September 18, 2019 § Leave a comment
Last year’s Pettersen case caused somewhat of a ruffle among many attorneys when it affirmed a chancellor’s findings that pre-marriage assets were marital or converted to marital, and passive appreciation of pre-marital securities was also marital. One lawyer told me that he was still scratching his head over the latter.
Lost in the consternation is that the opinion by Judge Barnes includes some jewels of authority that you might find useful:
Frederick Pettersen claimed that the chancellor erred when he announced that he would not consider child support, but he never objected at trial. In ¶10, the court said, “Furthermore, this issue was not asserted in Frederick’s motion for reconsideration.” Aside from the fact that there is no such thing as a motion for reconsideration, this is a remarkable statement because it assumes that you must assert the bases for your R59 motion in the motion. In my experience, few attorneys recite more than that they want a new trial or an amendment of judgment without detailing the reasons why. R7(b) specifically states that a motion “shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.” That “grounds therefor” language is pretty important, but sometimes overlooked.
As for the proper demarcation date, the court said at ¶12:
Our Court has held:
“The law in Mississippi is that the date on which assets cease to be marital and become separate assets—what we refer to as the point of demarcation—can be either the date of separation (at the earliest) or the date of divorce (at the latest).” Collins v. Collins, 112 So. 3d 428, 431-32 (¶9) (Miss. 2013). [However, a] chancellor may consider a temporary order as the line of demarcation between marital and separate property. Id. Ultimately, however, the chancellor has the discretion to draw the line of demarcation. Id. at (¶10).
Randolph v. Randolph, 199 So. 3d 1282, 1285 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016).
At ¶18, the opinion discussed classification of assets:
¶18. Furthermore, when determining whether certain property is marital, a chancery court “must inquire whether any income or appreciation resulted from either spouse’s active efforts during the marriage.” Rhodes v. Rhodes, 52 So. 3d 430, 436 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011). “If so, that income or appreciation becomes part of the marital estate.” Id.
In ¶19, the court rejected Frederick’s argument that his wife, Audrey, was not entitled to any of his retirement funds because of an extra-marital affair:
Moreover, a spouse’s misconduct is only one factor to consider in the division of marital assets. A chancery court “should not view equitable distribution as a means to punish the offending spouse for marital misconduct. Rather, ‘marital misconduct is a viable factor entitled to be given weight by the chancellor when the misconduct places a burden on the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship.’” Bond v. Bond, 69 So. 3d 771, 773 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Carrow v. Carrow, 642 So. 2d 901, 904-05 (Miss. 1994)).
In discussing whether pre-marital properties were properly classified, the court said at ¶23:
¶23. “Marital property is ‘anyand all property acquired or accumulated during the marriage and is subject to an equitable distribution by the chancellor.’” Mamiaro v. Mamiaro, 179 So. 3d 51, 53 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994)). There is no dispute that these properties were acquired before the marriage. But, in discussing Ferguson, the Mississippi Supreme Court held:
Instead of looking to the bare title of a marital asset, this Court, as should the trial courts, will continue to consider all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the accumulation of the marital assets, including noneconomic contributions and factors, when deciding how the marital property should be divided under our system of equitable distribution.
Carnathan v. Carnathan, 722 So. 2d 1248, 1253 (Miss. 1998). Although Frederick argues that Audrey made no economic contribution to these properties, he acknowledges that Audrey helped prepare balance sheets with respect to the rental properties for a period of time during their marriage. We find, therefore, that the chancery court’s awarding her ten percent of the properties’ value was not an abuse of discretion.
And the court reminded us of the definition of commingling:
¶26. “Commingled property is a combination of marital and non-marital property[,] which loses its status as non-marital property as a result.” Maslowski v. Maslowski, 655 So. 2d 18, 20 (Miss. 1995).
Finally, the opinion considered Frederick’s argument that he used non-marital funds to purchase an asset, so it should be a “mixed asset” with greatly reduced equitable distribution to Audrey:
¶29. “[A] presumption of marital property arises to any property acquired during the marriage.” Maslowski, 655 So. 2d at 20. The chancellor properly considered the applicable Ferguson factors, finding: (1) the property was acquired during the marriage; (2) Audrey had “substantially contributed to this property by serving as bookkeeper”; and (3) Frederick had managed the subject property during the separation and continues to do so. Therefore, we find no merit to this issue.
