Courthouses Yet to be Seen
June 23, 2015 § Leave a comment
We are in the final stretch of the courthouses project.
Here are the ones for which I still do not have a photo: Tishomingo; Prentiss; Pontotoc; Marshall; Tate; Panola at Sardis; Oktibbeha; Yazoo; Warren; Sharkey; Issaquena, Washington; Jefferson; Lincoln; Lawrence; Pike; Walthall; and Wilkinson.
If you have a photo, email it to lprimeaux@Comcast.net.
Does a Custody Decision Have to Pass Through Joint Custody?
June 22, 2015 § 2 Comments
We’ve talked here before about the principle that, where the parties have consented to allow the chancellor to adjudicate custody, the chancellor may award either party custody, and may award joint custody. That was decided by the MSSC in Crider v. Crider in 2012, and has been elaborated on in cases applying it since.
Does Crider, then, require the chancellor to consider whether joint custody should be awarded before awarding either party sole custody? That was the issue confronting the COA in the case of White v. White, decided June 16, 2015.
Maegan White and Christopher White consented to an irreconcilable differences divorce, with custody of their children, Garrett and Harley, as a contested issue. The chancellor accepted the recommendation of the GAL and awarded sole custody to Christopher, and her opinion made no mention of the possibility or consideration of joint custody. Meagan appealed, arguing that the chancellor’s failure to consider joint custody was error. She contended that Crider and Clark v. Clark, 126 So.3d 122 (Miss. App. 2013) required the judge to consider whether joint custody was in the best interest of the children.
Judge Roberts addressed her argument for the COA:
¶19. Maegan’s interpretation of both Clark and Crider is faulty. In Clark, this Court reversed and remanded a chancellor’s decision to award sole physical custody to the mother, requiring the court to consider the propriety of joint custody on remand. Both parents had requested sole physical custody of their child and submitted the issue to the court for determination. After hearing testimony of the parties, the chancellor had noted: “[In these] kinds of cases . . . it’s hard . . . to give the child to one or the other because everything here would support that. . . . [H]ow can you choose one over the other, but [this court] has to.” Clark, 126 So. 3d at 124-25 (¶10). In reversing the chancery court’s judgment, this Court noted, “Based on our reading of the transcript, it appears that the chancery court may have concluded . . . that it was required to order custody to one parent regardless of whether joint physical custody was in the best interest of [the child].” Id. at 125 (¶12). Noting our concern that the chancery court had incorrectly concluded it was not authorized to consider joint custody, as neither party had requested it, we reversed and remanded for further consideration.
¶20. Similarly, in Crider, parents in an irreconcilable-differences divorce each requested sole custody of their child. The parents submitted the issue of custody to the court for determination. After considering testimony presented and conducting an Albright analysis, the chancellor found that, even though neither parent requested joint custody, it was in the child’s best interest. Thus, she awarded joint custody to the parents for a two-year period. The mother appealed, noting that Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-24(2) (Rev. 2013) [footnote omitted] prohibited a chancellor from awarding joint custody unless specifically requested by the parties. This Court agreed and reversed the chancellor’s judgment, prompting the father to petition for certiorari with the supreme court. After a thorough analysis of the statute and its meaning, the supreme court stated:
It is logical and reasonable that “application of both parties” exists when both parties consent to allowing the court to determine custody. The fact that the parties request that the court determine which parent is to receive “primary custody” does not alter this. The parties are allowing the court to determine what form of custody is in the best interest of the child. If joint custody is determined to be in the best interest of the child using court-specified factors, i.e., the Albright factors, the parties should not be able to prohibit this by the wording of the consent.
Crider, 904 So. 2d at 147 (¶12). The supreme court further noted that the chancellor is in the best position to evaluate the “credibility, sincerity, capabilities and intentions of the parties,” and that it is “incumbent upon a chancellor not to award joint custody” unless in the best interest of the child. Id. at (¶13). The court ultimately held that “when parties consent in writing to the court’s determination of custody, they are consenting and agreeing to that determination and this meets the statutory directive of ‘joint application’ in [section] 93-5-24(2).” Id. at 148 (¶15). Finally, the court affirmed the chancellor’s judgment and noted that a “chancellor may award joint custody in an [irreconcilable-differences] divorce, when the parties request the court to determine custody.” Id. at 148-49 (¶17) (emphasis added).
