FINAL DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY IN JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY
January 6, 2011 § 3 Comments
MCA § 93-5-24 provides that the joint legal custodians shall “share the decison-making rights, the responsibilities and the authority relating to the health, education and welfare of a child,” and “An award of joint legal custody obligates the parties to exchange information concerning the health, education and welfare of the minor child, and to confer with each other in the exercise of the decision-making rights, responsibilities and authority.”
The problem is that the statute does not delineate exactly how final decisions will be made after the conferring is done. Common sense tells us that there can not be a committee of two. What if, for instance, the father demands that the child attend military school in Chattanooga, but the mother is just as adamant that the child attend Lamar in Meridian? Or how about if one parent believes that the child should have botox injections for cosmetic reasons and the other is opposed? Or one parent takes the position that the child should take ADHD medication, and the other is opposed to medication? Or one wants the child to have the usual childhood immunizations and the other does not out of fear of autism. The statute does not inform us how those ties or any others, some involving important decisions about the children, will be broken.
In this district, both chancellors take the position that joint legal custody is not in the best interest of the child and will not be approved unless there is some form of a tie-breaker provision.
Some lawyers try to skirt the problem by providing in a PSA that the parent with physical custody at the time will have final decision-making authority. This approach does not work, however, because the effect of life-affecting decisions like those enumerated above carry over into the other parent’s custodial time in shared physical custody arrangements.
Most PSA’s address the issue by providing that one parent or the other will have final decision-making, or tie-breaking, authority. That still means that both parents must confer, consult and participate in the decision-making process as required by the statute. Although the physical custodian is the most logical tie-breaker, I had a case once where the mother had sole physical custody and the parents shared joint legal custody of a paraplegic child. They agreed that the father would have final decision-making authority because he would continue to be responsible to transport the child to and from school, to and from all of his activities and family and church events, and to and from Birmingham for numerous and frequent medical visits.
It is okay to allocate responsibility between the parents, as, for instance, where the father is going to pay for private school, and the parties agree that he will have final decision-making authority as to the child’s education, with the mother to make final decisons as to the health and welfare. In such a case, it would be wise to define exactly what the scope of authority would be as to education, since the three realms of decison-making overlap somewhat. For instance: “Father shall have the final decision-making authority as to which school the child will attend in Lauderdale County so long as both parties reside therein; all other decisions will be finally decided by the mother.”
In cases where one parent is the sole physical custodian, the case of Clements v Young, 481 So.2d 263, 266 (Miss. 1985), offers a little help and guidance. In that case, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated:
“Our law necessarily provides that the award of custody to a parent incident to a separation or divorce vests in the custodial parent the right to make, and responsibility for making, day to day decisions regarding the care and welfare of the children. Except as otherwise agreed by the parties in writing, the custodial parent may determine the child’s upbringing, including his education and health and dental care. Such discretion is inherent in custody. It is vested in the custodial spouse though not spelled out in detail in a separation agreement or custody decree.”
Clements does not address what happens where the parties “otherwise agree in writing,” as where they agree to joint legal custody with one to have sole custody. Have they “otherwise agreed” that the sole physical custodian will no longer have final decision authority, or is it presumed that the physical custodian will have it? Clements involved other issues and so is distinguishable on its facts. In my opinion, the best practice where one parent is the physical custodian and they share joint legal custody is simply to name the final decision-maker in the PSA.
An important reminder: I posted before about the danger of relying on the term “primary physical custody.” Designation of one parent as “primary” physical or legal custodian has no legal meaning whatsoever, and will not impart decision-making authority.