August 24, 2015 § Leave a comment
The date on which the marital assets are assigned a value can make a drastic difference in the ultimate outcome of the equitable distribution. It’s a concept that we’ve touched on here before. In Lowery v. Lowery, 25 So.3d 274, 285-286 (Miss. 2009), the court said:
¶ 27. For purposes of determination of equitable division … the date for determination would be either the date of separation (at the earliest) or the date of divorce (at the latest). “Cases appear to hold that, as a matter of law, property acquired during separation is marital unless a support order has been entered…. However, a few cases suggest that the issue is a question of fact for the chancellor to decide….” Bell on Mississippi Family Law at § 6.02[b] n. 58 (citing Stone v. Stone, 824 So.2d 645, 647–48 (Miss.Ct.App.2002); Aron v. Aron, 832 So.2d 1257, 1258–59 (Miss.Ct.App.2002)).
Other cases have suggested that the valuation date can vary according to the assets. In other words, one asset could have one valuation date, and another a different valuation date.
So, is the rule any different when the case is remanded to the trial court for a do-over? Things can change in the lengthy time it takes to complete the appeal process, after all.
That’s what happened in Lewis v. Pagel, handed down by the MSSC on August 13, 2015. Following a trip through the COA, and from there to the MSSC, Drake Lewis and Tonia Pagel (formerly Lewis), found themselves back before the chancellor for a do-over on equitable distribution. The case was remanded for the chancellor to treat certain real properties as non-marital, to re-value a business, and to re-analyze equitable distribution. The chancellor followed the appellate courts’ instructions, using the asset values as of the date of the divorce.
Drake appealed, complaining that the chancellor’s approach skewed the ultimate outcome because values had changed in the time it took to complete the appeal cycle. Justice Chandler addressed his argument this way:
¶27. It is well-established that “an equitable division of property does not necessarily mean an equal division of property.” Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So. 2d 850, 863-64 (Miss. 1994). “[F]airness is the prevailing guideline in marital division.” Lowery v. Lowery, 25 So. 3d 274, 285 (Miss. 2009) (quoting Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 929). Here, the chancellor’s division of the property was approximately equal. Drake’s argument that he received substantially less than Tonia relies on circumstances that occurred after the divorce judgment. However, the date for determination of equitable distribution is, at the earliest, the date of separation, or, at the latest, the date of divorce. Lowery, 25 So. 3d at 285. Additionally, an order of equitable division is a nonmodifiable judgment. East v. East, 493 So. 2d 927, 931 (Miss. 1986). Therefore, when the Court of Appeals remanded for the chancellor to revisit the equitable distribution, the chancellor properly redetermined the equitable distribution as of the divorce.
When you read the entire Lewis opinion (as I am sure you will), note that the chancellor did consider a post-appeal change in value that favored Drake. Legacy Holdings, LLC, a family business, was valued at the time of the divorce at $1,148,270, but the chancellor found that it had no value at the time of the remand hearing.
Here is a post about a case in which the chancellor’s use of the divorce trial date on remand was affirmed.
It would be a nifty skill for a lawyer to be able to tell the future. None of us in real life, however, has a crystal ball. Still, it’s a good idea to impress on your client that a side effect of an appeal could be that you can win the battle and lose the war. By the time the case descends from the lofty, rarified atmosphere of the appellate courts to ground level, things may have changed drastically in the meantime, resulting in a bounce that does not favor your client. In Lewis, the appeal on the equitable distribution saved Drake some rehabilitative alimony, but cost him $100,000 in lump-sum alimony. That’s going to leave a mark.
August 18, 2015 § 3 Comments
When Michael and Rosie Jackson went through their divorce, the chancellor awarded the former marital residence to Rosie and ordered that she pay the mortgage debt on it. The parties agreed that the value of the home was $78,000, and that its mortgage debt was $50,103, resulting in equity of $27,897.
