Directed Verdict or Involuntary Dismissal?
May 8, 2019 § Leave a comment
“Juries render verdicts; judges render judgments.” — Lawrence Primeaux
You can quote me on that.
It happens every now and then that someone moves for a directed verdict in a chancery court bench trial. That can create a problem because the standard for directing a verdict is considerably different from that for an involuntary dismissal.
The distinction was at issue in the COA’s case of Vermillion v. Vermillion, decided March 19, 2019. In that case, the chancellor granted the defendants’ (Robyn’s and Douglas’s) motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the plaintiff’s (Angela’s) pleading seeking grandparent visitation rights. Judge Carlton wrote for the court:
¶10. Angela argues that the chancellor erred in granting Robyn and Douglas’s motion for a directed verdict. Angela asserts that because the case was tried without a jury, Robyn and Douglas should have filed a motion for involuntary dismissal, rather than a motion for a directed verdict. Angela also argues that the chancellor applied an erroneous interpretation of Mississippi Code Annotated section 93-16-3(2)–(3) (Rev. 2013); specifically, whether Angela established a viable relationship with Chella Rose.
¶11. We first address Angela’s procedural issue. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), which governs involuntary dismissals, “applies in actions tried by the court without a jury, where the judge is also the fact-finder.” All Types Truck Sales Inc. v. Carter & Mullings Inc., 178 So. 3d 755, 758 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which governs directed verdicts, applies to jury trials, where the judge is not the fact-finder.” Id. at (¶12) (emphasis omitted). We recognize that “the appropriate motion in a case tried without a jury is not a motion for directed verdict, but for involuntary dismissal . . . .” Gulfport-Biloxi Reg’l Airport Auth. v. Montclair Travel Agency Inc., 937 So. 2d 1000, 1004 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). In similar cases, rather than reversing a trial court’s judgment granting a directed verdict due to a procedural error, this Court has considered such appeals under the standard of review for a motion for involuntary dismissal. Id. at 1006 (¶18); Ladner v. Stone County, 938 So. 2d 270, 273 (¶¶9-10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). We will therefore review the judgment at issue before us under the standard of review for Rule 41(b) involuntary dismissals.
¶12. In applying this standard, we recognize that “[a]ppellate courts . . . employ a more deferential standard of review when considering involuntary dismissals [at a bench trial] than when reviewing grants of directed verdicts” at a jury trial. All Types Truck Sales, 178 So. 3d at 758 (¶13). Rule 41(b) involuntary dismissals are reviewed under a “substantial evidence/manifest-error standard,” rather than the de novo standard applied when reviewing directed verdicts. Id. “A judge should grant a motion for involuntary dismissal if, after viewing the evidence fairly, rather than in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the judge would find for the defendant.” Id. (quoting Gulfport-Biloxi Reg’l Airport Auth., 937 So. 2d at 1004 (¶13)). “The court must deny a motion to dismiss only if the judge would be obliged to find for the plaintiff if the plaintiff’s evidence were all the evidence offered in the case.” Id.
The court went on to analyze the evidence and the judge’s ruling and found no error in the dismissal despite the wrong standard.
This case illustrates how you can hand your opponent a ground for appeal simply by using incorrect terminology. Save your directed verdicts for jury trials. That’s where they belong. Bench trials call for a motion for involuntary dismissal per MRCP 41(b) at the conclusion of the plaintiff’s case.
No Directed Verdict in Chancery Unless it is a Jury Trial
March 26, 2018 § 1 Comment
Sheila Jones George filed a contempt action against her ex, Mike Jones, charging that he had failed to comply with their divorce judgment. After Sheila rested, Mike’s attorney addressed the court: “Your honor, we would make a motion for a directed verdict, this case be dismissed as not meeting the burden of proof of contempt.” The chancellor did dismiss Sheila’s contempt claim, and she appealed.
