Whose Inconvenience Counts in Visitation?
December 5, 2017 § Leave a comment
When Mike and Kim Smith were divorced in 2011, both of them lived in the Tupelo area. In 2012, Kim relocated near Atlanta with the children, and the parties agreed to meet for visitation exchanges in Leeds, Alabama, a point approximately half-way.
Mike customarily travelled to Kentucky for work or play, and the parties agreed for a time to meet in Chattanooga, which was more convenient for Mike. Kim, however, found the Chattanooga exchange unacceptable, and insisted on the Leeds exchange location. Mike filed a petition to modify visitation to require the Chattanooga location.
Following a hearing, the chancellor denied Mike’s petition to modify the visitation exchange point. Mike appealed. In Smith v. Mull, decided November 7, 2017, the COA affirmed. Judge Lee wrote for the unanimous court, Tindell not participating:
¶14. Mike also argues that the chancellor erred in failing to modify the exchange location from Leeds to Chattanooga when he is working or visiting in Kentucky. In doing so, Mike asserts the chancellor “gave no cogent reason” for her decision. We disagree.
¶15. This Court has articulated the relevant principles regarding modifications of visitation: When modification of visitation is at issue, the material change in circumstances test is not applicable because the court is not being asked to modify the permanent custody of the child. To modify a visitation order, it must be shown that the prior decree for reasonable visitation is not working and that a modification is in the best interest of the child. The chancellor has broad discretion to determine the specific times for visitation. H.L.S. v. R.S.R., 949 So. 2d 794, 798 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). With these principles in mind, we find the chancellor’s decision to deny Mike’s request for modification was supported by substantial credible evidence.
¶16. In his motion, Mike sought to have the exchange location modified to “the most convenient location for . . . the minor children.” He argued that when he is working or visiting in Kentucky, Chattanooga should be the court-ordered exchange location, as it is a slightly shorter distance (approximately 143 miles) from Kim’s home than Leeds (approximately 152 miles). He further argued that the chancellor’s failure to modify the
exchange location was not in the best interests of the children because it requires approximately 150-160 additional miles per exchange when he is in Kentucky. He alternatively sought to have Kim meet him at a different location so long as it did not exceed the 152 miles that Kim would normally drive from her home. Kim testified that Leeds was “very systematic, very structured, it’s what we’re used to, we know the safe places, we know all that stuff.” Kim also testified that, although Chattanooga may be a shorter overall distance from her home, it took longer to travel there than to Leeds.
¶17. To prevail, Mike needed to show that “the prior decree for reasonable visitation [was] not working and that a modification [was] in the best interest[s] of the child[ren].” Id. After hearing testimony from both parties, the chancellor found: “[M]odification of the place of exchange, while perhaps more convenient for [Mike] when he elects to travel out of state, would disturb the children’s routines with which they have become comfortable and which complies with the prior decrees.” The chancellor further stated: “I don’t buy into [Mike’s] argument . . . that the court is inconveniencing the children, because, as their father, [Mike] ha[s] to make whatever decision works for [himself]in their best interest[s].” The chancellor ultimately held that Mike failed to show that visitation was not working to serve the best interests of the children. Upon review of the facts before us, we do not find the chancellor erred by declining to modify the visitation-exchange location. This issue is without merit.
This is actually a somewhat familiar fact situation in chancery court. One or both parties relocate, throwing visitation into controversy. In these cases, I often hear it said that the test is whether the prior order for visitation is working or workable. But that is an incomplete statement. The test is actually whether the prior order for visitation is not working … and whether modification is in the best interest of the child or children. That latter consideration is what tripped Mike up in this case. It’s not what is more convenient for either or both parents; it’s what is in the best interest of the child or children.