The Effect of Harris v. Harris
August 21, 2019 § 1 Comment
Back in February, 2018, I posted about the MSSC’s ruling in Harris v. Harris, which overruled Spalding v. Spalding, regarding the impact of Social Security (SS) retirement benefits on alimony. Spalding had held that the alimony-paying party is entitled to a credit against alimony in the amount of the other party’s receipt of SS benefits derived from the alimony-paying party’s work record. Harris held that receipt of SS does not automatically trigger modification. Here is a link to my post.
In Alford v. Alford, a July 23, 2019, COA case about which I posted yesterday, Judge Greenlee wrote a specially concurring opinion raising some concerns about Harris and how it will be applied:
¶37. I concur with the majority. However, because I am concerned about the effect Harris v. Harris, 241 So. 3d 622 (Miss. 2018), may have in this case and other cases, I specially concur.
¶38. Our supreme court’s decision in Harris has the potential to greatly impact those in our population who are aging and under a court-ordered duty of support. For our citizens who earn their wages through compensation from work for others, there comes a time that many should at least consider retirement, if retirement is not required or decided for them. The litigants in this case, if not retired, are rapidly approaching retirement.
¶39. In such cases, the problem chancellors face is in reliably predicting the impact of retirement upon the earnings of the parties. Harris should not mean that once retirement occurs to one or both of the parties (although foreseeable at the time of the initial support order) that the parties are foreclosed from asking the court for a modification based on a material and substantial change in circumstances. See Plummer v. Plummer, 235 So. 3d 195, 199 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (modification of alimony requires proof of a material and substantial change in circumstances since the date of the prior judgment). If the application of our law is to foreclose a litigant’s request for a modification of periodic alimony upon that party’s retirement, such could mean that in order to meet the amount required, that party must not retire. If that is the case, has our law not imposed a servitude upon a citizen until death? Retirement is a substantial change to an individual’s circumstances, and Harris should not be allowed to hinder such a change from being brought before the chancellor for consideration.
This is a conundrum I have never seen directly addressed by our appellate courts: retirement is reasonably foreseeable and even necessary at some age. Retirement almost always results in a downward shift in the retiree’s income. How does that foreseeability affect the right to request modification? I think Judge Greenlee makes a valid point.
The Better Chancery Practice Blog 
Judge Greenlee’s concurrence makes sense and is fair. While retirement may be foreseeable in the sense we all hope to retire one day, it should well serve as an opportunity to review/modify one’s obligations if otherwise warranted.