Fraud on the Court and MRCP 60(b)
January 28, 2014 § 1 Comment
What does it take to trigger relief from fraud on the court?
That’s the question I posed in a previous post dealing with the COA’s October 2, 2012, decision in the case of Rosemary Finch v. Stewart Finch.
The answer based on the COA decision was that one need merely suggest that a fraud on the court was committed, and the chancellor can take it from there. So that settles that, right? Well, not exactly. The MSSC granted cert and took another look.
In Finch v. Finch, handed down January 16, 2014, the high court affirmed the COA’s decision on the chancellor’s handling of the fraud-on-the-court issue, but remanded for further findings of fact by the trial court on other issues.
The MSSC decison, penned by Justice Pierce, is worth your time to read, because it sheds further light on the dimensions of fraud on the court, how it affects judgments, how the trial court should address it, and how you should deal with it.
What is most strking to me about this opinion, however, is how the court divided on the decision:
LAMAR, KITCHENS AND CHANDLER, JJ., CONCUR. RANDOLPH, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND IN RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. DICKINSON, P.J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY WALLER, C.J., KING AND COLEMAN, JJ.; CHANDLER, J., JOINS IN PART.
Four justices joined entirely in the opinion: Pierce, Lamar, Kitchens, and Chandler. Randolph added a fifth concurrence “in part and in result.” The dissent garnered five votes also: Dickinson, Waller, King, and Coleman. Chandler added a fifth vote, “in part.” Neither Justice Randolph nor Justice Chandler wrote an opinion explaining their concurrence or dissent in part, so we do not know enough to understand their rationales. Apparently, under the MSSC internal procedures, a tie vote goes in favor of the justice who wrote the original opinion. In his dissent, Justice Dickinson referred to this as a “plurality opinion.”
I found Justice Dickinson’s dissent to be forceful and persuasive. He questioned whether due process had been violated, and he found the proof of actual fraud lacking. He was not successful, though, in selling his opinion to a majority. So the law of Mississippi in cases involving fraud on the court remains as I described it in that previous post:
… all that was necessary in this case was to give the chancellor a suggestion that there may have been a fraud on the court, and she picked it up and ran with it. The chancellor has broad, equitable power when it comes to relief under MRCP 60(b), which the court can exercise on its own motion. In this particular case the problem was fraud, but 60(b) vests the court with the same equitable powers to address mistake, “or any other reason justifying relief from judgment …”