The Value of Valuation

June 11, 2020 § Leave a comment

In the divorce case between Missy and Randy Norwood, the only evidence in the record of property values was in the form of the parties’ 8.05 financial statements. This despite the fact that the property in dispute for equitable division included 129 acres of land with poultry houses, a residence with 3.37 acres and the poultry business. Missy’s financial statement assigned a gross value of $1,148,000, and Randy’s total was $840,000. There was debt. The chancellor sorted through it as best he could, assigned values, and divided the estate. Unhappy with the division, Missy appealed.

The COA affirmed in Norwood v. Norwood, decided May 12, 2020. Judge McCarty wrote the 5-4 majority opinion:

¶11. “It is within the chancery court’s authority to make an equitable division of all jointly acquired real and personal property.” Martin v. Martin, 282 So. 3d 703, 706 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Bullock v. Bullock, 699 So. 2d 1205, 1210-11 (¶24) (Miss. 1997)). “This Court reviews a chancery court’s division of marital assets for an abuse of discretion.” Id. “We will not reverse a chancery court’s distribution of assets absent a finding that the decision was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous, or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Id.

¶12. “Our Supreme Court has held that the foundational step to make an equitable distribution of marital assets is to determine the value of those assets.” Id. at (¶8) (internal quotation mark omitted). From there the chancery court must equitably divide the marital property according to the factors first articulated in Ferguson. Id. at 706-07 (¶8). [Fn omitted]

¶13. Now on appeal, Missy claims error in the chancery court’s valuation of the marital assets. However, the chancery court relied upon the evidence provided by the parties in valuation and distribution. The general rule is that “[i]t is incumbent upon the parties, not the chancery court, to prepare the evidence needed to clearly make a valuation judgment.” Id. at 707 (¶10). In Martin, the wife had complained that the husband received more than her after the chancery court’s distribution of assets. Id. at 706 (¶6). Yet, “[d]espite numerous requests from the chancery court, neither party provided the court with a single valuation of the assets at issue,” “[t]here was no testimony of the market value of the real property,” and “[a]ppraisals were never conducted.” Id. at 707 (¶9).

¶14. In light of the general rule, we affirmed the court’s decision regarding property distribution. Id. at (¶13). For “[w]here a party fails to provide accurate information, or cooperate in the valuation of assets, the chancery court is entitled to proceed on the best information available.” Id. at (¶10); see also Messer v. Messer, 850 So. 2d 161, 170 (¶43) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (“This Court has held that when a [chancery court] makes a valuation judgment based on proof that is less than ideal, it will be upheld as long as there is some evidence to support [its] conclusion.”).

¶15. In this case, the chancery court considered all of the evidence before it—both parties’ Rule 8.05 financial statements and their in-trial testimony. It is clear that more and better proof would have been helpful to the chancery court. But the fact that there was little proof does not automatically warrant a reversal of the chancery court’s determination of this issue. As we declared nearly two decades ago, “[t]o the extent that further evidence would have aided the chancellor in these decisions, the fault lies with the parties and not the chancellor.” Ward v. Ward, 825 So. 2d 713, 719 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002).

¶16. The dissent cites Mace v. Mace, 818 So. 2d 1130, 1133-34 (¶¶13-14) (Miss. 2002), to suggest we should remand due to the lack of an expert’s valuation of the marital property. In that case, the Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed the valuation of a medical practice, which the trial court had assessed at $374,000, including the value of the building and equipment. Id. at 1133 (¶13). Because of the complexity of the issues, and because “it [was] abundantly clear from the testimony that the valuation of the practice was unreliable,” the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a more comprehensive valuation. Id. at 1134 (¶¶15-16).

¶17. However, Mace did not create a requirement that only an expert can conduct a property valuation before an equitable division can be determined. Parties may choose not to hire an expert or not have the resources to do so. Unlike the complex proof needed in Mace, this is not a case that requires clarification on remand. The chancery court was not impeded in this matter because of the proof presented at trial. The chancery court found that “Randy’s 8.05 Financial Statement shows minimal income from the poultry operations” and that both Randy and Missy agreed the expenses he listed from the poultry farm were accurate. There is no reason to re-try this case when there is “minimal income” and the expenses were not in dispute.