When the chancellor toted up the assets, he assigned the equity to Rosie. Her share of the marital assets amounted to $31,928, and Michael’s share came to $120,310.64. The difference in favor of Michael was $88,382.64.
Then the chancellor allocated the marital debts between the parties. Michael was assigned $4,950 in credit card debt, reducing Michael’s asset value to $115,360. Rosie was assigned the mortgage debt, which the chancellor found to have reduced Rosie’s asset value to minus $18, 175. In order to equalize the estates based on that arithmetic, the chancellor awarded Rosie lump-sum alimony $57,680.32.
Before going any further, take a moment and ask yourself whether there is any flaw in that arrangement.
In Jackson v. Jackson, handed down by the MSSC on August 13, 2015, the court reversed in part and remanded because the chancellor counted the mortgage debt twice: once by subtracting it from the total value of the property; and a second time by including it in the debts assigned to Rosie. The result was that Rosie’s share of the marital estate was undervalued by $50,103, which in turn affected the amount of lump-sum alimony awarded. The case was sent back to the trial court for a re-do on that issue. All other issues were affirmed.
The COA had affirmed this decision and brushed aside Michael’s complaint about the calculation, noting that our law requires only that the division of the marital estate be equitable, not necessarily equal. The COA’s decision was the subject of a prior post here dealing with homosexual behavior as habitual cruel and inhuman treatment.
Judges do make mistakes when it comes to juggling those numbers in equitable distribution cases. Always check behind the judge for errors in handling debt such as was done here. While you’re at it, check arithmetic and make sure that the figures used match up with the evidence. File a timely R59 motion if you catch an error. Better to let the judge fix it, if she will, than to have to go to the expense of an appeal.
August 17, 2015 § 5 Comments
Love, as they say, conquers all, including good judgment in some cases.
Most of us have seen this scenario more than once: Boyfriend, hopelessly in love with girlfriend, proposes marriage; Girlfriend, eyelids batting furiously, says “yes”; Boyfriend slips a rather expensive engagement ring on Girlfriend’s finger; wedding ensues, converting Boyfriend and Girlfriend to Husband and Wife; marital bliss soon gives way to combat; Husband retains attorney; Wife does the same. You represent Husband. Here is the conversation in your office:
H: Oh, and not only do I not want her to get anything, but I want that engagement ring back.
You: Under our law an engagement ring is a gift; the judge will not give it back to you.
H: Oh yes he will because it belonged to my mother. It’s been in the family for 175 years. It was given to my great (etc., etc.) grandmother by Napoleon just after his victory at Austerlitz.
So let’s pause right there while you catch your breath. So it’s an heirloom. And a valuable antique, to boot. What to do?
Well, first off, you were right to point out that if it meets the elements of a valid gift, the judge is not going to take the ring away from her. Those elements are: (1) that the donor was competent to make a gift; (2) that the donation was a voluntary act and the donor had donative intent; (3) that the gift must be complete and not conditional; (4) that delivery was made; and (5) that the gift was irrevocable. In re Estate of Ladner, 909 So.2d 1051, 1053 (Miss. 2004). Those are fact issues, and the burden of proof is clear and convincing.
In a recent case the COA addressed a similar situation (not involving Napoleon). Here’s how Judge Barnes’ opinion laid out the dispute in Lomax v. Lomax, decided August 11, 2015:
¶11. The main point of contention in the divorce and the determination of marital property concerned the chancery court’s award of the engagement ring to Tara. The chancellor concluded that Tara was entitled to keep the ring, which had previously belonged to Max’s mother, since Max had given the ring to Tara as an inter vivos gift prior to the marriage. Max argues that the parties had an oral agreement that if the marriage did not work out, the ring would be returned to his mother. At the hearing, Max testified that his mother’s ring was given to Tara under the condition that once Max could afford another stone for the ring setting they had purchased, she would return the ring.
¶12. Tara, however, emphatically denied that there was an actual agreement that the ring would be returned, but she acknowledged that after the couple separated, she told her mother-in-law she wanted to be “fair” and return the stone. But she explained at the hearing that when she made that comment to Max’s mother, she “didn’t realize that [Max] intentionally wanted to cost [her] $20,000” to obtain the divorce.
