A Primer on Third-Party Custody

December 11, 2013 § 2 Comments

The cases on third-party custody can be confusing in their own right, but when one adds into the mix the cases where third parties acting in loco parentis also claim custody, it can become downright confusing.

The MSSC case of Davis v. Vaughn, decided November 21, 2013, includes a welcome exposition on the subject that you just might want to save for future reference. It stands for the proposition that a third party’s in loco parentis status, standing alone, is not enough to overcome the natural-parent presumption. Here is the key language from Justice Kitchen’s opinion for a unanimous court:

¶10. We first address Davis’s assertion that parties standing in loco parentis should be able to seek custody of the child without having to prove that the natural parent has relinquished his or her parental rights. The law recognizes that parents are the natural guardians of their children, and “it is presumed that it is in the best interest of a child to remain with the natural parent as opposed to a third party.” In re Dissolution of Marriage of Leverock and Hamby, 23 So. 3d 424, 429 (Miss. 2009) (citing K.D.F. v. J.L.H., 933 So. 2d 971, 980 (Miss. 2006)). See also Miss. Code Ann. § 93-13-1 (Rev. 2013) (“The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their minor children and are equally charged with their care, nurture, welfare and education . . . . If either father or mother die or be incapable of acting, the guardianship devolves upon the surviving parent.”). However, the presumption in favor of the parent may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that “(1) the parent has abandoned the child; (2) the parent has deserted the child; (3) the parent’s conduct is so immoral as to be detrimental to the child; or (4) the parent is unfit, mentally or otherwise, to have custody.” Smith, 97 So. 3d at 46 (citing Vaughn II, 36 So. 3d at 1264-65 (Miss. 2010); Leverock, 23 So. 3d at 429-30; Carter v. Taylor, 611 So. 2d 874, 876 (Miss. 1992)). If the natural-parent presumption is successfully rebutted, the court may then proceed to determine whether an award of custody to the challenging party will serve the child’s best interests. Id. (citing In re Custody of M.A.G., 859 So. 2d 1001, 1004 (Miss. 2003); Logan v. Logan, 730 So. 2d 1124, 1127 (Miss. 1998)).

¶11. A person in loco parentis is one who stands in place of a parent, having assumed the status and obligations of a parent. Favre v. Medders, 241 Miss. 75, 81, 128 So. 2d 877, 879 (Miss. 1961). “Any person who takes a child of another into his home and treats it as a member of his family, providing parental supervision, support and education, as if it were his own child, is said to stand in loco parentis.” W.R. Fairchild Constr. Co. v. Owens, 224 So. 2d 571, 575 (Miss. 1969) (citing Favre, 128 So. 2d 877). In loco parentis status carries with it the same duties and liabilities that belong to a natural parent, including a right to custody of the child “as against third persons.” Favre, 128 So. 2d at 879 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

¶12. Although this doctrine grants third parties certain parental rights, such rights are inferior to those of a natural parent. Thus, in a custody dispute between one standing in loco parentis and a natural parent, the parent is entitled to custody unless the natural-parent presumption is rebutted. Smith, 97 So. 3d at 46-47. The court may not consider granting custody to a third party, including one standing in loco parentis, unless and until the third party rebuts this presumption. In other words, “[t]he doctrine of in loco parentis does not, by itself, overcome the natural-parent presumption,” although it may be a factor in determining whether the presumption has been rebutted. Id. at 46-47.

¶13. Giving preference to natural parents, even against those who have stood in their place, honors and protects the fundamental right of natural parents to rear their children. Vance v. Lincoln County Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 582 So. 2d 414, 417 (Miss. 1991) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944)). This concept is hardly new:

Nature gives to parents that right to the custody of their children which the law merely recognizes and enforces. It is scarcely less sacred than the right to life and liberty, and can never be denied save by showing the bad character of the parent, or some exceptional circumstances which render its enforcement inimical to the best interests of the child.

Moore v. Christian, 56 Miss. 408 (1879). See also Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (“It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”) (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070, (1925)). Furthermore,

[A]s a consequence of this, it is presumed to be for the real interest of the child that it should be in the custody of its [natural parent], as against collateral relatives, and he, therefore, who seeks to withhold the custody against the natural and legal presumption, has the burden of showing clearly that the [parent] is an unsuitable person to have the custody of his [or her] child; or that, however moral a [person] may be, he [or she] had abandoned his child, contributing nothing to its support, taking no interest in it, and permitting it to remain continuously in the custody of others, substituting such others in his own place so that they stand in loco parentis to the child, and continuing this condition of affairs for so long a time that the affections of the child and of the foster parents have become mutually engaged to the extent that a severance of this relationship would surely result in destroying the best interest of the child.

Hibbette v. Baines, 78 Miss. 695, 29 So. 80 (1900). In other words, by allowing one’s child to remain in another’s custody, without providing any support to or pursuing a relationship with the child, a natural parent may, over time, relinquish his or her parental rights in favor of a de facto parent. More than a century later, the Court continues to recognize these legal maxims, declaring in Smith that “grandparents who stand in loco parentis have no right to the custody of a grandchild, as against a natural parent, unless the natural-parent presumption first is overcome by a showing of abandonment, desertion, detrimental immorality, or unfitness on the part of the natural parent.” Smith, 97 So. 3d at 47-48 (Ethredge v. Yawn, 605 So. 2d 761, 764, 766 (Miss. 1992)).

¶14. Davis has cited no authority to support our overruling this line of precedent. Instead, she relies on the facts in her case, arguing that, without a change in the law, there is no “real legal benefit” to the doctrine of in loco parentis. But, this Court clearly has recognized that the doctrine protects those standing in the shoes of the natural parents from outside intrusions, and these rights are constitutionally guarded. For example, in Britt v. Allred, 199 Miss. 786, 25 So. 2d 711 (1946), this Court held that parties who had taken in and cared for an orphaned child stood in loco parentis to the infant and could not be deprived of their “parental rights” without notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 789-90 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). That decision noted that this holding was founded upon the “universal rule governing due process of law,” as recognized in our state and federal constitutions. Id. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Miss. Const. art. 3, § 14.

¶15. Judges often are faced with the difficult task of removing a child from a loving home in deference to a natural parent’s custodial rights. Even so, the law does not allow parental rights to supercede the best interests of the child. Parental rights, as is true of other fundamental rights, can be forfeited or taken away, and our law does recognize some means by which third parties can overcome the law’s preference of natural parents. See Smith, 97 So. 3d at 46 (listing the ways in which the natural-parent presumption may be rebutted). Consistent with longstanding legal authority, requiring Davis first to demonstrate that Vaughn had relinquished his right to parent his child, was not an undue burden. The law protects the best interests of the child by its recognition that a natural parent’s “liberty interest . . . in the care, custody, and management of their children and families,” is not an absolute right. G.Q.A. v. Harrison County Dep’t of Human Res., 771 So. 2d 331, 335 (Miss. 2000) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 758-59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982)).

This is the latest iteration of the Vaughn case. You can read an earlier post that mentions it here.

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§ 2 Responses to A Primer on Third-Party Custody

  • […] last month we discussed the MSSC decision in Vaughn v. Davis, which dealt with the rights of a natural parent as opposed to those of a party who has stood in […]

  • I recently finished an in loco parentis case. I know what Justice Kitchens said about the “benefit” of being in loco parentis, but in the real world I do not see ANY legal benefit since against a parent you are just like any other third party (if I understand the law correctly which I often do not). My opinion is useless, but it would seem that if a person is judicially determined to be in loco parentis then “daddy” or “momma” should be on equal footing with “father” of “mother”.

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