WHEN IS THE RETURN DOOR TO THE COURT ROOM LOCKED?
March 12, 2013 § Leave a comment
Some lawyers are confused about when and how a judgment precludes a return trip to court by operation of res judicata. The confusion is somewhat understandable, since in chancery court we often deal with return trips for modifications and contempts. It’s been discussed here before.
There are chancery cases, however, such as divorce judgments as to property and grounds, property disputes, suits for rescission and specific performance, actions to contest wills, and the like where res judicata can operate as a bar — or not.
The COA case of Rodgers v. Moore, et al., decided last November by the COA, is one of those cases. In 2004, the Moores filed suit to remove cloud on title against Mary Rodgers. In 2006, the suit was dismissed by the court without prejudice pursuant to MRCP 41(d) for failure to prosecute. In 2007, the Moores filed yet another suit, and Mary Rodgers, proceeding pro se, answered that the suit should be dismissed as res judicata due to the prior dismissal. There are some other procedural wrinkles in the case that do not directly pertain to my point here.
The chancellor ruled that the 2004-filed proceeding was not res judicata, and Mary appealed.
Judge Roberts, writing for the court that affirmed the chancellor’s ruling, gave us a handy exposition on the principles of res judicata and why they did not bar the 2007 suit:
¶10. Rodgers first asserts that the chancery court erred in finding that the doctrine of res judicata was not triggered in the current case. The doctrine of res judicata requires the presence of four identities before it is applicable, and the absence of any of the identities is “fatal to the defense of res judicata.” Hill v. Carroll Cnty., 17 So. 3d 1081, 1085 (¶10) (Miss. 2009) (citations omitted). The four identities are as follows: “(1) identity of the subject matter of the action; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the parties to the cause of action; and (4) identity of the quality or character of a person against whom the claim is made.” Id. (citing Harrison v. Chandler-Sampson Insurance, Inc., 891 So. 2d 224, 232 (¶24) (Miss. 2005)). Additionally, a fifth requirement is that there must be a final judgment adjudicated on the merits. See Harrison, 891 So. 2d at 232 (¶22); Beene v. Ferguson Auto., Inc., 37 So. 3d 695, 698 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010). If these five things are established, then res judicata bars any claims that were brought in the prior action or could have been brought in the prior action. Hill, 17 So. 3d at 1084-85 (¶¶9-10).
¶11. Rodgers submits that the four identities are present. She also claims that the chancery court’s dismissal of the case filed in 2004 without prejudice was a final judgment on the merits. According to Rodgers, the plaintiffs in the first suit failed to show ownership of the property, thereby failing to establish superior title. We agree with Rodgers’ contention that the first, second, and fourth identities are present; however, we do not find that the third and fifth identities are necessarily present. The first identity is met because the subject matter of both suits was to remove a cloud on the title of a specific piece of land. The second is the identity of a cause of action. This “is found where there is a commonality among the ‘underlying facts and circumstances upon which the present claim is asserted and relief sought.’” Studdard v. Pitts, 72 So. 3d 1160, 1162 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Riley v. Moreland, 537 So. 2d 1348, 1354 (Miss. 1989)). The causes of action in both cases are the same. Fourth is the quality of the persons against whom the claim is made, which are also the same.
¶12. In dispute are the third identity and the fifth requirement. The third identity is whether the parties in both actions are the same or are in privity with the original parties. See Little v. V & G Welding Supply, Inc., 704 So. 2d 1336, 1339 (¶15) (Miss. 1997); Williams v. Vintage Petroleum, Inc., 825 So. 2d 685, 689 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). It is clear that the original parties to the suit are also parties in the second suit. However, the second suit contains several additional parties not in the original suit. What is unclear from the record is whether these additional parties were in privity with the original parties; nonetheless, the determination of this identity is not dispositive, as the fifth requirement is clearly not met.
¶13. The fifth requirement is that there has been a final adjudication on the merits in the original suit. We do not agree with Rodgers’s claim that the chancery court’s dismissal without prejudice of the 2004 case was an adjudication on the merits. In its October 11, 2010 opinion, the chancery court stated that the original case was dismissed “without ruling on any of the issues brought by either party[.]” In Williams, 825 So. 2d at 688 (¶12) (citing Stewart v. Guar. Bank & Trust Co. of Belzoni, 596 So. 2d 870, 872-73 (Miss. 1992)), this Court stated: “A voluntary dismissal taken without prejudice is not an adjudication on the merits and does not operate as res judicata in subsequent suits.” See also Ladnier v. City of Biloxi, 749 So. 2d 139, 156 (¶69) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). The chancery court’s dismissal of the 2004 case without prejudice was not an adjudication on the merits. The dismissal was on the ground that the “pleadings did not establish the [p]laintiffs as the proper parties to the litigation.” No issue involving the ownership of the disputed property was addressed by the chancery court; therefore, the chancery court was correct in finding that res judicata did not bar the second suit.
An MRCP 41(d) dismissal, then, is not a dismissal on the merits, is without prejudice, and will not operate as res judicata, because it is not a final judgment disposing of all claims in the case. Neither is a voluntary dismissal or any dismissal without prejudice. Don’t overlook, though, that a statute of limitations may run in the time that the case lies dismissed.
Modifications and contempts are not barred by res judicata because (1) the court retains jurisdiction to consider modification of certain issues, and to enforce its judgments, and (2) they are not a relitigation of the prior action, and they are based on and limited to matters occurring post the final judgment.
This case does not add anything substantive to my previous post on the subject, other than some additional authority that you can cite as needed, but it does illustrate the character of judgment that is necessary to operate as a bar.
