A COSTLY LESSON IN PSA DRAFTSMANSHIP
July 21, 2011 § 3 Comments
What does this fairly commonplace paragraph from a PSA mean:
School and Extracurricular Expenses. Husband and Wife shall each be responsible for one-half (1/2) of all school and extra-curricular expenses incurred by the minor child including but not limited to the cost of books, activity fees, lab fees, school uniforms, tuition, and sports equipment.
Does that provision refer to private elementary and/or high school? Or does it refer to college? Is the language ambiguous?
In McLeod v. McLeod, decided July 19, 2011, by the COA, those questions were presented squarely to the appellate court.
Judge Griffis wrote the opinion that held the language above to encompass all levels of education, and rejected both the arguments that the language was ambiguous and that private elementary and high school expenses are usually included in child support as the court had held in Southerland v. Southerland, 816 So.2d 1004 (Miss. 2002), and Moses v. Moses, 879 So.2d 1043 (Miss. App. 2004). The opinion distinguished the two cases from the facts in this case. The COA decision is worth a read, and I will not rehash it further here.
The point I want to make is how important it is to be aware of precision in your draftsmanship. It would have been a simple matter for the husband’s attorney to clarify the language to specify that it pertained to college, if that was, in fact, the agreement.
Some PSA’s lack clarity. The meaning is hidden behind a cloud of words. That was not the problem in this COA case, but it’s a common problem nonetheless. You can read some ideas for clearer draftsmanship here.
Mostly, though, it seems that we sometimes get in too much of a hurry. The client may be pressing or you put off tending to it until you had no more time to spare. Haste is the enemy of precision.
Make time to set aside what you have drafted for at least a few hours or a couple of days. Then pick it back up and look at it through fresh eyes. Put yourself in the role of a judge who is reviewing it. You know what you meant to say, but will that judge looking through different eyes see it the same way? Are there more precise words that could be used? Is what you have written susceptible to more than one interpretation? Is there something there that can come back and bite your client?
You want your PSA’s — and everything you draft, including pleadings, contracts, briefs — to say exactly what you mean to say and to promote the best interest of your client. Take your time on draftsmanship. Haste is the enemy of precision.
COA SINKS ANOTHER APPEAL FROM A LESS-THAN-FINAL JUDGMENT
July 20, 2011 § 4 Comments
It was only last month that the COA dispatched two appeals to dismissal-land because they were taken from less-than-final judgments. You can click the link to read about Jackson v. Lowe and S.E.B. v. R.E.B. The underlying principle is, you will recall, that an appeal only lies from a final judgment, and if any issues remain unadjudicated and not addressed as required in MRCP 54(b), your appeal will be dismissed.
The COA once again confronted the issue in R.A.S. Jr., K.S., A.S, V.S. and M.S. v. S.S., rendered July 19, 2011. In that case, the appellant, referred to as “Matt,” had filed a Chancery Court modification action seeking to reduce his $6,900 per month child support. His ex, “Anna,” responded by charging him with molesting one of their children. The charges were nol prossed, and Matt countered with a chancery motion for an accounting of the child support. Later, he filed an amended petition asking to “reform” original decree provisions for child support and custody.
The chancellor held a motion hearing and, without hearing any evidence, ruled from the bench that he was going to leave physical custody and legal custody as they were. He stated, “I’m not here today to decide [the modification issue] … I’m not going to address those motions stoday as to whether or not they meet the legal standard.” The judge later entered an order denying Matt’s request for an accounting, reserving ruling on the modification.
Matt filed a motion for a new trial (Note: in chancery this is a motion for rehearing, traditionally referred to as a motion for reconsideration), and Anna filed a motion for payment of certain expenses provided in the original judgment. The judge overruled Matt’s motion and denied Anna’s motion without addressing certain transportation expenses she had requested.
Matt complained on appeal that the chancellor refused to allow him to present evidence on his modification pleading, instead putting off a hearing so that Anna’s parenting could be monitored. A guardian ad litem had been appointed.
In every one of the chancellor’s rulings cited by the COA, it is clear that the judge was not making a final ruling. The COA said at ¶ 20 that
“The chancellor’s orders here were not final. We fully recognize that child-custody decisions are always subject to modification until the children’s emancipation. And no judgment entered is final in the sense of ending the case until that point. However, that the case involves custody modification does not eliminate the requirement that the chancellor enter a final, appealable judgment. Absent proper Rule 54(b) certification or the supreme court’s permission to proceed on an interlocutory appeal, which are both lacking here, piecemeal appeals are not allowed.