¶18. Because it is the parties’ duty, and not the chancellor’s, to prepare and submit evidence for a valuation judgment, we find no abuse of discretion. It is clear that the chancery court’s decision was based upon the proof mustered by the parties at trial. It was the parties’ decision at trial to present slim proof. That choice will not result in reversal on appeal. This decision is affirmed.

As the court points out in ¶17, there are legitimate reasons why parties may choose not to have property appraised by a professional. Cost most certainly can be a factor. The parties may simply choose to leave it up to the chancellor to decide, although that is usually a crap shoot.

You can use requests for admission to help nail down values.

Just remember that the less precise your proof the more the matter falls within the chancellor’s discretion and judgment. And if there’s any proof at all in the record to support her findings, your chances of getting her reversed are practically nil.

Valuation in the Face of Insubstantial Proof

July 29, 2019 § Leave a comment

There is plenty of case law holding that the chancellor may rely on the parties’ evidence submitted at trial to value marital assets and make equitable distribution, even when that evidence is less than substantial. I posted on the subject here and here, and in other posts.

That precedent did not persuade the COA, however, in Mark Chism’s appeal from the chancellor’s ruling in the divorce case he filed against his wife, Landaria. In Chism v. Chism, decided June 4, 2019, the COA reversed and remanded the chancellor’s decision that adopted Landaria’s valuation of the parties’ jointly-owned chicken-wing business. Chief Judge Barnes penned the court’s opinion:

¶20. Mark argues that the chancellor erred in accepting Landaria’s valuation of the couple’s business without sufficient proof and therefore led to an inequitable division of the marital property. Thus, Mark claims the entire financial award must be reversed and remanded.

¶21. To resolve property division, the chancellor must: “(1) classify the parties’ assets as marital or separate, (2) value those assets, and (3) divide the marital assets equitably.” Burnham v. Burnham, 185 So. 3d 358, 361 (¶12) (Miss. 2015). Equitable division of property is governed by the factors articulated in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 929 (Miss. 1994). The third Ferguson factor asks the chancellor to consider “[t]he market value . . . of the assets subject to distribution.” Ferguson, 639 So. 3d at 929. Three methods of valuation may be used to determine the market value of a business for this purpose: “(1) an asset-based approach, in which assets and liabilities are evaluated, (2) a market-based approach, in which the market is surveyed for similar sales, or (3) an income-based approach, in which a value is placed on earning potential.” Lacoste v. Lacoste, 197 So. 3d 897, 907 (¶34) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (citing Singley v. Singley, 846 So. 2d 1004, 1011 (¶18) (Miss. 2002)).

Regardless of what method an expert might choose to arrive at the value of a business, the bottom line is one must arrive at the “fair market value” or that price at which property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller when the former is not under any compulsion to buy and the latter is not under any compulsion to sell, both parties having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.


¶22. The chancellor found the total value of all marital property, including the business, was $1,176,598. Landaria was awarded fifty-percent of that value. Taking into account the Ferguson factors and distribution of other marital property, Landaria was ultimately awarded $521,299. Mark does not dispute that the chicken-wing business was a marital asset. However, he maintains that because the business was the couple’s main asset and source of income, a more specific business evaluation was necessary for an equitable distribution of marital property.

¶23. The chancellor found that the parties owned Memphis Best Wings. Although Mark had operated another chicken-wing business prior to the marriage, he started this new business jointly with Landaria during the marriage, and both parties contributed. In fact, Landaria quit her job as a teacher to work at the restaurant as a paid employee. However, not surprisingly, she was dismissed upon the parties’ separation. These facts are uncontested. The chancellor found the business’s value was $1,000,000 according to Landaria’s unsupported testimony and Rule 8.05 estimate. No details of how she arrived at this valuation were provided, and Mark did not even list the business on his Rule 8.05 form. The chancellor found that the business had “grown into a very substantial and profitable” one. He stated the $1,000,000 figure “has not been disputed” by Mark, who did not rebut this estimate at trial or offer his own estimate. Yet, there was no testimony from Landaria about how she arrived at that value for the business. Landaria even admitted, when asked by the chancellor, that her stated value was “just [her] estimate.” However, Mark’s 2014–2016 tax returns, provided during discovery, were admitted into evidence and included his profit and loss income statements. These evidence net profits of $60,291; $48,543; and $63,516, respectively, which does not appear to support a $1,000,000 valuation. [Fn omitted] During his examination of Mark, Landaria’s counsel tried to show that Mark was “keep[ing] the cash out of the business [account].” A photograph was entered into evidence showing Mark and his sister sitting at a table with a pile of cash on it, but none of these bills appear to be large ones. Statements showed that Mark made few cash deposits to the bank each month, but he maintained that he bought supplies and paid bills with the cash and did not keep it for personal use. Additionally, the chancellor speculated that the couple was not reporting all of their cash earnings from the business but using this money to fund their extravagant lifestyle.

