Child Support Deviation for Daycare
September 9, 2014 § 1 Comment
MCA 43-19-103 is an intriguing statute. For those of you who every now and then look at the Mississippi Code, you will find much there that will assist you in advising your clients in child support cases, whether original or modification.
Section 103 sets out the so-called “deviation criteria” upon which a chancellor may rely in finding that application of the statutory child support guidelines in MCA 43-19-101 would be unjust or inappropriate.
In particular, I want to call to your attention that the Mississippi Legislature in 2012 amended the statute to add subsection (i), which reads as follows:
Payment by the obligee of child care expenses in order that the obligee may seek or retain employment, or because of the disability of the obligee.
This subsection allows the judge to find that the child care expenses for employment or occasioned by disability skew the payee’s expenses to the extent that a deviation upward from the guidelines is justified.
I don’t know about you, but when I practiced I saw many cases where the chancellor awarded strictly guideline child support, which was barely enough to pay the custodial parent’s daycare expenses so that she could work in a low-paying job. There was nothing left over to pay other expenses of the child, which fell on the mother to bear.
The most recent case in which a chancellor’s deviation based on daycare expenses was upheld is Marin v. Stewart, a COA case decided September 24, 2013, about which I previously posted here. My earlier post focused on the point that the chancellor is not required to address each and every deviation factor if she concludes that deviation is appropriate, but only those that apply in the case.
Before you launch off into your next child support case — whether you represent the payor or payee — study Section 103 and see whether there is anything there that will help your case. As I have said many times here before: when you save your clients money, they love you; and when you cost your clients money, they hate you.
You Can Use Escalation Clauses Once Again
September 8, 2014 § Leave a comment
The landmark case of Tedford v. Dempsey, 437 So.2d 410 (Miss. 1983), is notable primarily as the case that firmly established the age of 21 as the ultimate age of emancipation in Mississippi.
Tedford is also the case that encouraged lawyers and judges to incorporate child support escalation clauses into their PSA’s and judgments. This is the specific language from the opinion:
“Quote Unquote”
September 5, 2014 § Leave a comment
“Knowledge is proud that he has learn’d so much; Wisdom is humble that he knows no more.” — William Cowper
“Wisdom does not show itself so much in precept as in life — in a firmness of mind and mastery of appetite. It teaches us to do, as well as to talk; and to make our actions and words all of a color.” — Seneca
“The question is, whether, like the Divine Child in the Temple, we are turning knowledge into wisdom, and whether, understanding more of the mysteries of life, we are feeling more of its sacred law; and whether, having left behind the priests and the scribes and the doctors and the fathers, we are about our Father’s business, and becoming wise to God.” — Frederick William Robertson
In Terrorem Now has an Exception
September 4, 2014 § 5 Comments
In terrorem clauses, as you will recall dimly from law school, are provisions in wills and trusts that prohibit any beneficiary who contests the instrument from taking anything through it, in effect creating a forfeiture. They are designed to be a potent deterrent to litigation among the beneficiaries.
Mississippi has long adhered to the rule that, unless a particular provision is contrary to law, a testator or settlor is allowed to make any provisions for disposition of his property that he sees fit to make, including in terrorem clauses.
Here is a specimen in terrorem clause from a will:
If any beneficiary hereunder (including, but not limited to, any beneficiary of a trust created herein) shall contest the probate or validity of this Will or any provision thereof, or shall institute or join in (except as a party defendant) any proceeding to contest the validity of this Will or to prevent any provision thereof from being carried out in accordance with its terms (regardless of whether or not such proceedings are instituted in good faith and with probable cause), then all benefits provided for such beneficiary are revoked and such benefits shall pass to the residuary beneficiaries of this Will. . . .
That language was the subject of litigation in the MSSC case of Parker v. Benoist, decided by the MSSC on August 28, 2014.
William Benoist had admitted the 2010 will of his father, B.D. Benoist, to probate. It included the in terrorem language set out above. William’s sister, Bronwyn, who was a co-fiduciary with William over some of their father’s assets, filed a will contest charging undue influence, and asking the court for an accounting, to void any benefits William received as a result of his undue influence, and for equitable relief.
Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict that, although there was evidence of a confidential relationship, there was no evidence of undue influence. The chancellor then ruled that the in terrorem clause was valid and enforceable, and that, as a result, Bronwyn took nothing under the will. Bronwyn appealed.