The chancellor clearly deferred ruling on contested issues, which he had not revisited when the parties appealed. Because we find the chancellor did not enter a final, appealable judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”
The court also pointed out that the supreme court has held in Michael v. Michael, 650 S0.2d 469, 471 (Miss. 1995), that parties may not appeal from a temporary order.
From Judge Maxwell’s opinion in this case, it appears that the record was somewhat confused. It may have been confusing to counsel as to exactly what matters were being addressed in which proceedings. I suggest you get a clear understanding with your chancellor either before hearing or when he casts the pleadings at the outset of trial as to what matters will be addressed. If you’re perplexed that the judge won’t address a certain issue at a certain time, try to pin him down on the record as to when, exactly, you can be heard on the issue.
In any event, the COA has once again sent an important message to trial and appellate counsel: If you don’t have a final, appealable judgment, your appeal will be dismissed.
ALL THAT GLITTERS IS NOT GOULD
July 19, 2011 § 1 Comment
The hamlet of Gould, Arkansas, population 850 or so, has a lot in common with 1939 Munich, Germany. If the Gould City Council has its way, citizens in Gould will enjoy the same lack of basic civil rights that Germans did under the Nazis more than 70 years ago.
You see, the City Council of Gould last week enacted a city ordinance that states “No new organizations shall be allowed to exist within the city of Gould without approval from majority of the city council.” The Mayor vetoed the ordinance, complaining that it was patently unconstitutional, but the council is expected to override the veto.
I have not read the ordinance in its entirety, but I saw one of the council members interviewed on Memphis news last weekend, and she explained that any group will need to convince the council of the merits of their group. Once satisfied, the council will grant permission for it to meet, and will decide what limitations will be imposed. “You can’t just come in here, get with four people and decide to start an organization,” she said, adding, “You will go through your city council with legal documentation and get approval.” The councilwoman said that someone has to be in control, and the city council is there for that purpose. That’s the way it works, she said; you go to the person in control and get permission.
Prohibited would be unauthorized meetings between citizens and the mayor, meetings of civic groups and church groups, and even family conversations about politics over the dinner table — unless the council grants its blessing.
It seems that the council was reacting to a local group that had been formed to question and criticize the council’s actions in not funding improvements to the community sewer system, or some such dispute, and the council did not appreciate the criticism. Their solution to the criticism was to eliminate it rather than address its substance. In other words, when you are faced with opposition, eliminate it.
There is no question that government without opposition is much more efficient and easy than when plain old voters get in the way. Ask any Nazi or Soviet, or any other totalitarian; they’ll tell you how much easier things flow when the citizenry doesn’t get in the way. Democracy is messy and contentious. Feelings get hurt. Things get said. Due process gums up the works. Dictatorship flows so much more smoothly.
But the First Amendent unquestionably gives the citizens of Gould, as citizens of the United States, the right to assemble peaceably, to speak out, to criticize, and to be heard by their elected officials. Our government is designed to let “we the people” mouth off, gripe to high heaven, and raise all manner of ruckus. Our forefathers launched a revolution based on the fact that the English tyrant would not pay any heed to their grievances. It’s no accident that the fundamental rights to speak, assemble and petition are in the very First Amendment to our Constitution.
I hope that someone from Little Rock pays a friendly visit to the misguided town council of Gould and convinces them of the obvious: that they are in violation of the law, and that they will save their town and taxpayers a lot of money by not requiring this sad episode to go to litigation involving lots of scarce dollars for attorneys fees. Scarce dollars that could be used to fix that sewer system.
PUBLICATION PROCESS: THE NIGHTMARE CONTINUES
July 18, 2011 § 1 Comment
Thank goodness most, if not all, lawyers are paragons of mental health. Otherwise they would regularly be reduced to quivering, sobbing hulks curled in a fetal position on the office hook rug, terrorized by the veritable panoply of unseen legal bugaboos that can bite them, sometimes fatally, in the butt. These legal viruses are not mere phantasms; they infest your files, lurking there invisible like the dust mites that feast on your body while you sleep. <Shiver>
MRCP 4(c)(4)
I have already warned you about the dangerous propensity of MRCP 4 publication process to devour entire cases whole. It’s a rule that can transform your case from a delightful, playful puppy dog into an undead, zombie-esque creature that will turn on you and try to drink your blood and eat your skin.