¶24. In Mark’s post-trial motion to reconsider, he argued the chancellor erred by appointing a business-valuation expert, and Mark moved to designate Robert Vance as such an expert. Vance submitted a valuation report which came to the conclusion that Memphis Best Wings had a fair market value of $1,898 as a going-concern entity, excluding goodwill. Vance used the asset-based approach for his valuation, claiming that the market-based approach and the income-based approach are inappropriate because they imply the existence of goodwill in the value of a business, which is prohibited under Mississippi law, citing Lacoste and Singley v. Singley, 846 So. 2d 1004, 1011 (¶18) (Miss. 2002). Landaria moved to strike the expert’s testimony and opinion because discovery had been completed for well over a year. Mark moved to proffer it, and a hearing was held on the matter. Although the chancellor denied Mark’s motion to reconsider, he allowed the expert’s proffered testimony and business valuation report, dated April 3, 2018, for identification purposes.

¶25. This Court and the Mississippi Supreme Court have reversed the chancellor when evidence on the valuation of the business in property distribution was insufficient. In Lacoste, this Court reversed and remanded a business valuation which the chancellor based on the previous year’s profit/loss statement. Lacoste, 197 So. 3d at 908 (¶38). Like here, the business was considered the couple’s main asset and source of income. Id. at 907 (¶34). However, the parties failed to present sufficient evidence to value the business by the approach the chancellor deemed best (the income-based approach). Id. at 908 (¶37). While we found “the chancellor did the best she could with the evidence presented,” this Court nonetheless found it necessary to reverse because of lack of support for the valuation. Id. at 909 (¶42). In Mace v. Mace, 818 So. 2d 1130, 1133 (¶¶13, 16) (Miss. 2002), the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the chancellor on the value placed upon a husband’s medical practice which was a marital asset. The value of $144,000 was determined solely by the husband’s testimony, did not appear to be based upon any reliable method, and it was unclear what physical assets were included in the valuation. Id. at 1134 (¶15).

¶26. Moreover, this Court, following the Mississippi Supreme Court’s directions, has stated that “the foundational step to make an equitable distribution of marital assets is to determine the value of those assets based on competent proof.” Dunaway v. Dunaway, 749 So. 2d 1112, 1118 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 929). As stated earlier, the chancellor must determine the “fair market value” of the business, using one of the three approaches: an asset-based approach, a market-based approach, or an income-based approach. Lacoste, 197 So. 3d at 908 (¶34) (quoting Singley, 846 So. 2d at 1011 (¶18)).

¶27. Not all approaches will be applicable for all businesses. For example, in Lacoste, the chancellor found an asset-based approach was inapplicable because the business had few assets, owned little equipment, and had no employees or training facility. Lacoste, 197 So. 3d at 908 (¶36). The market-based approach was also ruled out as no comparable business sales were introduced, and the business’s success was largely due to the reputation of the owner and marketing. Id. The chancellor, therefore, considered only the income-based approach as appropriate. Id. at (¶37). We found, however, that given the drastic income fluctuations and possibility that income “may be intertwined with goodwill, as the business hinge[d] on [the husband’s] reputation and personal efforts,” the case had to be remanded for further evaluation. Id. at 910 (¶45).