In a case of first impression, the MSSC reversed the chancellor’s enforcement of the in terrorem clause. This language is from ¶ 1:
In this appeal, we must determine whether Mississippi law should recognize a good faith and probable cause exception to a forfeiture in terrorem clause in a will. We hold that it should, and that Bronwyn has sufficiently shown that her suit was brought in good faith and was founded upon probable cause.
At ¶ 8, the court, in an opinion written by Justice Kitchens, said that “We hold that such a provision is unconstitutional under Mississippi’s Constitution, void as against public policy, and fundamentally inequitable, and we join the large number of jurisdictions who permit a good faith and probable cause exception to forfeiture clauses in wills.”
The opinion goes on to say that such clauses frustrate the fundamental purpose of courts, which is to detemine the truth and to decide whether or not a will is valid, contrary to the Mississippi Constitution’s guarantee of the right of access to the courts. Although forfeiture provisions may serve the useful purpose of discouraging and punishing persons from seeking unjustified enrichment and corecive settlements, they go too far when they deprive the court of its duty to determine the validity of a donative transfer. The solution is to allow a good faith and probable cause exception. This is what the court said at ¶ 14:
… The will of the testator should control, but courts exist to determine whether the testator’s will is a valid reflection of the testator’s wishes. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “probate” as a “[c]ourt procedure by which a will is proved to be valid or invalid. . . .” Black’s Law Dictionary 1081 (5th ed. 1979). By definition, probating a will is proving that it is valid. This must occur through litigation. A strict interpretation of no-contest provisions in wills would hamper courts’ goal of determining what is, once and for all, the will of the testator. A bona fide inquiry into the validity of the will should not be defeated by language contained in the will itself. We hold that, in Mississippi, forfeiture provisions in wills are enforceable unless a contest is brought in good faith and based on probable cause. “Probable cause exists when, at the time of instituting the proceeding, there was evidence that would lead a reasonable person, properly informed and advised, to conclude that there was a substantial likelihood that the challenge would be successful.” Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers at § 8.5 cmt. c. The determination of good faith and probable cause should be inferred from the totality of the circumstances. [Emphasis added]
The bottom line in this case is that, although in terrorem clauses can still be used in wills and trusts, they may now be overcome and adjudged unenforceable if subjected to challenges found to be made in good faith and based on probable cause. And the right to have a court scrutinize the validity of the will can not be thwarted by the language of the will. These are important points of law on which to advise your clients when drafting donative instruments.
In this case, the court found that Bronwyn did have probable cause because: she understood her parents’ previous intentions from prior wills and discussions she had had with them; the 2010 will was unknown to her and contradicted her prior understanding; her father had been in failing health complicated by alcoholism and use of pain killers around the wtime he executed the 2010 will; he was taking medication for cognition problems; large withdrawals were made from his accounts that went directly to William; and he conveyed large tracts of real estate to William around the time of making the 2010 will. The 2010 circumstances occurred while B.D. was in William’s care. There was no evidence of bad faith on Bronwyn’s part in bringing her suit.
By the way, I got a thrill out of ¶ 12 of the court’s opinion, where Justice Kitchens invokes maxims of equity and actually quotes from Griffith’s Mississippi Chancery Practice.
There are some other interesting aspects to this case, including: the award of attorney’s fees from the estate to defend the will; the denial of an award of attorney’s fees against Bronwyn; and whether William should have been disqualified and removed as executor. Each of those deserves its own, separate post. Until then, you can read the court’s opinion for yourself.
The Value of Your Professional Reputation
September 3, 2014 § 3 Comments
Not too long ago, I posted here about the value of your reputation with the court. It’s a subject that can not be overemphasized.
Yesterday, Philip Thomas added an eloquent post on topic: Mississippi Judges Stress the Importance of Professional Reputation.
It’s not only important reading for young (or “Baby” in Mr. Thomas’s parlance) lawyers, but also for more experienced, jaded lawyers who might have begun letting the concept slip from their grasp.
More on Evidence of Prior Conduct in a Modification Case
September 2, 2014 § Leave a comment
As a rule, in a modification the chancellor is prohibited by the principle of res judicata from considering evidence of conduct that predates the judgment sought to be modified. It’s a concept that we have talked about here before.
The COA case of Summerlin v. Eldridge, handed down August 19, 2014, is the most recent case to deal with the issue.
In their divorce in May, 2011, Mike and Tamara Summerlin agreed to a custody arrangement under which Mike would have custody of daughter Madison, and Tamara would have custody of the two younger children, Haley and Grace.
