Impact on the Harmony and Stability of the Marriage

July 16, 2019 § Leave a comment

Eleanor Ellison and Stephen Williams had a stormy relationship punctuated with Stephen’s numerous departures. After Stephen left her once again and moved in with another woman, Eleanor filed for divorce. Following a trial, the chancellor divided the marital estate, and Eleanor was displeased with the outcome, even though she received a larger share of the marital estate.

She appealed, and one of the issues she raised was that the chancellor had given inadequate attention to the effect of Stephen’s conduct on the marriage, which, of course, is one of the Ferguson factors.

In Ellison v. Williams, handed down June 18, 2019, the COA reversed and remanded on the issue. Judge Westbrooks wrote for a 5-4 court:

¶11. Ellison also asserts that the chancellor should have considered Williams’s extramarital affair. We agree. The Mississippi Supreme Court has reversed and remanded cases when the chancellor did not consider how an extramarital relationship “impacted and burdened the stability and harmony of the marriage.” Watson v. Watson, 882 So. 2d 95, 108 (¶68) (Miss. 2004) (quoting Singley v. Singley, 846 So. 2d 1004, 1009 (¶13) (Miss. 2002)). “Mississippi is in a minority of states in which marital misconduct is a factor for consideration in property division.” Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 6.08[2][e], 176 (2d ed. 2011).

¶12. Here, Ellison did receive a slightly larger portion of the marital estate than Williams, but the chancellor did not cite that as his reasoning. The chancellor stated that he was aware it was Ellison’s family home that they first resided in and then leveraged to purchase another home; he therefore awarded Ellison sixty percent. The chancellor awarded Ellison a fault-based divorce but then did not directly consider how Williams’s absences and infidelity affected the stability and harmony of the home when dividing the estate. Because we believe the chancellor’s lack of consideration was error, we reverse and remand for further proceedings on this issue to allow the chancellor to consider the extramarital relationship in equitably dividing their estate. Additionally, we reverse and remand to allow the chancellor to make a full Ferguson analysis on the record.

Judge Tindell, joined by Carlton, Greenlee, and McCarty, disagreed in part. His concurring and dissenting opinion:

¶20. Because the chancellor heard evidence of Williams’s extramarital relationship and thereafter awarded Ellison with a greater percentage of the marital estate, I would affirm the chancellor’s judgment in its entirety. Where substantial evidence supports a chancellor’s findings, the Court is without authority to disturb the chancellor’s conclusions even if it would have found otherwise in the original matter. Joel v. Joel, 43 So. 3d 424, 429 (¶14) (Miss. 2010). We have previously held that “failure to make an explicit factor-by-factor analysis does not necessarily require reversal where we are satisfied that the chancellor considered the relevant facts.” Palmer v. Palmer, 841 So. 2d 185, 190 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). Unless the chancellor’s judgment was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or applies an erroneous legal standard, the judgment should stand. Carambat v. Carambat, 72 So. 3d 505, 510-11 (¶24) (Miss. 2011).

¶21. The final judgment does address Williams’s adultery in the chancellor’s findings of fact. Further, after conducting a full Ferguson analysis, the chancellor awarded Ellison sixty percent of the marital assets and forty percent to Williams. Substantial evidence supported the chancellor awarding a greater portion of the marital estate to Ellison, and he did so accordingly. For these reasons, I find no manifest error in his conclusions and respectfully dissent in part from the majority’s opinion.

To say that there is a crazy-quilt of decisions on point would be a laughable understatement: the chancellor must address all of the Ferguson factors; the chancellor must address only the pertinent Ferguson factors; the chancellor’s consideration of the Ferguson factors may be gleaned from her findings in the record, regardless whether she ever mentions Ferguson; Ferguson factors must be specifically addressed; adulterous conduct must be considered for its impact on the stability of the household; the chancellor may not use property division to punish misconduct or reward good conduct.

Valuation Bugaboo

July 15, 2019 § Leave a comment

Rodney Kimble and his wife Stepidy went through a divorce. Rodney didn’t like the way the chancellor divided the marital estate, and he particularly objected to the judge’s valuation of a 2006 Volvo truck, a 2000 Freightliner trailer, and a 2007 Transcraft trailer, all of which he complained were overvalued by the chancellor. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in not considering his testimony that the truck and trailers were inoperable and had not been used in several years.

Here’s how Judge Tindell, writing for the COA, addressed Rodney’s claims in Kimble v. Kimble, decided June 18, 2019:

¶8. “[T]he foundational step to make an equitable distribution of marital assets is to determine the value of those assets based on competent proof.” Dunaway v. Dunaway, 749 So. 2d 1112, 1118 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 929). “[I]t is incumbent upon the parties, and not the chancellor, to prepare evidence touching on matters pertinent to the issues to be tried.” Benton v. Benton, 239 So. 3d 545, 548 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). When “a party fails to provide accurate information, or cooperate in the valuation of assets, the chancellor is entitled to proceed on the best information available.” Id. The chancellor possesses sole authority to assess both the credibility and weight of witness testimony. Culumber v. Culumber, 261 So. 3d 1142, 1150 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).

¶9. Here, as previously discussed, both parties submitted Rule 8.05 financial disclosures to the chancellor and testified at the hearing. Rodney’s initial Rule 8.05 disclosure, however, failed to reflect all his assets. During questioning by Stepidy’s attorney, Rodney admitted that his Rule 8.05 financial statement failed to include three bank accounts and five vehicles and/or trailers that he owned. Stepidy’s attorney also questioned Rodney about the values he listed for certain vehicles and the discrepancies between those values and the higher valuations reflected by the National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA). While subsequently questioning Rodney about his valuation of the marital home, the following exchange occurred:

STEPIDY’S ATTORNEY: Okay. And on the financial declaration, you say the house . . . [is] worth about [$]63,000; is that right?

