Blueprint for Proving Fraud on the Court
March 20, 2019 § 2 Comments
If you will type “fraud on the court” in that Search box over there on the right at the top of the page, you will call up some posts I have done on the effect that fraud on the court has on a judgment.
Most fraud-on-the-court situations are pretty clear. Sometimes, though, you have to convince the judge that the behavior about which you are complaining did constitute a fraud on the court even though it appears benign on its face. Your burden of proof is clear and convincing, so you have to make sure the evidence is strong.
In Manning v. Tanner, 594 So.2d 1164, 1167 (Miss. 1992), the MSSC established four factors that the court must find in order to vacate a judgment for fraud on the court:
(1) that the facts constituting the fraud, accident, mistake, or surprise must have been the controlling factors in the effectuation of the original decree, without which the decree would not have been made as it was made;
(2) the facts justifying the relief must be clearly and positively alleged as facts and must be clearly and convincingly proved;
(3) the facts must not have been known to the injured party at the time of the original decree; and
(4) the ignorance thereof must not have been the result of the want of reasonable care and diligence.
Clearly factor 1 is the most important to the analysis. If the allegedly fraudulent conduct would not have effected the outcome, the relief should not include setting aside the judgment. To illustrate: I set aside an irreconcilable differences divorce once because on a R60 hearing a year later emails were produced in which the parties essentially agreed that the PSA presented to the court was a sham, and that they were actually agreeing to terms that an attorney had told them I would never approve. Had I known of the side deal when I was presented the original judgment I would never have signed it.
Factor 2 mentions pleadings. Remember the requirement of R9(b) that “the circumstances constituting fraud … shall be stated with particularity.” You have to state in your motion what the specific conduct was that you claim was fraudulent. And, again, the conduct must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
If your client knew, or should have known by reasonable care and diligence, of the fraud, then the court should not set aside the judgment. That’s Factors 3 and 4.
In deciding whether to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court, the chancellor must keep in mind that “Relief based on ‘fraud upon the court’ is reserved for only the most egregious misconduct, and requires a showing of ‘an unconscionable plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its decision.’” Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 873 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1989). “The mere non[-]disclosure to an adverse party and to the court of facts pertinent to a controversy before the court does not add up to ‘fraud upon the court’ for purposes of vacating a judgment under Rule 60(b).” Trim v. Trim, 33 So.3d 471, 477-78 (Miss. 2010). “To warrant relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) the movant must prove fraud, misrepresentation or other conduct by clear and convincing evidence.” Hill v. Hill, 942 So.2d 207, 214 (Miss. App. 2006) [My emphasis].
The Better Chancery Practice Blog 
You left out Finch v. Finch
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