MORE SIGNS OF THE IMPENDING APOCALYPSE

January 27, 2012 § 4 Comments

100,000

January 26, 2012 § 2 Comments

Yesterday this little corner of the blogosphere recorded its 100,000th view. By 3:00 pm we had our 100,028th view. That’s in 19 months.

The statistics page (that you can’t see) tells me that we get an average of 226 views per day. That average includes weekends, when viewing drops to 50-150 a day, depending on Lord knows what.

A typical day has between 200 and 350 views, most typically around 300. I have seen views spike into the 500’s; the highest total being 560 on June 14, 2011, which was a post about the one-year anniversary of this blog.

I’m glad that so many of you find it useful. When I started this I had no idea so many people would touch base so often.

Please feel free to comment. I am sure your silence does not indicate total agreement with what I say. I am open to questions, critiques and pointers about the way you do chancery pratcice where you are (I am even open on this blog to “That’s not the way we do it in Jackson” comments).

JOINT CUSTODY OUT OF THE BLUE

January 25, 2012 § 2 Comments

Neither party has asked for joint custody in their pleadings. They consent to a divorce and agree that the chancellor shall adjudicate custody. The husband testifies that he wants sole custody. The wife testifies that she wants either sole custody or joint custody.

Can the chancellor grant joint custody?

The answer is set out in Crider v. Crider, 904 So.2d 142, 148 (Miss. 2005), where the Mississippi Supreme Court stated:

We hold that when parties consent in writing to the court’s determination of custody, they are consenting and agreeing to that determination and this meets the statutory directive of “joint application” in § 93-5-24(2). This is the only interpretation that conforms to the primary directive of § 93-5-24(1) that “custody shall be awarded as follows according to the best interests of the child.” It is the chancellor who must determine what is in the best interest of the child, and it is the chancellor who determines the level of commitment parents have to sharing joint custody.  

So the answer is yes, where the parties have consented to an irreconcilable differences divorce, the judge may grant joint custody regardless whether it was specifically spelled out as an option in adjudication of custody.

It would seem under Crider’s language that the parties may not limit the court’s determination of best interest — say, by a stipulation that joint custody shall not be awarded — any more than could the statute. But to my knowledge that issue has not been addressed by the appellate courts.

The trial court must still weigh whether the relationship between the parties is suitable for joint custody. After all, joint custody is inappropriate where the parties are unable to communicate and cooperate.  Lewis v. Lewis, 974 So.2d 265, 266 (Miss. App. 2008); Crider, at 147.

In Phillips v. Phillips, 45 So.3d 684, 695-96 (Miss. App. 2010), the COA upheld the chancellor’s award of joint custody, alternating a week at a time, despite a history of animosity and strained relatiosnhips. Citing Crider, the court said at ¶34 that “The chancellor is in the best position to evaluate the parties’ capabilities to cooperate.”     

In Watts v. Watts, decided by the COA on January 24, 2012, at ¶ 28, the court again affirmed the chancellor’s award of joint custody, and cited Crider. The parties had entered into a consent for divorce leaving the issue of custody for adjudication by the court. Echoing Crider, the COA held that it was up to the chancellor to evaluate the evidence and to decide whether the level of conflict between the parties made joint custody undesirable or unworkable. 

Another post with some ruminations about joint custody is here.

LAWYERS AND VICARIOUS TRAUMATIZATION

January 24, 2012 § 1 Comment

Lawyers who represent people see almost every conceivable form of mankind’s capacity to be inhuman. We see violence and its physical and emotional scars, financial coercion, verbal cruelty, sexual abuse, use of children and other family members as weapons, defamation, and on and on in a breathtaking, seemingly inexhaustable panorama of brutality that seems almost limitless in the scope of its imaginative cunning.