RODNEY: I guess.

STEPIDY’S ATTORNEY: Well, I mean, that’s what you put down.

THE COURT: Hang on. Rule 8.05 requires the parties to exchange a financial statement that’s to be signed under oath. I’ve sat here for the last 30 minutes and listened to various and numerous discrepancies in your 8.05. I’m going to take a break, and at 9:45[a.m.], I’m going to return, and I want that 8.05 to reflect exactly what your knowledge is.

RODNEY: Okay.

THE COURT: I’ve heard vehicles that aren’t listed. I’ve heard checking accounts that aren’t listed. Somebody hasn’t done . . . [his or her] job. I’m going to give you ten minutes to do it, or I’m going to hold you in contempt. Do you understand what I’m telling you?

¶10. On Stepidy’s Rule 8.05 statement, she listed the following values for the three vehicles now at issue on appeal: (1) $20,000 for the 2006 Volvo truck (VIN ending in 3635); (2) $17,000 for the 2000 Freightliner conventional trailer; and (3) $20,000 for the 2007 Transcraft trailer. Stepidy testified that she and her attorney obtained these values from NADA after inputting the vehicles’ VINs and title information. While Rodney’s initial Rule 8.05 statement failed to list any of the three disputed vehicles, Rodney testified that the 2006 Volvo truck (VIN ending in 3635) was inoperable and that he no longer used the 2000 Freightliner conventional trailer. Rodney further testified that he had tried and failed to sell the vehicles. As a result, Rodney claimed that both vehicles lacked any monetary value. As to the 2007 Transcraft trailer, Rodney stated that he rarely used the trailer, and he valued the item at $4,000.

¶11. Despite Rodney’s testimony that he had not driven or operated the 2006 Volvo truck (VIN ending in 3635) in three to five years, Stepidy’s attorney questioned him about two different tickets he had received for the vehicle within the last two years. (The first ticket was issued in August 2015, and the second ticket was issued in February 2016.) In response, Rodney stated that a mistake had occurred and that the VINs for his two 2006 Volvo trucks had been mixed up.

¶12. In rendering his bench opinion, the chancellor found that Rodney lacked credibility and that his testimony had been full of inaccurate and untruthful information intended to conceal his income and assets. Based on the evidence before him, the chancellor valued each of the now disputed items among the amounts provided by Stepidy’s Rule 8.05 statement and Rodney’s testimony and amended the Rule 8.05 statement. Because we find the record contains sufficient evidentiary support for the chancellor’s valuation of the three disputed assets, we refuse to find any manifest error. See Dunaway v. Dunaway, 749 So. 2d 1112, 1121 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to find error where “the chancellor, faced with proof from both parties that was something less than ideal, made valuation judgments that find some evidentiary support in the record. . . . [and] appears to have fully explored the available proof and arrived at the best conclusions that he could . . . .”). We therefore find this assignment of error lacks merit.

So …

  • The chancellor found that Rodney lacked credibility. Not surprising given the sorry state of his 8.05 and his slipshod answers to questions about values. When the chancellor bases her findings on credibility, her conclusions are well-nigh bulletproof on appeal because it is within the chancellor’s exclusive realm of responsibility to assess credibility and the weight to assign to testimony.
  • You could just about hear the chancellor’s frustration over the incomplete 8.05. A frustrated chancellor is never a good thing when he is frustrated at you or your client.
  • Rodney sort of self-destructed on the witness stand over his assertion that he hadn’t driven the truck and trailers but had been ticketed while operating them. The judge didn’t buy the mixed-up VIN excuse, and I don’t know anyone else who would have either.
  • Contrast Rodney’s valuations with Stepidy’s. Hers had a rational basis that the chancellor could rely on, and were presented in an orderly and complete fashion.

Rule 8.05 and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

June 3, 2019 § 1 Comment

UCCR 8.05 should make everyone’s job in chancery court a lot easier. But lawyers, in their eternal ingenuity for contriving ways to complicate nearly all of creation, turn them into an implement of torture that they inflict on the court.

Chancellor Haydn Roberts of Rankin County presented this material at the Bar’s Family Law Section Hot Tips Seminar recently:

How to Confuse, Frustrate and/or Anger a Judge with an 8.05

Seriously, it happens often!

Don’t Prepare an an 8.05

Rule 8.05 states: “Unless excused by Order of the Court for good cause shown, each party in every domestic case involving economic issues and/or property division  shall provide the opposite party or counsel, if known, an 8.05 in compliance with subparts (a) and (b) of the rule

Speights v. Speights, 2016-CA-01691-COA

Prepare your client’s 8.05 in the lobby, hallway or parking lot immediately preceding trial

Most of us Judges aren’t stupid and can tell when an 8.05 is prepared in this fashion

Common errors when this happens include unsigned 8.05s, incomplete property asset listing, incomplete debt listing and amounts, confusing expenses, pages
missing,

AND MY FAVORITE – misspelled children’s names and inaccurate birthdays

Don’t Bring Copies

You need a minimum of 5 copies (6 with a GAL)

Your copy

Counsel opposite

The Court

Evidence

Copy for the witness

GAL copy

Deflate Income

Gross income – “total income from all sources before deductions, exemptions or other tax deductions

Includes wages, investment income, gifts from friends, rentals, social security, pension, child support, etc…

