SYMPATHY FOR THE DEVIL
December 12, 2010 § 8 Comments
Curtis Wilkie’s THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF ZEUS is the story of the rise and fall of powerful trial lawyer Dickie Scruggs. It is entertainingly well written, as one would expect of an author with Wilkie’s gift for the word, and microscopically researched. Wilkie’s book complements KINGS OF TORT, Alan Lange’s and Tom Dawson’s treatment of Scruggs’ downfall from the prosecution point of view. Those of you who savor Wilkie’s keen writing and incisive journalism will not be disappointed by this book. The subject matter is a must-know for all Mississippi lawyers and jurists, and citizens as well. I recommend that you buy and read this book.
Although I commend Wilkies’s book to you, I do find it troubling that it is unabashedly sympathetic to Scruggs. Wilkie finally acknowledges their friendship at page 371, the third-to-last page of the book.
As a member of the legal profession for nearly four decades and a member of the judicial branch, I can find no sympathy whatsoever for Scruggs at this stage of his life. His flirtations with unethical conduct and illegality are legion. Even his acolyte (Stewart Parrish’s excellent descriptive), Tim Balducci, said in a candid moment that his approach to corruptly influence judge Lackey was not his “first rodeo” with Scruggs, and that he knew “where all the bodies are buried.” Big talk? Perhaps. But to me it eloquently bespeaks Scruggs’ history: His involvement at the shadowy edges of Paul Minor’s illegal dealings with Judges Wes Teel and John Whitfield; his use of stolen documents in the tobacco litigation; his use of questionably acquired documents in the State Farm litigation; and the hiring of Ed Peters to influence Judge Bobby Delaughter. Are there more?
Wilkie suggests that Scruggs’ increasing dependence on pain-killer medication led him to fall carelessly into a trap laid for him and Balducci by a scheming Judge Lackey, who had it in for Scruggs because of Scruggs’ political attacks on Lackey’s friend George Dale. He posits that Lackey created the crime, and that Scruggs had set out initially “only” to improperly influence Lackey.
The pain killers may be a contributing reason, but even a first-year law student knows that is not an excuse.
What about the idea of a trap? I leave it to lawyers far better versed in criminal law and procedure to address that. To me, the issue is finally resolved in this sentence on page 337: “But Scruggs had acknowledged, ‘I joined the conspiracy later in the game.'” Case closed as far as I am concerned. Moreover, Scruggs was not an unsophisticated convenience store owner charged with food stamp fraud. He was a sophisticated, powerful lawyer skilled in manipulating the levers of legal machinery. He was not a gullible rube who did not grasp the significance of his actions or their consequences. He was a lawyer and as such was held to the highest standard of propriety vis a vis the judiciary, a standard he trod into the mud.
As for Judge Lackey, the author skillfully excerpts quotes from the judge’s testimony to support his charge that Lackey had an animus against Wilkie’s friend, in particular the judge’s use of the term “scum” to describe Scruggs. From my perspective, I can understand how someone in Lackey’s position would view the arrogant and powerful lawyer as scum when he saw how Scruggs had seduced the star-struck young Balducci, whom Lackey liked, into impropriety and, indeed, illegality. Some of Dickie’s and Curtis’ influential and powerful friends in Oxford may buy Wilkie’s and Scruggs’ attempt to tar Judge Lackey, but I do not. Judge Lackey chose to stay on the side of right and Scruggs chose the other side. The point goes to the judge.
Scruggs’ plaint that he only intended to commit an unethical act, not a crime — in other words that the consequences were unintended — is a familiar theme in history. Henry II of England griped to his knights that he was irked by that troublesome bishop, Thomas Becket. The knights, knowing from experience how far they could go before incurring the wrath of their king, promptly rode to Canterbury and rid their sovereign of that meddlesome priest, killing him at the altar. Likewise, Scruggs’ knights, Balducci, Patterson, Langston, Backstrom and the others, knew the ballpark Scruggs was accustomed to playing in, and they set out with his money and influence to promote his (and their) interests in the accustomed manner of doing business.