Over time the exposure takes its toll. Some lawyers develop a defensive cynicism that effectively shields them from their clients’ pain, but also prevents them from empathizing. Other lawyers experience burnout that makes them ineffective. Still others experience sleeplessness, irritability, sadness, loss of concentration, difficulty in intimacy, depression, and a panoply of other symptoms. Your clients’ problems too often intrude into your own life and can come perilously close to becoming your own problems.

All attorneys who represent people experience stress. Even extreme stress. Some deal with it in a healthy way. Too many others self-medicate with alcohol, drugs or toxic behavior.

There is research that dubs this phenomenon “Vicarious Traumatization.” It is the process by which a lawyer who comes into contact with the client’s traumatization can become traumatized himself or herself.

Here is a link to a paper published by the American Bar Association entitled Secondary Trauma and Burnout in Attorneys: Effects of Work with Clients Who are Victims of Domestic Violence and Abuse, by Andrew P. Levin, MD.

A lawyer is quoted in the article:

“It actually feels good to hear that I am not the only one who feels depressed and helpless and that these issues are worth studying. Fortunately, the stress has decreased with experience and time for me, but I still have vivid memories of quite traumatic experiences representing victims of domestic violence who were so betrayed that it was difficult to continue to have faith in humankind.”

Read the paper and see whether you recognize yourself there.

WHO ARE THE PARTIES IN A GRANDPARENT VISITATION CASE?

January 23, 2012 § 3 Comments

Who gets to participate in a grandparent visitation case?

MCA § 93-16-5 states:

“All persons required to be made parties in child custody proceedings or proceedings for the termination of parental rights shall be made parties to any proceeding in which a grandparent of a minor child or children seeks to obtain visitation rights with such minor child or children … ” [Emphasis added]

MCA § 93-15-107(1), dealing with termination of parental rights, states:

“In an action to terminate parental rights, the mother of the child, the legal father of the child, and the putative father of the child, when known, shall be parties defendant.”

MCA § 93-11-65 allows for a custody action against any resident or non-resident, whether or not having actual custody. MCA § 93-27-205(1) provides that in child custody proceedings between states, any person having actual custody must be joined.

From the statutes, then, the plaintiff is required to join the natural mother, the legal father, and the putative father, when known, and any person having actual custody. The requirement of joinder is not subject to the trial court’s discretion, but rather is mandated through the statute’s use of the word shall. Since the statute is in derogation of common law, it must be strictly construed.

Don’t make the mistake of filing your suit against the custodial parent alone. You might just make a wasted trip to the court house.

DICTA

January 20, 2012 § 2 Comments

  • For map freaks and Mississippi River afficianados: Spectacular Corps of Engineers map of the ancient courses of the Mississippi River.
  • SOPA (Stop Offshore Piracy ACT) and PIPA (Protect IP Act) have generated a lot of controversy recently. If you’re a user of the internet — and you are if you’re reading this — you should be vitally interested in how these laws might affect your access to and use of internet content if they are adopted. CBS (which backs the laws, by the way) has a piece on what you need to know about SOPA and PIPA. Forbes offers its take, asking What are SOPA and PIPA and Why All the Fuss? Yielding to pressure encouraged by sites such as Google and Wikipedia, Congress has delayed taking up the matter, and President Obama has stated he opposes it, probably dooming it; you can read about it here. Unless you’re happy with the idea of the government playing a bigger role in the internet, this is a law that you need to be vigilant about.
  • Sous-Vide cooking.
  • Before you spend that extra $$$ to buy some really special olive oil, you might want to read this NPR piece on Tom Mueller’s book about olive oil scams.
  • Some powerful ways to use LinkedIn for law firm marketing.
  • Tantalizing cooking ideas from New Orleans’ June Yamagishi.

CLARIFYING ATTORNEY’S FEES IN CONTEMPT ACTIONS

January 19, 2012 § Leave a comment

I’ve talked here before about some confusion (in my opinion) on the part of the COA as to the criteria to award attorney’s fees in contempt cases as opposed to other cases. The question that gave rise to the confusion was whether proof of the McKee factors and/or inability to pay would be required to support an award of attorney’s fees in a contempt action.