The chancellor awarded Tara the ring. Judge Barnes addressed Max’s claim that the chancellor was in error by letting Tara keep the family jewels:
¶13. In Neville v. Neville, 734 So. 2d 352, 357 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999), this Court held that since an engagement ring was a gift that predated the marriage of the parties, it “was not a marital asset subject to equitable division.” “It was, therefore, beyond the chancellor’s authority to order [the wife] to return possession of that item to [the husband] and [the chancellor’s] refusal to do so cannot constitute reversible error on appeal.” Id. Accordingly, we find no error in the chancellor’s decision to award the engagement ring to Tara.
In the Neville case, incidentally, Mr. Neville claimed that the ring was a family heirloom.
A few observations:
- The ring does not just disappear from the marital equation. It is considered Tara’s separate property, and its value will be considered, along with her share of the equitable distribution, in determining whether she has a “deficit” that would justify alimony.
- The fact that it was a family heirloom does not enter into the picture. If the giving of the ring meets all the requirements of a gift under Mississippi law, it belongs to the donee.
- Max might have wanted to memorialize his version of the transaction with a pre-nup that provided that Tara would return the ring in the event of a marital dissolution, particularly if it had monumental value like the Napoleon ring mentioned above.
- I think the outcome would have been different had Tara admitted on the witness stand that the ring was not a gift, but was hers temporarily only until Max could replace the valuable stone in it. The judge believed Tara that the ring was an unconditional gift, and that did in Max’s position. The chancellor is the ultimate determiner of whom to believe.
- Would the outcome before the COA have been different if it were not only a family heirloom, but also a priceless antique with a provenance linked to one of the great figures in world history? We’ll have to wait until our appellate courts are confronted with such a fact situation. Until then, I think it’s safe to conclude that if the ring is gifted, it’s the property of the one to whom the gift is given — divorce or none.
December 1, 2014 § Leave a comment
Most of us tend to think in the 21st century that lump-sum alimony is a tool for equitable distribution; however, it does retain a small role in alimony itself, as the court’s analysis in a recent case illustrates.
In the November 6, 2014, MSSC case, Davenport v. Davenport, the chancellor had conducted a Ferguson analysis, and ordered Tammy Davenport to pay her ex, Richard, lump-sum alimony in the sum of $1,515,914.33, payable in monthly installments of $8,421.75 over 180 months. Tammy appealed, arguing on this point that the chancellor had erred by not making on-the-record findings of Tammy’s ability to pay applying the Armstrong factors.
Justice Randolph addressed the argument:
¶30. Lump-sum alimony can serve two distinct purposes. The first purpose is to aid the chancellor in equitably dividing the marital estate under the Ferguson factors. See Haney, 907 So. 2d 948. The second purpose is to aid the chancellor in correcting an equitable deficit, resulting from the equitable distribution of the marital estate under the Armstrong factors. See Rogillio v. Rogillio, 57 So. 3d 1246, 1249 (Miss. 2011).
Let’s pause right there and look at that second stated purpose. Lump-sum alimony has also been used as a replacement or supplement for permanent or rehabilitative spousal support, and to award a spouse’s substantial contribution to asset accumulation. See Bell on Mississippi Family Law, 2d Ed., § 9.02[b][ii]-[v], pp. 244-245. So it does retain a role in the award of alimony.
The analyses of equitable distribution and alimony pass through two entirely different filters. Equitable distribution is conducted applying the Ferguson factors. Alimony requires analysis of the Armstrong factors. Only if the equitable distribution leaves a deficit for one spouse may the court then proceed to consider alimony.