In August, 2011, Tamara filed for modification, seeking custody of Madison, and, apparently, asking for MIke to have custody of Haley. An agreed judgment was entered changing custody of Madison from Mike to Tamara, and custody of Haley from Tamara to MIke.
After that the parties swapped salvoes of pleadings for contempt and modification, and, in February, 2012, the chancellor left custody as the parties had previously agreed. They subsequently agreed that Mike would regain custody of Madison. That left only custody of Grace as a contested issue.
The case came to trial, and the chancellor, in October, 2012, awarded custody of all three children to MIke.
Tamara appealed, arguing that the chancellor erred in considering conduct of hers that predated the August, 2011, order, which had been the last modification order entered before the final modification judgment resulting from the trial.
The COA found no error. Here’s what Judge Fair’s opinion stated:
¶8. Tamara argues the chancellor erred in allowing testimony concerning matters that occurred prior to the August 19, 2011 order. According to Lackey v. Fuller, 755 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (¶13) (Miss. 2000), this practice is not permissible because of the res judicata principle. Tamara is correct that res judicata prohibits the chancellor from considering circumstances that occurred prior to the decree being considered for modification. Id. However, in this instance, the order awarding the custody of Grace to Tamara was entered on May 24, 2011, and not on August 19, 2011. The August 19, 2011 order changes custody of Madison and Haley but does not mention Grace.
¶9. Furthermore, in denying Tamara’s motion to reconsider, the chancellor noted that the only “evidence of events predating the original divorce decree was considered as impeachment evidence to [Tamara’s] and Del’s testimony.” The chancellor found the facts distinguishable from those in Lackey. Our review of a chancellor’s decision to admit evidence falls under the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. at (¶10). In this instance, we find no abuse of discretion by the chancellor. This issue is without merit.
So, two points:
- In order for the bar of res judicata to operate, the four identities must be present. In this case, the prior modification judgment(s) did not create a bar as to testimony involving custody of Grace, because Grace was not part of the subject matter of the prior judgment(s). The bar does not exist from the date of the last order or judgment entered, but rather exists when the four identities come together in one order or judgment. In this case, the last order or judgment in which the four identities were present as to Grace was the divorce judgment, and the testimony at trial to which Tamara objected was post-divorce-judgment.
- The reason why the testimony is offered appears to make a difference. Here it was not considered substantively by the trial judge, but was only considered as impeachment of Tamara’s and her current husband’s testimony. The COA did not cite any case specifically so holding, but you may want to cite this decision to support such an argument next time you have this issue come up.
Difficulties in Talking About Incompetence and Incapacity, Part IV
August 28, 2014 § Leave a comment
[This is Part IV of a paper by Attorney Tom Freeland, IV, of Oxford, presented at a seminar sponsored by the North Mississippi Rural Legal Services Elder Law Project, Jennie Kilgore, Director]
Wills and Powers of Attorney
Every person eighteen (18) years of age or older, being of sound and disposing mind, shall have power, by last will and testament, or codicil in writing, to devise all the estate, right, title and interest in possession, reversion, or remainder, which he or she hath, or at the time of his or her death shall have…
Miss. Code. Ann. § 91-5-1. The Mississippi courts have explained what “sound and disposing mind” means here:
For testamentary capacity to be present, the testator must be of “sound and disposing mind” at the time of the will’s execution. Miss.Code Ann. § 91–5–1 (Rev.2004); In re Estate of Edwards v. Edwards, 520 So.2d 1370, 1372 (Miss.1988); Weems, at § 4:3. The requirement of a sound and disposing mind does not mean the testator’s mind must be as good as it ever was. Weems, at § 4:3. Rather, the relevant test centers on the time the will is executed. At that time, the testator must: “understand and appreciate the nature and effect of his act [of making a will,] the natural objects or persons to receive his bounty and their relation to him, and [be] able to determine what disposition he desires to make of his property.” In re Estate of Mask v. Elrod, 703 So.2d 852, 856 (¶ 17) (Miss. 1997).
Noblin v. Burgess, 54 So. 3d 282, 291 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
Rather than focusing on the statutory language—”sound and disposing mind”—the courts focus on the test quoted from Estate of Mask and repeated in many other cases. Did the testator “understand and appreciate the nature and effect of his act?” That is, did the testator know he or she was making a will? Did the testator know the “natural objects or persons to receive this bounty and their relationship to him?” That is, did the testator know who his heirs would naturally be, and was making an intentional decision about disposition? Finally, was the testator “able to determine what disposition he desires to make…” That is, were the terms of the will established by the testator’s decision of what disposition to make.
