Agreements Against Public Policy

March 11, 2019 § Leave a comment

In a recent case, the COA was confronted with the question whether an agreement between the parties for lump-sum child support, incorporated into an irreconcilable differences divorce judgment, was enforceable. Lump sum child support is not allowable in Mississippi. Pittman v. Pittman, 909 So.2d 148, 152-53 (Miss. App. 2005). All of the authorities on Mississippi family law agree.

Kevin McCall filed a petition to modify his lump sum child support and added a R60 motion arguing that the provision was void as against public policy.

In McCall v. McCall, a January 29, 2019, decision, the COA ruled that the issue was no properly before the court because Kevin McCall had never appealed the 2014 divorce judgment that approved the agreement (interesting question: how does one appeal from an agreed judgment?). The opinion, penned by Judge Griffis, went on to add:

¶20. … Instead, this Court recognizes that “property settlement agreements are contractual obligations.” In re Estate of Hodges, 807 So. 2d 438, 442 (¶20) (Miss. 2002). The provisions of a property-settlement agreement executed prior to the dissolution of marriage must be interpreted by courts as any other contract. Id. at 445 (¶26). In East v. East, 493 So. 2d 927, 931-32 (Miss. 1986), the supreme court held that “[a] true and genuine property settlement agreement is no different from any other contract, and the mere fact that it is between a divorcing husband and wife, and incorporated in a divorce decree, does not change its character.” [Fn omitted]

¶21. Although this Court does not authorize the award of lump sum child support, we recognize that circumstances may arise between divorcing parties, such as here, where the divorcing parties may determine that there is a just and a reasonable basis for a non-custodial parent to agree to pay the custodial parent a lump sum amount to satisfy child support obligations.

In a dissent, Judge McCarty took the position that the agreement was void as against public policy, and that the issue was properly before the COA via the R60 motion. Judge Westbrooks joined in the dissent.

It is well-settled in our law that the parties may agree to terms in an irreconcilable differences divorce that no judge could order in a contested case. For instance, they may agree that support for the child will continue beyond age 21, or that child support will exceed the guidelines. Or they may agree to forms of alimony that no judge could order. They may agree that lump sum alimony terminates on death.

It’s difficult to determine where the line is between what the chancellor may approve and what is void whether the chancellor approves it or not. I’ll post some thoughts tomorrow on provisions that our appellate courts have held to be unenforceable.

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