In Williamson v. Williamson, decided January 10, 2012, the COA set the record straight. Judge Carlton’s opinion sets it out at ¶ 28:

Furthermore, we find no merit to Will’s contention that the chancellor erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Mary due to a lack of consideration of the McKee analysis. Will’s argument fails to differentiate the chancellor’s award of attorney’s fees in a divorce action as compared to a contempt action. In Mabus v. Mabus, 910 So. 2d 486, 490 (¶13) (Miss. 2005), the Mississippi Supreme Court explained that, generally, in divorce actions, appropriate attorney’s fees are awarded in an amount to secure a competent attorney. However, in contempt actions, attorney’s fees are awarded “to make the plaintiff whole.” Id.; see also Patterson, 20 So. 3d at 73 (¶26) (stating that an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate when there is a finding of contempt, and “[n]o showing as to the McKee factors is required”); Bounds v. Bounds, 935 So. 2d 407, 412 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). As stated, Mary introduced an itemization of attorney’s fees into evidence at trial. Will failed to provide sufficient evidence showing that the attorney’s fees testified to by Mary were unreasonable. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion by the chancellor in finding Will in contempt and in awarding Mary the attorney’s fees she incurred in bringing her petition for contempt. See Mabus, 910 So. 2d at 489 (¶8) (“Where a party’s intentional misconduct causes the opposing party to expend time and money needlessly, then attorney[’s] fees and expenses should be awarded to the wronged party.”).

I think that language pretty well clarifies the law on the point. In contempt cases, contrary to other cases such as divorce, proof of the McKee factors is not required, nor is proof of inability of the wronged party to pay; however, you must put on proof to show the fees incurred and the reasonableness so that the trial judge has some objective standard to apply.

There is one often overlooked avenue for establishing the reasonableness of attorney’s fees. It’s set out in MCA 9-1-41, which reads as follows:

In any action in which a court is authorized to award reasonable attorneys’ fees, the court shall not require the party seeking such fees to to put on proof as to the reasonableness of the amount sought, but shall make the award based on the information already before it and the court’s own opinion based on experience and observation; provided, however, a party may, in its discretion, place before the court other evidence as to the reasonableness of the amount of the award, and the court may consider such evidence in making the award.

In my opinion, the statute is something you can use to your advantage in a contempt case, since McKee proof is not required. But be careful in trying to apply it in other kinds of cases. In Doe v. Doe, 644 So.2d 1199, 1209 (Miss. 1994), the supreme court said:

It is true that Miss.Code Ann. § 9-1-41 (1972) allows an award of attorney fees based “on the information already before it and the court’s own opinion.” However, such discretion still requires some guidelines. Guidelines help to insure that the chancellor’s award is based on factual information and is not arbitrary. This Court accordingly holds that chancellors should grant attorney fees under Miss.Code Ann. § 9-1-41 (1972) after considering the factors for attorney fees as stated in McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764, 767 (Miss.1982).

Doe was not a contempt case. It was an action for termination of visitation rights based on allegations of sexual abuse. In non-contempt actions the rule is that you will need to put on the proof required by the case law. In divorce cases, for example, that means proof of the client’s inability to pay as well as McKee proof.

SOME SUGGESTED PROVISIONS FOR PSA’S

January 18, 2012 § 3 Comments

Every lawyer has his or her own idea about what needs to be included or not included in a property settlement agreement (PSA) for an irreconcilable differences (ID) divorce. Here are some provisions I have seen in PSA’s through the years that you might find helpful in specific instances.