The courts have moved away from a possible vagueness trap—what is “of sound mind?”— to more particular language that focuses on the testator’s understanding of what it means to make a will.
Another factor in the test is one of timing: The test for whether a person had capacity to make a will looks to capacity at the specific time the will was signed and witnessed. [Fn 5] This has led the Mississippi Supreme Court to reject medical testimony that a long-term patient lacked capacity due to age and illness and that it was “possible but improbable” that the patient had a lucid interval, in favor of testimony from the testator’s lawyer that the patient knew the extent of his property and established the provisions for the will, and where the testator told the witnesses that it was his will and he wanted them to witness it. Hayward v. Hawyard, 299 So.2d 207, 209 (Miss. 1974). Even findings that a testator had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia or where a conservatorship had been granted for mental instability, that testator can still be competent to make a will. Estate of McCorkle v. Beeson, 27 So.2d 1180, 1187-1188 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). The Mississippi Supreme Court has held:
The general law (recognized by the chancellor) is that an insane person may execute a valid will ‘in a lucid interval.’ Gholson v. Peters, 180 Miss. 256, 176 So. 605 (1937). Although the conservator in this case had legal control of the property and estate of the testator, this did not affect the testamentary capacity of the one whose property was under the conservatorship. The key to testamentary capacity is mental competency at the time the will is made. Scally v. Wardlaw, 123 Miss. 857, 86 So. 625 (1920). Regardless of the existence of the conservatorship, one whose property is under conservatorship may execute a valid will during lucidity, if possessed of the requisite understanding and mental capacity.
Lee v. Lee, 337 So.2d 713, 714-15 (Miss. 1976).
[Fn 5] If there is a codicil to the will, the test of competency looks to the time of the codicil because the codicil republishes the will.
A final question of competency or capacity is the competency to make a power of attorney. Mississippi’s Uniform Durable Power of Attorney Act provides no guidance except that it provides that, where the principal (the maker of a power of attorney) lapses into incapacity, the powers granted continue, “as if the principal were competent and not disabled.” Miss. Code Ann. § 87-3-307. This creates the problem of a holder of a power of attorney who ignores his fiduciary duties and abuses the power with a client who is incapacitated and therefore no longer has the capacity to cancel the grant of the power. [Fn 6] At that point, the only real solution would be the appointment of a conservator, an appointment that many use a power of attorney to avoid.
The Court of Appeals has attempted to bridge this gap in statutory definition for competency to make a power of attorney by looking to the test for making a will. Dowdy v. Smith, 818 So.2d 1255, 1258-59 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). While not justified by statute, this is understandable because it involves adoption of the clearest of the tests discussed in this article, and because it looks to the capacity of a maker of an instrument at the moment the instrument is made:
We find that a fair analogy is the standard for determining whether a testator has the capacity to execute a will. Both a general power of attorney and a last will and testament require an appreciation of the nature and extent of a grantor’s estate and the effects of a potential distribution.
At least until the Supreme Court opines otherwise, this is the best indication we have of the capacity the maker of a power of attorney must hold.
[Fn 6] The prospect of a holder of a power of attorney whose principal was incapacitated is one of many possible abuses. The author is aware of deeds in the land records of Lafayette County made by a holder of a power of attorney after the death of the principal, in violation of Miss. Code Ann. § 87-3-111 (cancelling powers of attorney on death). The deeds were also, on their face, self-dealing.
Conclusion
Clear or definitive answers are not available even when focusing just on the legal profession in an attempt to pin down or establish a clear meaning for the terms “incompetence” or “incapacity.” The courts and legislature have not agreed on precise or consistent meanings. There is statutory overlap in areas that seem distinct—a guardian looks over the person of the ward, while a conservator looks over the estate unless the court decides otherwise. These tensions are exacerbated when an attempt is made to look beyond the courts and law and ask what meaning these terms may have to other professions.
[Thanks to Mr. Freeland for allowing me to share this informative paper with blog readers.]
Difficulties in Talking About Incompetence and Incapacity, Part III
August 27, 2014 § Leave a comment
[This is Part III of a paper by Attorney Tom Freeland, IV, of Oxford, presented at a seminar sponsored by the North Mississippi Rural Legal Services Elder Law Project, Jennie Kilgore, Director]
Conservatorships
The standard for appointing a conservator is stated in Miss. Code. Ann. § 93-13-251:
If a person is incapable of managing his own estate by reason of advanced age, physical incapacity or mental weakness… the chancery court of the county wherein the person resides… upon the petition of the person or of one or more of his friends or relatives, may appoint a conservator to have charge and management of the property of the person and, if the court deems it advisable, also to have charge and custody of the person subject to the direction of the appointing court.
