Divorce Venue Can Be Waived
September 5, 2017 § 2 Comments
If there is one maxim of conventional wisdom in Mississippi divorce law, it is “Venue in a divorce is jurisdictional.” As a result, an objection to venue can not be waived.
That’s because the divorce venue statute, MCA 93-5-11, has been construed to confer subject matter jurisdiction which, as everyone knows, can neither be waived nor voluntarily conferred. The concept is embedded in our case law.
The foregoing was the law until June 1, 2017. Now the law has changed.
In Lewis v. Pagel, decided by the MSSC on June 1, 2017, Drake Lewis tried to argue on appeal that the chancery court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over his divorce from Tonia Lewis Pagel because he was not a resident of the county where the divorce was filed. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, and turned its attention to the question whether Drake had waived what up until then had been unwaivable. Justice Chamberlin wrote for a unanimous court:
¶28. In addition to residing in Harrison County, Drake waived his objection to improper venue by not timely raising it. Under Mississippi law, it is a “basic premise that venue may be waived.” Belk v. State Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 473 So. 2d 447, 451 (Miss. 1985).
¶29. Section 159 of the Mississippi Constitution vests subject-matter jurisdiction in the chancery courts over divorce proceedings. Miss. Const. art. 6, § 159. Personal jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding, though, is governed by Mississippi Code Section 93-5-11. Section 93-5-11 was amended by the Legislature in 2005 to include new language on the transfer of venue: “Transfer of venue shall be governed by Rule 82(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-11; see also 2005 Miss. Laws 448. Rule 82(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(d) Improper Venue. When an action is filed laying venue in the wrong county, the action shall not be dismissed, but the court, on timely motion, shall transfer the action to the court in which it might properly have been filed and the case shall proceed as though originally filed therein. The expenses of the transfer shall be borne by the plaintiff. The plaintiff shall have the right to select the court to which the action shall be transferred in the event the action might properly have been filed in more than one court.
M.R.C.P. 82 (emphasis in original). Further, the Rules provide the procedure for contesting improper venue. M.R.C.P. 12(b). We have not applied the language of Section 93-5-11 directly after its 2005 amendment.
¶30. We recognize that before the 2005 amendment this Court consistently found that Section 93-5-11 could not be waived as it vested subject-matter jurisdiction over divorce actions in the chancery courts. See Cruse v. Cruse, 202 Miss. 497, 499, 32 So. 2d 355, 355 (1947) (applying Section 2738); Price v. Price, 202 Miss. 268, 272, 32 So. 2d 124,125 (1947) (applying Section 2738); Carter v. Carter, 278 So. 2d 394, 396 (Miss. 1973) (applying Section [93-5-11’s 1942 Code predecessor]) [Fn omitted] ; Miller v. Miller, 323 So. 2d 533, 534 (Miss. 1975); Stark v. Stark, 755 So. 2d 31, 33 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); Slaughter v. Slaughter, 869 So. 2d 386, 395 (Miss. 2004); see also Bush v. Bush, 903 So. 2d 700, 701 (Miss. 2005) (order granting and deciding merits of petition for interlocutory appeal).
¶31. Today, we overrule these past cases to the extent that they hold that Section 93-5-11 confers subject-matter jurisdiction on chancery courts. [Fn 3] Subject-matter jurisdiction is conveyed by the Mississippi Constitution. Section 93-5-11 governs the venue of a divorce action and limits the chancery court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure control the procedure to be utilized when venue is improper. [My emphasis]
[Fn 3] In 2006—after Section 93-5-11 was amended—this Court, in dicta, found that Section 93-5-11’s venue requirement conferred subject-matter jurisdiction on the chancery courts. National Heritage Realty, Inc. v. Estate of Boles, 947 So. 2d 238, 248–49 (Miss. 2006) (applying Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-63(1)). We decline to follow this interpretation of Section 93-5-11 post-amendment. It appears the Boles Court did not take the amendment into account.
¶32. Additionally, even if the venue argument was correct, the appropriate remedy would have been transfer of the matter to Jackson County. M.R.C.P. 82(d). Rule 82(d), explicitly incorporated by Section 93-5-11’s amendment, allows the court to transfer an action only “on timely motion.” Id.
¶33. Drake’s motion challenging venue—eight years after the initial complaint—was untimely. Tonia filed her complaint for divorce in 2006; the chancery court entered an order of divorce in 2008. Drake first raised the issue of venue in 2014—six years after the entry of the judgment of divorce.
¶34. It is uncontested in the record that Drake did not answer Tonia’s complaint for divorce. While Drake was not required to do so, he was permitted to do so under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 81. M.R.C.P 81(d)(4); see also M.R.C.P. 12. Drake certainly could have responded to Tonia’s complaint and challenged venue. Instead, Drake chose to litigate the entire divorce and several ancillary matters, including several appeals, before raising his venue objection once a contempt judgment appeared imminent.
¶35. Our finding of waiver is reinforced by Drake’s actions after filing this appeal. After Drake noticed this appeal—in which he raises the issue of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction before this Court—he entered three agreed orders that were approved as to form by his counsel. Each order recognizes that the Harrison County Chancery Court has jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the dispute and the parties involved in the
dispute. [Fn omitted] Therefore, we find that Drake has waived his objection to venue by litigating in Harrison County.
So there you have it. Venue in a divorce case is no longer a function of subject matter jurisdiction that can not be waived or voluntarily conferred; it is a function of personal jurisdiction that can be waived. If venue is improper, the issue must be timely raised, and the remedy is transfer, not dismissal.
Remember that “timely” language from R 82. It does no good to plant a venue objection in your answer, and then to joust through discovery and motions for a year or two only to try to get the case transferred after the tide has been running against your client.
One little fillip, though. Won’t this open up the possibility of forum shopping? The plaintiff and defendant may decide to file in a district where neither resides because it has a shorter wait time to final hearing, or has a judge who is more to their liking, or for any other reason. A judge may invoke R 82 on her own motion at any time, but something has to bring the issue to the judge’s attention for that to happen. Or maybe we are simply entering an era when the locus of the divorce no longer has that much significance. Stay tuned.
[…] I posted about Lewis at this link. I urged readers to “stay tuned” to see how the court’s ruling plays out. […]
[…] posted here previously about the Lewis v. Pagel case, which changed the law of venue in divorce cases. It held that venue relates to personal […]