Overtime hours count

Be careful as the Judge may ask for a recent loan application from your client, wherein he/she must report his/her income

See, 2017-CA-1476 SCT; Tracy Marie Miles Williams v. Brent Reid Williams; affirmed 01/17/19; and Trim v. Trim 33 So.3d 471 (Miss. 2010)

Inflate Expenses

If your client’s expenses far exceed his/her income, and he/she doesn’t have much debt…SOMETHING ISN’T CORRECT

Single person in an apartment shouldn’t incur $1200/month in food and household items BUT single person raising multiple children will incur at least that much

Most client’s don’t have much “household maintenance”

Pet expenses, yard expenses, miscellaneous, entertainment should be ACTUAL and know what those items entail

Double-dip Expenses

Some insurance is listed as a deduction

Don’t use health insurance as a mandatory deduction and then also an “insurance expense”

Same with life insurance, property insurance, rental insurance, automobile insurance, personal property insurance, umbrellas

Intermingle Expenses

Use columns

Expenses could be current, past, future

Expenses could be single, family/household, and/or spouse + child(ren)

Keep it realistic even if speculative

Fail to Update

Time Lapse between temporary hearing and final may mean different information

When you update an 8.05 tell the Court

Witness/Client should know the differences and WHY there are differences

If Client has new employment, attach new pay stub

Mislabel property

Make sure personal property matches

“Grandma’s antique roll top desk” on wife’s 8.05 is the same as “desk in bedroom” on husband’s 8.05

2012 Accord on wife’s 8.05 is the Blue Honda on husband’s 8.05

Watch the models, years, makes, account numbers, bank names, creditors’ names

Mark property value/equity as “unknown”

If you list an asset or debt as “unknown” and the opposite party has a value, the Judge will likely use that value

Be prepared to give a value even if it’s an educated guess

Be prepared to discuss the other party’s value(s) and why it/they are wrong

REMEMBER – asset value as to “stuff” is garage sale value, not brand spanking new

Who Needs Statements? [i.e., Documentation]

Debts should be corroborated by statements

Helps if they are at or near date of demarcation you are requesting

Retirement accounts

Bank accounts with substantial balances

Other accounts

Church Donations

This not a way to equalize income to expenses

If client makes church donations during a court matter, they should KNOW the following:

Church’s name
Church’s location
What service time they attend
Preacher’s name

 

Some previous posts on how to improve your 8.05’s are here, here, and here. Or type “8.05” in the search box to access a plethora of posts on financial proof and 8.05’s.

Proving Inability to Pay

May 13, 2019 § Leave a comment

When we think of the award of attorney’s fees in a divorce the first principle that comes to mind is “inability to pay.” We know and focus on the concept that the party with inability to pay will be entitled to attorney’s fees.

But inability to pay is only part of the formula. “The party seeking attorney’s fees is charged with the burden of proving inability to pay; usually where the party is able to pay his or her own attorney’s fees, an award of such fees is inappropriate.” Duncan v. Duncan, 915 So.2d 1124, 1128 (¶16)(Miss. Ct. App. 2005). [Emphasis added]

It’s that burden of proving that often is overlooked. The party’s mere assertion that he has the inability to pay, or a nodded affirmative to the question whether she can pay her own fees simply will not do the job. You have to put proof in the record that will support a finding by the judge that your client does not have the resources to pay.

In the COA case of Vandenbrook v. Vandenbrook, decided March 26, 2019, the court by Judge Carlton found the evidence lacking:

¶49. Based on our perusal of the record, the chancellor made no explicit findings addressing all of the McKee factors, either in her order, or on the record, but it can be surmised from the chancellor’s statement that she had considered them. [Fn 9] The more perplexing question is not the reasonableness of the amount awarded, but the basis for finding that Emma was not able to pay it. As noted, the chancellor stated: “But according to the McKee factors, you know, Emma has an inability to pay.” On the question of whether Emma had the ability to pay her own attorney’s fees, the chancellor offered no analysis of Emma’s financial condition that would support the conclusion that Emma was unable to pay them. During the chancellor’s discussion of the custody issue, she stated the following: “[Emma] has just entered the work force again, but it sounds like she’s got a stable job at this point. And it sounds like she has a stable home at this point.” We note that Emma testified that she could not pay her attorney’s fees. As stated, the burden was on Emma to prove that she could not pay her attorney’s fees. Although the decision to award attorney’s fees in a
divorce proceeding is left to the sound discretion of the chancellor, there must be evidence undergirding the chancellor’s decision that a party is unable to pay her attorney’s fees before an award can be made. Here, we find the record lacks such evidence. Therefore, we find that the chancellor erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Emma for the divorce proceeding, which ultimately resulted in Emma’s complaint for the divorce being dismissed. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the chancellor’s award of attorney’s fees for the chancellor to determine whether Emma has the inability to pay and to apply the McKee factors with supporting findings.

Fn 9 This Court in Evans v. Evans, 75 So. 3d 1083, 1090 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011),stated the following: “While this [C]ourt has held that a chancellor’s failure to apply the McKee factors is not necessarily itself reversible error, see Miley v. Daniel, 37 So. 3d 84, 87(¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), the proof must at least support an accurate assessment of fees under the McKee criteria.”

I seriously doubt that this is a case where the chancellor overlooked the evidence in the record or failed to recite what evidence it was she relied on. My guess is that she had no evidence other than Emma’s assertion in her testimony upon which to base her finding. Why do I say that? Because I see it time and again. As I have posted here many times, lawyers for the most part devote little attention to making an adequate record to support an award of attorney’s fees.

