep with the client’s file, including a dated note that it was discussed with the client, and including any observations. Also have the subscribing witnesses sign it. That could prove to be an invaluable aid in the event of a will contest.
The Lawyer’s Duty
January 16, 2018 § 2 Comments
In the spirit of the new year, which is always a good time to reassess and reevaluate, I offer you MCA § 73-3-37, with which I am sure you are familiar, but perhaps would like to read anew:
It is the duty of attorneys:
(1) To support the constitution and laws of this state and of the United States;
(2) To maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers;
(3) To employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to them, such means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead by any artifice or false statement of the law;
(4) To maintain inviolate the confidence and, at every peril to themselves, to preserve the secrets of their clients;
(5) To abstain from all offensive personalities, and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which they are charged;
(6) To encourage neither the commencement nor continuance of an action or proceeding from any motives of passion or personal interest;
(7) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to themselves, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed.
Update on the Contest
January 10, 2018 § 21 Comments
Back in November I reported that the BCPB had come in second overall in the Expert Institute’s Best Legal Blogs contest. As I posted here on November 8, that is quite an achievement thanks to all of you.
I reckoned that that was the end of that, but I was wrong.
During the holidays a package arrived in the mail from the Expert Institute. Inside was an attractive box adorned with a blue ribbon.
Inside was this letter …
As promised also enclosed was an iPad, new and unopened, sealed in its own packaging. Wow. Something I never expected. Oh, and add in two pens, a journal, and a t-shirt.
So, once again, thanks to all of you who voted. You brought the blog this recognition and earned me this prize. And to whomever made the nomination and started this process, thank you.
It’s heartening to know I have a loyal readership. I hope each of you gets a sound return on the investment of time you make reading here. Thanks again.
Adverse Possession: How You Got There Makes All the Difference
January 9, 2018 § Leave a comment
The Joneses filed suit against the Pruitts claiming that they had acquired title to two parcels of the Pruitt’s land. They claimed adverse possession as to one part, and a prescriptive easement as to another.
The chancellor ruled in favor of the Pruitts, and the Joneses appealed.
in Estate of Jones, et al. v. Pruitt, decided September 26, 2017, the COA affirmed. For purposes of this post, we will focus on the permissive nature of the use. Judge Irving wrote for a more-or-less unanimous court (two judges “concur in part and in result without separate written opinion”):
¶13. The Joneses argue that the chancery court erred in denying their claims for adverse possession or a prescriptive easement with respect to the 455-foot roadway, and for adverse possession with respect to the deer-camp structure. Mississippi Code Annotated section 15-1-13(1) (Rev. 2012) provides:
Ten (10) years’ actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land, uninterruptedly continued for ten (10) years by occupancy, descent, conveyance, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title . . . .
“The standard and burden of proof to establish a prescriptive easement is the same as a claim for adverse possession of land.” Morris v. W.R. Fairchild Constr. Co., 792 So. 2d 282, 284 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (citation omitted). In either claim, the following elements must be proven: that use of the property is “(1) under a claim of ownership; (2) actual or hostile; (3) open, notorious and visible; (4) continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten years; (5) exclusive; and (6) peaceful.” Webb v. Drewrey, 4 So. 3d 1078, 1082 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). “The person claiming the possession has the burden of proving each of these elements by clear and convincing evidence.” Biddix v. McConnell, 911 So. 2d 468, 475 (¶18) (Miss. 2005) (citation omitted).
a. Roadway
¶14. First, the Joneses maintain that the chancery court erred in finding that their use of the 455-foot roadway was permissive—and therefore insufficient to satisfy the hostility requirement of adverse possession or a prescriptive easement—on the basis that the Pruitts had given them verbal permission to use the roadway. In support of their argument, the Joneses cite this Court’s decision in Delancey v. Mallette, 912 So. 2d 483, 489 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005), in which we held that “[w]hen a use of the lands of another for roadway purposes has been open, visible, continuous and unmolested since some point in time anterior to the aged inhabitants of the community, such use will be presumed to have originated adversely.” (Quotations omitted). Further, the Joneses argue that “[r]equiring a litigant who is attempting to establish adverse possession or a prescriptive easement to prove that there was no permission for use would be unreasonable. The law typically frowns upon requiring a party to prove a negative averment.” Morris, 792 So. 2d at 284 (¶9).
¶15. In response, the Pruitts contend that one of the most basic principles in establishing adverse possession or a prescriptive easement is that the use must be hostile, and that “permissive use by the possessor of the property in question defeats the claim of adverse possession.” Ellison v. Meek, 820 So. 2d 730, 735 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted). In support of their argument, the Pruitts cite the testimony at trial that the Pruitts and Joneses had a friendly relationship up until this dispute. The Pruitts further argue that the fact that Sidney kept the gate locked is consistent with Bocee’s testimony at trial that she allowed him to cross into her land as long as he watched out for her property. Additionally, the Pruitts argue that the fact that Sidney never gave Bocee a key is irrelevant, as Sidney, himself, admitted that the Pruitts did not need a key to access the Joneses’ property.
¶16. This Court held in Cleveland v. Killen, 966 So. 2d 848, 851 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007):
As a general rule, permissive possession of lands, even if long continued, does not confer title in the person in permissive possession until a positive assertion of a right hostile to the owner has been made known to him. If there was never a request or a grant of permission to use the land, however, the use would not be permissive, but would be adverse. It is a fact question for a chancellor to determine whether a use is prescriptive or permissive.
(Internal citations and quotations omitted). Furthermore, we reiterated:
Use of property by permission does not evolve into a hostile or adverse use until the permission ends. The time period for obtaining adverse possession or a prescriptive easement, when express or implied permission is previously given, does not begin to run until some form of objection to the use is made by the landowner.
Id. at 852 (¶15).
¶17. Chancellor Harvey-Goree, in her order, found that “all the testimony revealed that the use [of the roadway] was peaceable and permissive.” Chancellor Clark made similar findings in his order on the Joneses’ motion for reconsideration or for a new trial, and affirmed Chancellor Harvey-Goree’s holding with respect to the roadway. We affirm. The record is void of any evidence suggesting that the Joneses’ use of the roadway was anything but peaceful. Furthermore, Irozenell even testified at trial that she never sought to bar the Joneses from using the roadway; rather, she merely sought to have them remove their lock from the gate on the roadway. As such, the Joneses have failed to establish that their use of the roadway was hostile, and their claim for adverse possession or a prescriptive easement thereto is unsuccessful.
That language in the statute, ” … in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued … ,” simply does not embrace occupancy that was commenced or continued by permission because it is not hostile or adverse.
Here the Pruitts gave the Joneses permission to be on the property. The same result would obtain if the occupancy were commenced pursuant to a lease. Both Judge Mason and I have had adverse possession cases involving leases.
Another important point to leave with is that the elements of adverse possession must all be proven by clear and convincing evidence in order to establish a prescriptive easement.
The Better Chancery Practice Blog 