Protection from debts incurred by the other party:

Debts. If either party has made any debt in the name of or against the credit of the other, the party making such debt shall be solely responsible to pay it promptly and in due course, and to indemnify the other. There are no other joint debts of the parties. Each party shall be solely responsible to pay the debts incurred by him or her in their own name. From and after the date of this agreement, neither will incur any debt in the name of or against the credit of the other, and neither will do any act or thing to impair the credit of the other. Each will indemnify and hold the other harmless for his or her obligation to pay any debt provided for in this Agreement.

Attorney’s fees:

Attorney’s Fees and Costs. Husband and Wife each agree to pay his or her own separate attorney’s fees incurred in obtaining a divorce on the sole ground of irreconcilable differences.

Where other documents will be necessary to finalize the entire settlement:

Execution of Documents. Husband and Wife each agree to execute and deliver promptly any and all documents, papers, agreements, assignments, titles, bills of sale, contracts, deeds, Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDRO’s), and other papers of every kind and nature whatsoever deemed necessary by the other to effect the spirit and intent of this Agreement.

To confirm and ensure that there are no unwritten or side agreements:

Entire Agreement. This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties, and each acknowledges that there are no other or further agreements not expressly included herein. This Agreement is contractual, and not merely a recital. The parties agree that no part of the consideration for this Agreement is any promise, inducement, representation, or agreement to obtain or maintain any divorce action in any Court. Each party acknowledges that this Agreement is entered into freely and voluntarily, without force, duress or influence by any person.

Release of all claims:

Final Settlement and Release of all Claims. Husband and Wife acknowledge that they have read this Agreement and carefully considered the same, and do further acknowledge that this Agreement permanently and finally resolves all marital and personal disputes between them, including, but not limited to, any and all claims for alimony, personal injury, defamation, invasion of privacy, torts of every kind and nature, and division of property rights between the parties hereto, and they do hereby mutually release each other from all claims that each has against the other, other than as specifically set forth in this Agreement, .

Where the parties want the agreement to be enforceable whether or not approved by the court*:

Approval by Court. The parties agree and stipulate that their Agreement shall be made a part of, and shall be incorporated into the Court’s Judgment of Divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences. The parties understand and acknowledge that, although this Agreement is subject to approval by a court of competent jurisdiction in order for it to be incorporated into and made a part of any Judgment of Divorce between them, it shall nonetheless be a binding and lawful contract between them, and that its enforceability shall not be affected in any way by its approval or non-approval by any court in connection with any divorce action between them. If either party files any contest to a divorce between them, this Agreement shall nonetheless be enforced in all of its terms.

A useful provision to ensure that there are no open-ended obligations:

Date of the Agreement and Time to Perform. The date of this agreement shall be the date when it has been executed by both parties. If no specific time limit is stated for taking any action prescribed in this agreement, then the parties agree that all such actions will be accomplished in a reasonable time, but not later than thirty (30) days from the date of entry of any judgment of divorce between the parties on the sole ground of irreconcilable differences.

Where one party is not represented:

Representation. Husband is represented by [attorney]. Wife is not represented by an attorney, and she is representing herself, in connection with the execution of this agreement and in connection with any divorce proceeding between the parties. Wife is fully competent to do so, and she is under no legal or other disability. Wife understands that the law firm of [attorney] represents Husband alone, and Wife further acknowledges that she has relied on her own best judgment in connection with the execution of this agreement and in connection with any divorce proceeding between the parties, and that she has neither received, nor expects to receive, any counsel or advice from Husband’s attorney. Wife understands that she is and has been free to consult with any attorney at any time in connection with the execution of this agreement and in connection with any divorce proceeding between the parties. Wife understands that she should not sign this Agreement unless and until she understands all of its provisions in full.

Clarification that tax advice has not been rendered:

Tax Advice. The parties acknowledge and understand that there may be certain tax consequences pertaining to this Agreement, and that each of them should obtain independent tax advice from qualified tax accountants or tax counsel prior to signing. Husband acknowledges that he has not received tax advice from his attorney in connection with this Agreement and a divorce.