My suggestion is that you spend a little less time on the more flamboyant issues like proof of adultery, and more time on the 8.05. Questions like “What money do you have to pay your attorney’s fees? How much have you had to borrow to pay? Why did you have to borrow? What effect will it have on your ability to buy the children’s school clothes if you have to pay your own attorney’s fees?” And so on. Oh, and while you’re at it, be sure to quiz the adverse party on his ability to pay, because his inability to pay may negate your claim.

Double Fault

April 17, 2019 § 1 Comment

When both parties are clearly guilty of grounds for divorce, who gets the divorce?

Stephen Anderson proved that his wife, Emmarie, was guilty of adultery. She put on proof that he was guilty of habitual drunkenness and habitual cruel and inhuman treatment. The chancellor found both parties had proven the other guilty by the requisite standard of proof.

What is the chancellor to do? Grant both parties a divorce? Grant Stephen a divorce because adultery is more serious? Grant the divorce to Emmarie because people shouldn’t be violent toward each other? Order them to go home together and try to preserve the sanctity of their marriage?

The chancellor granted Emmarie a divorce, and Stephen appealed, arguing that he should have been granted the divorce because it was Emmarie’s adultery that caused his separation from her.

In Anderson v. Anderson, decided March 19, 2019, the COA affirmed. Judge Lawrence wrote the opinion, which analyzed Stephen’s argument on the point:

¶9. Stephen argues that because he proved that Emmarie committed adultery and Emmarie’s adultery caused him to leave, he should have been granted a divorce on that ground. Stephen further argues that Emmarie should not have been granted a divorce on habitual cruel and inhuman treatment because she reconciled with him after her 2012 claim.

¶10. “There can be but one divorce granted. Where each party has requested a divorce and offers proof sufficient to establish a basis for divorce, the chancellor must then determine which of the parties will be granted a divorce.” Garriga v. Garriga, 770 So. 2d 978, 983-84 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing Hyer v. Hyer, 636 So. 2d 381, 382 (Miss. 1994)). Here, Stephen filed for divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and adultery. Emmarie counterclaimed on the same grounds.

¶11. In Sproles v. Sproles, 782 So. 2d 742, 746 (¶14) (Miss. 2001), the chancellor granted the wife a divorce on the grounds of habitual drunkenness and habitual cruel and inhuman treatment instead of granting the husband a divorce on the ground of adultery even though his wife admitted at trial that she had committed adultery. Our supreme court affirmed the chancellor, finding that “[t]here [was] ample proof that it was [the husband’s] conduct that caused the dissolution of the marriage and that [the wife] was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment and habitual drunkenness.” Id. at 747 (¶20). In Boutwell v. Boutwell, 829 So. 2d 1216, 1219 (¶¶40-43) (Miss. 2002), our supreme court dealt with a nearly identical issue and relied on Sproles to affirm the chancellor’s grant of divorce to the wife on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.

¶12. Here, Emmarie admitted that she committed adultery. However, the chancellor also heard testimony from Emmarie, Emmarie’s mother, and Emmarie and Stephen’s son about Stephen’s physical abuse upon Emmarie that started prior to and throughout the marriage. Ultimately, the chancellor determined that it was Stephen’s continued course of physical abuse upon Emmarie that caused the breakdown of the marriage. Finding the chancellor’s decision was supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the chancery court’s grant of divorce to Emmarie on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.

Here the chancellor specifically found that it was Stephen’s conduct that caused the breakdown of the marriage, and it was on that finding that she made the award of the divorce to Emmarie. That basis has been upheld by the courts.

When you have the possibility that either party may be granted a divorce because both have grounds, it would behoove you to develop proof that the opposing party was more at fault. You need that kind of proof in connection with Ferguson, Albright, and Armstrong factors.

 

 

Bifurcation and the Appeal

April 3, 2019 § Leave a comment

It’s becoming more and more common that contested divorce trials are bifurcated so that the grounds are tried separately from the issues of equitable distribution, alimony, etc. Under this practice, the grounds are tried first. If no divorce is granted, that’s the end of that. If, on the other hand, the court finds that the grounds are proven, then the court retains jurisdiction to determine property division and other such issues at a later date. The advantages are manifold, chiefly that one does not have to invest the time and money to develop evidence relating to property unless and until a divorce is granted.

That’s what was done in the divorce case of Mary and Glen Montgomery. The court bifurcated the case, and a hearing was held on the grounds for divorce. Following the hearing, the chancellor found that Glen had proven HCIT, and granted the divorce. The judge did commence a hearing on the remaining issues, which involved property only, but the hearing could not be concluded, and it was recessed to a date four months later. The court entered a judgment on the day of the hearing granting Glen the divorce and stating that “Matters of equitable division [would] be addressed in a later judgment.” The judgment also recited that “This is a final judgment on the grounds for divorce only. The Court hereby reserves jurisdiction …” over all of the remaining financial issues. Mary, who had represented herself in the proceedings, filed a timely pro se appeal.

In Montgomery v. Montgomery, decided March 5, 2019, the COA dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Jack Wilson wrote for the court:

¶5. A fuller recitation of the facts of the case is unnecessary because we lack jurisdiction. See Walters v. Walters, 956 So. 2d 1050, 1051 (¶2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). “Though the issue has not been raised by the parties, this Court is required to note its own lack of jurisdiction.” Id. at 1053 (¶8). “Generally, only final judgments are appealable.” Id. (quoting M.W.F. v. D.D.F., 926 So. 2d 897, 899 (¶4) (Miss. 2006)). “A final, appealable, judgment is one that ‘adjudicates the merits of the controversy[,] . . . settles all issues as to all the parties[,]’ and requires no further action by the lower court.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Banks v. City Finance Co., 825 So. 2d 642, 645 (¶9) (Miss. 2002)).