Just when you were growing comfortable with your new-found awareness of Rule 4’s parlous proclivities, here comes something else to worry about.
It’s Article 6, §169 of the Mississippi Constitution, which is entitled, “Style of Process.” It states in pertinent part: “The style of all process shall be ‘The State of Mississippi …’ ”
Given the fact that the MSSC and COA have strictly interpreted Rule 4 as it applies to publication, I think you would be wise to look at your process forms and make sure that every one includes THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI. Look at MRCP Forms 1C, 1D and 1DD. Notice that each includes the style of the case, which includes the court, county and state, and the language THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI. Redundant? Perhaps. An additional line you have to pay for? Absolutely. Necessary? You bet; it’s required by our state constitution!
Chancellor George Warner consistently found process inadequate that did not include the requisite language. Over the years, we have grown less vigilant, and now you can find process in the newspaper that lacks the proper style. I predict that someone will raise this point on appeal and that the appellate court will say, “Sorry, you goofed up and violated the Mississippi Constitution; your process is no good, the court had no jurisdiction, and this case is reversed.”
Now uncurl yourself from that fetal ball, brush yourself off, and start fixing your forms. THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI. Add the words in where they belong. Take pride in the fact that you have avoided being a victim of this peril. And rest easy for now … until the next legal plague that will try to drink your blood and eat your skin.
Thanks to attorney Leonard Cobb.
DICTA
July 15, 2011 § 2 Comments
- Starbucks and bankruptcy were made for each other. Coffee drinkers need their fix(es) each and every day, and Starbucks offers a pretty dang good coffee product that makes you want more and more and more. At about $4 a cup, though, it doesn’t take too long to make a sizeable dent in your bank account. SquawkFox has a recipe for a frappuccino it claims is every bit as good as Starbucks, and every bit as fattening, and all the ingredients together cost only $.32. The recipe also discloses the secret ingredient that will make your home-made cup identical to the store-bought. Making it at home will save you about $3.40 a cup over usual Starbucks prices. At one frap a day for a 30-day month, that’s a savings of $102 a month. You can use that money to pay in part for time at the gym.
- I keep saying I am going to try this sticky balsamic rib recipe, but I never seem to get around it. So maybe one of you could do it and let us all know how it turned out. Looks delicious.
- Should there be a code of ethics for bloggers?
- Curvy, Louisiana? That’s what Baton Rouge would be renamed if you made an atlas of the US and renamed US communites according to the adjectives most used by users of dating web sites to describe themselves. Check out my home town of Tissue, LA.
- “This is a private matter,” said the victim in a California case in which his estranged wife poisoned his food, tied him to a bed, severed his — uh — “private matter,” and threw it into a garbage disposal before calling the police. This development should spice up their pending divorce considerably.
- Picklefreak.com is the creation of Monroe County native Katy Tackett, who is to pickles what Carl Sagan was to the cosmos.
The well-attired pickle freak at Mardi Gras
WHY NOT MISSISSIPPI?
July 14, 2011 § 7 Comments
As I write this, around 500 Mississippi lawyers and judges, many with their families, are in Destin, Florida, for this year’s bar association meeting. That is around 1,000 Mississippians who are spending Mississippi dollars in Florida hotels, on Florida golf courses, in Florida restaurants and bars, in Florida shops, on Florida souvenirs, on Florida fishing charters and equipment, and at Florida gas stations and convenience stores.
Why is Mississippi not worthy of this largesse?
Admittedly, when the Mississippi Bar made its move away from Mississippi back in the 80’s, the coast was a tired place in serious need of updating, but that was before the casinos. Now, even after Katrina, the coast is well able to accommodate the brigade of lawyers and their retinue. There are hotels, casinos, restaurants and shops, there are fishing charters, excursions and every conceivable amenity.
Money spent by the bar members here in Mississippi would pay Mississippi jobs, put money in the pockets of Mississippi vendors, and directly benefit the coast … and any other area with a fitting venue, like, for instance, Desoto County, Jackson, Vicksburg or Natchez. Even if the bar were to meet in Mississippi every other year, that would be a positive.
And it would be a plus in the eyes of Mississippians for a profession that continues to be cynically judged from the Scruggs fallout.
Why not Mississippi?
