What You May Get with a Motion for Reconsideration
April 25, 2018 § Leave a comment
Continuing with yesterday’s R59 theme, we turn to the question of what, exactly, are you asking for when you make a R59 motion, and how does what you ask for shape what you’re likely to get?
It wound up being an issue for one Tracy Dixon. After the chancellor denied his request for modification, Tracy filed a “Motion for Reconsideration, Correction of Judgment, or in the Alternative for a New Trial.” The chancellor entered an order granting a new trial without ruling on the merits of any issues in the case. Without holding a new trial or hearing any further evidence, the chancellor entered a revised opinion and amended final judgment unfavorable to Tracy. He appealed.
The COA affirmed in Dixon v. Dixon, handed down February 6, 2018. Judge Wilson expounded for the 5-4 majority:
¶29. In his final issue on appeal, Tracy argues that the chancellor exceeded his authority under the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure by entering a revised opinion and amended final judgment. As discussed above, after the initial final judgment was entered (on February 10, 2016, nunc pro tunc January 26, 2016), Tracy filed a “Motion for Reconsideration, Correction of Judgment, Or In The Alternative For New Trial.” The chancellor then entered an order granting a “new trial,” which did not address or rule on the merits of any of the issues in the case. Finally, without holding a “new trial” or hearing any additional testimony or evidence, the chancellor entered a revised opinion and amended final judgment, which is the subject of this appeal. Tracy argues that the chancellor’s entry of a revised opinion and
amended final judgment violated Rule 59(d), which provides as follows:
Not later than ten days after entry of judgment the court may on its own initiative order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party. After giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard on the matter, the court may grant a timely motion for a new trial for a reason not stated in the motion. In either case, the court shall specify in the order the grounds therefor.
M.R.C.P. 59(d). Specifically, Tracy argues that the chancellor effectively ordered a “new trial”—either sua sponte or “for a reason not stated in [Tracy’s timely] motion” for a new trial. Id. If the former, Tracy says that the chancellor violated Rule 59(d) by acting more than “ten days after entry of judgment.” Id. If the latter, Tracy says that the chancellor violated Rule 59(d) by not “giving [him] notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Id.
¶30. We conclude that Tracy has misinterpreted the case’s procedural history and the chancellor’s rulings. Tracy’s “Motion for Reconsideration” primarily sought to alter or amend the judgment in various respects—he sought to change the final judgment based on the evidence already presented, not a “new trial.” In fact, the motion’s prayer for relief did not even mention a “new trial.” Rule 59(a)-(d) governs a motion for a new trial. However, Rule 59(e) governs a motion to alter or amend the judgment.
¶31. Rule 59(e) simply provides that “[a] motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be filed not later than ten days after entry of judgment.” M.R.C.P. 59(e). Interpreting the nearly identical federal rule, [Fn omitted] federal courts have held that “[a] judge may enlarge the issues to be
considered in acting on a timely motion under Rule [59(e)].” Charles v. Daley, 799 F.2d 343, 347 (7th Cir. 1986). The court may amend any part of the judgment, and the court is not limited to the grounds raised in the motion. EEOC v. United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of the U.S. & Canada, Local No. 120, 235 F.3d 244, 250 (6th Cir. 2000). “The salient fact is that a motion to amend judgment was timely filed. Such gave the [trial] court the power and jurisdiction to amend the judgment for any reason, if it chose to do so, and it was not limited to the ground set forth in the motion itself.” Varley v. Tampax Inc., 855 F.2d 696, 699 (10th Cir. 1988); accord Bullock v. Buck,
611 F. App’x 744, 746 n.2 (3d Cir. 2015) (“In ruling on a Rule 59(e) motion, a District Court is not limited to the grounds set forth in the motion itself.”); Walker v. Walker, 216 So. 3d 1262, 1272-74 (Ala. Ct. Civ. App. 2016).
¶32. We conclude that these decisions are consistent with our Supreme Court’s recognition of a trial court’s “broad discretionary authority under Rule 59(e) to grant relief.” Bruce v. Bruce, 587 So. 2d 898, 904 (Miss. 1991). Our Supreme Court has held that “[w]hen hearing a motion under Rule 59(e), a trial court proceeds de novo, if not ab initio.” Id. “Rule 59(e) provides the trial court the proverbial chance to correct its own error . . . .” Id.
¶33. Tracy’s filing of a timely motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) suspended the finality of the judgment and permitted the chancellor to consider the various issues in this case “de novo, if not ab initio.” Id. At that point, the chancellor had “the power and jurisdiction to amend the judgment for any reason, if it chose to do so, and it was not limited to the ground set forth in the motion itself.” Varley, 855 F.2d at 699. On appeal, we review the chancellor’s amended final judgment on its own merits.
So R 59(e) is one of those proverbial two-edged swords, kind of like asking your law-school professor to look back over your paper to see whether she could possibly find that extra point on the exam to get you that 3.0; the search might take the result in the opposite direction.