Henry II did penance for the rest of his life for what he saw as the unintended consequences of his actions. Will Scruggs try to redeem himself for the damage he did to the legal profession and the legal system? Time will tell. When he is released from prison, he could find ways to devote some of his hundreds of millions of dollars to improving the courts and the legal profession and restoring integrity to the profession that made him rich. In the final decades of his lfe, he could become known as a philanthropist who advanced the law and the legal profession, with his past a footnote. I hope that is what he does.
Read this book and judge it yourself. You may see it differently than I. The story, though, and its lessons, are important for Mississippians to know and understand.
A MILITARY LIFE INSURANCE POTHOLE
December 10, 2010 § 2 Comments
You have tried your divorce case to a conclusion and your client, the wife, is awarded custody and statutory child support. The husband, an active-duty member of the Navy, is ordered to maintain his Serviceman’s Group Life Insurance (SGLI) policy for benefit of the minor child. It would appear that everything is peachy-keen. Your client is on cruise control, right?
Not so fast, my friend. Your client’s limo is headed for a major pothole. Consider the following:
Richard and April Ridgway were divorced in 1977 in the State of Maine. They had three children at the time.
In the divorce judgment, the trial court ordered Richard to maintain his SGLI policy in the face amount of $20,000 with April as beneficiary for benefit of the three minor children.
Richard later married Donna and changed the designation of the beneficiary to provide that the proceeds would be paid as specified “by law,” which under federal law means that it would be paid to his widow, who would be Donna. Richard died and both April and Donna filed claims to the proceeds.
April filed suit in Maine courts seeking imposition of a constructive trust for benefit of her children. Donna joined the suit seeking payment to herself based on the designation of beneficiary by Richard.
The case wended its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, and in Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 US 46 (1981), that court held that due to the supremacy clause, a state court ruling must yield to federal law that gives a serviceman the unfettered right to designate his own SGLI beneficiary, and for such policies to be exempt from attachment, execution and other process for collection.
What all this means is that the state trial court judge’s rulings vis a vis the SGLI is essentially meaningless.
So what can you do? One solution may be to ask the court to take judicial notice of the Ridgway decision (and provide the judge a copy), and have your client testify that she insists that the husband obtain and maintain a private policy of life insurance with the children as sole named beneficiary. If you put all your client’s eggs in the SGLI basket, she may find it empty when egg-gathering time arrives. And she just might look to you to make things right.
Thanks to attorney Bill Jacob for this. I have not researched this issue for later authority, but Bill tells me it is good law.
DEATH SENTENCE FOR THE QUEEN OF SOUL
December 9, 2010 § 2 Comments
It was in the fall of 1968 that I began my love affair with Aretha Franklin. I found an LP of hers on special in a campus bookstore and paid $2.98 ( and that was marked down from $3.98) for ARETHA FRANKLIN LIVE IN PARIS. That was nearly three hours’ worth of earnings from my part-time minimum wage job. A lot of money for a starving college sophomore to spend on a little entertainment. That record became one of the most beloved of my formidable vinyl collection. I played it until the stereo was worn out of its grooves, and I still have it. I listen to the version on my computer now from time to time, last Sunday the most recent. The Queen of Soul still reigns, as far as I am concerned.
So it was with great sadness that I learned only yesterday that Aretha has pancreatic cancer and has been given less than a year to live. How sad.
It was not too many years ago that a diagnosis of any kind of cancer was a death sentence. That has changed dramatically, and many forms of cancer can be successfully treated and defeated. We all know survivors today who would have been victims some years ago.
Unfortunately, it’s all too true that pancreatic cancer is still a swift death sentence. It claimed both the universally admired and loved Circuit Judge Bob Evans and Meridianite Guy Feltenstein earlier this year. Judge Evans lived only a few months after his diagnosis. Guy had a few months longer. Both suffered agonizing illnesses. Both left a gaping hole in the lives of others.