THE LAWYER’S MISSION IN LIFE
July 13, 2011 § Leave a comment
The Mississippi Bar Association annual meeting commences today in faraway, sunny Florida. I thought this would be a propitious time to look back more than a hundred years at the proceedings of the association in its earliest days.
On May 5-7, 1908, the Mississipi State Bar Association held its third annual meeting in Meridian.
Various papers were presented, among them “Railroads and the People,” Suggestions of Error, Legal and Otherwise,” “Reminiscences of a Few Mississippi Lawyers,” and “The Power of the Courts.”
The convention even adopted a resolution that, because their presence would “lend grace and dignity to its annual meeting and wisdom of its deliberations,” members in future were “invited to attend sessions accompanied by their wives, daughters, sisters and sweethearts as the condition may then exist.” That language of that resolution sounds patronizing to us more than a century later, but we need to keep in mind that lawyers in those days were, if not exclusively male, almost exclusively male, and their language reflected not only that reality but also the more patriarchal usages of the day, which used the masculine gender to denote the general, as the text below shows.
Another of the papers delivered at that meeting was by Meridian’s own S. A. Witherspoon, who spoke on “The Lawyer’s Mission in Life.” The language is perhaps too flowery for todays tastes, but the message is no less relevant and thoughtful now than it was 102 years ago. It is too long to reproduce in its entirety, but here are some excerpts:
- ” … if the exigencies of [the lawyer’s] professional duties do not lead him into the investigation of the truth and require the exercises of his powers in maintaining the cause of justice, and demand the aid of his influence in establishing the great law of love between man and man, then the lawyer’s life work is at war with his better nature, and deterioration instead of development must be his certain doom.”
- “… in the solution of all political, social and religious problems that affect the happiness of humanity [lawyers] have been found in the front ranks, and the cause of freedom, justice and morality has found in them its most devoted and ablest advocates.”
- “The strife, contention and never ending warfare of the lawyer’s life may conceal from the casual observer its logical relation and productive tendency toward the peace, goodwill and love among men, but it should be remembered that the legal battle which he constantly wages merely takes the place of violence and bloodshed of the barbarian, and that the lawyer in civilized life simply confines the fighting, which seems to be a necessity of humanity, within the ranks of his own profession, and this relieves his fellow men of the evils of human warfare.”
- “But the prominent feature of the lawyer’s work is the problem of truth, and his greatest difficulty is measured by its laborious discovery.”
- “And the light of his truth, streaming through all the walks of human life, as distinctly marks the lawyer’s mission as does the warmth and light that gives life and beauty to the flowers and defines the mission of the sunbeam.”
- “The mission of the lawyer is not confined to the court room and does not end when the decree or judgment of the court is placed on the minutes, but it extends into all the affairs of men, and finds its last boundary at that point where his service is not needed for the betterment of humanity.”
- “The professional duties of the lawyer develop in him a capacity for the ascertainment of truth, a power to explain and expound it to others, and the art and ability to advocate the cause of justice, and to win the triumph of right; and the possession of any power involves the duty of exercising it for the good of others. He has no right to bury his talent, or to hide his candle under a bushel. Whatever advantage and superiority he may enjoy over his fellow men is the result of his relation to society and the special privileges which it has granted him. And, therefore, I say that in all the religious, moral, social, and industrial controversies that divide the people, the lawyer is obliged to take part, and to give them the benefit of whatever wisdom and virtue he may possess.”
Excerpted from “The Mississippi Bar’s Centennial: A Legacy of Service,” 2006 by the Mississippi Bar.
CHIRP, CHIRP
July 12, 2011 § 2 Comments
Lawyer, meet stress. It’s your bane, your motivator, your constant companion, your all-too-familiar demon. It comes from clients, deadlines, judges, finances, family and ethics. It visits you on the day the bills are due, the day after those requests for admissions were unansweredly due, at 2:00 a.m., and when you walk in the court room door. It can make you sick, grumpy, sad, drunk, ineffective, inattentive, erratic and even violent. It’s part of the job. Learn to live with it or die.
So kick back and allow a respite in your busy routine to let your blood pressure subside. Here are some calming nature sounds to help salve your bruised psyche. Chill.
“A PERILOUS MISTAKE” IN HANDLING FIDUCIARY MATTERS
July 11, 2011 § 8 Comments
Lawyers in my district are aware that I have begun cracking down on the handling of estates, guardianships and conservatorships. Delinquent and inadequate accountings, lack of inventories, absence of vouchers and other deficiencies are no longer tolerated.