¶28. Here, the chancellor was unable to adopt any of the three approaches as none were presented to him. Landaria offered only an unsupported estimate on her 8.05 form and testimony. Mark did not provide any value for the business on his Rule 8.05 form or give any testimony as to its value. As established in Lacoste and Mace, the chancellor should require that the parties utilize a reliable method of valuation and support it with adequate proof, or prove valuation through expert testimony. See Lacoste, 197 So. 3d at 910 (¶46); Mace, 818 So. 2d at 1134 (¶15). If they fail to offer such proof, the chancellor may appoint an independent valuation expert. Id. Accordingly, we reverse the chancellor’s $1,000,000 valuation of Memphis Best Wings and remand for further proceedings.

What this portion of the opinion omits is that Mark failed, refused and neglected to provide financial proof sufficient to value the business, and was even jailed for contempt for non-cooperation in discovery. He went through a succession of lawyers. It seems to me that he had his chance to offer proof of the value of of his business, but he chose to play cat-and-mouse games with Ladaria and the court. Unfortunately, those shabby tactics served him well on appeal. He actually benefitted from his evasion of discovery by getting a second bite at the apple.

Contrast the court’s treatment of Mark’s coyness with values and the suggestion that the trial judge should appoint an expert with this language from Kimble v. Kimble, a COA case decided only 14 days after Chism:

¶8. “[T]he foundational step to make an equitable distribution of marital assets is to determine the value of those assets based on competent proof.” Dunaway v. Dunaway, 749 So. 2d 1112, 1118 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 929). “[I]t is incumbent upon the parties, and not the chancellor, to prepare evidence touching on matters pertinent to the issues to be tried.” Benton v. Benton, 239 So. 3d 545, 548 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). When “a party fails to provide accurate information, or cooperate in the valuation of assets, the chancellor is entitled to proceed on the best information available.” Id. The chancellor possesses sole authority to assess both the credibility and weight of witness testimony. Culumber v. Culumber, 261 So. 3d 1142, 1150 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). [My emphasis]

Admittedly, Kimble involved valuation of vehicles, not a business, but sometimes it’s difficult here at grass-roots level to figure out where we are supposed to draw the line. I posted about Kimble here.

Whose Values Count?

March 25, 2019 § 1 Comment

In the course of their divorce proceedings, the chancellor twice requested both Tracy and Brent Williams to submit a list of assets, values, and debts. When they came to trial, only Brent did so, and Tracy even listed the value of her business, a daycare, as unknown. The chancellor used Brent’s figures upon which to base equitable distribution. Tracy appealed, arguing that the chancellor erred in not appointing appraisers, even though she never made that request of the trial court. She argued that the valuations were not accurate due to depreciation.

The MSSC affirmed in Williams v. Williams, decided January 17, 2019. Justice Beam wrote for a unanimous court:

¶19. While we note that “expert testimony may be essential to establish valuation sufficient to equitably divide property, particularly when the assets are diverse . . . ,” Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 929 (Miss. 1994), we also recognize and “reiterate the principle that findings on valuation do not require expert testimony and may be accomplished by adopting the values cited in the parties’ 8.05 financial disclosures, in the testimony, or in other evidence.” Horn v. Horn, 909 So. 2d 1151, 1165 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Ward v. Ward, 825 So. 2d 713, 719 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)).

¶20. Here, the record reflects that only Brent attempted to provide the chancellor with evidence regarding the valuations of the parties’ business interests, and the chancellor used those valuations as reflected in her opinion. Tracy’s argument that the chancellor committed reversible error by not appointing experts to appraise the current valuations due to depreciation is without merit. This Court refuses to blame the chancellor for a party’s failure to present sufficient evidence of property valuation. Faced with similar circumstances, we stated the following in Dunaway v. Dunaway:

It is our conclusion that the chancellor, faced with proof from both parties that was something less than ideal, made valuation judgments that find some evidentiary support in the record. To the extent that the evidence on which the chancellor based his opinion was less informative than it could have been, we lay that at the feet of the litigants and not the chancellor. The chancellor appears to have fully explored the available proof and arrived at the best conclusions that he could, and we can discover no abuse of discretion in those
efforts that would require us to reverse his valuation determinations. Dunaway v. Dunaway, 749 So. 2d 1112, 1121 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). As explained in Dunaway, the chancellor’s duty is not to obtain appraisals of the marital property. Id. Further, the Dunaway court found that, while expert testimony about property valuations might be helpful in some cases, it is not required, and the chancellor may consider other
evidence presented by the parties. Id.