¶21. Maegan incorrectly interprets both Clark and Crider to require a chancellor to consider joint custody when faced with an irreconcilable-differences divorce. The chancellor “is bound to consider the child’s best interest above all else.” Riley v. Doerner, 677 So. 2d 740, 744 (Miss. 1996). In both Clark and Crider, the chancellors found joint custody to be in the child’s best interest. In Clark, the chancellor incorrectly awarded sole custody to one parent despite the finding that joint custody was the child’s best interest; in Crider, the chancellor awarded joint custody because that was in the child’s best interest, and the supreme court affirmed that award. Crider and its progeny allow—not require—a chancellor to award joint custody when in the best interest of the child. In the present case, the chancellor found that it was in Garrett and Harley’s best interest to give custody to [Christopher]. Though the chancellor’s order makes no mention of joint custody, he is not required to do so. The chancellor’s primary duty is to consider the best interests of the children and make a determination of custody based on that concern. There is no evidence that the chancellor disregarded the children’s best interests when determining custody. The chancellor’s custody award to [Christopher] was not error.
Not much to add to that, except to cite you to this post on Easley v. Easley, and this one with some random thoughts on joint custody, which might make your collection of authorities on this point complete.
The Courthouses of Mississippi
June 19, 2015 § Leave a comment
Bolivar at Cleveland – Beverly Kraft
Bolivar at Rosedale – Beverly Kraft
Winston – LP
Jones at Ellisville – Kathy Wilkinson
Clay – Beverly Kraft
Carroll at Carrollton – Glenn Huggins
Coahoma – Beverly Kraft
Jefferson Davis – Kathy Wilkinson
Franklin – Beverly Kraft
Copiah – Beverly Kraft
Asking Permission Rather than Forgiveness
June 18, 2015 § 3 Comments
That old saw about it being easier to ask forgiveness than to get permission may apply in some aspects of life. It does not, however, apply in guardianships.
I wish I had a few bucks for every time I have seen a lawyer open a guardianship, qualify the guardian, and then go off and file a PI or wrongful death case “for the benefit of the ward.” Later, the attorney has to beg forgiveness, because he had no permission.
MCA 93-13-27 spells out specifically what is required:
All suits, complaints, actions and administrative and quasi judicial proceedings for or on behalf of a ward for whom a general guardian has been appointed shall be brought in the name of the general guardian for the use and benefit of such ward, be such general guardian that of his estate or that of his estate and person or that of his person only. And all such actions, suits or proceedings shall be commenced only after authority has been granted to such general guardian by proper order or decree of the court or chancellor of the county in this state in which the guardianship proceedings are pending, upon proper sworn petition and supporting oral testimony. A certified copy of said order authorizing such suit or proceedings shall be attached to the complaint or instrument or document originally filed as commencing such action, suits or proceedings. If such proceedings be commenced by act of said general guardian, then on request therefor a certified copy of said order or decree shall be submitted by said general guardian as evidence of his authority to the person or persons with or through whom the guardian may deal in performing any act commencing such proceedings. [Emphasis added]
So before you go crashing off into circuit, county, or district court, you must: (a) file a sworn petition in the guardianship case outlining what it is you propose to do; (b) set the matter for hearing; and (c) present oral testimony in support of your petition. It should go without saying that the petition can only by filed by a guardian who has been properly appointed by the court, has posted whatever bond was required, has taken the oath, and has been issued letters of guardianship.
When the lawsuit is filed, a certified copy of the order authorizing it must be attached as an exhibit to the complaint.
There can be some ramifications here. If I were a defendant, I think I might sit back and let the statute of limitations run on the claim, and then file to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of standing. How would you feel as the attorney for the guardian in that situation?
Semper Pactiones Quod Non
June 16, 2015 § Leave a comment
If the title of this post is not a legitimate Latin legal maxim, it should be, because it captures the essence of an important principle of extra-judicial modification. The above can be translated as “You don’t always get what you bargained for.”
That most certainly was true in the case of Patrick and Lesa Deckard, who were divorced from each other in 2003. The divorce judgment required Patrick to pay Lesa $1,200 per month as support for their two children.
Soon after the divorce one of the children went to live with the paternal grandparents. Patrick contended that he and Lesa agreed between them that the child support would be reduced to $800 a month, and then later to $600 a month. Yet another, later, agreement had Patrick paying child support of $700 a month, the amount of private school tuition. Lesa took the position that Patrick dictated what he would pay by claiming it was all he could afford; she pointed out also that Patrick never paid the amounts in question, anyway. Patrick did not produce any evidence of any extra-judicial agreements.
The chancellor found Patrick in contempt and awarded Lesa judgments totaling around $114,000 for unpaid child support, unpaid medical expenses of the children, and attorney’s fees. The judge also ordered Patrick to pay $800 in child support from that point on. Patrick appealed.