Closing the door on a party claiming later that the property should have been appraised:

Fair Division. The parties agree that this Agreement is a fair division of their assets and a fair allocation of debt between them. They acknowledge that the most accurate method of determining values of assets would be to have them appraised, but they agree to save time and money as to values by relying on their own best judgment.

If a former name is to be restored, it is a good idea to include that agreement in the PSA:

Name Change. Wife may, at her sole election, have her name changed to a name of her choosing in any final Judgment of Divorce between the parties.

There is no guarantee that any of these provisions will be effective in any given court. I am offering them as a suggestion for points you might want to cover in your own PSA’s. There are certainly better or other ways to state the same points.

_______________

* “Today we hold that a property settlement agreement executed in contemplation of a divorce based upon irreconcilable differences is unenforceable when one party withdraws from the irreconcilable differences proceeding and seeks a divorce on grounds other than irreconcilable differences. Much confusion may be avoided by inserting appropriate language within the property settlement agreement which specifically addresses this contingency … the contract should specify, with particularity, within its four corners, whether it is to be limited to an irreconcilable differences divorce or whether it is intended to be binding in a divorce granted on any other grounds.” Grier v. Grier, 616 So.2d 337, 341 (Miss. 1993) [Emphasis added]. The unmodifiable (i.e. property settlement) provisions of the PSA  may be enforced by the court sans a divorce, but the modifiable (i.e. child support and custody and periodic alimony) issues may not.

JUST WHOM DO YOU REPRESENT?

January 17, 2012 § Leave a comment

Consider this scenario …

You have represented Betty Sue in several matters, including a contentious divorce, contempts, and closing on her new home. Betty Sue was so satisfied that you have ended up doing legal work for many of her family and friends. She has been quite the bonanza in terms of clientelle. One day she comes into your office with her ex and asks you to do an agreed modification so that Junior can go live with his dad in Simpson County to play football. You draft a joint petition and an agreed judgment, have everyone sign off, present it to the chancellor, and Voila! Another minor miracle to impress Betty Sue and her wide circle of family and friends.

As often happens, though, things fall apart. Junior gets into trouble and is kicked off of the football team. He is not getting along with dad, and he decides he wants to return to mom. Dad refuses. Betty Sue returns once again to your office, and you take a retainer, prep pleadings, and file for modification, fully expecting another feather in your cap. So far so good. Until …

In the mail comes a motion to disqualify you in the case on the basis that you represented both parties in that joint motion and agreed judgment. You dig up the file and to your dismay you see that nowhere on the pleading or the judgment is it indicated that you represented Betty Sue alone. The chancellor sees it the other side’s way, and you are out on your ear. Betty Sue and her family, being country folk who don’t have time for subtleties and nuances, feel that you are dropping her and maybe even have gotten in league with her ex. Ouch. To try to make amends you refund Betty Sue’s retainer so she can hire another attorney. But the damage is done.

The problem could have been avoided if you had simply included a paragraph in the pleading that spelled out that you represent Betty Sue alone in the modification, that you have given no legal advice to the ex, and that he signifies by signing that he understands that he may consult with any attorney of his choice; you should also have spelled out at your signature line “Attorney for Betty Sue _____ only,” and added pro se, after the ex’s name. That would have been plenty for the chancellor to refuse to disqualify you.

The same principle applies any time the other party is unrepresented. Be especially aware when you have a joint complaint for irreconcilable differences (ID) divorce that, since it is unethical for an attorney to represent both parties in an ID divorce, your pleading must spell out which party you represent.

And always, in your property settlement agreement (PSA), add a paragraph identifying which spouse you represent, that you have provided the unrepresented party no advice, and that the unrepresented party has had the opportunity to confer with the attorney of his or her choice. That way, when the pro se party signs the PSA, future quibbling over who you represented is effectively sealed off.