¶21. Tracy did not come forth with expert testimony or any other valuations of the businesses; therefore, the chancellor used the available proof, including Brent’s valuations, and arrived at the best conclusion that she could. Accordingly, this Court finds the chancellor did not err in the valuation of the Williams’s business interests.

I’ve said it here before that it’s often breathtaking how little attention lawyers give to adequate proof of values in divorce cases. That forces judges to do their dead-level best with scanty evidence. It can leave your clients disappointed in the outcome at the least, and mad as a hornet at you at the worst.

It’s malpractice in a divorce case to merely accept your client’s 8.05 as scribbled out by her without going over it and questioning every item, or at least the ones that appear out of line, and without making sure it is complete, with values and itemization of debt.

In this district, as the judge in this case did, we require an asset table showing the parties’ values, designation as marital or non, and debt. The list must be consolidated, meaning that there is one list. That way the judge is not required to figure out whether the “green sofa, $600” on her list is the same as the “couch in living room, $2,000” on his list are the same thing. We also will not give you a trial setting unless and until you produce that list. In cases where one party decides not to participate in that exercise, we accept the unilateral list and proceed to trial.

How Much is Valuation Worth?

February 20, 2018 § 1 Comment

Valuation, valuation, valuation. It’s a subject I’ve talked about here often. I started to link some of my posts on the subject, but, instead, let me simply ask that you enter the word “valuation” above in the Search box and see for yourself the plethora of posts that pop up.

Most of the cases on which I have commented went up on a complaint by the disappointed party that the chancellor didn’t value assets correctly, or didn’t give proper weight to evidence presented, or whatever. The overwhelming number of cases decided on appeal say the same thing: the trial judge will do the best she can do with what evidence you present, so you’d better make a decent record.

The latest version of this old, sad tale comes to us courtesy of Mr. Timothy Benton, who appealed from a judgment assessing him with alimony and child support that he says are not supported by the evidence.

Tim and his wife, Beth were married in 2000. Tim was owner of two businesses, Tim Benton Tree Service and Benton Green, LLC, the income from which supported the family. Beth helped in the businesses from time to time, but she primarily cared for the parties’ four children.

Tim and Beth separated in 2013, and Beth filed for divorce in November, 2014, on the grounds of desertion, HCIT, and ID.

Following a temporary hearing on January 12, 2015, which both parties attended, Beth was awarded custody and Tim was ordered to pay her temporary child support of $3,500 and temporary alimony of $1,500. Because neither party could produce their tax returns at the hearing, the court reset the matter for February 18, 2015, with directions to produce them then. In addition, the judge directed Tim to produce any business financial records showing his income and operating expenses. When Tim appeared on the February date, he failed to produce the records, and the court continued the matter to April 6, 2015, with the same directions.

On April 6, 2015, Tim appeared yet again without financial records as directed. His attorney withdrew from representation.

The case proceeded to trial. Beth produced an 8.05 financial statement and some bank statements. Tim had neither 8.05 nor any financial records. The judge based her findings on the meager evidence presented, concluding that Tim had more than $17,000 a month in income. She ordered him to pay $2,500 a month in child support, plus all of the expenses and tuition of private schooling and all medical expenses of the children. The chancellor also ordered Tim to pay $6,000 per month in alimony and granted other financial relief.

Tim lawyered up and filed a R59 motion claiming that he had been unable adequately to represent himself at trial and needed a new trial to present CPA evidence.

Not surprisingly, the chancellor denied the motion, stating that, ” … the burden lied at the feet of the litigants to provide the Court with sufficient evidence in which to value the marital assets … during the course of the litigation [Tim] was afforded ample opportunity and time on multiple occasions to provide supplemental evidence, which he did not do.”

Tim appealed.

