CONSTITUTIONAL: MARTIN FACTORS AND GRANDPARENT VISITATION
May 21, 2012 § 3 Comments
Ever since grandparent visitation was enacted by our legislature in 1983, I have heard grumblings from some members of the bar that the statute is unconstitutional. The complaint chiefly is that it intrudes the state into the parent-child relationship and invades the province of parents’ decison-making, which should be beyond the state’s reach when the parents have not violated any laws or hurt their children.
The first test came in the case of Martin v. Coop, 693 So.2d 912 (Miss. 1997), in which the MSSC upheld the constitutionality of the statutes and established factors that trial courts were required to consider in adjudicating whether there should be grandparent visitation in a given case, and its terms.
The matter appeared to be settled until the US Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel v. Granville, 530 US 57 (2000), which held a visitation statute of the State of Washington to be unconstitutional. In Troxel the opponents saw another avenue of attack, and it was only a matter of time before the issue would percolate up from a trial court.
The first case in the aftermath of Troxel was Zeman v. Stanford, 789 So.2d 798 (Miss. 2001), in which the appellants questioned the constitutionality of MCA 93-16-3(1), which affords grandparental visitation when the parents are divorced and one parent has been awarded custody. The court in Zeman held that the constitutionality of that very statute had already been addressed and found constitutional in Martin v. Coop, and that Troxel added nothing new to the conversation.
The most recent iteration on the subject came in the case of Smith v. Wilson, an appeal from Chancellor Jim Davidson’s ruling in Lowndes County Chancery Court. In this case, the grandparents had sought visitation on the basis that their daughter, the child’s mother, had died. The judge granted the visitation in favor of the Wilsons, and the Smiths appealed, questioning the constitutionality of both MCA 93-16-3 and 93-16-5 in light of Troxel.
In its May 3, 2010, opinion authored by Justice King, the court first distinguished the statute deemed unconstitutional in Troxel. That Washington law provided:
Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of circumstances.
The statute was too broad in scope, since it did not define any specific class of persons who would have standing to petition for visitation, and it did not protect the parent’s right to make decisions about rearing her children. As for other non-parental visitation statutes, the Supreme Court declined to go further, stating:
Because much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific non-parental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter.
Justice King pointed out that the Mississippi statute is not overly broad as was the statute in Troxel, and that both Martin and Zeman correctly dispose of the constitutionality argument through the application of the Martin factors, which protect the parents’ substantive due process rights. The court held that neither of the statutes nor the Martin factors violate the Constitution.
A couple of other points from the decision:
- The Smiths’ argument that the burden of proof should be by clear and convincing evidence, was rejected by the court, which found no authority for the proposition (¶¶ 26-27).
- The court found (¶30) no merit to the argument that chancellors should be required to defer to parents’ wishes. The court stated that “While a chancellor should accord special weight to a parent’s wishes, there is no automatic right to deference.
- Also rejected was the Smith’s argument that a parent must be found unfit before awarding grandparent visitation (¶¶31-32).
- The court held (¶¶33-35) that there is no requirement in the statute providing for visitation by the parents of a dead parent that there have been an unreasonable denial of visitation as a prerequisite.
The decision, joined in by all nine justices, affirmed Judge Davidson’s award of grandparent visitation.
So it would appear that the constitutionality of Mississippi’s grandparent visitation is laid to rest, at least for now. I do not know whether a petition for rehearing has been filed, but that would likely be a futile gesture considering the unanimity of the court. Maybe the appellants are maneuvering for a run at the US Supreme Court. We’ll see.
It’s worth noting as well that the primary basis for overturning the grandparent visitation statute was that it was overly broad and it’s sweeping breadth offended the Due Process rights of parents.
Mississippi’s grandparent visitation statute was actually singled out by the United States Supreme Court in Troxel as an example of a statute which provides the types of limitations necessary to protect due process.
Thanks for pointing that out. I’ll have to re-read Troxel to catch that.
Should be at 530 U.S. at 71.