MIXED ATTORNEY’S FEES
May 21, 2013 § 1 Comment
The COA decision in Tidmore v. Tidmore, decided May 14, 2013, underscores the mixed attorney’s fee, a fairly common phenomenon in chancery court. It happens when one brings an action combining two or more different causes of action. It could be a contempt and modification, or a divorce with an allegation of contempt of the temporary order, or a suit seeking injunctive relief and sanctions.
In reversing the chancellor’s award of attorney’s fees assessed against Nicole Tidmore in favor of her ex-husband, Michael, the COA, by Judge Irving, said this:
¶10. Nicole argues that the chancellor erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Michael since some of the attorney’s fees were incurred in pursuing a modification of custody. We note that “attorney’s fees are not normally awarded in child custody modification actions.” Mixon v. Sharp, 853 So. 2d 834, 841 (¶32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003). However, it is well established that “[a] chancellor may award attorney’s fees as the result of a contempt action” in a domestic-relations case. Id. “One of the purposes for awarding attorney fees [in a contempt action] is to compensate the prevailing party for losses sustained by reason of the defendant’s noncompliance.” Durr v. Durr, 912 So. 2d 1033, 1040 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). Thus, “[n]o showing as to the McKee factors is required” where there is a finding of contempt. Patterson v. Patterson, 20 So. 3d 65, 73 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
¶11. Additionally, Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-5-23 (Supp. 2012) requires the chancellor to impose attorney’s fees for unsubstantiated allegations of abuse:
If after investigation by the Department of Human Services or final disposition by the youth court or family court allegations of child abuse are found to be without foundation, the chancery court shall order the alleging party to pay all court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the defending party in responding to such allegation.
(Emphasis added).
¶12. In this case, the chancellor ordered Nicole to pay Michael’s attorney’s fees and the GAL fees as follows:
With regard to [Michael’s] claims for attorney’s fees, the [c]ourt finds that the allegations made by [Nicole] are without foundation and furthermore that she was found in contempt . . . . As such, all the [GAL] fees are hereby [assessed] to [Nicole]. [Nicole] shall pay the [GAL] her remaining fees in the amount of $1,200.00 along with reimbursing [Michael] the [GAL] fees he initially paid in the amount of $1,500.00 within sixty (60) days of September 26, 2011.
After examining the [McKee factors], the [c]ourt finds that [Michael] is entitled to attorney’s fees in the amount of $8,076.01[,] which the [c]ourt finds were reasonable and necessary in prosecuting the contempt case against [Nicole], and further in defending the unsubstantiated allegations of abuse and/or neglect[,] and a judgment is hereby entered for the same. As such[,] a total judgment is hereby entered against [Nicole] in the amount of $9,733.91 in favor of [Michael], which shall be paid within sixty (60) days of September 26, 2011[,] along with the remaining $1,200.00 in [GAL] fees[,] which shall be paid directly to the [GAL] within sixty (60) days of September 26, 2011[.]
¶13. We cannot say that the chancellor abused his discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to Michael for his successful prosecution of the contempt charges against Nicole or for his defense against the baseless allegations of abuse. We also find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in ordering Nicole to pay the GAL fees. The chancellor found Nicole in contempt for claiming the children as dependents on her 2008 tax return and for withholding one of the children from Michael on one occasion. The chancellor did not find Michael in contempt for any of the claims asserted by Nicole. Additionally, the chancellor determined that Nicole’s allegations of abuse against Michael were unsubstantiated. The chancellor’s order was clear that the fees were awarded because of the unsubstantiated abuse allegations and because of Nicole’s contemptuous conduct.
¶14. While Michael is certainly entitled to an award of attorney’s fees for the contempt and for his defense against the abuse allegations, it is not clear that the total amount of $8,076.11 is only for the contempt and defense against the abuse allegations. In fact, an exhibit shows that at least part of the fees awarded were for the modification-of-child-custody proceedings. As such, the court erred in awarding the full amount of the attorney’s bill. Although there may be difficulty in allocating the attorney’s fees, the chancellor should nonetheless make that determination. Therefore, the amount of the award of attorney’s fees is reversed and this issue is remanded to the chancellor for a determination of the amount of attorney’s fees that should be awarded to Michael for the contempt proceedings and defense against the baseless abuse allegations.
So another attorney’s fee award bites the dust for lack of an essential finding. It’s not clear from the opinion whether the chancellor had all the information he needed to make the allocation of fees as lucid as it could or should have been.
Remember to give the judge all the essential information he or she needs to make a decision that would stand up if there is an appeal. All the judge needed here was time records or testimony to show how the hours devoted to the case by the attorney were spent as to each issue. There is no one who knows that better than the attorney who did the work. Naturally, there will be some judgment calls as to how to categorize various activities, but that is what cross examination is for, isn’t it?
While we’re on the issue of attorney’s fees, the COA touched on Michael’s request for an appellate attorney’s fee:
¶15. Michael also asks this court to order Nicole to pay his attorney’s fees on appeal. “When allowed, this Court has generally granted attorney’s fees in the amount of one-half of what was awarded [by the chancellor].” Carroll v. Carroll, 98 So. 3d 476, 483 (¶26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Lauro v. Lauro, 924 So. 2d 584, 592 (¶33) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)). However, because Nicole prevails on this issue, Michael is not entitled to attorney’s fees on appeal.
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