The Better Chancery Practice Blog

Here’s an important principle to bear in mind:

Once a chancellor has recused himself in a case, he is without further authority to act in that case, even in the most trivial procedural matters.

The case of Covington v. Montgomery, 43 So.3d 1193 (Miss. App. 2010) illustrates how and why that principle can be so important. Here’s what happened:

Covington, an attorney in Harrison County, filed a petition in chancery court seeking modification of custody from his ex-wife to himself. All four chancellors, including Judge Carter Bise, recused themselves because one of the parties was a practicing attorney in the district. Judge Frank McKenzie of Jones County was appointed to serve as special chancellor. He heard the case and denied the modification. Covington decided to appeal.

On the last day of the appeal deadline, Covington filed a motion to extend the appeal time, and got the signature of Judge Bise on the order. He subsequently filed his notice of appeal within the enlarged time.

The COA, on its own motion, raised the issue of its jurisdiction and held that Judge Bise’s order “had no effect” because Judge Bise had recused himself and had no further authority to act in the case. The opinion, written by Judge Roberts, pointed out that the duration of the special chancellor’s appointment is determined by the supreme court’s order appointing him, and there was nothing in it to indicate that his authority ended before the trial court’s jurisdiction terminated with the filing of the notice of appeal.

I have been approached by parties in cases where I have recused myself seeking procedural orders. Often the parties are there by agreement. In one case, I was asked to sign off on an agreed final judgment because the special chancellor was on vacation. I told them to wait. Once I got out I had no more authority. It’s a point to bear in mind.