A 54(b) HICCUP
May 2, 2012 § 4 Comments
MRCP 54(b) provides that, when a case involves multiple claims for relief, or multiple parties, the court may enter a final, appealable judgment as to fewer than all of the issues, or as to only certain parties, upon a determination that there is no just reason for delay, and at the trial court’s expressed direction for entry of the judgment. We have referred to it here as “Rule 54(b) certification.” Without such certification, the court’s ruling is not appealable, does not terminate the action, and is subject to revision at any time before entry of a final judgment disposing of all claims against all parties. It’s a subject we’ve dealt with here repeatedly: here, here, here, here and here.
In Wilton Acquisitions Corp. v. First Methodist Church of Biloxi, decided by the COA April 3, 2012, the chancellor dismissed Wilton’s pleadings for discovery violations and took under advisement the plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees in the case ” … until the Defendant submits sufficient information on which the Court can base its decision …” The judgment also recited “Ordered and Adjudged that this is a final judgment under Rule 54(b) as to all matters addressed herein.” The judge went on to explain that the court needed further information upon which to base its decision on attorney’s fees, and that ” … there is no just reason for delay and that judgment shall be final pursuant to [Rule] 54(b) as to all claims in the matter with the exception of the amount of expenses and attorney’s fees to be awarded, if any.”
Wilton appealed, complaining about the merits of the dismissal.
The COA, however, sidestepped the merits, finding that the chancellor had abused his discretion in ruling that the judgment was final and appealable under MRCP 54(b). The court noted at ¶8 that 54(b) judgments are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
Citing Myatt v. Peco Foods, 22 So.3d 334, 340 (Miss. App. 2009), the court pointed out that Rule 54(b) is an attempt to strike a balance between the undesirability of piecemeal appeals and “the need to review a case at a time that best serves the needs of the parties.”
At ¶13, the opinion states that “We find the record unclear as to why the chancellor certified this judgment as final under Rule 54(b) when an item of requested relief, First Methodist’s request for attorney’s fees, was still pending. We find no apparent reason, from the record to review a partial judgment; therefore, we must dismiss this appeal.” [Emphasis added] Thus, the COA concluded that the chancellor had abused his discretion in certifying the case as a final, appealable judgment.
What you need to take away from this case is that if you want the partial judgment to be properly certified under 54(b), make sure that it includes the reasons why a review of the case on appeal before disposition of fewer than all of the issues will best serve the needs of the parties. In this particular case, perhaps an immediate review was necessary in order to prevent prejudice in related litigation, or a statute of limitations is ticking perilously away on a claim that might arise out of the outcome of the case. We really have no idea because the judge did not tell us. The COA is telling us that it is not sufficient merely to quote the language of the rule that “there is no just reason for delay;” you have to be sure that the judgment recites why, and why the best interest of the parties will be served thereby.
As a practice matter, if you intend to appeal, make sure you get that 54(b) judgment to recite what it needs to recite to pass muster under Wilton. If you are not allowed to draft the judgment yourself, or to have input into its language, file a timely MRCP 59 motion and ask the judge to add the specific wording you need. Otherwise, you may have the unpalatable choice of filing that appeal just in case, with full knowledge that it may well be a wasted effort.
HOW TO WASTE A TRIP TO THE COA
March 21, 2012 § 3 Comments
We’ve talked here before about the futility of filing an appeal from a judgment that disposes of fewer than all of the issues that were pled and tried, and does not include an MRCP 54(b) certification.
The latest manifestation of the principle appeared in the COA case of Williams v. Claiborne County School District, et al., decided February 21, 2012. In that case, the school district complained in its cross-appeal that the trial judge erred by not granting it the $120,000 in damages it had asked for in its pleadings. Indeed, the chancellor did not even address the issue of damages.
Oops. On its own initiative (after having been alerted by the cross-appeal), the COA dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal because the judgment disposed of fewer than all the issues, and did not include an MRCP 54(b) certification by the judge, meaning that it was not a final, appealable judgment.
Another wasted trip to the COA. Think of those long, lonesome, solitary (albeit billable) hours working on briefs and record excerpts, on reply and rebuttal briefs, on research. Think of what the clients will say when they get the bills for all that time spent to produce nothing but a return to the starting line. Ouch.
As I’ve said before, if you feel that the judge has not addressed an issue so that you don’t have a final judgment, or if you’re in doubt about it, file a timely MRCP 59 or 60 motion and raise the point so that the judge can either (a) address the missing issue, or (b) schedule a trial on the missing point, or (c) amend the judgment to add a 54(b) certification.
COA SINKS ANOTHER APPEAL FROM A LESS-THAN-FINAL JUDGMENT
July 20, 2011 § 4 Comments
It was only last month that the COA dispatched two appeals to dismissal-land because they were taken from less-than-final judgments. You can click the link to read about Jackson v. Lowe and S.E.B. v. R.E.B. The underlying principle is, you will recall, that an appeal only lies from a final judgment, and if any issues remain unadjudicated and not addressed as required in MRCP 54(b), your appeal will be dismissed.
