Maxims: Complete Justice

September 10, 2013 § 1 Comment

The second essential maxim is that “Equity delights to do complete justice and not by halves.”

In pre-rules practice, this was regarded as an important procedural concept that encouraged practitioners to join as many claims as existed in the umbrella of a single suit. As Judge Griffith explained:

The maxim has a complete operation in this state. It is our settled policy that if equity have jurisdiction of the cause of action it should assume full jurisdiction and settle all disputed questions in one and the same suit as far as within the pleadings, and the court will allow and may even suggest such amendments to the pleadings as will permit full adjudication. There not only may, but generally must, be included in the one suit every clearly evident feature of the controversy and there must be made as parties all those substantially interested, so that when the matter is thus settled there will be no doors left open out of which it is probable that furher suits or further contention will spring. In short, equity will not permit litigation by fragments when it can be avoided by bringing the whole cognate matter into one suit. Griffith, § 37, p. 39.   

From a procedural standpoint, all of the principles enunciated by Judge Griffith are incorporated into our MRCP. R15 allows, and even encourages, liberal amendments to make sure that there are no pleading obstacles to complete relief. R8(e)(2) and R18 allow a party to assert as many claims or defenses that he has, whether consistent or not. R14 allows joinder of third parties. R19 and 20 provide for joinder of any and all persons needed for a just adjudication. R21 rules out misjoinder as a ground for dismissal, and allows for severance of claims for adjudication. R24 makes provision for intervention. R25 sets out the rules for substitution of parties.  

From a philosophical standpoint, however, this maxim has had much broader impact. It means that, once the court has taken jurisdiction, it should do what is necessary to effect complete justice, and not to stop because of some perceived pleading impediments or non-joinder. The chancellor should give the parties an opportunity to amend and/or bring in parties necessary to afford full relief, and then proceed. The spirit of the maxim is that a chancery proceeding is not a Gotcha! game in which the parties try to catch each other with their pants down, so to speak, but rather is a search for what is right, fair, and equitable, leading to application of a remedy that will completely achieve that right, fair, and equitable result.

Maxims: No Wrong Without a Remedy

September 9, 2013 § 1 Comment

“Equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy” is the maxim from which all of equity jurisprudence springs.

Over centuries the idea of “wrong” has been refined to include matters that are actionable, and to exclude those that the law deems not actionable. Judge Griffith explained it this way: ” … the maxim at this day is subordinate to positive institutions, and cannot be applied either to subvert established rules of law or to give a court of equity a jurisdiction beyond established principles.”

When the equity court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, it should be given wide latitude to fashion a remedy to correct a wrongful situation. As Judge Griffith stated:

“The maxim now means this: It is not necessary that some exact precedent must be found for extending relief in a given situation, if the case be such that under the established law of the land some relief is clearly requisite and a practical remedy consonant with established principles of procedure may be applied, — such a remedy is not to be denied merely because it cannot be found that the remedy was ever before applied in just that manner to that exact state of case. Under the operation of the maxim, modern equity is not authorized to create a substantive right where none such exists in the law of the land, nor to invent a distinctly new procedure to fit the case, beyond or outside of the procedural methods already established.” Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice, 2d Ed., 1950, § 35, p. 38. 

When the law bestows a right, it also extends a remedy that can be granted in equity. Conversely, a court of equity will not supply a cause of action where none exists in the law.

In its early days, as the law developed procedures and forms of operation, claimants were limited to a few writs by which they could bring causes of action before the courts. The variety of writs was necessarily restricted in number, lest the courts be overwhelmed by multiplicity of suits. This system worked adequately as long as the parties were feudal lords who were relatively few in number. As commerce grew, however, and as more and more individuals acquired property interests and wealth, more and more controversies arose that simply did not fit within the confines of the recognized writs. Claimants were forced to appeal to the conscience of the King for relief from wrongs for which the writs did not afford a remedy. The King, having other matters of state to deal with, delegated that responsibility to the chancellor, who soon needed counterparts to handle the caseload. Over time the chancellors established precedent and certain principles — the maxims — that they followed in cases presented. The legal system administered by the King’s chancellors came to be known as equity, separate and distinct from the law. 