¶6. “A judgment granting a fault-based divorce is a non-final order if issues attendant to the fault-based divorce, such as property division, remain before the lower court.” Id. at (¶9). That is precisely the situation here. The chancery court’s judgment granting a divorce expressly stated that the court reserved jurisdiction to divide the marital estate and resolve all other financial matters related to the divorce. Therefore, the judgment granting a divorce “was not a final judgment from which an appeal could be taken.” Id.; accord, e.g., M.W.F. v. D.D.F., 926 So. 2d 897, 898-900 (¶¶3-6) (Miss. 2006) (holding that a “judgment of divorce” granting a divorce was not final because it did not resolve issues of property
division, alimony, child custody, and child support); Ory v. Ory, 936 So. 2d 405, 408 (¶3) & n.1 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that a “judgment of divorce” was not final because the chancery court reserved the division of the marital assets for a later date). The judgment granting a divorce was not final even though it was labeled as a “final” judgment. Walters, 956 So. 2d at 1052-54 (¶¶5-7, 9, 11-12) (holding that a “Final Judgment of Divorce” was not a final, appealable judgment because the equitable division of the marital estate remained pending before the chancery court). Whether a judgment is “final” is a matter of substance, not form. See M.R.C.P. 54(b).

¶7. Rule 54(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides one exception to the rule that only final judgments are appealable. See Walters, 956 So. 2d at 1053 (¶10). Under Rule 54(b), “the [trial] court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed direction for the entry of the judgment.” M.R.C.P. 54(b). However, the trial court’s “expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay” must be stated “in a definite, unmistakable manner.” Id., advisory committee notes. In other words, the trial court must expressly “certify” that the
interlocutory ruling should be deemed final and “released for appeal.” Jennings v. McCelleis, 987 So. 2d 1041, 1043 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Indiana Lumbermen’s Mut. Ins. Co. v. Curtis Mathes Mfg. Co., 456 So. 2d 750, 753 (Miss. 1984)).

¶8. In this case, the trial judge did not make such an express certification. Indeed, the judge did not make any statement to the effect that there was “no just reason for delay” of an appeal. M.R.C.P. 54(b). To the contrary, the judgment granting Glen a divorce expressly stated that the equitable division of the marital estate would be “addressed . . . in a later judgment.” The judgment further stated that the court reserved jurisdiction to address that issue and all other financial matters. Moreover, the court even gave the parties a date for the second day of trial. Therefore, Rule 54(b)’s exception to the final judgment rule does not apply. See Walters, 956 So. 2d at 1052-54 (¶¶5-14) (holding that Rule 54(b) did not apply in the absence of an expressed determination by the trial court that there was no just reason for delay—even though the trial judge stated orally and in a written judgment that he intended to allow an immediate appeal from a “Final Judgment of Divorce”).

¶9. Because the chancery court has not entered a final, appealable judgment in this case, this Court lacks jurisdiction, and this appeal must be dismissed.

Nothing more to add. Keep this in mind the next time you try a bifurcated case.

 

Whose Values Count?

March 25, 2019 § Leave a comment

In the course of their divorce proceedings, the chancellor twice requested both Tracy and Brent Williams to submit a list of assets, values, and debts. When they came to trial, only Brent did so, and Tracy even listed the value of her business, a daycare, as unknown. The chancellor used Brent’s figures upon which to base equitable distribution. Tracy appealed, arguing that the chancellor erred in not appointing appraisers, even though she never made that request of the trial court. She argued that the valuations were not accurate due to depreciation.

The MSSC affirmed in Williams v. Williams, decided January 17, 2019. Justice Beam wrote for a unanimous court:

¶19. While we note that “expert testimony may be essential to establish valuation sufficient to equitably divide property, particularly when the assets are diverse . . . ,” Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 929 (Miss. 1994), we also recognize and “reiterate the principle that findings on valuation do not require expert testimony and may be accomplished by adopting the values cited in the parties’ 8.05 financial disclosures, in the testimony, or in other evidence.” Horn v. Horn, 909 So. 2d 1151, 1165 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Ward v. Ward, 825 So. 2d 713, 719 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)).

¶20. Here, the record reflects that only Brent attempted to provide the chancellor with evidence regarding the valuations of the parties’ business interests, and the chancellor used those valuations as reflected in her opinion. Tracy’s argument that the chancellor committed reversible error by not appointing experts to appraise the current valuations due to depreciation is without merit. This Court refuses to blame the chancellor for a party’s failure to present sufficient evidence of property valuation. Faced with similar circumstances, we stated the following in Dunaway v. Dunaway:

It is our conclusion that the chancellor, faced with proof from both parties that was something less than ideal, made valuation judgments that find some evidentiary support in the record. To the extent that the evidence on which the chancellor based his opinion was less informative than it could have been, we lay that at the feet of the litigants and not the chancellor. The chancellor appears to have fully explored the available proof and arrived at the best conclusions that he could, and we can discover no abuse of discretion in those
efforts that would require us to reverse his valuation determinations. Dunaway v. Dunaway, 749 So. 2d 1112, 1121 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). As explained in Dunaway, the chancellor’s duty is not to obtain appraisals of the marital property. Id. Further, the Dunaway court found that, while expert testimony about property valuations might be helpful in some cases, it is not required, and the chancellor may consider other
evidence presented by the parties. Id.

