If You Want Specific Findings, Here’s What You Do
April 16, 2019 § Leave a comment
Dotie Jackson was unsuccessful in his attempt to modify custody. The chancellor found that he had failed to prove a material change in circumstances that would impact the child and warrant further analysis of the three-prong test for modification. He appealed.
In the March 19, 2019, case of Jackson v. Jackson, the COA affirmed the chancellor’s ruling. One issue Dotie raised was that the chancellor had erred in not making specific findings. Judge Greenlee’s opinion for the unanimous court addressed the point:
¶15. Dotie argues this matter should be reversed and remanded for the chancellor to make specific findings that there was no material change in circumstances which adversely affected the children. He also argues specific findings under an Albright [Fn omitted] analysis are required.
¶16. Under both the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and the Uniform Chancery Court Rules, the chancellor is not obligated to provide specific findings of fact unless a party requests that she do so. See Smith v. Smith, 97 So. 3d 43, 46, 48 (¶¶7,16) (Miss. 2012) (citing Johnson v. Gray, 859 So. 2d 1006, 1012 (¶31) (Miss. 2003)). Dotie did not make such a request. And we have specifically acknowledged that this rule applies in child-custody cases. Blevins v. Bardwell, 784 So. 2d 166, 174-75 (¶¶30-31) (Miss. 2001).
¶17. But here, the chancellor did make findings of fact that are clearly set forth in her bench ruling. The chancellor definitively concluded:
[T]he Court finds and agrees with the guardian ad litem . . . with regard to the children . . . . [J]ust as [the] guardian ad litem, I have conducted an analysis based upon information made available to me. And it is my opinion that there has been no substantial material change in the home of Lori Beth Duperier [Jackson] that would warrant further consideration of the three-prong test for custody modification.
A careful reading of the chancellor’s bench ruling reveals the facts on which she based her ruling.
[T]he parties are really blessed. They have two beautiful young children, and they are healthy, and they are doing well. Both parents are healthy, financially stable . . . and they live a good life.
. . . .
[T]he mother contacted the professionals, and they did what they are required to do. They are to report situations where . . . they’re concerned that there is some type of abuse.
The chancellor noted that the investigation concerning the abuse allegations “was handled quickly.” She further stated:
I believe and I found credible the mother’s testimony that once the allegations were dismissed that she saw no need for the counseling. The guardian ad litem
testified the children were doing well. They [are] happy. They are healthy. They love both parents. Probably as the children see it, they did not skip a beat on their relationships with both parents. From my description, they are involved. They love both parents.
Thus, the chancellor found the allegations against Dotie did not alter the children’s relationships with either Dotie or Lori Beth. As earlier discussed, we found no error in the chancellor’s finding there was no material change in circumstances that adversely affected the children. And in absence of such a finding, the chancellor was not required to make specific findings under the Albright factors. Anderson[v. Anderson], 961 So. 2d [55] at 58 (¶6) [(Miss. Ct. App. 2007)]. Reversal and remand is not warranted in this instance.
Some thoughts:
- There is plenty of case law that the Chancellor is required to make specific findings on the Albright factors. No motion is required to trigger that particular duty.
- BUT if the chancellor finds no material change or adverse effect, then the chancellor is not required to analyze the case under Albright, so the duty of specific Albright findings does not come into play.
- If you want specific findings for matters such as material change, which unlike Albright are not required findings, you must make a motion per UCCR 4.01 and bring it to the attention of the court. The rule states:
In all actions where it is required [e.g., Albright] or requested [by a motion made according to this rule], pursuant to MRCP 52, the Chancellor shall find the facts specially and state separately his conclusions of law thereon. The request must be made either in writing, filed among the papers in the action, or dictated to the Court Reporter for record and called to the attention of the Chancellor.
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