Right to Appointed Counsel in a TPR Case

June 1, 2015 § 5 Comments

If any area of family law has undergone what could unquestionably be considered an upheaval recently, it would have to be termination of parental rights (TPR), per MCA 93-15-101, et seq.

The first shot was fired in Chism v. Bright, about which we previously posted here. Chism is the MSSC case that interpreted MCA 93-15-103 to require that the statutory prerequisites be satisfied before the chancellor may consider whether any of the grounds for termination apply in the case. It was that case that caused us to question whether TPR as a private action between individuals was now extinct.

In Pritchett v. Pritchett, decided April 7, 2015, the COA took up the issue whether an indigent parent facing TPR is entitled to appointment of counsel. Judge Roberts, applying US Supreme Court precedent, concluded that such a right does exist. His reasoning:

¶9. As was outlined above, James claimed indigency and requested an attorney be appointed on three separate occasions, and the chancery court never addressed his requests, nor did it appoint an attorney to represent him. It is well established, through the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, that an indigent defendant in a criminal case has a right to the assistance of counsel, specifically when a defendant’s loss of liberty may result; however, the case before us today is a civil case.

¶10. Nonetheless, it is also well established that “a parent’s desire for and right to ‘the companionship, care, custody[,] and management of his or her children’ is an important interest that ‘undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.’” Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cnty., N.C., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)). Further, “[a] parent’s interest in the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate his or her parental status is, therefore[,] a commanding one.” Id. In footnote three of Lassiter, the Supreme Court noted that “[s]ome parents will have an additional interest to protect. Petitions to terminate parental rights are not uncommonly based on alleged criminal activity. Parents so accused may need legal counsel to guide them in understanding the problems such petitions may create.” The Supreme Court held in Lassiter that it would not be “‘prudent to attempt to formulate a precise and detailed set of guidelines to be followed in determining when the providing of counsel is necessary’ . . . since ‘the facts and circumstances are susceptible of almost infinite variation.’” Id. at 32 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)). It also stated that “[i]nformed opinion has clearly come to hold that an indigent parent is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel[,] not only in parental termination proceedings, but also in dependency and neglect proceedings[.]” Id. at 33-34. But the Supreme Court ultimately left the decision on whether to appoint counsel to be decided on a case-by-case basis by the state. At the time of Lassiter, statutes in thirty-three states and the District of Columbia provided for the appointment of counsel in termination cases. Id. at 34.

¶11. The termination of parental rights is a serious and permanent proceeding, one which effectively ends any ties between a parent and a child. The Mississippi Legislature recognized the seriousness of such an event and recommended that alternatives to the termination of parental rights be pursued “when, in the best interest of the child, parental contacts are desirable[.]” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-15-103(4). The Mississippi Supreme Court case of K.D.G.L.B.P. v. Hinds County Department of Human Services, 771 So. 2d 907, 909 (¶8) (Miss. 2000), also involved the question of whether a natural parent should be appointed an attorney in a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding. In K.D.G.L.B.P., the chancery court thoroughly questioned the natural mother about the lack of an attorney and whether she would represent herself. Id. at (¶9). She indicated that she would represent herself, she never asked for a continuance, and she did not indicate that she was unable to afford an attorney. Id. at 909-10 (¶¶9-10). The supreme court, in analyzing Lassiter, stated:

One of the most important factors to be considered in applying the standards for court[-]appointed counsel is whether the presence of counsel would have made a determinative difference. The Lassiter decision thus states that appointment of counsel in termination proceedings, while wise, is not mandatory and therefore should be determined by state courts on a case-by-case basis.

Id. at 910 (¶12). The supreme court went on to find that “the mother was granted a fair and adequate hearing.” Id. at 911 (¶14).

She was given ample notice of the proceeding in time for her to secure suitable counsel. At trial, she never asked for a continuance or for additional time to seek substitute counsel. Instead, she signified to the court that she intended to represent herself and that she was ready to proceed. Furthermore, on the day of trial, she did not even allude to the fact that her financial condition might have precluded her from being able to retain counsel. This argument was only raised in post-trial motions. Finally, the evidence supporting the chancellor’s decision to terminate the mother’s parental rights was so overwhelming that the presence of counsel would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Although the termination of parental rights is a serious judicial proceeding, a review of the record indicates that the chancellor’s actions ensured that the mother was provided a constitutionally adequate hearing as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.

Id.

¶12. The case before us is distinguishable from K.D.G.L.B.P. in that serious due-process concerns exist in this case that were not present in K.D.G.L.B.P. James claimed indigency in three letters filed with the chancery court and requested appointment of counsel. The record does not contain a response from the chancery court. Furthermore, James requested the chancery court assist him with securing transportation to the hearing. The only action taken by the chancery court was to “continue [the] matter for [James] to arrange transportation.” Since James was an inmate in MDOC custody, it appears disingenuous to say that he could arrange his own transportation. The hearing proceeded in James’s absence.

¶13. We simply are unable to conclude, based on the scant record we have, that the presence of counsel would not have made an outcome-determinative difference. As an illustration, James’s request to be present for the hearing could have been secured by his attorney filing a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, which would have required James’s presence at the hearing to testify. Such a common-law writ would command the custodian, MDOC, to bring James to the chancery court to testify. Mississippi Code Annotated section 9-1-19 (Rev. 2014) and Mississippi Code Annotated section 11-43-7 (Rev. 2012) provide chancery courts the authority to grant such writs as habeas corpus. Additionally, an attorney’s presence could have aided James with presenting the complex issue of the applicability of the section 93-15-103 to the present facts.

¶14. We reverse the chancery court’s decision and remand this case for the chancery court to determine the question of indigency and the necessity of appointment of counsel under Lassiter, and for the chancery court to make appropriate arrangements for James to be present and/or participate in the proceedings.

The message here is that TPR is serious and has constitutional implications that require heightened due-process requirements. The judge should inquire searchingly on the record whether the defendant understands the nature of the action and what is at stake, and whether the defendant is honestly capable of representing his or her own interests.

Carried to its logical extreme, I wonder whether any pro se party in any case is ever truly equipped to decide whether he or she should proceed without counsel? Is any lay person competent to make that determination without advice of counsel? No matter, all that is required under Lassiter and K.D.G.L.B.P. is a waiver on the record.

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§ 5 Responses to Right to Appointed Counsel in a TPR Case

  • Caleb May says:

    At the end of the Pritchett opinion there is also a ruling that the Petitioner failed to meet the first prerequisite of the statute, (i.e. children still live with natural mother, and therefore no removal). Does this ruling change your opinion on whether the first prerequisite has two alternatives, as you stated in March when you revisited the Chism case?

  • Leigh Berry says:

    Sent from my iPad

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