No Alimony for You
January 14, 2019 § Leave a comment
Robert Culumber was granted a divorce from his wife, Toni, on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and habitual drunkenness. They had separated after only 13 months together. The chancellor found that Toni was not entitled to alimony. Toni appealed both the granting of the divorce and the denial of alimony.
In the case of Culumber v. Culumber, handed down December 4, 2018, the COA affirmed on all issues. Chief Judge Lee wrote for the unanimous court (Tindell not participating) on the alimony issue:
¶28. Finally, Toni argues that in the event that the divorce was properly granted, then the chancery court improperly denied Toni’s request for rehabilitative alimony. Toni alleges that even though the marriage was short, she is entitled to rehabilitative alimony payments because Robert paid all the bills and expenses in the marriage and that she needs assistance to become self supporting after the marriage.
¶29. We first note that alimony is considered only if after equitable division, one party is left with a deficit. Carney v. Carney, 201 So. 3d 432, 440 (¶28) (Miss. 2016). “The decision of whether to award alimony, and if so, what amount, is left to the chancellor’s discretion.” Hearn v. Hearn, 191 So. 3d 129, 132 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). When determining whether to award alimony, the chancellor is to consider the Armstrong factors:
(1) the income and expenses of the parties; (2) the health and earning capacities of the parties; (3) the needs of each party; (4) the obligations and assets of each party; (5) the length of the marriage; (6) the presence or absence of minor children in the home, which may require that one or both of the parties either pay, or personally provide, child care; (7) the age of the parties; (8) the standard of living of the parties, both during the marriage and at the time of the support determination; (9) the tax consequences of the spousal support order; (10) fault or misconduct; (11) wasteful dissipation of assets by either party; or (12) any other factor deemed by the court to be “just and equitable” in connection with the setting of spousal support.
Larson v. Larson, 192 So. 3d 1137, 1142 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993)).
¶30. In regard to the type of alimony Toni argues she is entitled to, we note that rehabilitative alimony is “an equitable mechanism which allows a party needing assistance to become self-supporting without becoming destitute in the interim.” Serio v. Serio, 203 So. 3d 24, 30 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Lauro v. Lauro, 847 So. 2d 843, 849 (¶15) (Miss. 2003)). It is “awarded to parties who have put their career on hold while taking care of the marital home.” Id. “Rehabilitative alimony allows the party to get back into the working world in order to become self-sufficient.” Id.
¶31. The chancellor stated that there was no basis for alimony. Toni alleges that the chancellor placed too much emphasis on the length of the marriage and did not properly consider the other factors. The record indicates otherwise. As the chancellor noted, Toni was not working at all when she came into the marriage. Additionally, she brought approximately $30,000 of debt into the marriage which Robert paid off in full. It is true, as the chancellor noted, that the marriage was very short—barely one year. The parties had no children. Per the chancellor’s findings, Toni was “actually better off by virtue of the marriage in terms of her education, having her student loan paid off and other things to help her further her career, rather than lose it.” Career wise, Toni was relatively young—being in her late thirties, while Robert was approaching retirement—being in his late fifties. In December 2013, Toni became employed, making around $38,000, and this employment continued at the time of trial. Robert paid all of the bills and expenses during the short-term marriage and assumed responsibility for all marital debt. Toni received payment for her
equitable share of marital assets in the amount of $13,442.00. As we now affirm, the chancellor found Toni at fault in the marriage on grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment and habitual drunkenness. We do not find that the chancellor abused his discretion in denying Toni an award of rehabilitative alimony. This issue is without merit.
This is not a particularly noteworthy case, except that it illustrates how a chancellor, and the COA on review, may view rehabilitative (and other forms of) alimony in light of the Armstrong factors given a set of facts such as these.
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