I read not too long ago that with the ability to do stem-cell research, scientists feel they are on the path to a cure. I hope so. The Lustgarten Foundation promotes research for a cure. If you have some spare change to donate, it would be for a good cause.
In the meantime, the death watch for this superbly talented woman who in every sense is the Queen of Soul ticks down to its inevitable conclusion. How so very sad.
FAMILY VIOLENCE AND ITS IMPACT ON VISITATION
December 9, 2010 § 1 Comment
We’ve already discussed the impact of family violence on the court’s adjudication of custody here and here. Family violence also directly affects visitation.
MCA § 93-5-24(9)(d)(i) provides in part:
“A court may award visitation by a parent who committed domestic or family violence only if the court finds that adequate provision for the safety of the child and the parent who is a victim of domestic or family violence can be made. “
The statute sets out specific actions that the court may take in such a case. The court may:
- Order the exchange to take place in a protected setting;
- Order supervised visitation;
- Order counselling or an intervention program for the perpetrator;
- Order the perpetrator to abstain from possessing or consuming alcohol or controlled substances before and during visitation;
- Order the perpetrator to pay a fee for supervised visitation;
- Prohibit overnight visitation;
- Require a bond for the safe return of the child; or
- Impose any other conditions for the safety of the child, other parent or other family members.
The court may order that the residence address of the custodial parent or child be kept confidential.
The court may not require a victim of domestic or family violence to attend counselling, individually or with the perpetrator, as a condition of visitation.
SNOW
December 8, 2010 § 2 Comments
We have snow flurries today in east-central Mississippi. And, yes, there are snow flurries on my blog. I may just let it keep on snowing through Christmas.
Cheers.
TRANSFER OR DISMISS?
December 8, 2010 § 5 Comments
It was long the law in Mississippi divorce cases that venue is jurisdictional, and that an action filed in the wrong county had to be dismissed, and could not be transferred to the appropriate county. See, Carter v. Carter, 278 So.2d 394, 396 (Miss. 1973). Venue in a Mississippi divorce is said to be “exclusive” because the divorce statutes define where venue lays. The action must be brough exclusively in the county specified. Where venue is exclusive, it is jurisdictional.
Against this backdrop, the Mississippi Supreme Court decided the case of National Heritage Realty, Inc. v. Estate of Boles, 947 So.2d 238 (Miss. 2006), reh. den. February 8, 2007. The case involved an estate opened in Tallahatchie County, which was the county where the decedent formerly lived before relocating to a nursing home in Leflore County, where she subsequently died. The chancellor found that venue for the estate was properly in Leflore County, and had ordered that the estate be transferred from Tallahatchie County to Leflore. The Supreme Court, by Justice Easley, ruled that the venue statute for estates is exclusive, and, therefore, jurisdictional. In the absence of jurisdiction, the chancellor was without authority to take any action, even a transfer. In the absence of jurisdiction, his action was void and not merely voidable. Justice Easley at page 248 based his reasoning on the established divorce venue law, to which he analogized the estate venue statutes.
The only problem is that the divorce venue statute, MCA § 93-5-11, had been amended in 2005, a year before the Boles decision, to add the following sentence: “Transfer of venue shall be governed by Rule 82(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.” MRCP 82(d) reads, in part:
“When an action is filed laying venue in the wrong county, the action shall not be dismissed, but the court, on timely motion, shall transfer the action to the court in which it might properly have been filed and the case shall proceed as if originally filed therein … “
Justice Easley’s opinion makes no mention of the amendment.