In the case of Deckard v. Deckard, decided June 2, 2015, the COA affirmed, Judge Ishee’s opinion laid out the rationale:
¶6. In the judgment of divorce issued by the chancery court on December 18, 2003, Patrick was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $1,200 per month. In the order dated March 6, 2014, Patrick was found to be in contempt for his failure to pay $107,013 in child support from 2005–2014. Patrick argues that the amount claimed is too high because their oldest son, Taylor, moved in with his paternal grandparents soon after the divorce.
¶7. Patrick asserts that allowing Lesa to collect child support from Patrick for Taylor’s benefit would be unjust enrichment because “for all practical intents and purposes he had never been in Lesa Deckard’s home and she never expended any monies for child support for his use and benefit.” However, the chancellor disagreed and found that Patrick owed the amount ordered by the original agreement to Lesa in unpaid child support. In doing so, the chancellor quoted the following from Smith v. Smith, 20 So. 3d 670, 674 (¶¶13-14) (Miss. 2009) (citations omitted):
The law remains firm that court-ordered child-support payments vest in the child as they accrue and may not thereafter be modified or forgiven, only paid. But this does not mean that equity may not at times suggest ex post facto approval of extra judicial adjustments in the manner and form in which support payments have been made. The noncustodial parent may be entitled to credit for any additional support which he/she has evinced by satisfactory proof to the trial court.
. . . .
In a contempt action concerning past-due child support, when the custodial parent introduces evidence that the noncustodial parent who is required to pay the support has failed to do so, a prima facie case of contempt has been made. At this point, the burden falls on the defending party, to avoid a finding of contempt, to prove that there was payment or other defense, and this proof must be “clear and convincing and rise above a state of doubtfulness.”
¶8. The chancellor found that while Taylor was living with Patrick’s parents, Patrick did not contribute any money or financial assistance in any manner to his parents for Taylor’s benefit. Accordingly, the chancellor found that there was not any evidence before the court that would allow Patrick to receive a credit for any child-support payments.
¶9. Although Patrick cites the case of Brewer v. Holliday, 135 So. 3d 117 (Miss. 2014), to support his position, the facts in this case are distinguishable from the facts in Brewer. In Brewer, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the chancellor’s finding that a man was not entitled to a credit for the amount of child support he had paid to his ex-wife for the period of time in which their son did not live with her. Brewer, 135 So. 3d at 121 (¶16). However, the chancellor only agreed to the credit because the son had been living with his father while his father was still paying the mother child support for him. Id.
¶10. In the instant case, Taylor was living with Patrick’s parents, and Patrick admits that there is no evidence that he contributed any money to his parents for Taylor’s expenses. “Whether or not a non-custodial parent should be given credit against his/her child support obligation[] is a matter left to the sound discretion of the chancellor.” Strack v. Sticklin, 959 So. 2d 1, 5 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). As such, we agree with the chancery court that Patrick is in contempt for his failure to pay $107,013 in child support.
Oh, and Patrick overlooked the fact that when child support is global (i.e., one amount for all children, as opposed to a specified amount per child), the fact that one child is no longer entitled to support (e.g., due to emancipation), it does not necessarily result in a reduction in the total amount of child support.
And on the issue of the enforceability of the extra-judicial agreements, the COA first pointed out that the evidence was in dispute as to whether there were ever any such agreements, and then made this observation:
¶13. “No party obligated by a judicial decree to provide support for minor children may resort to self help and modify his or her obligation with impunity.” Crow v. Crow, 622 So.2d 1226, 1231 (Miss. 1993) (citation omitted). “A party making an extra-judicial modification does so at his own peril.” Id. (citation omitted). Because there is no evidence of an extrajudicial agreement, we affirm the chancery court’s findings that Patrick is in contempt for $107,013 for unpaid child support.
An especially good lawyer will sit down with her client in the aftermath of a divorce, or custody, or child-support case and carefully explain that people quite often will try to reach all kinds of handshake agreements later — whether out of a desire to avoid more bloodshed and hard feelings, or to avoid the pain of more attorney’s fees, or from exhaustion — and those kinds of agreement are fraught with peril. Better to get some legal advice and a court order before changing what the court ordered.
Happy Birthday to BCPB
June 15, 2015 § 14 Comments
Sunday marked the fifth anniversary of this blog.
The birthday party was pretty wild, with cake, ice cream, punch, bubbly, clowns (always lurking around here), bouncy house, slip-n-slide, and a few sets by St. Paul & the Broken Bones. The crowd didn’t finally disperse until police broke it up around 2 am.
Not really. It was an ordinary dull (hot) Sunday around my house.
