An Effect of Affirmance
July 9, 2014 § Leave a comment
Richard Dean filed an adverse-possession lawsuit, and the chancellor found that he failed to prove his case. Dean appealed, and the COA affirmed. He then filed a petition for cert to the MSSC, which the court denied.
Not to be deterred, Dean then filed a R60(b) motion with the chancery court that had originally denied his relief. The chancellor overruled his motion, and Dean once again appealed.
The COA again affirmed, in Dean v. Slade, et al., decided April 22, 2014. Jurisdictional nerd that I am, I found the court’s discussion of the effect of affirmance on trial court jurisdiction interesting enough to share. Here is what Judge James wrote for the court:
¶7. We first question whether the chancery court had the necessary jurisdiction to entertain Dean’s motion for reconsideration. Upon Dean’s initial appeal of the chancery court’s judgment, the chancery court lost jurisdiction. See City of Cleveland v. Mid-S. Assocs. LLC, 94 So. 3d 1049, 1050 (¶4) (Miss. 2012) (Jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court once a notice of appeal is filed.). And because we affirmed the judgment, as opposed to remanding the judgment, and the Mississippi Supreme Court denied certiorari, jurisdiction did not return to the chancery court. See id. As the Mississippi Supreme Court noted in Collins v. Acree, 614 So. 2d 391, 392 (Miss. 1993):
From time immemorial, we have adhered to the basic and elementary rule that our appellate affirmance ratifies, confirms, and declares that the trial court judgment was correct as if there had been no appeal. Upon issuance of our mandate, the trial court simply proceeds to enforce the final judgment. The execution of the mandate of this Court is purely ministerial.
Although in Collins the supreme court noted that there may be occasions when application of Rule 60(b) may be appropriate following an affirmance and issuance of a mandate, we do not find such an occasion present here. There is nothing in Dean’s motion that suggests that the judgment should be altered following affirmance by this Court and denial of certiorari by our supreme court. As we discuss below, Dean’s allegation of earwigging was litigated prior to his initial appeal, and the evidence he purports to be newly discovered is merely impeachment evidence that was discoverable prior to trial. As the supreme court has stated, “Rule 60(b) is not an escape hatch for lawyers and litigants who had procedural opportunities afforded under other rules and who[,] without cause[,] failed to pursue those procedural remedies. Rule 60(b) is designed for the extraordinary, not the commonplace.” [Sabal Corp. v.] Howell, 853 So. 2d [122,] at 124 [(Miss. Ct. App. 2003)] (¶4) (quoting Bruce v. Bruce, 587 So. 2d 898, 904 (Miss. 1991)) …
So you can’t create an endless loop of litigation with post-trial motions ad infinitum and absurdum.
Dean is the subject of a prior post wherein I excoriated the practice of so-called (pre-) trial briefs.