From time to time I get requests from lawyers to transfer a case, usually from Lauderdale to Clarke County, although I have been requested to transfer to other counties. This occurs primarly with out-of-district lawyers who are unfamiliar with the fact that some people with a 39301 zip code and a Meridian address actually reside in Clarke County, or some folks with Collinsville addresses actually reside in Newton or Neshoba, or with Daleville or Lauderdale addresses actually residing in Kemper. The predominant type of case lawyers want transferred involves the Structured Settlement Protection Act, MCA § 11-57-1, et seq. I presume they prefer transfer over dismissal because dismissal requires filing a new petition and starts over the law’s technical notice and time requirements.
So how can we reconcile Boles and MCA § 93-5-11 and MRCP 82(d)?
In the absence of any definitive guidance from the appellate courts, here is my interpretation:
- If the case is not a divorce and venue is exclusive (i.e., defined in the statute upon which your action is based), then the case can not be transferred. It must be dismissed and refiled.
- If venue in the case arises under MCA § 11-11-3, the general venue statute (which has been held to be applicable to actions in chancery court where there is no exclusive venue statute), the case may be transferred per MRCP 82(d).
- If the case is a divorce, it may be transferred per MCA § 93-5-11, but see the caveat below.
Some observations based on the above:
Cases under the Structured Settlement Protection Act may not be transferred because MCA § 11-57-11 includes an exclusive venue provision.
An action solely for an injunction is under the general venue statute because MRCP 65 does not define venue for the action. A Rule 65 action may be transferred.
Although the statute expressly authorizes transfer of a divorce, consider the ramifications before you do it. The divorce statutes include an exclusive venue provision. Under Boles, an action filed in the wrong venue in an exclusive venue case is void ab initio, meaning that the chancellor has no authority to take any action other than to dismiss. The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Price v. Price, 32 So.2d 124 (Miss. 1947). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a defect that may be raised at any time, even years after the fact, because the action of the court lacking jurisdiction is void, and not merely voidable. Would you want to risk having your client’s divorce set aside somewhere down the road by the other party who is disgruntled with the outcome? If I were the attorney, my preference would be to take the safe path and dismiss the case with improper venue rather than transfer it.
[I hope this is a helpful starting point for Frankie and colleagues at MC Law]
SEEK AND YE SHALL FIND
December 7, 2010 § Leave a comment
Now that there are more than 200 posts on this blog, I realize that it may not be as easy as it once was to find what you’re looking for. Here are five ways to search the blog:
- In the panel to the right is a small window with the word “Search” and a magnifying glass. Enter a search term there and you will retrieve a selection of posts that might have what you’re looking for. For example, if you’re looking for “tax effects of alimony,” you could enter “alimony,” or “tax effects,” or even “IRS.”
- Again in the panel to the right is a drop-down menu that says “Select category,” under the label “Search Older Posts by Category.” Every substantive post is assigned a subject-matter category, and it can be retrieved by their category grouping. For example, that alimony post you were looking for above will be under the category “Alimony.” Grandparent visitation posts will be under “Child Custody,” since visitation is a subset of custody.
- And again in the panel to the right, you can look at “Older Posts” and search month by month, or scroll all the way to the bottom of the page and you will find boxes with numbers; each numbered page includes 10 posts, and you can search through all the older ones by going back page by page.
- Finally, you can click on a “Category” or “Tag” in the left column, and that will take you to a page with all posts on other WordPress blogs in the same category or using the same tag.
If all else fails, ask me and I will try to point you to the post you need.
DEALING WITH CRAZY CLIENTS
December 7, 2010 § 6 Comments
The issues that bring people to Chancery Court are some of the very issues that stretch ordinary people to the breaking point. And it’s the lawyer who most often becomes the shock absorber, taking calls from worried clients in the wee hours, receiving hundreds of repetitive or accustory e-mails, being accused of all manner of things, having your judgment questioned at every turn, and even being threatened. Like we have said, some clients can make you ashamed to be a human being.
Some clients can be downright dangerous.
