… And More on R41(b) Dismissal
March 27, 2018 § Leave a comment
Only yesterday we visited the notion of an MRCP 41(b) dismissal in a trial without a jury. The point there was that the motion is one to dismiss, not for a directed verdict.
Today we study the standard that the trial court is to apply in deciding how to rule on the motion.
In In the Matter of the Dissolution of the Marriage of Lewis, decided by the COA on March 20, 2018, Judge Wilson expounded on the topic:
¶13. In a bench trial, after the plaintiff “has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant . . . may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.” M.R.C.P. 41(b). A motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) is different from a motion for a directed verdict, which is made only in a jury trial. Ladner v. Stone Cty., 938 So. 2d 270, 273 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). “This distinction must be understood, because the standard of review for a dismissal is different than that for a directed verdict.” Id.
¶14. In ruling on a Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss, “[t]he judge must consider the evidence fairly, rather than in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” as would be the case on a motion for a directed verdict or a motion for summary judgment. Century 21 Deep S. Props. Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So. 2d 359, 369 (Miss. 1992) (emphasis added). That is, the trial judge should give the plaintiff’s evidence only “such weight and credibility as he would ascribe to it if he were making findings of fact and rendering final judgment.” Gray v. Alumax Extrusions Inc., 477 So. 2d 1355, 1356-57 (Miss. 1985). If the judge “would find for the defendant” on the evidence presented, “the case should be dismissed.” Corson, 612 So. 2d at 369. “[T]he motion should be granted if the plaintiff has failed to prove one or more essential elements of his claim or if the quality of the proof offered is insufficient to sustain the plaintiff’s burden of proof.” Buelow v. Glidewell, 757 So. 2d 216, 220 (¶12) (Miss. 2000). “The court must deny a motion to dismiss only if the judge would be obliged to find for the plaintiff if the plaintiff’s evidence were all the evidence offered in the case.” Corson, 612 So. 2d at 369 (emphasis added).
¶15. “This Court applies the substantial evidence/manifest error standards to an appeal of a grant or denial of a motion to dismiss pursuant to [Rule] 41(b).” Id. The trial judge’s “decision on the motion is, for purposes of appeal, treated like any other finding of fact. In other words, his decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless it was manifestly wrong.” Gray, 477 So. 2d at 1357.
Applying the law to the case at hand:
¶16. “The chancellor’s findings of fact about cohabitation [and] de facto marriage . . . are entitled to substantial deference when reviewed on appeal.” Hughes v. Hughes, 186 So. 3d 394, 397 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting McMinn v. McMinn, 171 So. 3d 511, 518 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014)). “We will not reverse a chancellor’s findings regarding the existence or nonexistence of a de facto marriage unless they are manifestly or clearly erroneous.” Id. at 403 (¶26) (citing Burrus v. Burrus, 962 So. 2d 618, 621 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)).
We’ll look at the concept of de facto marriage in a later post. At this point it’s important to bear in mind the standard you need to argue to convince the chancellor to grant — or deny — that 41(b) motion.