My motivation in part has been the fact that there are lawsuits pending against local lawyers claiming mishandling of fiduciary matters. On the coast only last year, it was discovered that a lawyer serving as county administrator until his death may have misappropriated funds in excess of a million dollars.
If you’re going to handle probate matters, understand that as the lawyer you have a grave responsibility for which you may be held liable by judgment for the proper handling of the estate by the fiduciary. Let me repeat that you may be held liable by judgment.
My responsibility as chancellor is not only to ensure that the assets and rights of the ward or estate are protected, but also to see that the attorney does not err.
To get an idea of the gravity, you need to read and take to heart the Mississippi Supreme Court’s decision in Matthews v. Williams, 633 So.2d 1038 (Miss. 1994). In that case, the conservator failed to file an inventory and, when he finally did, omitted financial assets. He failed to file accountings, and when he finally did reported expenditures made without any prior approval of the court. He made investments without approval of the court, and was unable to account properly for them. The chancellor approved his actions, but when that chancellor left office, the next chancellor granted a petition to remove the conservator. Here are some key excerpts from the court’s opinion (beginning at page 1039):
Every guardian shall, within three months after his appointment, return to the court, under oath, a true and perfect inventory of the estate, real and personal, and of all money or other things which he may have received as the property of his ward; and he shall return additional inventories of whatever he may subsequently receive. And he shall annually return an inventory, under oath, of the increase of the estate, if there be any. A guardian who shall fail to return inventories may be removed and his bond put in suit, unless he can show cause for the default. (Emphasis added)
The first inventory was not filed until February 23, 1988, a year and two months following Dan’s appointment. It did not mention bonds owned by the estate. The third inventory filed May 13, 1990, purporting to show the inventory of the estate as of December 31, 1989, lists “Series E. Bonds $2,063.22.”
The bonds were first identified by serial number and date of purchase in the fourth inventory showing assets as of December 18, 1990, and filed January 7, 1991, which states: “Series E Bonds (all $25.00/7 year Bonds),” and then lists twenty-seven bonds by serial number and showing dates of purchase from July 1966 through July 1969. Subsequent inventories were not timely filed, and no reason was given therefor. There is no explanation for failure to include the bonds.
II. ANNUAL ACCOUNTS
It shall be the duty of the guardian … to improve the estate committed to his charge, and to apply so much of the income, profit or body thereof as may be necessary for the comfortable maintenance and support of the ward and of his family, if he have any, after obtaining an order of the court fixing the amount…. The guardian is empowered to collect and sue for and recover all debts due his said ward … (Emphasis added)
This statute requires that a court order fixing the amount to be spent for the care and maintenance of the ward be obtained prior to making such expenditures. Dan simply made the expenditures as he saw fit. When this Court addressed such action in Welch v. Childers, 195 Miss. 415, 420, 15 So.2d 690, 691 (1943), we held:
A minor under guardianship is a ward of the Chancery Court. All receipts and disbursements of his estate are required to be under the authority and direction of the Chancery Court or the Chancellor in vacation. The expenses for the maintenance and support of the ward cannot be proved in any other way. The object of the law is to guard against dishonesty and mismanagement of the estate by the guardian…. The law does not leave the amount of the expenditures by the guardian for the maintenance, support and education to (the guardian’s) discretion. The sum must be fixed by the court. If the guardian contracts therefor without the sanction of the Chancery Court or Chancellor, the liability therefor is personal to him, and he cannot be allowed for it in his accounts for the ward. The guardian has no power to bind the estate of his ward without the sanction of the Chancery Court or the Chancellor.