The COA once again confronted the issue in R.A.S. Jr., K.S., A.S, V.S. and M.S. v. S.S., rendered July 19, 2011. In that case, the appellant, referred to as “Matt,” had filed a Chancery Court modification action seeking to reduce his $6,900 per month child support. His ex, “Anna,” responded by charging him with molesting one of their children. The charges were nol prossed, and Matt countered with a chancery motion for an accounting of the child support. Later, he filed an amended petition asking to “reform” original decree provisions for child support and custody.
The chancellor held a motion hearing and, without hearing any evidence, ruled from the bench that he was going to leave physical custody and legal custody as they were. He stated, “I’m not here today to decide [the modification issue] … I’m not going to address those motions stoday as to whether or not they meet the legal standard.” The judge later entered an order denying Matt’s request for an accounting, reserving ruling on the modification.
Matt filed a motion for a new trial (Note: in chancery this is a motion for rehearing, traditionally referred to as a motion for reconsideration), and Anna filed a motion for payment of certain expenses provided in the original judgment. The judge overruled Matt’s motion and denied Anna’s motion without addressing certain transportation expenses she had requested.
Matt complained on appeal that the chancellor refused to allow him to present evidence on his modification pleading, instead putting off a hearing so that Anna’s parenting could be monitored. A guardian ad litem had been appointed.
In every one of the chancellor’s rulings cited by the COA, it is clear that the judge was not making a final ruling. The COA said at ¶ 20 that
“The chancellor’s orders here were not final. We fully recognize that child-custody decisions are always subject to modification until the children’s emancipation. And no judgment entered is final in the sense of ending the case until that point. However, that the case involves custody modification does not eliminate the requirement that the chancellor enter a final, appealable judgment. Absent proper Rule 54(b) certification or the supreme court’s permission to proceed on an interlocutory appeal, which are both lacking here, piecemeal appeals are not allowed.
The chancellor clearly deferred ruling on contested issues, which he had not revisited when the parties appealed. Because we find the chancellor did not enter a final, appealable judgment, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.”
The court also pointed out that the supreme court has held in Michael v. Michael, 650 S0.2d 469, 471 (Miss. 1995), that parties may not appeal from a temporary order.
From Judge Maxwell’s opinion in this case, it appears that the record was somewhat confused. It may have been confusing to counsel as to exactly what matters were being addressed in which proceedings. I suggest you get a clear understanding with your chancellor either before hearing or when he casts the pleadings at the outset of trial as to what matters will be addressed. If you’re perplexed that the judge won’t address a certain issue at a certain time, try to pin him down on the record as to when, exactly, you can be heard on the issue.
In any event, the COA has once again sent an important message to trial and appellate counsel: If you don’t have a final, appealable judgment, your appeal will be dismissed.
A LESS-THAN-FINAL JUDGMENT
July 6, 2011 § 3 Comments
It sometimes happens that the chancellor grants some of the relief requested, saying in effect, “That’s all I’m going to do,” and directs entry of a final judgment. It happens, for instance, where one party asks for an award of attorney’s fees and the court does not want to grant it, or where one party in a divorce wants the living room furniture that the other party has and the judge leaves things as they are. You can conjure up some similar scenarios.
The question is: when the judge does that, is there a final, appealable judgment?
The COA addressed what is not a final, appealable judgment in two recent decisions handed down the same day.
In Jackson v. Lowe, decided June 28, 2011, the COA answered the question by reference to MRCP 54(b), which states:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counter-claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an expressed determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed direction for the entry of the judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated which adjudicates fewer than all of the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
In Jackson, the court held that since the chacellor’s decision did not address several issues and did not certify that it was a final judgment as to the issues adjudicated, it was an interlocutory judgment that was not appealable, and until the parties saw to it that all issues had been addressed, there was no jurisdiction for an appeal.
A similar result was reached in S.E.B. v. R.E.B. decided June 28, 2011, in which the chancellor flatly refused to adjudicate alimony and child support.
What the COA is telling you is that unless the trial court’s judgment addresses every claim, or unless you have a Rule 54(b) certificate from the trial judge, you are going nowhere on appeal until you do.
I posted here about some of the nuances of Rule 54(b), and you might want to take a look at the post again.
I have almost always included a paragraph in my judgments that states to the effect that “The court has considered all other issues and prayers for relief asserted by the parties and finds that they should be denied and no further relief granted.” I do not know whether that will suffice as an adjudication, and after the S.E.B. decision, I’m not so sure; no one has ever raised the issue. Of course, I use that only for miscellaneous issues that do not have trial factors because failure to address applicable trial factors is reversible error. I also have included a Rule 52(b) certificate in appropriate cases.
Moral of the story: If you are not satisfied that the chancellor has met the requirements of Rule 52(b), be sure to file the proper motion for a certificate, and do it timely. If you are outside the 10-day requirement of Rule 59, you might want to file a motion to set the remaining issues for trial. Yes, this will likely steam up your judge, who probably figured your case was concluded, but just smile and show her a copy of Jackson v. Lowe, and maybe everything will be all right.
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