MRCP 81(d)(5) requires that process shall command the defending party to appear at a specified date, time, and place. If the matter is not heard on the day specified in the summons, then ” … it may by order signed on that day be continued to a later day for hearing without additional summons …” on the defending party. And, subsequently, if the matter can not be heard on the date to which it was continued, then a continuance order must be entered on that date to a later date. And so on in the same fashion from one continued date to another until final judgment. Some refer to those continuance orders as “linking” continuance orders.
So, is it necessary to preserve process for the non-appearing defending party to receive notice of each linking continuance order? That was what Jessica Tullos argued about the final judgment modifying custody to her ex-husband James. The matter had been continued several times, all in her absence, and she complained that linking orders were not entered, and that it was error that she did not receive any of them.
In Tullos v. Tullos, decided November 7, 2017, the COA rejected Jessica’s argument and affirmed the trial court. Judge Westbrooks wrote for the unanimous court, Tindell not participating:
¶10. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 81(d) provides special procedures for hearings on modification or enforcement of custody. M.R.C.P. 81(d)(2). When a modification action is filed, notice of the action and the procedures for continuances are governed as follows:
[S]ummons shall issue commanding the defendant or respondent to appear and defend at a time and place, either in term time or vacation, at which the [action or matter] shall be heard. Said time and place shall be set by special order, general order, or rule of the court. If such action or matter is not heard on the day set for hearing, it may by order signed on that day be continued to a later day for hearing without additional summons on the defendant or respondent. The court may by order or rule authorize its clerk to set such actions or matters for original hearing and to continue the same for hearing on a later date. M.R.C.P. 81(d)(5).
¶11. “[T]he Mississippi Supreme Court has held that a central consideration under Rule 81 is the adequacy of the notice of the date, time, and place of the hearing.” Brown v. Tate, 95 So. 3d 745, 749 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Vincent v. Griffin, 872 So. 2d 676, 678 (¶5) (Miss. 2004)). However, if a proper summons is given that notifies the other party of a new controversy that has arisen and of the date, time, and place for a hearing, the rule itself provides that an order entered on the day of the initially scheduled hearing obviates the need for any new summons for a hearing actually held on the later date. Bailey v. Fischer, 946 So. 2d 404, 407 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (citing M.R.C.P. 81(d)(5)). If no such order is entered, there should be a new Rule 81 summons. Id.
¶12. Though there were five continuances, all orders were signed by the chancellor on each respective hearing date. Therefore, the initial summons was preserved. Jessica argues that because she was not provided a copy of the four subsequent orders continuing the case and
resetting the trial, a new Rule 81 summons should have been issued. Caselaw does not support this contention. The rule states that if the matter is not heard on the day it is set, then an order entered on that day may continue the cause to a later date without a new summons being issued. Sanghi v. Sanghi, 759 So. 2d 1250, 1259 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (citing M.R.C.P. 81(d)(5)).
¶13. Jessica had notice of the first continuance, and the record does not reflect that she attended that hearing. Jessica also admits that she may have had actual notice of the final hearing through the GAL’s statement regarding the hearing, but she contends that actual notice is insufficient to cure defective process. We agree. “Actual notice does not cure defective process.” Pearson v. Browning, 106 So. 3d 845, 852 (¶39) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). “[J]urisdiction is not obtained by a defendant’s informally becoming aware that a suit has been filed against him.” Id. Nevertheless, Jessica was aware of a pending custody matter, evidenced by her initial appearance at the first hearing and her signature on the first order of
continuance. A central tenet of Rule 81 is adequate notice of a pending legal matter, and Jessica was given notice at the inception of the custody matter.
¶14. Therefore, we do not agree with Jessica’s argument that a Rule 81 summons should have been reissued because she was not notified of subsequent court-ordered continuances. The summons was preserved with each signed order of continuance. Moreover, each order provided a day certain for the next hearing. Though the final order of continuance was not filed until the day after the hearing, the summons was still preserved because the trial judge signed the order on the day of the hearing. Rule 81 states “if such action or matter is not heard on the day set for hearing, it may by order signed on that day be continued to a later day for hearing without additional summons on the defendant or respondent.” M.R.C.P. 81(d)(5). Accordingly, we find that an additional summons was not required, and Jessica was adequately notified of the custody matter. Finding no error, we affirm.
Nothing to quibble with here. The rule itself is pretty clear that there is nothing in the rule that supports Jessica’s position; in fact, the rule weighs against her. Nothing further than linking continuances was required.