Waiving a Motion by Inaction
December 5, 2018 § 1 Comment
When Christina and Billy Leblanc appeared for their divorce trial, also at issue was a contempt action that Christina had filed complaining that Billy had failed to pay the mortgage on the former marital residence as directed by the court in a temporary order. On the first day of trial Billy admitted in his testimony that he had not paid it as ordered.
On the second day of trial, however, the parties agreed to a consent to divorce that did not mention the contempt. The chancellor did not include an adjudication of contempt, and Christina appealed alleging several errors, including the non-adjudication of contempt. She contended that the chancellor should have awarded her a separate judgment for the mortgage arrearage.
In Leblanc v. Leblanc, decided October 23, 2018, the COA affirmed on this issue. Judge Wilson wrote for the unanimous court (Irving not participating):
¶69. As discussed above, the chancery court twice ordered Billy to pay the arrearage on the mortgage on the marital home, and Christina filed two contempt motions based on Billy’s failure to do so. Her second motion was still pending when trial began. On the first day of trial, Billy admitted that the mortgage was not current. He claimed that he was unable to pay it. Then, at the beginning of the second day of trial, the parties consented to an irreconcilable differences divorce. The chancery court’s final judgment awarded Christina the marital home, along with the mortgage. However, the court’s judgment did not specifically address Billy’s prior contempt or the arrearage. On appeal, Christina argues that the chancery court erred by not finding Billy in contempt and by not entering a separate judgment in her favor for the mortgage arrearage.
¶70. We conclude that the issue of Billy’s contempt was waived because the parties did not list contempt among the issues to be decided by the court. In an irreconcilable differences divorce, the issues that are to be decided by the court by the consent of the parties must be “specifically set forth.” See Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2(3) (Rev. 2013). “The language of section 93-5-2(3) is clear. A chancellor may decide contested issues in a divorce based upon irreconcilable differences. However, he is limited to the resolution of those issues specifically identified and personally agreed to in writing by the parties.” Myrick v. Myrick, 186 So. 3d 429, 433 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Wideman v. Wideman, 909 So. 2d 140, 146 (¶22) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)) (brackets omitted). Here, the parties agreed that the chancellor would decide issues related to child custody and support, equitable division, alimony, and insurance. Contempt was not mentioned when they consented to an irreconcilable differences divorce. Therefore, we hold that the issue was waived.
¶71. In addition, our general “rule is that a party making a motion must follow up that action by bringing it to the attention of the judge and by requesting a hearing upon it. It is the responsibility of the movant to obtain a ruling from the court on motions filed by him, and failure to do so constitutes a waiver of same.” Anderson v. McRae’s Inc., 931 So. 2d 674, 678 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added; quotation marks omitted). Here, Christina noticed her motion for a hearing on the first day of trial and mentioned the motion at the outset of trial; however, she did not request a ruling on the motion when she subsequently consented to an irreconcilable differences divorce, or at any time thereafter. Therefore, there is no “ruling from the [chancery] court” for this Court to review. Id. Accordingly, we conclude that Christina waived the issue by failing to obtain a ruling.
Okay, I get it that the issue was waived as a contested issue at this trial and for this appeal, but does that mean that Christina can’t ever recover what Billy didn’t pay? Does it mean that she permanently waived collection? Well, here is what Professor Bell said:
“The obligation to pay past-due temporary support survives a final judgment, even though the temporary support is replaced by a permanent support order. A payor was properly held in contempt for failure to make temporary child support, alimony, and mortgage payments totaling $2,900.” [Citing Langdon v. Langdon, 854 So. 2d 485, 496 (Miss. App. 2003). Also citing Baier v. Baier, 897 So. 2d 202, 205 (Miss. App. 2005) for the proposition that temporary arrearages may not be forgiven]. Bell on Mississippi Family Law, 2d Ed., § 14.02[3].
So it would appear that Christina may get another bite at that crabapple.
I see pleadings raising all sorts of issues and defenses, and motions filed along the way, that are never called up before the court for hearing. You need to heed the court’s warning that failure to bring those up for the court to address will waive them so that they can’t be raised on appeal.
The Better Chancery Practice Blog 
If someone paid me to do it, I’d drive down to the law library and spend an hour or so reading up on Bar and Merger and Res Judicata – but since no one is paying me, I think I’ll do something else.