Mark Bennett is a Texas criminal defense lawyer who has a blog named Defending People: The Tao of Criminal Defense Trial Lawyering. He came up with a practical guide to dealing with crazy clients that he titled 10 Practical Rules for Dealing with the Borderline Personality. Here are his guidelines:
10 Practical Rules for Dealing with the Borderline Personality
- If you don’t have to deal with a crazy person, don’t.
- You can’t outsmart crazy. You also can’t fix crazy. (You could outcrazy it, but that makes you crazy too.)
- When you get in a contest of wills with a crazy person, you’ve already lost.
- The crazy person doesn’t have as much to lose as you.
- Your desired outcome is to get away from the crazy person.
- You have no idea what the crazy person’s desired outcome is.
- The crazy person sees anything you have done as justification for what she’s about to do.
- Anything nice you do for the crazy person, she will use as ammunition later.
- The crazy person sees any outcome as vindication.
- When you start caring what the crazy person thinks, you’re joining her in her craziness.
“YOU MAKE ME ASHAMED TO BE A HUMAN BEING”
December 6, 2010 § 1 Comment
Any lawyer who practices family law for any length of time learns quickly that some clients can be scarily delusional, or nearly so, and that managing their expectations can be an impossible task.
Here is an animated video of a lawyer-client interview about child custody that will have you family lawyers in tears — either from laughing hysterically or from regretfully recognizing yourself and/or a client in the exchange.
WARNING: This video includes some pretty rough language, and is not safe for work or appropriate for children.
Thanks to attorney Rhae R. Darsey and Municipal Judge Robert D. Jones for this.
BRAISED SHORT RIBS OR OX TAIL
December 4, 2010 § Leave a comment
Braising is cooking meat or a vegetable in liquid in slow heat. The result is a tasty dish that will melt in your mouth. The technique produces layers of rich flavors that are surprisingly complex considering the relative simplicity of the preparation.
The recipe below is for short (beef) ribs, but it works just as well with ox tails. It may seem curious that the recipe calls for chicken stock, but once you taste it you’ll see why. And you can see that the seasonings are quite simple. The flavors that you get from braising are so robust that you don’t need much more than the taste of the ingredients. Of course, it’s your kitchen, add whatever seasonings you like; just remember that braising will magnify or diminish their effects, depending on which herbs or spices you add.
Be sure the vegetables are coarsely chopped. You don’t want them to disappear in the long, slow cooking.
I have done a lot of braising, and it’s my favorite cooking method. I like this recipe because it fairly reflects what I do when I am throwing a dish together with whatever I have on hand. Try it. I think you’ll be pleased and pleasantly surprised with the results.
BRAISED SHORT RIBS
1 Tbsp. vegetable oil
1 1/2 Lb. short ribs, cut into 3″ pieces, about 6-8 in all, or flanken
2 Medium onions, coarsely chopped
2 Carrots, sliced
2 Stalks celery, coarsely chopped
2 Cloves garlic, minced
8 Oz. sliced mushrooms
6 Oz. tomato paste
3 Tbsp. all-purpose flour
1 Bottle (750 ml.) red wine
2 Cups chicken stock
Salt and black pepper to taste
Egg noodles, cooked
Pat the meat dry. Season with salt and black pepper.
Heat the oil in a dutch oven until it shimmers. Add the meat and brown on all sides over medium heat. Remove the meat from the pan and set aside.
Drain all but one tablespoon of the oil. Add the onions, carrots, celery, garlic, mushrooms and a sprinkle of salt and cook until the vegetables begin to soften, about five minutes.
Add the tomato paste and flour and mix thoroughly with the vegetables. If necessary, add a splash of wine to facilitate the mixture. Let the mixture heat, stirring often, for about five minutes.
Stir in the red wine and chicken stock. Add the meat back to the pot. Bring the contents to a boil. Reduce heat to medium-low and cover. Cook for two hours. Remove the pot top and let cook for another fifteen minutes to reduce.
Serve over the cooked egg noodles.