The Davenport decision continues, explaining the factors applicable to lump-sum alimony, and how they fit into the picture:
¶31. In Haney v. Haney, this Court found that the chancellor’s award of lump-sum alimony was allocated to equitably distribute the marital assets. Haney, 907 So. 2d at 952. This Court discussed how, prior to Ferguson, lump-sum alimony was the central mechanism through which marital property was divided. Haney, 907 So. 2d at 952. In Cheatham v. Cheatham, the Court set out factors to be taken into account when considering an award of lump-sum alimony. Cheatham v. Cheatham, 537 So. 2d 435, 438 (Miss. 1988). Based on the factors later presented in Ferguson, this Court stated:
Clearly, the Cheatham factors were simply an earlier attempt by this Court to provide a chancellor with guidelines for awarding what today is called an equitable distribution of marital assets, under appropriate circumstances. Indeed, we see no Ferguson factor which would be inappropriate in evaluating lump sum alimony. Although we continue to refer to certain payments as “lump sum alimony,” these payments are really no more than equitable distribution in the form of lump sum cash, rather than an equitable portion of certain property which cannot be divided equitably.
Haney, 907 So. 2d at 955.
¶32. This Court later considered an award of lump-sum alimony and reiterated that ” . . . the chancery court was obligated to apply the appropriate factors . . . the Cheatham-Ferguson factors. Yelverton v. Yelverton, 961 So. 2d 19, 25 (Miss. 2007). See also Dickerson v. Dickerson, 34 So. 3d 637, 647-48 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (After reviewing Haney and Yelverton, the court concluded that chancellors should consider lump-sum alimony under the Ferguson factors; however, an analysis under Cheatham is not reversible error.); George v. George, 22 So. 3d 424, 427-30 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (Lump-sum alimony was analyzed under this Court’s ruling in Haney, considering the Cheatham factors, while periodic alimony was analyzed under the factors set forth in Armstrong.); Dunn v. Dunn, 911 So. 2d 591 n.4 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (acknowledging that, pursuant to Haney, the Ferguson factors should be considered when determining an award of lump-sum alimony).
¶33. In Lauro v. Lauro, this Court described alimony as something which is contemplated subsequent to the equitable division of marital property. Lauro v. Lauro, 847 So. 2d 843, 848 (Miss. 2003). Lauro relies on the language set forth in Johnson v. Johnson, quoting:
If there are sufficient marital assets which, when equitably divided and considered with each spouse’s non-marital assets, will adequately provide for both parties, no more need be done. If the situation is such that an equitable division of marital property, considered with each party’s non-marital assets, leaves a deficit for one party, then alimony based on the value of non-marital assets should be considered.
Lauro, 847 So. 2d at 848 (emphasis original) (quoting Johnson v. Johnson, 650 So. 2d 1281, 1287 (Miss. 1994)). Lauro further explains that the Armstrong factors must be considered when awarding alimony. Lauro, 847 So. 2d at 848. See Lowrey, 25 So. 3d at 280. (“Failure to make an on-the-record . . . analysis is manifest error.”).
¶34. If lump-sum alimony is awarded as a mechanism to equitably divide the marital assets, then chancellors may conduct their analysis under the Ferguson factors. Haney, 907 So. 2d at 955. However, if the alimony, lump-sum or otherwise, is awarded subsequent to the equitable distribution of the marital assets, then chancellors must conduct their analysis under the Armstrong factors. Lauro, 847 So. 2d at 848.
¶35. In the instant case, the chancellor fully considered the award of lump-sum alimony under the Ferguson factors because the award served as a means to equitably divide the marital property. Therefore, the chancellor appropriately conducted a Ferguson analysis in the findings of facts and conclusions of law incorporated it into the final decree; thus, the chancellor did not fail to adequately consider Tammy’s ability to pay the award. This issue is without merit. [Emphasis added]
I think it would simplify everything if we would:
- Leave the term “lump-sum alimony” exclusively to describe that post-Armstrong-analysis use of a lump-sum payment to supplement or replace true alimony or to reward substantial contribution to accumulation of assets; and
- Use the term “equalizing payment” or some similar phrase to apply to payments ordered under a Ferguson analysis to balance out the equitable division.
To continue to call something alimony that we all know has nothing to do with an Armstrong analysis invites confusion and the continued need to explain and clarify it in our case law, for no good reason. Lump-sum alimony was judicially created in 1856 to address a void in the law of alimony. It was created to allow lump-sum payments of true alimony in lieu of periodic payments. In the pre-Ferguson days, the court looked for a way to adjust equities around our title rules, and transmuted lump sum alimony into a tool to do that. Ferguson, however, changed this area of the law, yet the old terminology has remained confusingly in place. With the change ushered in by Ferguson, it’s appropriate that we should change our nomenclature.