¶21. Tracy did not come forth with expert testimony or any other valuations of the businesses; therefore, the chancellor used the available proof, including Brent’s valuations, and arrived at the best conclusion that she could. Accordingly, this Court finds the chancellor did not err in the valuation of the Williams’s business interests.

I’ve said it here before that it’s often breathtaking how little attention lawyers give to adequate proof of values in divorce cases. That forces judges to do their dead-level best with scanty evidence. It can leave your clients disappointed in the outcome at the least, and mad as a hornet at you at the worst.

It’s malpractice in a divorce case to merely accept your client’s 8.05 as scribbled out by her without going over it and questioning every item, or at least the ones that appear out of line, and without making sure it is complete, with values and itemization of debt.

In this district, as the judge in this case did, we require an asset table showing the parties’ values, designation as marital or non, and debt. The list must be consolidated, meaning that there is one list. That way the judge is not required to figure out whether the “green sofa, $600” on her list is the same as the “couch in living room, $2,000” on his list are the same thing. We also will not give you a trial setting unless and until you produce that list. In cases where one party decides not to participate in that exercise, we accept the unilateral list and proceed to trial.

PSA No-No’s

March 12, 2019 § Leave a comment

Just because your client agrees with her estranged husband to certain terms for settlement of their divorce does not mean that you should plug those terms into a PSA and shove it under the judge’s nose for approval along with a divorce judgment. Our appellate courts have held that some provisions are void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy. Here are the most notable:

  • A provision that relocation of the custodial parent would automatically trigger a change of custody without court action is void because it deprives the chancery court of jurisdiction to modify its judgment. McManus v. Howard, 569 So.2d 1213, 1216 (Miss. 1990).
  • Likewise, an agreement that the custodial parent may not relocate without prior court approval is void. Bell v. Bell, 572 So.2d 841, 845-46 (Miss. 1990).
  • The parties may not agree that child support terminates when the child turns 18. Lawrence v. Lawrence, 574 So.2d 1376, 1381 (Miss. 1991).
  • A post-nuptial agreement that the father would automatically have custody of the parties’ child in the event of a separation was held to be unenforceable. McKee v. Flynt, 630 So.2d 44, 50 (Miss. 1993).
  • A mother’s agreement to forego child support in return for a deed to some property was void as against public policy. Calton v. Calton, 485 So.2d 309, 310 (Miss. 1986).
  • The parties’ agreement that the mother would pay no child support if she agreed to transfer custody to the father is unenforceable. R.K. v. J.K., 946 So.2d 764, 779-80 (Miss. 2007).

It should go without saying that the chancellor, before approving the agreement, must find that it makes adequate provision for the support and custody of the child(ren). MCA § 93-5-2(2). The court reversed in a case where the mother agreed to no visitation whatsoever and to a provision that her payment of child support was in an amount she could not afford. Lowrey v. Lowrey, 919 So.2d 1112, 1119 (Miss. 2005).

An agreement for no child support should be approved only in the most exceptional circumstances, such as unemployment. Brawdy v. Howell, 841 So.2d 1175, 1179 (Miss. App. 2003).

It is against public policy for the parties to present one agreement to the court for approval while having a secret agreement that they would not abide by its terms. Wilburn v. Wilburn, 991 So.2d 1185, 1193 (Miss. 2008). I set aside a divorce judgment on its first anniversary after I was presented proof in court that the parties had exchanged emails in the course of settlement negotiations that the husband promised he would not enforce the wife’s obligation to pay certain debts under the agreement if she would agree that he did not have to pay the child support provided for. Oh, and the agreement for her to pay certain debts was only in the agreement to help her qualify for a low-income mortgage.

Keep in mind that our appellate courts have been reversing cases in which the paying party was ordered to maintain life insurance in a benefit amount in excess of the total obligation. In one case, the trial court ordered the ex-husband to maintain a $1,000,000 life insurance policy to secure a $480,000 lump sum alimony award. The COA reversed, holding that the amount of life insurance may only be enough to secure the award. Griner v. Griner, 235 So.3d 177, 188-89 (Miss. App. 2017). Your PSA’s should follow that line of reasoning or reflect some other justification for the agreed amount.

 

 

Another Divorce Misfire in an HCIT/Constructive Desertion Case

January 28, 2019 § Leave a comment

Brooke Hoffman charged her husband Michael with habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and constructive desertion. After hearing the evidence, the chancellor dismissed her complaint, finding that she had proved neither ground. Brooke appealed the denial of the divorce.

The COA affirmed in Hoffman v. Hoffman, decided October 23, 2018, with Judge Wilson writing for a unanimous court:

¶22. As discussed above, Brooke alleged that she was entitled to a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and constructive desertion. As a practical matter, there is little difference between these two grounds. “In effect, conduct that would qualify as habitual, cruel, and inhuman treatment becomes constructive desertion when the innocent spouse leaves the home rather than remaining.” Deborah H. Bell, Mississippi Family Law § 4.02[5][d], at 80 (2d ed. 2011).

¶23. “Habitual cruel and inhuman treatment is conduct that either: (1) endangers life, limb, or health, or creates a reasonable apprehension of such danger and renders the relationship unsafe for the party seeking relief, or (2) is so unnatural and infamous as to render the marriage revolting to the non-offending spouse, making it impossible to carry out the duties of the marriage, therefore destroying the basis for its continuance.” Farris v. Farris, 202 So. 3d 223, 231 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Heimert v. Heimert, 101 So. 3d 181, 184 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)). “To prove habitual cruelty, the plaintiff must show more than mere unkindness, rudeness, or incompatibility.” Smith v. Smith, 90 So. 3d 1259, 1263 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). “Although in cases of violence a single incident may be sufficient for a divorce, generally the plaintiff must show a pattern of conduct.” Id.