So, what is the sum of these past 5 years vis a vis this blog?
- This is the 1,411th post. I wondered when I started this whether I would still have anything to say after a few months.
- There have been 2,944 comments. Thank you, thank you, thank you. I wanted from the start to generate some comments and helpful observations.
- There are now 480 followers by email. That’s a lot, as far as I am concerned, and I think there are many other readers who don’t follow via email.
- I hear from all areas of the state from lawyers, and even judges, who have used this as a resource.
The fundamental goal when I set out was to begin compiling material to which legal professionals could come to find answers to basic questions, practice tips, and ideas to improve representation of clients. I think I’ve been successful to a degree.
I’ve always saved major changes and new directions for anniversary dates, and this year will be no exception. On past anniversaries, I changed the name of the blog, changed its focus, and revamped its appearance.
I’ve also always used the anniversary as a re-commitment for another year.
So here’s what’s coming this time:
- I’m going to follow the lead of the saner bloggers who went before me and relax my regimen of a post a day, M-F, a pace that can get somewhat hairy at times with all of one’s other demands. So you might see anywhere from one to five posts in a given week, and, occasionally, none. I encourage to you to “follow” the blog via email by clicking on the window and entering your email address on the computer version; that way, you’ll get notice via email when there is something to read.
- All of the archived content will remain in place. Change in frequency of posts won’t affect that.
That’s all for now. I will continue into the foreseeable future. I hope this continues to be a useful resource.
The Courthouses of Mississippi
June 12, 2015 § 1 Comment
Lowndes – Josh Clemons
Benton (Historical) – Beverly Kraft
Benton – Beverly Kraft
Chickasaw at Houston – Grant Fox
Chickasaw at Okolona – Beverly Kraft
Leake – Richard Young
Wayne – Kathy Wilkinson
Monroe Chancery – Craig Brasfield
Ittawamba – Beverly Kraft
Carroll at Vaiden – Maggie Ferguson
A Procedural Peculiarity
June 11, 2015 § Leave a comment
We’ve talked here many times about the R54(b) principle that, if the judgment disposes of fewer than all of the issues, it is not a final, appealable judgment unless the judge certifies so in the manner prescribed by the rule. We’ve sounded that theme so often that I’m not going to add links in this post. You can search them for yourself, if you care to.
It’s that principle that has me scratching my head over the COA case Wood, et al. v. Miller, decided June 2, 2015.
Donna Smith and Audrey Kemp filed a complaint in chancery court in 2004 to quiet and confirm title, to determine heirship, and to partition some 261 acres of land that had descended via heirship and devise to the parties named in the suit. They filed an amended complaint in 2007.
Following a hearing in 2009, the chancellor entered a judgment quieting and confirming title and ordering partition. The commissioners some time in 2010 filed a report detailing how the property could be divided into three shares.
In October, 2010, the defendants filed a separate pleading in the same civil action seeking to obtain title of all the property by adverse possession. The pleading was not styled as a counterclaim.
In May, 2012, the chancellor entered a judgment confirming the commissioners’ report, and ordered that the petitioners would have one share, the respondents another share, and another group of heirs the third share.
Afterward the plaintiffs filed a pleading asking for a judgment for waste based on the defendants’ refusal to allow the land to be rented during the litigation. At the hearing on that pleading, the question arose about the pending adverse-possession claim that had never been addressed. The attorney for the defendants announced that he would schedule a hearing on the matter at a later date. He never did. The chancellor entered judgment against the defendants for waste for more than $90,000.
The defendants appealed, raising only two issues: (1) that the chancellor erred when she ruled that two of the petitioners had inherited Thornton Miller’s interest in the property through the will of Thornton’s widow, Magnolia; and (2) that they had adversely possessed the property. They did not otherwise contest the heirship determination, the partition, or the judgment for waste. It does not appear from the opinion that they raised any issue as to the original judgment quieting and confirming title.
In its opinion, the COA, by Judge Roberts, pointed out, quite accurately, that any issue of invalidity of Magnolia’s will had not been raised before the chancellor; nor could it, because MCA 91-7-23 requires such claims be brought within two years of probate of the contested will, and not later. Magnolia’s will had been probated in 1986, so the claim as to the will’s invalidity was untimely and barred by the statute. On those grounds, then, the COA refused to review the issue on appeal.
This was unquestionably the right conclusion as to issue (1).
As for the adverse possession claim, issue (2), the court concluded that, since it had never been presented to the chancellor for review, the issue was not properly before it, and refused to entertain this issue also.