October 29, 2014 § 2 Comments
It’s no secret that family use of an asset during the marriage can convert it from separate property to marital property.
Steve Cupp tried to argue that his Lake Cormorant house was separate property, not subject to equitable distribution, because: (1) he acquired the property before his ten-month marriage to his wife, Jenny; (2) he titled it in his sole name; (3) he made all of the mortgage payments from his separate account; and (did I already mention this?) (4) he and Jenny lived together only ten months before they separated.
The chancellor agreed with Jenny that family use had converted the property from separate to marital, and included it in the equitable distribution. Steve appealed.
The COA affirmed in Cupp v. Cupp, handed down October 8, 2013. Judge Maxwell’s opinion explained:
¶16. We first address Steve’s argument that the chancellor erred in classifying the Lake Cormorant property as marital, and, therefore, the property should not have been included in the division of marital assets. Steve asserts that because he acquired the property prior to the marriage, titled the property solely in his name, and made mortgage payments from his separate account, that the property is not marital in nature. Jenny counters Steve’s claims by noting that she lived in the home with her son and Steve before Steve moved to Sevierville. At that time, Jenny contributed domestically to all maintenance on the home for a number of months until she joined Steve in Sevierville.
¶17. Mississippi employs the family-use doctrine when determining whether a couple’s separate property has become marital due to the family’s use of the property. See, e.g., Stewart v. Stewart, 864 So. 2d 934, 937-38 (¶13) (Miss. 2003); Rhodes v. Rhodes, 52 So. 3d 430, 438 (¶¶25-26) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011); Brame v. Brame, 98-CA-00502-COA (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2000), rev’d in part on other grounds, 796 So. 2d 970 (Miss. 2001). Property that was acquired prior to the marriage by one of the parties can become marital property when used by the family. See id. Furthermore, a party’s contribution to the maintenance of a family home, whether monetary or physical, is considered when dividing the home equitably. See, e.g., Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 928; Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994); Tatum v. Tatum, 54 So. 3d 855, 861 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010).
It seems to me that the only way to avoid having property succumb to the family use doctrine is to do everything that Steve did here, except to allow his wife to set foot on the property. Ever. He should have kept it padlocked and given her a letter informing her that if she entered the property she would be prosecuted for trespass.
Of course, I am being facetious. But only in part. What else must one do to keep property separate? It seems that the so-called family-use doctrine can have a decidedly un-family-friendly whipsaw to it. Imagine telling your wife she can’t set foot on your lake property because you want to keep it separate. Imagine telling your child that you can’t take her fishing there because it’s separate. Imagine telling your musically-gifted son he can not practice on the grand piano you keep locked up in a warehouse because you promised grandma that you would keep it in the family.
In my opinion, it would be better to say in a case like this that it is separate property, the value of which causes a disparity in the financial situations of the parties, opening the possibility for time-limited alimony for Jenny.
¶18. The record reflects that the chancellor determined that the property in question was converted to a marital asset by means of the family-use doctrine. The chancellor also noted “that while [Steve] made the primary financial contributions to the accumulation of marital assets, [Jenny] made significant domestic contributions to the marriage.” We agree. Steve, Jenny, and Jenny’s son all lived in the home for some time prior to their move to Sevierville. Jenny also physically maintained the home by herself for several months after Steve moved. We cannot find manifest error in the chancellor’s determination that the Lake Cormorant property was part of the marital estate. This issue is meritless.
August 11, 2014 § Leave a comment
When equitable distribution is reversed and remanded for a do-over, alimony has to be redone also, because the two are inextricably intertwined; as equitable distribution expands, alimony contracts, and vice versa.
But what about child support?