¶24. Similarly, “constructive desertion” occurs when the innocent spouse “is compelled to leave the home and seek safety, peace, and protection elsewhere” because the offending spouse has engaged in conduct that “would reasonably render the continuance of the marital relation, unendurable or dangerous to life, health or safety.” Griffin v. Griffin, 207 Miss. 500, 505, 42 So. 2d 720, 722 (1949). “Chancellors should grant a divorce on the ground of constructive desertion only in extreme cases.” Hoskins v. Hoskins, 21 So. 3d 705, 710 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009). The burden of proof is on the party seeking the divorce to prove her ground by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 707 (¶6).

¶25. We affirm the chancery court’s judgment that Brooke failed to prove grounds for divorce. The chancery court noted that Brooke alleged only one incident of physical violence, which Mike denied. The court then noted that Brooke’s single allegation of violence was undermined by a police officer’s observation that she exhibited no signs of physical abuse immediately after the alleged injury. The court also noted that the day
following the alleged abuse Brooke wrote in a diary “that the parties made love and that she could ‘really tell that he (Mike) was emotionally present.’”

¶26. The chancery court also found that Brooke’s allegations related to Mike’s relationship with Matt were not credible. Mike denied Brooke’s allegations and another witness corroborated his testimony. Furthermore, the court found that Brooke offered “no proof” of an actual affair or physical relationship.

¶27. “It requires little familiarity with the institutional structure of our judicial system to know that this Court does not sit to redetermine questions of fact.” Johnson v. Black, 469 So. 2d 88, 90 (Miss. 1985). “The chancellor is the finder of fact, and the assessment of witness credibility lies within his sole province.” Darnell v. Darnell, 234 So. 3d 421, 423-24 (¶8) (Miss. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). “This Court gives deference to a chancellor’s findings in regard to witness testimony, because the chancellor is able to observe and personally evaluate the witnesses’ testimony and the parties’ behavior.” McNeese v. McNeese, 119 So. 3d 264, 275 (¶32) (Miss. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). Applying our familiar standard of review, we cannot say that the chancery court clearly erred in finding that Brooke’s allegations were not credible.

¶28. The same is true of the chancery court’s finding that Brooke’s allegations of emotional abuse were “unpersuasive.” The court noted that Brooke only testified to “a discreet number of unpersuasive specific incidents.” And, again, Mike denied Brooke’s allegations that he was emotionally abusive. It is for the chancellor “alone” to “judge[ ] the credibility of the witnesses” and weigh any “conflicting evidence.” Irle v. Foster, 175 So. 3d 1232, 1237 (¶32) (Miss. 2015). This Court does not reweigh conflicting evidence on such issues of fact. Mayton v. Oliver, 247 So. 3d 312, 322 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017).

¶29. Suffice it to say there was conflicting evidence with respect to each of Brooke’s various allegations against Mike. Those conflicts represent issues of fact for the chancery court to decide. Id. The chancery court summarized its reasons for dismissing Brooke’s complaint for divorce as follows:

Brooke may very well have determined for herself that she is no longer willing to countenance the ways in which she and Mike seem no longer to get along, especially when considered from the perspective of another man’s arms with whom she may now seem more compatible. However, . . . for a divorce to be granted on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment there must be proof of systematic and continuous behavior on the part of the offending spouse which goes beyond mere incompatibility . . . .

. . . .

The theory of constructive desertion as a grounds for divorce is reserved for extreme cases. Although Brooke’s and Mike’s marriage might reasonably be characterized on the record made as unhappy and unfulfilling, the evidence does not support a finding that it is to be considered unendurable to Brooke.

. . . .

The [c]ourt takes no pleasure in declining to award relief in a circumstance where the parties are separated and one party professes to be so
unhappy as to seek to be officially unshackled from the bonds of matrimony. The [L]egislature, as the policy makers for this [S]tate, have consistently declined to amend the divorce statutes to provide that one party can obtain a divorce from the other spouse without a showing of fault. Our appellate courts have not expanded the definition of cruel and inhuman treatment to include circumstances which would otherwise comprise mere incompatibility. The [c]ourt is, therefore, constrained by the evidence presented to it and the record made, and cannot find that Brooke’s and Mike’s marriage was unendurable at the time that Brooke left. Thus, the [c]ourt cannot find that Mike is guilty of constructive desertion.

We find no clear error, legal error, or abuse of discretion in the chancery court’s findings and conclusions. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the chancery court dismissing Brooke’s complaint for a divorce.

Some observations:

  • The inescapable object lesson here is one most practitioners have come to appreciate over the years: HCIT is not an easy ground with which to obtain a divorce, even though the burden of proof is only a preponderance of the evidence.
  • In ¶24, dealing with constructive desertion, the court says, citing Hoskins, that “The burden of proof is on the party seeking the divorce to prove her ground by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 707 (¶6).” That can at least be misleading. Hoskins does not say that; when Hoskins mentions burden of proof, it is referring to HCIT. Indeed, the only ground for divorce with a preponderance burden of proof is HCIT. The other grounds require clear and convincing evidence. See, Bell, 2d Ed., § 4.02[1][b]. Bell does say that, “In effect, conduct that would qualify as [HCIT] becomes constructive desertion when the innocent spouse leaves the home rather than remaining.” Id., §4.02[5][d]. So I guess it could be argued that the HCIT burden of proof applies in constructive desertion cases, but I am not aware of any cases that say that directly.