Another source of confusion over who represents whom arises in minor’s settlements. Insurance companies often hire attorneys to file the petition and have it approved by the court. Too often, though, that petition does not specify whom the attorney represents. It would seem to be a simple matter for some language like that set out above to be included in the petition and even in the judgment approving the settlement. Leaving the point ambiguous would seem to be an invitation to a fly-specking attorney to try later to get the settlement set aside. If you would like to read about how and why that might happen, check out Carpenter v. Berry, et al.

Finally, confusion over who represents whom can arise when a lawyer lets his or her name slip into the court file. That happened in my court recently when a lawyer showed up in response to an MRCP 81 summons and allowed as how she “might be hired to represent the respondent,” and signed off on an agreed order resetting the hearing. She later tried to take the position that she had never been hired and so was not in the case. Sorry, but she is in the case until the judge signs an order letting her out. Another post on when appearances can lock you into a case is here.

WE CAN NOT WALK ALONE; WE CAN NOT TURN BACK

January 16, 2012 § Leave a comment

Martin Luther King, Jr.’s speech delivered August 28, 1963, at the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C.

——————————————————–

I am happy to join with you today in what will go down in history as the greatest demonstration for freedom in the history of our nation.

Five score years ago, a great American, in whose symbolic shadow we stand today, signed the Emancipation Proclamation. This momentous decree came as a great beacon light of hope to millions of Negro slaves who had been seared in the flames of withering injustice. It came as a joyous daybreak to end the long night of their captivity.

But one hundred years later, the Negro still is not free. One hundred years later, the life of the Negro is still sadly crippled by the manacles of segregation and the chains of discrimination. One hundred years later, the Negro lives on a lonely island of poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity. One hundred years later, the Negro is still languished in the corners of American society and finds himself an exile in his own land. And so we’ve come here today to dramatize a shameful condition.

In a sense we’ve come to our nation’s capital to cash a check. When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men, yes, black men as well as white men, would be guaranteed the “unalienable Rights” of “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note, insofar as her citizens of color are concerned. Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, America has given the Negro people a bad check, a check which has come back marked “insufficient funds.”

But we refuse to believe that the bank of justice is bankrupt. We refuse to believe that there are insufficient funds in the great vaults of opportunity of this nation. And so, we’ve come to cash this check, a check that will give us upon demand the riches of freedom and the security of justice.

We have also come to this hallowed spot to remind America of the fierce urgency of Now. This is no time to engage in the luxury of cooling off or to take the tranquilizing drug of gradualism. Now is the time to make real the promises of democracy. Now is the time to rise from the dark and desolate valley of segregation to the sunlit path of racial justice. Now is the time to lift our nation from the quicksands of racial injustice to the solid rock of brotherhood. Now is the time to make justice a reality for all of God’s children.

It would be fatal for the nation to overlook the urgency of the moment. This sweltering summer of the Negro’s legitimate discontent will not pass until there is an invigorating autumn of freedom and equality. Nineteen sixty-three is not an end, but a beginning. And those who hope that the Negro needed to blow off steam and will now be content will have a rude awakening if the nation returns to business as usual. And there will be neither rest nor tranquility in America until the Negro is granted his citizenship rights. The whirlwinds of revolt will continue to shake the foundations of our nation until the bright day of justice emerges.

But there is something that I must say to my people, who stand on the warm threshold which leads into the palace of justice: In the process of gaining our rightful place, we must not be guilty of wrongful deeds. Let us not seek to satisfy our thirst for freedom by drinking from the cup of bitterness and hatred. We must forever conduct our struggle on the high plane of dignity and discipline. We must not allow our creative protest to degenerate into physical violence. Again and again, we must rise to the majestic heights of meeting physical force with soul force.

The marvelous new militancy which has engulfed the Negro community must not lead us to a distrust of all white people, for many of our white brothers, as evidenced by their presence here today, have come to realize that their destiny is tied up with our destiny. And they have come to realize that their freedom is inextricably bound to our freedom.

We cannot walk alone.