The COA’s decision in Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, handed down July 29, 2014, reminds us that child support and attorney’s fees have to be revisited, as well:
¶47. Deidi argues that the chancellor committed error in the computation of child support and by not awarding her attorney’s fees. As set forth above, in Lauro [v. Lauro, 847 So.2d 843, 850 (¶17) (Miss. 2003)], the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that since the case was remanded for further consideration of equitable division, the chancellor should be instructed “to revisit the awards of alimony and child support after he has properly classified and divided the marital assets.” Lauro, 847 So.2d at 850 (¶17). Thus, since this case has been remanded for further consideration of equitable division of assets and alimony, on remand, the chancellor will have all the tools of marital dissolution available: equitable division, lump-sum alimony, and periodic alimony. Likewise, the chancellor may revisit the awards of child support and attorney’s fees.
I was aware of the language in Lauro that requires the remand court to look not only at equitable distribution, but also at alimony and any child support. I was unaware that the remand also embraced attorney’s fees. It is logical, though, that the judge on remand, after completing a re-analysis of the division of the marital estate, and after the award of alimony and child support, could arrive at a different conclusion about ability to pay attorney’s fees.
An interesting feature of this case is that the chancellor did not treat a private-school debt, apparently for tuition, as a marital debt. It’s pure speculation on my part, but I will bet that stems from the chancellor’s confusion over how exactly to treat private school expenses. It’s a confused area, with cases going every which way. If we need some bright line guidance in an area, private school expenses is one.
February 26, 2014 § 1 Comment
I’ve whined here more times than I can count about how the record is almost always bereft of any testimony from either party in a divorce about what valuation date should be used by the court in assessing values. The date that the chancellor uses can take away or add thousands of dollars to your client’s slice of the marital pie, so it’s a subject that you should approach with some interest.
The valuation date (or demarcation date) is entirely within the discretion of the court, and if you do not put evidence in the record as to which date should be used and why, then you are leaving it strictly up to the chancellor to go with any reasonable date. One of several previous posts where I spelled this out is here.
If I were trying a case with valuations, I would always ask my client what valuation date should be used and why. And remember, that different assets can have different valuation dates. Why? Well, for one thing, it gives you something in the record to argue, as opposed to raising the argument in a vacuum on appeal with nothing in the record to support it. For another, it just might be all the chancellor needs to select the very date that your client designates. And, for yet another, if you don’t put that evidence under the judge’s nose, how in the world do you expect the judge to guess correctly what your client wants?
So how do you pick the best valuation date for your client? Look at how values are fluctuating, if they are, and pick the most advantageous date, then have your client explain to the court why and how that date will produce the most equitable result. If you want inspiration on how to do this, I suggest you study the various appeals where the court has upheld the chancellor’s arbitrary decision on valuation dating. How the chancellor picked a date is one indicator you can use. You can also draw inspiration from the after-the-fact arguments of counsel who left it up to the trial judge. The COA decision in McDevitt v. Smith, handed down November 26, 2013, is a recent example.
February 5, 2014 § 2 Comments
The COA’s decision in Proctor v. Proctor, handed down January 28, 2014, is one of those cases where the appellate court deferred to the chancellor’s discretion, both on application of the Ferguson factors in equitable distribution, and on the Armstrong factors vis a vis alimony.
I talked about deference in a previous post. Proctor is an illustration of how stout the trial judge’s judgment can be when she invokes the applicable factors and her decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. You might want to pay particular attention to Judge Barnes’ opinion at ¶ 19, where she points out that equitable division need only be equitable, not equal. That seems to be a concept that many lawyers and litigants do not grasp.
Another point that bears mention is at ¶ 36, where Judge Barnes addresses Ms. Proctor’s request for an award of attorney’s fees on appeal:
Donna makes a cursory request that this Court award her attorney’s fees on her appeal, in an amount equal to one-half of the amount that was awarded by the chancery court, according to Grant v. Grant, 765 So. 2d 1263, 1268 (¶19) (Miss. 2000), and Durr v. Durr, 912 So. 2d 1033, 1041 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). The distinguishing feature of these cases, however, is that the appellee was requesting attorney’s fees for defending the case on appeal, not the appellant prosecuting the appeal, unsuccessfully. Therefore, we deny Donna’s request.