With this issue, I have this question: since the judgment of the trial court disposed of fewer than all of the issues, should the COA have accepted jurisdiction over the appeal in the first place? R54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed direction for entry of the judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated which adjudicates fewer than all of the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all of the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before entry of the judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
Since the adverse possession issue is still pending as a claim in this case, was there a final, appealable judgment, or should the COA have rejected jurisdiction? Well, no matter, I think that the COA reached the proper conclusion because:
- You can not adversely possess against co-owners. The determination of heirship resolved the issue of Magnolia’s bequest and ownership, making all of the parties co-owners. Even if the matter had been properly presented at hearing to the chancellor, it did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
- Any adverse possession claim should have been presented as a compulsory counterclaim to the claim to quiet and confirm, per R13. The reason for the rule is to prevent the very thing that was attempted in this case.
- The chancery court’s order quieting and confirming disposed of any adverse possession claims.
- This matter was pending in the trial court for nine years. If you haven’t demanded a hearing on your claims you should not have the right to ask or demand that the court deal with it later. You’re already late enough.
In other words, the outcome would not have changed. Just to be clear … I agree with the court’s ruling in this case. I just thought it presented a peculiar set of issues and procedures that would be of some interest.
Pro Se Times Five
June 9, 2015 § 5 Comments
Every now and then one of those tv commentators with a big head, staring all-knowingly into the eye of the camera, will pontificate that members of my generation believe — somewhat arrogantly, they say — that we can do anything.
I take issue with that. I know, for example, that I would not be a very successful brain surgeon, what with my less-than-steady hands and absolute ignorance of surgical techniques, not to mention minimal understanding of brain and skull structure. Of course my lack of success in that field would make me a spectacularly successful defendant — from the perspective of plaintiffs.
You would probably agree with me, as would most rational people, that it is singularly ill-advised for laypeople to attempt brain surgery on someone else, or even themselves.
Brain surgery requires a high degree of education, smarts, and practice. As does the law.
Why, then, do ordinarily sensible people — who would not dream of doing brain surgery, and who have had the wherewithal to reach adulthood without blowing themselves up or being devoured by wild beasts or falling into any similar calamity — insist on representing themselves in litigation and — horrors — on appeal?
That’s what happened in the case of Estate of Forrest: Forrest v. Forrest, decided June 2, 2015, by the COA. In that case, Diane Forrest had a falling-out with the sons of her deceased husband over assets and expenses of the estate. When Diane filed a petition to close the estate, the sons showed up at the hearing, ready to do battle. But the chancellor, in solomonic fashion, conferred with the parties and announced that they had reached a settlement agreeable to all. The COA opinion by Judge Ishee describes what happened next:
¶5. After reading the agreement into the record, the chancellor asked the parties if they understood and assented to the agreement as dictated into the record. All parties responded affirmatively. Diane then filed this appeal.
Pro se, I might add.
Diane’s appeal was doomed because Diane’s attorney (herself) apparently did not grasp the fundamental concept that an appeal involves legal argument. Judge Ishee explicated:
¶7. Diane filed her appellant’s brief pro se. In her brief, Diane failed to cite any authority in support of her claims. Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(6), an appellant’s brief must “contain the contentions of appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the reasons for those contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.” It is well settled under Mississippi caselaw that “failure to cite any authority is a procedural bar, and a reviewing court is under no obligation to consider the assignment.” Norwood v. Miss. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 105 So. 3d 408, 410 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted).
¶8. Although Diane has chosen to appeal this matter without the assistance of counsel, the Mississippi Supreme Court has consistently held that “[a] pro se litigant shall be held to the same standard as an attorney.” Bailey v. Wheatley Estates Corp., 829 So. 2d 1278, 1281 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). As such, we decline to address Diane’s assignments of error because she failed to cite any authority in her briefs.
Actually, Diane’s failure to cite any authority is probably indicative of the fact that there is no authority that would support reversing the chancellor in this case. Diane made her deal, affirmed her agreement in open court, and then tried to renege via appeal. That’s not a formula for success.
Oh, and did I mention that all four of the sons, who were appellees, are listed as pro se also? So were they better lawyers than Diane because they won? Not necessarily. Their one defensive ploy was to move to strike Diane’s brief because it was filed too late. The COA dismissed that issue as mooted out by the larger and much more obvious issue of failure to cite any authority.
I know what you’re probably thinking: “it’s obvious that they were pro se because they did not want to pay lawyers.” I get that. I know that lawyers, particularly in bulk, can be expensive. But that’s sort of beside the point. The point is that a pro se appeal is about as futile as doing brain surgery on oneself — and about as messy and painful.
The Better Chancery Practice Blog 