And as we walk, we must make the pledge that we shall always march ahead.

We cannot turn back.

There are those who are asking the devotees of civil rights, “When will you be satisfied?” We can never be satisfied as long as the Negro is the victim of the unspeakable horrors of police brutality. We can never be satisfied as long as our bodies, heavy with the fatigue of travel, cannot gain lodging in the motels of the highways and the hotels of the cities. We cannot be satisfied as long as the negro’s basic mobility is from a smaller ghetto to a larger one. We can never be satisfied as long as our children are stripped of their self-hood and robbed of their dignity by signs stating: “For Whites Only.” We cannot be satisfied as long as a Negro in Mississippi cannot vote and a Negro in New York believes he has nothing for which to vote. No, no, we are not satisfied, and we will not be satisfied until “justice rolls down like waters, and righteousness like a mighty stream.”¹

I am not unmindful that some of you have come here out of great trials and tribulations. Some of you have come fresh from narrow jail cells. And some of you have come from areas where your quest — quest for freedom left you battered by the storms of persecution and staggered by the winds of police brutality. You have been the veterans of creative suffering. Continue to work with the faith that unearned suffering is redemptive. Go back to Mississippi, go back to Alabama, go back to South Carolina, go back to Georgia, go back to Louisiana, go back to the slums and ghettos of our northern cities, knowing that somehow this situation can and will be changed.

Let us not wallow in the valley of despair, I say to you today, my friends.

And so even though we face the difficulties of today and tomorrow, I still have a dream. It is a dream deeply rooted in the American dream.

I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.”

I have a dream that one day on the red hills of Georgia, the sons of former slaves and the sons of former slave owners will be able to sit down together at the table of brotherhood.

I have a dream that one day even the state of Mississippi, a state sweltering with the heat of injustice, sweltering with the heat of oppression, will be transformed into an oasis of freedom and justice.

I have a dream that my four little children will one day live in a nation where they will not be judged by the color of their skin but by the content of their character.

I have a dream today!

I have a dream that one day, down in Alabama, with its vicious racists, with its governor having his lips dripping with the words of “interposition” and “nullification” — one day right there in Alabama little black boys and black girls will be able to join hands with little white boys and white girls as sisters and brothers.

I have a dream today!

I have a dream that one day every valley shall be exalted, and every hill and mountain shall be made low, the rough places will be made plain, and the crooked places will be made straight; “and the glory of the Lord shall be revealed and all flesh shall see it together.”2

This is our hope, and this is the faith that I go back to the South with.

With this faith, we will be able to hew out of the mountain of despair a stone of hope. With this faith, we will be able to transform the jangling discords of our nation into a beautiful symphony of brotherhood. With this faith, we will be able to work together, to pray together, to struggle together, to go to jail together, to stand up for freedom together, knowing that we will be free one day.

And this will be the day — this will be the day when all of God’s children will be able to sing with new meaning:

My country ’tis of thee, sweet land of liberty, of thee I sing.

Land where my fathers died, land of the Pilgrim’s pride,

From every mountainside, let freedom ring!

And if America is to be a great nation, this must become true.

And so let freedom ring from the prodigious hilltops of New Hampshire.

Let freedom ring from the mighty mountains of New York.

Let freedom ring from the heightening Alleghenies of Pennsylvania.

Let freedom ring from the snow-capped Rockies of Colorado.

Let freedom ring from the curvaceous slopes of California.

But not only that:

Let freedom ring from Stone Mountain of Georgia.

Let freedom ring from Lookout Mountain of Tennessee.

Let freedom ring from every hill and molehill of Mississippi.

From every mountainside, let freedom ring.

And when this happens, when we allow freedom ring, when we let it ring from every village and every hamlet, from every state and every city, we will be able to speed up that day when all of God’s children, black men and white men, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, will be able to join hands and sing in the words of the old Negro spiritual:

Free at last! Free at last!

Thank God Almighty, we are free at last!