Separate Summons for Contempt in a Divorce Case

January 8, 2019 § Leave a comment

Note: this post was edited at 11:00, am to correct a misstatement in the first paragraph that contempt is a R81 matter, not a R4 matter as originally posted. Sorry for the error

It’s a fairly common occurrence that a counterclaim for contempt is filed in a divorce action, or a motion for adjudication of contempt is filed in a pending divorce. As we all know, divorce is a R4 matter, and contempt is a R81 matter, so is new, or different, process required to proceed on the contempt claim?

Here’s what the COA said in Thornton v. Thornton, an August 14, 2018, decision:

¶22. Additionally, regarding Brenda’s assignment of error attacking the chancellor’s ruling on her petition for contempt, we recognize that “[a]lthough contempt proceedings in divorce cases often are filed in the same cause number and proceed with the underlying divorce case, they are held to be separate actions, requiring new and special summons under Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure 81.” Shavers v. Shavers, 982 So. 2d 397, 402 (¶25) (Miss. 2008). We therefore find that Brenda’s argument regarding the contempt proceedings is not properly before this Court because “the contempt action [is] separate from the divorce judgment cited in the notice of appeal.” Williamson v. Williamson, 81 So. 3d 262, 277 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). We now turn to address Brenda’s other issues before us on appeal.

Shaver is a tad peculiar because it involved a removal to federal court followed by a remand back to state court, and a question about what effect that had on state court jurisdiction. Williamson involves a post-appeal contempt in which the COA ruled that the contempt action was no part of the divorce that had been appealed.

Shaver does cite Sanghi v. Sanghi, 759 So.2d 1250, 1255 (Miss. App. 2000), in which the parties were engaged in a long-dormant divorce case. Mrs. Sanghi filed a pleading to have Dr. Sanhi held in contempt for failure to pay child support, and he was served by certified mail, since he was already before the court in the divorce action via R4 summons. Here is the COA’s discussion:

¶ 24. This takes us full circle back to the question of whether Dr. Sanghi received sufficient notice of the April 13 hearing that underlies the actions at the July 2 hearing. To reiterate, Dr. Sanghi received notice of the first hearing that had been scheduled for March 9. That notice was not a summons sent by certified mail under Rule 4(c)(5), though the “motions” were sent by that procedure. Instead it was a “Notice of Court Setting” sent first class mail by the court administrator. This notice made Dr. Sanghi aware of the need to seek a postponement and presumably also to seek counsel to initiate the removal. The result of the requested delay was that the court administrator then mailed a notice on February 16, 1998, that the new hearing would be on April 13, 1998. There is nothing in the record explicitly confirming that Dr. Sanghi received the second notice, but he does state in his brief that the April 13 date was set at his request. There are several indications in the record and briefs but no direct proof that he was aware of the April 13 setting from the time that he sought a postponement of the March 9 hearing, but he just did not appear. Again, the inadequacy of the record is at the peril of the appellant Dr. Sanghi, so we proceed under the stated assumptions.

¶ 25. We have just described what was done. We now look at what should have been done. Whether the judgment is valid depends largely on the nature of the defects that occurred.

¶ 26. Rule 81(d)(3) requires that a petition or complaint be filed to modify or enforce child support and alimony judgments or to seek contempt. The mislabeling of the initiating pleading is a matter of form and would not by itself create a lack of authority for the court to act.

¶ 27. After the petition is filed, a summons is to issue notifying the respondent of the time and place for an appearance. If an answer to the petition is required, the notice should state that as well. M.R.C.P. 81(d)(4) & (5). Nothing is said about the available means of service, but the rule provides that the procedures “control to the extent that they may be in conflict with any other provision of these rules.” M.R.C.P. 81(d). The implication is that where Rule 81 does not even address a necessary procedure covered in the general rules, then the general provisions apply. Since 81 does not speak to the means for service of summons, it cannot conflict with the general rules that do. Not to be overlooked, though, is that Rule 81 controls the content of the summons. Service on an out-of-state defendant cannot be completed under Rule 4 by sending a summons by regular mail. Had a return envelope to send an acknowledgment of receipt been included and then utilized by Dr. Sanghi, that would have sufficed. M.R.C.P. 4(c)(3)(A). Certified mail service on an out-of-state defendant also is adequate, if the receipt is returned. M.R.C.P. 4(c)(5).

¶ 28. The notice of the April 13 hearing was not a Rule 81(d)(5) summons, though it provided most of the relevant information. The only required information under the Rule is that a party is to be told the time and place for the hearing and that no answer is needed. M.R.C.P. 81(d)(4) & (d)(5). The sample form that sets out the summons also indicates that the case name is to be shown, the suit number, the name of the person being served, and that failure to appear may result in a judgment with monetary or other consequences; the petition that initiated the action also is to be attached. M.R.C.P. Form 1D. These forms are not mandatory, but use of them removes any question of sufficiency under the Rules. M.R.C.P. 84. The notice sent by the court administrator contained all of the information that Form 1D would have contained, except that there was no statement regarding the need for a written response nor any language commanding attendance or warning that failure to appear could have significant consequences. The same day or perhaps the day before, the three “motions” were separately sent by certified mail and received by Dr. Sanghi.

Most often these matters get tried by consent, so there is a waiver of the objection and the parties resolve it that way.

But when you are handling a R4 case in which R81 issues later arise, especially against a pro se litigant, I strongly encourage you to issue that extra R81 summons. It’s worth the extra cost, time and effort.

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