That prior court approval is absolutely required by statute before a conservator makes expenditures seems never to have occurred to counsel representing Dan or the chancellor who then examined and approved them. Expenditures for the care and maintenance of Mrs. Mathews and her property were made by Dan as though he had some blanket power of attorney to spend as he thought best, and only then report it to a chancellor. No explanation was offered to the chancellor for all these expenditures having been made without court approval, nor did the chancellor require one. This is of profound concern to this Court. We again remind attorneys for estates of wards and decedents and the chancellors who examine accounts and inventories that they, too, have special and far-reaching fiduciary duties. It was the obligation of the attorney to advise the conservator as to his statutory duties, responsibilities, and limitations on expenditures. As for chancellors, a chancellor who must approve accounts and inventories has a duty beyond deciding lawsuits. He is under an obligation first to see that accounts and inventories filed comply with the statutes before he approves them. He is also the “superior guardian” of the ward. This Court long ago in Union Chevrolet Co. v. Arrington, 162 Miss. 816, 826, 827, 138 So. 593, 595 (1932), held:
Infants and persons of unsound mind are disabled under the law to act for themselves. Long ago it became the established rule for the court of chancery to act as the superior guardian for all persons under such disability. This inherent and traditional power and protective duty is made complete and irrefragable by the provisions of our present state constitution. It is not competent for the Legislature to abate the said powers and duties or for the said court to omit or neglect them. It is the inescapable duty of the said court and or the chancellor to act with constant care and solicitude towards the preservation and protection of the rights of infants and persons non compos mentis. The court will take nothing as confessed against them; will make for them every valuable election; will rescue them from faithless guardians, designing strangers, and even from unnatural parents, and in general will and must take all necessary steps to conserve and protect the best interest of these wards of the court. The court will not and cannot permit the rights of an infant to be prejudiced by an waiver, or omission or neglect or design of a guardian, or of any other person, so far as within the power of the court to prevent or correct. Grif.Chan.Prac. §§ 45, 360, 530, 533. All persons who deal with guardians or with courts in respect to the rights of infants are charged with the knowledge of the above principles, and act to the contrary thereof at their peril. (Emphasis added) Also, Mississippi State Bar Association v. Moyo, 525 So.2d 1289, 1293 (Miss.1988).
Solicitors for guardians and conservators and chancellors who must approve their accounts and inventories who ignore these fiduciary responsibilities make a perilous mistake. [Note from the opinion: We are not comforted by the May 18, 1990, decree approving the third annual account in which the chancellor first authorized the conservator to “pay all future medical, personal, and other expenses for the creature comforts of Frances Mathews.” With no representation from Dan as to why any of these expenses might be, the chancellor gave him blanket authorization to expend his estate’s funds.
IV. INVESTMENTS WITHOUT COURT APPROVAL
Whenever the guardian shall have money of his ward not needed for current expenditures, or directed to be invested for the ward, he shall apply to the court, or chancellor in vacation, for direction as to the disposition he shall make of it. The court or chancellor shall determine whether he shall lend it at interest, and upon what security, or how he shall dispose of it. If the court or chancellor designate the person to whom the loan shall be made, or the security on which it shall be made, and the loan to be so made, responsibility shall not attach thereafter to the guardian; but if the court or chancellor shall entrust him with discretion in the matter, he shall be bound for the exercise of sound judgment…. Any guardian who fails to report to the court the fact that he has money of his ward not needed or allowed to be used for current expenditures, and to ask the order of the court as to the disposition of such money, may be chargeable with interest on the same at the rate of eight per centum (8%) per annum during the time of failure. (Emphasis added)
Moreover, we have been unable to trace the certificates of deposit from one accounting period to the next because the numbers identifying them differed. Interest proceeds appear to have been treated inconsistently, some deposited in the ward’s checking account, other reinvested. Interest deposited in the checking account identified by certificate of deposit numbers differed from the numbers identifying the certificates in the inventory for that period.
On January 23, 1987, Dan petitioned and on January 26, 1987, received court approval to commence legal action to recover money fraudulently obtained from her. No report was ever made to the court of the outcome of this action.
V. QUESTIONABLE EXPENDITURES
We do not have before us and do not address the justification for any expenditures made by Dan as conservator, or their reasonableness or necessity. These may be proper inquiries upon remand. Neville v. Kelso, 247 So.2d 828, 834-835 (Miss.1971).
The chancellor should also upon remand see that inventories reflect and accurately trace the investment of all funds.
Our sole inquiry on this appeal is whether the chancellor abused his discretion in removing Dan as conservator, and for the reasons set forth she clearly did not. Harris v. King, 480 So.2d 1131, 1132 (Miss.1985); Conner v. Polk, 161 Miss. 24, 29, 133 So. 604, 605 (1931).
I don’t know how it could be any clearer. You deal lackadaisically with probate matters at your peril. Your law license, your reputation as an attorney, your malpractice coverage, and even your own assets are on the line. I am not being melodramatic when I say this; I am being completely truthful and trying to wave a huge caution flag. Matthews v. Williams makes it abundantly clear that the approval of the chancellor will not shield you or your fiduciary.
The Better Chancery Practice Blog 