A BANKRUPTCY BUGABOO
November 1, 2012 § 1 Comment
Bankruptcy, particularly Chapter 7 liquidation, used to be such a complicating factor in chancery court. Divorce trials were held up for years while one or both parties pursued their arcane remedies in the alchemy of bankruptcy. Contempts and modifications were brought to a screeching halt. Everyone knew and feared the “automatic stay,” even if most did not even understand its scope and reach.
And so it was that Ian Garcino, attempting to collect a divorce-related debt from his ex-wife, Amanda Noel, encountered the buzzsaw of bankruptcy and unwittingly suffered its bite.
In 2008, the chancery court awarded Ian a judgment against Amanda in the sum of $16,278, which the court ordered her to pay within 60 days. Amanda not only did not pay, but she filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition.
Now, 11 USC § 523(a)(5), (15) excludes debts to spouses, ex-spouses, and children from the list of dischargeable matters. So Ian, no doubt out of an abundance of caution, penned a handwritten letter to the bankruptcy court advising the court that the debt in question arose out of a divorce property settlement between him and Amanda, and concluding that “Under applicable present bankruptcy laws this debt should not be discharged.”
The bankruptcy court treated Ian’s letter as a pleading initiating an adversary proceeding. That’s because, since 2005, the bankruptcy laws no longer require a party in Ian’s position to do anything, since the debt is in and of itself not dischargeable. When Ian filed his letter, he in essence put something into controversy that would have been beyond controversy had he done nothing.
Belatedly, Ian learned from a bankruptcy lawyer (who might have been able to give Ian some advice before he wrote the ill-fated letter) the folly of what he had done, but before Ian could take any action the bankruptcy court entered its order dismissing Ian’s proceeding due to his inaction.
Later, when Ian tried to execute on the judgment in chancery court, the chancellor granted a stay of execution finding that the debt was adjudicated to be discharged in bankruptcy court. Ian appealed.
In response to the appeal, Amanda raised two issues: One, that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate dischargeablility; and Two, that the bankruptcy court’s decision was res judicata on the issue of dischargeability, and was binding on the chancery court.
Judge Maxwell’s opinion in Garcino v. Noel, decided by the COA October 23, 2012, is one you should read for its exposition on the law of Chapter 7 bankruptcy vis a vis chancery practice. Here’s how the court disposed of the jurisdictional argument:
¶22. [Amanda’s] first suggested reason—that the chancery court lacked jurisdiction to make such a determination—is clearly wrong. “It is well established . . . that ‘bankruptcy courts and state courts maintain concurrent jurisdiction to decide exceptions to discharge arising under [section] 523(a)[.]’” Marvin v. Marvin, 659 S.E.2d 579, 581 (Va. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Monsour v. Monsour (In re Monsour), 372 B.R. 272, 278 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2007)). “Although only the bankruptcy court can decide whether to grant a discharge in bankruptcy, the effect of such a discharge may be determined by any court in which the issue is properly raised.” Burns v. Burns, 164 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Timmons v. Timmons, 132 S.W.3d 906, 915 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004)); see also Rogers v. McGahee, 602 S.E.2d 582, 586 (Ga. 2004) (holding that “a general discharge in bankruptcy does not deprive the state court of its jurisdiction to determine whether certain debts of the debtor former spouse are exempt”) (citations omitted). [Footnote omitted]
The COA found, however, that the res judicata argument was dispositive. The court held that the four identities required for res judicata were present because Ian brought the same claim, that the debt had not been discharged, against the same party in both the chancery court and in the bankruptcy court. The court held at ¶ 26 that the bankruptcy court’s adjudication was one on the merits, making it binding on other courts.
There are several lessons you can take from this case: One is that you don’t need to blunder into bankruptcy court unless you know what you are doing and know the possible effects of your actions; Two, the burden now is on the Chapter 7 bankruptcy petitioner to convince the bankruptcy court to stay the judgment, not vice versa, so you may proceed in chancery as if there were no impediments; and Three, res judicata has teeth.
PS … as Judge Maxwell’s opinion points out, this post is relevant to Chapter 7 bankruptcy, but it has limited applicability, if at all, to Chapter 13 and other forms of bankruptcy.
WHEN DOES RES JUDICATA OPERATE AS A BAR?
August 8, 2012 § 5 Comments
Lawyers from time to time will argue, or try to, that particular relief is barred by the operation of res judicata.
Here’s a succinct statement of the rule:
We recognize that the doctrine of res judicata precludes a party from litigating claims that were raised or could have been raised in the original action. Howard v. Howard, 968 So. 2d 961, 973 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). Four identities must be present before a subsequent action may be dismissed on the basis of res judicata:
(1) identity of the subject matter of the original action when compared with the action . . . sought to be precluded; (2) identity of underlying facts and circumstances upon which a claim is asserted and relief sought in the two actions; (3) identity of the parties to the two actions, and identity met where a party to the one action was in privity with a party to the other; and (4) identity of the quality or character of a person against whom the claim is made.
Id. “If the four identities are present, a party may not raise a claim in a subsequent action.” Id. “This is true regardless of whether all grounds for possible recovery were litigated or asserted in the prior action, as long as those grounds were available to a party and should have been asserted.” Id. (citation omitted).
Rogers v. Rogers, COA, July 24, 2012, ¶26, fn 2.
Res judicata has no application in a modification case involving alimony or child support, since those matters are never truly final, and are always subject to modification based on a change of circumstances. See Campbell v. Campbell, 357 So.2d 129, 130 (Miss. 1978); Austin v. Austin, 91 So.2d 1000, 1005 (Miss. App. 2007).
The Better Chancery Practice Blog 