Subjecting One’s Self to the Jurisdiction of the Court
March 12, 2014 § 2 Comments
The MSSC case of Pierce v. Pierce, handed down February 20, 2014, includes a couple of pretty important points of law that you should be aware of in your chancery practice.
Martin and Star Pierce were married in 2000, and lived in Harrison County, Mississippi. They separated, and Martin filed for divorce in the State of Washington in 2007. Since the Washington court had no personal jurisdiction over Star, it granted a divorce only.
Martin later filed an action in Harrison County seeking partition of the parties’ jointly-owned home and settlement of the parties’ financial obligations incurred during the marriage. Star counterclaimed for equitable distribution, alimony, and attorney’s fees.
The chancellor equitably divided the marital estate, including Martin’s military retirement, and awarded Star alimony and attorrney’s fees.
Martin appealed, complaining (1) that the Washington judgment was res judicata as to Star’s claims for equitable distribution and alimony, and (2) that, since he had only requested partition, he had not consensually submitted himself to Mississippi jurisdiction for division of his military retirement.
As for the issue of res judicata, the MSSC said, at ¶ 19, that although the Washington court properly had subject matter jurisdiction over Martin’s divorce action, it lacked personal jurisdiction over Star. A court with personal jurisdiction over only one of the parties in a divorce may not divide the parties’ assets. Therefore, the issues of property division and alimony were not res judicata by virtue of the Washington judgment, and the Mississippi Chancery Court had jurisdiction over those issues.
Note: It happens from time to time that a party, unhappy with a Mississippi temporary order or separate maintenance order, or with the slow progress of his case, or lacking viable grounds, moves to another state or jurisdiction and obtains a divorce. That does not deprive Mississippi of jurisdiction to adjudicate all of the other issues within its territorial jurisdiction that are pendant to a divorce, such as equitable distribution, alimony, child custody, child support, and so on, if the court obtains personal jurisdiction. In this case, Martin submitted himself to the personal jurisdiction of the court, and thus opened the door to the court’s adjudication of all those pendant issues.
A previous post on exactly what constitutes res judicata is at this link.
With respect to Martin’s assertion that his partition suit did not open him to other relief via counterclaim, the MSSC disagreed at ¶ 23: “It is well-established ‘that by filing suit a plaintiff automatically waives any objections he might otherwise have on grounds of personal jurisdiction to counterclaims presented against him in the suit'” [Citations omitted]
Note: Not a whole lot needs to be said about this particular point. When you invoke the jurisdiction of the court, you open yourself to any and all claims and actions that the other party has against you, both arising out of the same subject matter as the original suit (MRCP 13(a)), as well as any not arising out of the subject matter of the original suit (MRCP 13(b)).
You should read the court’s opinion. Its rationale and the authority are both something you can use in your library of helpful authority.