In Benton v. Benton, decided January 23, 2018, the COA affirmed. On the issue of the valuation used by the chancellor, Judge Irving wrote:

¶10. Tim argues that the chancery court erred in failing to value all material marital assets, including Benton Tree Services, and in rendering decisions of alimony and child-support awards accordingly. In response, Beth argues that the court properly distributed the marital assets in light of the fact that Tim refused to comply with the court’s orders to produce financial records. Thus, Beth maintains that the court’s subsequent alimony and child support awards were proper.

¶11. The Mississippi Supreme Court has stated that “the foundational step to make an equitable distribution of marital assets is to determine the value of those assets based on competent proof.” Dunaway v. Dunaway, 749 So. 2d 1112, 1118 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921, 929 (Miss. 1994)). “Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon the parties, and not the chancellor, to prepare evidence touching on matters pertinent to the issues to be tried.” Id. “Where a party fails to provide accurate information, or cooperate in the valuation of assets, the chancellor is entitled to proceed on the best information available.” Stribling v. Stribling, 906 So. 2d 863, 870 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) citation omitted).

¶12. Here, it is undisputed that the chancellor did not value Tim’s businesses. However, we refuse to hold her in error because of a party’s failure to cooperate in providing the necessary documents for proper valuation, and we reiterate the applicable caselaw set forth by the chancery court in its order denying Tim’s motion for a new trial. See Jenkins v. Jenkins, 67 So. 3d 5, 13 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (declining to find a chancellor in error for failing to conduct a marital-property valuation where the parties failed to provide the relevant evidence); Common v. Common, 42 So. 3d 59, 63 (¶¶12-13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a chancellor was not in error for valuing marital assets solely from the parties’ 8.05 financial statements, because the parties failed to provide the necessary evidence, and further holding that the former husband could not “now complain that the chancellor’s valuations [were] unfair when no reliable evidence of the value of the property was presented at trial”); Dunaway, 749 So. 2d at 1121 (¶28) (holding that, “[f]aced with proof that was far less than ideal, the chancellor made a valuation of the marital estate that finds some support in the record,” and refusing to hold a chancellor in error due to the former husband’s failure to produce evidence). It is this Court’s opinion that the chancellor did the best she could with the little information presented to her, and that she did not abuse her discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.

Not much to add, except this:

  • It is always a losing, self-destructive strategy to play cat-and-mouse games with financial proof, withholding all or some. The chancellor’s attitude and reaction in this case is about what one should expect in the face of repeated failure to present financial records, especially after having been ordered by the court to do so.
  • Forgive me for repeating what I often have said here: it is up to you to make a record of financial values. It’s not the judge’s job. Don’t expect your opponent to do it for you. It’s “at the feet of the litigants,” as the learned chancellor so eloquently put it.

Family Values

November 28, 2017 § 2 Comments

A point I have harped on often around here is that you should not spare your effort to produce proof on valuation of assets — particularly retirement funds, equity, and the like. It can make a huge difference in what your client takes away in equitable distribution and/or alimony, and if you have to appeal it may be the difference between affirmance and reversal.

A recent example is the COA’s decision in Inge v. Inge, decided October 3, 2017. Denise Inge appealed, complaining that the chancellor had erred by not finding the present value of the parties’ future retirement benefits. The COA found no error. Judge Wilson succinctly rejected her argument for a 10-0 court:

¶19. Moreover, to the extent that Denise’s complaint is that the chancellor failed to make findings as to present values of the parties’ respective future benefits, we simply note that Denise failed to present such evidence or calculations. The chancellor is not expected to go beyond the evidence that the parties present in order to value the marital assets. See Pruitt v. Pruitt, 144 So. 3d 1249, 1252-53 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). The chancellor received evidence of the future payments that each party could expect to receive under their respective retirement plans and concluded that it was fair and equitable for each party to keep his/her own benefits. Again, we cannot say that the chancellor abused her discretion. The division of assets, as a whole, was fair and equitable. Dogan [v. Dogan], 98 So. 3d [1115] at 1124 (¶20) [(Miss. Ct. App. 20120]. [My emphasis]

Let that sink in: The chancellor is not expected to go beyond the evidence that the parties present in order to value the marital assets. In other words, it’s up to you to make a record. The more thoroughly you do that the better equipped you will be on appeal.

A few other points to ponder (with links to some previous posts):

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