A FEW RANDOM THOUGHTS ABOUT JOINT CUSTODY

January 21, 2011 § 3 Comments

  • An award of joint legal custody was reversed where the reason assigned by the trial judge was to allow the mother to participate in and keep up with the children’s activities.  Joint legal custody requires the parties to confer in the joint decision-making about decisions affecting the children’s lives.  Concern for access to information does not warrant award of joint legal custody.  Lowrey v. Lowrey, 25 So.3d 274, 296 (Miss. 2009). 
  • The trial court is not required to consider the Albright factors in determining whether to award joint legal custody, since they apply only to physical custody.  Palculict v. Palculict, 22 So.3d 293, 297 (Miss. App. 2009).
  • MCA § 93-5-24(2) provides that the trial court in an irreconcilable differences divorce may award joint custody only “upon application of both parents,” but in all other cases the court may award joint custody “upon application of one (1) or both parents.”  But where the parties have consented to an irreconcilable differences divorce and agreed for the trial court to adjudicate custody, the chancellor may award joint custody.  Crider v. Crider, 904 So.2d 142, 148 (Miss. 2005).  
  • “There are … significant legal consequences attached to each form of custody.  If parents accustomed to joint decision-making disagree, the parent with sole legal custody has authority to make unilateral decisions regarding the child.  A move by one of two joint custodians triggers an Albright analysis to determine which parent should take sole physical custody.  In contrast, when a parent with sole custody relocates, the relocation is not in itself a reason to modify custody.”  Bell, Mississippi Family Law, § 5.04[4].
  • Joint custdy is inappropriate where the parties are unable to communicate and cooperate.  Lewis v. Lewis, 974 So.2d 265, 266 (Miss. App. 2008).   

“PRIMARY PHYSICAL”: A CUSTODY CONUNDRUM

August 3, 2010 § 7 Comments

Many lawyers use the term “primary physical custody” in their property settlement agreements.  For example:  “The parties shall share joint legal custody, and wife shall have primary physical custody of the minor children.” 

If the intent was for wife to have exclusive physical custody, use of the word “primary” in that sentence is probably harmless, if meaningless.

Consider, however, language in a property settlement agreement that provides, “The parties shall share joint legal and physical custody, with wife to have primary physical custody and husband to have secondary physical custody.”  For lawyers looking for a way to mollify a father demanding custody or at least joint custody, and a mother insisting on sole custody, such language sounds like a nice, painless way to make the father feel included in the physical custody loop while leaving the mother in first place, right?  Think again.

In Porter v. Porter, 23 So.3d 438 (Miss. 2009), the parties’ agreement used the “primary” and “secondary” language above.  The Mississippi Supreme Court pointed out that the joint custody statute includes no definition of the terms “primary physical custody” or “secondary physical custody.”  The court held that the term “primary physical custody” could not be used to transform what was expressly a joint physical custody arrangement into a de facto sole physical custody arrangement.  In other words, the use of the language “primary physical custody” has no legal meaning in our law, and its use may import dangerous ambiguity into your otherwise carefully-crafted agreement, leaving it open to an interpretation neither you nor your client ever intended.

Imagine having to explain to your client who thought she would be “primary” in the custody arrangement that she and her ex-husband are on an equal custodial footing.  Do you think she might be a bit peeved at her attorney? 

In my opinion, the same result as in Porter would be reached in the situation where the parties agreed to this language:  “The parties shall share joint legal and physical custody, and wife shall have primary physical custody.” 

And the same result with this language:  “The parties shall have joint custody, and wife shall have primary physical custody.”  The reason that this language would produce the same result is found in § 93-5-24 (5) (a), MCA, which states that ” … ‘joint custody’ means joint physical and legal custody.”

I believe that attorneys often operate under the mistaken belief that “primary physical custody” designates the person who has final decision-making authority in a joint custody arrangement.  The Porter case tells us that is not so.  If you want the wife to have final decision-making authority, use language to this effect:  “The parties shall share joint custody of the minor children, and wife shall have final decision-making authority in matters of the children’s health, education and welfare.”      

Practice Tip:  Avoid using the term “primary physical custody” or any other term not defined in the statute when crafting your custody provisions.

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