What You Say and How You Say it

June 13, 2016 § Leave a comment

When Lori and Gary Mosher appeared for the divorce trial to end their 26-year marriage, they agreed to a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, and submitted several contested issues for adjudication by the court.

The parties agreed that Lori would receive “one-half of [Gary’s] military retirement,” but left it to the court, apparently, to decide the amount. The chancellor found that Gary’s “military retirement” consisted of two components: “his disposable retired pay”; and his VA disability retirement of around $400 a month. Half of the two components came to $1,795, after deduction for a survivor annuity. Since the VA benefit was not subject to division under federal law, the chancellor awarded Lori a greater share of the retirement.

Gary appealed, complaining that the chancellor had no authority to divide the VA benefits because their agreement was to divide the military retirement only.

The COA affirmed on the point in Mosher v. Mosher, handed down May 24, 2016. Judge Fair wrote for the majority:

¶8. This argument misses the mark. Although it is true that the parties here agreed to divide the “military retirement” equally, the property settlement agreement did not specify what that was. Property settlement agreements are contracts, and like all contracts, there are sometimes disputes regarding the meaning of their terms. Gaiennie v. McMillin, 138 So. 3d 131, 135 (¶8) (Miss. 2014). It is apparent that the chancery court interpreted the parties’ agreement rather than disregarding it as Gary contends. The chancellor dedicated nearly ten of the fifty-six pages of her written judgment to this question.

¶9. As to the interpretation of the agreement, while it is clear Gary does not agree with the chancellor’s decision, he has not briefed that issue. “[T]here is a presumption that the judgment of the trial court is correct and the burden is on the Appellant to demonstrate some reversible error to [the appellate court].” Birkhead v. State, 57 So. 3d 1223, 1231 (¶28) (Miss. 2011); see also M.R.A.P. 28(a)(6). Gary has failed to meet his burden of showing error on this issue.

There are other issues addressed in the opinion dealing with equitable distribution and alimony. Judge Carlton dissented in part, joined by Greenlee and Griffis.

The main takeaways here for practitioners:

  • What you say and how you say it are pretty dadgum important when it comes to court. If the parties intended that only the military retirement, not including the VA disability retirement, was to be divided, then the agreement should have stated exactly that. Precision makes all the difference. It’s pretty hard to argue that something was intended when that intent does not appear in the specific language.
  • If you do not cite authority for your position on appeal, you have effectively waived it.

 

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