Several provisions are notable here: First, the test is “incapable of managing his own estate,” and, if that test is met, the chancellor can appoint a conservator who shall have charge of “the property of the person” and, if the chancellor deems advisable, have “charge and custody of the person,” subject to court direction. The subject of a conservatorship has the same limitation on their ability to make a contract as a minor. Miss. Code. Ann. § 93-13-261.
The statute for conservatorships was adopted because of a need for protective services for adults who were not incapacitated as defined in the guardianship statutes. The leading case on the conservatorship statutes, Harvey v. Meador, 459 So.2d 288, 291-292 (Miss. 1984), described this history:
In recent decades there has been an increased number of older adults in our society who possess assets in need of protective services provided through guardianships. But modification of laws have broadened the definition of persons for whom assistance can be afforded by the courts, and such statutes do not restrict such protection only to the adult incompetent or insane.
Noting that trend in our society, the Mississippi Legislature incorporated into law in 1962 the conservatorship procedure for persons who, by reason of advanced age, physical incapacity, or mental weakness, were incapable of managing their own estates. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-13-251, et seq. (1972).
Thus the Legislature provided a new procedure through conservatorship for supervision of estates of older adults with physical incapacity or mental weakness, without the stigma of legally declaring the person non compos mentis. This additional procedure was intended to encompass a broader class of people than just the incompetent.
The Court began with a comparison of conditions that would or would not support the appointment of a conservator:
[M]ere advanced age alone is insufficient. Advanced age will naturally bring about decrease in physical prowess and mental efficiency. However, advanced age which renders an inability to manage property or which advanced age exhibits a serious degree of deterioration is contemplated by the statute.
The fact that physical incapacity exists is not in and of itself sufficient justification for the court taking jurisdiction of property involuntarily. A blind or deaf person may be capable of understanding matters of business and receiving communication on the subject. However, almost complete physical paralysis resulting from a cerebral hemorrhage rendering one incapable of managing the estate would qualify under the statute as physical incapacity. Loss v. Loss, 25 Ill.2d 515, 185 N.E.2d 228 (1962).
Mental weakness, as opposed to the more strict application of mental incompetency, is another statutory standard which also employs some vagueness. Mere lack of good business judgment, not amounting to some degree of wasted or dissipated property, is not a sufficient standard. Mental weakness which renders the subject incapable of understanding and acting within discretion in the ordinary affairs of life is sufficient. See Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 796 (1966) (and cases cited therein).
Harvey, 459 So.2d at 292. From these considerations, the Court went on to adopt what it called “a management competency test as the standard to be applied under the conservatorship statute.” Id. The Court set forth factors to be examined in following the management competency test.
A test of management competency can be answered by considering the factors of: ability to manage, or improvident disposition, or dissipation of property, or susceptibility to influence or deception by others, or other similar factors.
Id. The Court of Appeals has suggested that any one of these factors is sufficient to allow appointment of a conservator. In re Conservator for Demoville, 856 So.2d 607, 609-610 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). The Court of Appeals case In re Conservatorship of Hester, 989 So.2d 986, 989-90 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) provides facts with a good example of the sort of proof that establishes the need for a conservatorship:
[A]t the time of trial, Emma was a seventy-six-year-old woman of below average intellect who had never concerned herself with thehandling of her own business affairs. Instead, she deferred to others to handle these matters in her stead, i.e., her husband, Elden, until his death, then [her live-in son,] Glen. Emma’s own testimony vividly illustrates her inability and/or refusal to deal with the management of her estate. She possesses little meaningful knowledge regarding the amount or whereabouts of her finances, and she has exhibited overall indifference to her business affairs and her living conditions alike. Emma has clearly misplaced her reliance on Glen who has dissipated her funds at will, using them as his own. Emma’s indifference to and/or ratification of Glen’s overreaching demonstrates the level of ease with which Emma may be taken advantage of. Although there was evidence that Emma was capable of performing basic tasks of self-preservation, the evidence supports the conclusion that Emma was incapable of managing her own affairs by reason of advanced age and mental weakness. The record also makes clear that one more responsible than Glen was needed to exercise care and custody over Emma’s estate and person.
The Better Chancery Practice Blog 