At the very heart of equity is the principle that, if the court has jurisdiction, it will not allow a wrong recognized by our law to go unremedied, and it will always extend a remedy to a person who has a right conferred by the law. It is this principle, more than any other, that sets equity uniquely apart from the law.

The Maxims of Equity

September 5, 2013 § 10 Comments

I made the statement several weeks ago that:

” … when all of the parties are assembled and within the jurisdiction of the court, and the judge makes a fundamental ruling that affects the relationship among the parties, the chancellor should have the authority to reach out and effect complete relief. Our chancery courts are still courts of equity, according to the Mississippi Constitution. The MRCP did not erase the great maxims of equity from our jurisprudence …

Yes, the maxims of equity. Have you heard of them? If you graduated from law school before 1982, you probably spent some time in the law library committing them and some of their key cases to memory. Since then, I’m not so sure. When the MRCP went into effect, it seems that there was a de-emphasis on teaching the idea of equity in chancery. If the procedures were in most matters identical to circuit practice, why was all that folderol about equity necessary?

Today, in an age when even evidence has been eliminated as a required subject in law school, I shudder to think that there might no longer be any formal effort to educate law students in the philosophical underpinnings of chancery and, indeed, the entire system of equity that is administered in our chancery courts.

The Mississippi Constitution, § 159, specifically confers on chancery courts full jurisdiction in “All matters in equity … ” as well as certain other enumerated areas.

Equity is distinguished from the law in civil cases in that the law may grant a money judgment (and by statute may even enter an injunction), but equity courts act on the person, imposing duties and obligations, creating equitable remedies to carry out the court’s orders to set right what is found to be wrong. The court of equity is a court of conscience. As the great Judge Griffith stated,

“It is more than a trite phrase that the court of equity is a court of conscience; and it is immaterial what rights a party could assert in a court of law, — a court of equity will limit him to those rights of which he could conscientiously avail himself. It has been tersely expressed that nothing but conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence can call forth the activities of a court of equity, and when these requisites are wanting, the court is passive and does nothing.” Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice, § 32, p. 35.

The foundation and spirit of equity have been distilled into aphorisms known as the Maxims of Equity. Every equitable proceeding touches on or embodies them in one way or another, whether expressly or impliedly. They inform not only the form, but also the substance, of all equity matters. Traditionally there were 12 great maxims and 12 so-called lesser maxims. Judge Griffith combined them into 14 essential statements of equity principles.

The 14 essential maxims are:

  1. Equity will not suffer a wrong without a remedy.
  2. Equity delights to do complete justice and not by halves.
  3. Equity acts upon the person.
  4. Equity acts specifically, and not by way of compensation.
  5. Equity looks to the intent, and will regard substance rather than form.
  6. Equity follows the law.
  7. Equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.
  8. He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
  9. He who seeks equity must do equity.
  10. To protect and enforce property rights is the object of equity.
  11. When parties are disabled equity will act for them.
  12. Courts of equity will not tolerate interference with their orders nor with their officers in the enforcement thereof.
  13. No person bound to act for another can act for himself.
  14. No person should be condemned without a legal chance to be heard.

The last two are equally applicable in law and equity courts.

If you’re going to spend time in chancery, you have got to understand how these maxims act as the very structure of equity upon which the chancellor bases his or her rulings.

This begins a series of posts that will focus on the Maxims of Equity. I will quote liberally in each from Judge Griffith’s 1950 monumental work on chancery practice. Although his tome is of only academic interest insofar as it relates to the pre-MRCP practice in chancery courts, Judge Griffith’s masterful grasp of the law of equity and its philosophy is unmatched. His book, now out of print, was once considered the authoritative work on Mississippi chancery practice, and was even employed as the law school textbook on the subject in the pre-MRCP era.

My goal is to acquaint a new generation of Mississippi solicitors (the traditional term for practitioners in Mississippi chancery courts) with these concepts, and to try to reintroduce them into the 21st century discussion of chancery court practice for the rest of us.

 

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