A Totality of Circumstances Case
January 16, 2019 § Leave a comment
Modification of custody may be based on a finding of changed circumstances that arises from a totality of the circumstances in which the child is living.
That is what happened in the case of Farra Sheridan in which the chancellor modified custody from her to her ex-husband, James Cassidy, based on multiple factors. Unhappy with the trial judge’s decision, Farra appealed.
In Sheridan v. Cassidy, a December 11, 2018, decision, the COA affirmed. Chief Judge Lee wrote the majority opinion:
¶10. “[I]n modification cases, as in original awards of custody, we never depart from our polestar consideration: the best interest and welfare of the child.” Johnson v. Gray, 859 So. 2d 1006, 1013 (¶33) (Miss. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, modification issues are different from original custody determinations. In order to succeed on a request for modification, “the non-custodial party must prove: (1) that a substantial change in circumstances has transpired since issuance of the custody decree; (2) that this change adversely affects the child’s welfare; and (3) that the child’s best interests mandate a change of custody.” Mabus v. Mabus, 847 So. 2d 815, 818 (¶8) (Miss. 2003). In Riley v. Doerner,
677 So. 2d 740, 744 (Miss. 1996), the supreme court held:
[W]here a child living in a custodial environment clearly adverse to the child’s best interest, somehow appears to remain unscarred by his or her surroundings, the chancellor is not precluded from removing the child for placement in a healthier environment. . . . A child’s resilience and ability to cope with difficult circumstances should not serve to shackle the child to an unhealthy home, especially when a healthier one beckons.
¶11. The chancellor found the following amounted to a material change in circumstances: Farra’s involvement with a married man; her numerous violations of the PSA, including allowing her boyfriend to spend the night while the children were present; her decision to abuse alcohol while taking prescription medications; her poor financial decisions; her refusal to co-parent with James; her inciting the children to access private information on James’s electronic devices; the children’s school absences and tardies related to weekend trips to Arkansas; the children’s living situation while visiting Arkansas; and issues with one child’s failure to complete school assignments. The chancellor also had concerns about Farra’s credibility.
¶12. We cannot find that the chancellor’s findings regarding a material change in circumstances were manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous …
I include this case only to illustrate for you how a chancellor may view the living situation of the custodial parent, and how Riley v. Doerner may come into play.
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