In the case of George v. Jones, decided March 6, 2018, the COA reversed and remanded. Judge Griffis explained the difference between a motion for an involuntary dismissal and a motion for a directed verdict, and how invoking the wrong procedure produces error:
¶15. … [W]e note that when Sheila rested her case-in-chief, Mike’s attorney made a motion for “directed verdict.” In a bench trial, the proper motion to be made at this time is a motion for involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 41(b) is the authority for an involuntary dismissal, and it provides:
After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court may then render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) is the authority for a directed verdict; it is properly made at a jury trial.
¶16. In Crowell v. Butts, 153 So. 3d 684, 687 (¶6) (Miss. 2014), the supreme court ruled:
A motion for directed verdict granted by the court, sitting without a jury, is procedurally a dismissal on the merits under [Rule] 41(b). This Court reviews a grant or denial of a Rule 41(b) motion to dismiss under the substantial evidence/manifest error standard. In considering a motion to dismiss, the trial judge should consider the evidence fairly, as distinguished from in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and should dismiss the case if it would find for the movant. The court must deny a motion to dismiss only if the judge would be obliged to find for the plaintiff if the plaintiff’s evidence were all the evidence offered in the case. (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted). [Emphasis in this paragraph added]
When you move to dismiss per R41(b), the judge must “consider the evidence fairly” and dismiss if it would rule for the party moving to dismiss based on the proof presented to that point, even without hearing the other side’s proof.
In a jury trial, the court has to consider the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmovant” and dismiss if it would find for the movant.
The standard for the court to apply in ruling on either motion is different in a bench trial than it is in a jury trial. Thus, invoking the wrong procedure can lead the judge to apply the wrong standard, and thus lead to error.
If you are confused over the difference, just remember that judges ruling from the bench render judgments; juries render verdicts. A chancellor cannot direct a verdict unless there is a jury; a chancellor can, in a bench trial, dismiss a party’s pleading and render judgment in favor of the other party.
Directed Verdict vs. Involuntary Dismissal
February 2, 2016 § 1 Comment
After the plaintiff or petitioner has rested in a chancery court bench trial, the defendant may move to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff or petitioner has proven no right to relief. That is an involuntary dismissal, pursuant to MRCP 41(b), commonly referred to as a “41(b) motion.”
In a jury trial, a party may move for a directed verdict at the close of the other party’s case. That is a motion for directed verdict per MRCP 50(a).
The two are entirely different creatures. A 41(b) motion has no place in a jury trial, and a motion for directed verdict has no place in a bench trial.
The distinction was noted in the recent COA case, Carlson v. Brabham, handed down January 19, 2016. Judge Griffis explained:
¶10. “In a non-jury trial, such as this case, the appropriate motion is not a motion for [a] directed verdict pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 50; instead, the correct motion is a motion for [an] involuntary dismissal pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).” Partlow v. McDonald, 877 So. 2d 414, 416 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (citation omitted) (citing Buelow v. Glidewell, 757 So. 2d 216, 220 (¶12) (Miss. 2000)). In this case, Brabham filed a Rule 50 motion for a directed verdict, rather than a Rule 41(b) involuntary-dismissal motion.
¶11. The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that in situations such as this, an appellate court must:
[C]onsider th[e] appeal based on the correct standard of review, which under Rule 41(b) is different than the standard of review applicable to a motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50. In considering a motion for [an] involuntary dismissal under Rule 41(b), the trial court should consider the evidence fairly, as distinguished from in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the [trial court] should dismiss the case if it would find for the defendant. On appeal, [an appellate court] must apply the substantial evidence/manifest error standard to an appeal of a grant or denial of a motion to dismiss pursuant to [Rule 41(b)].
Id. at 416-17 (¶7) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (citing Miss. Real Estate Comm’n v. Geico Fin. Servs. Inc., 602 So. 2d 1155, 1156 n.1 (Miss. 1992)).
As I have pointed out here before, if you proceed under the wrong rule in chancery, you are inviting either of two unappetizing results: (a) the chancellor may overrule your motion because there is no such thing as directed verdict in a chancery bench trial; or (b) the chancellor may apply the wrong standard to the proof, and you could find yourself boomeranged back to chancery on a remand that you created by your own inattention to the distinction.
Directed Verdict vs. Involuntary Dismissal
December 3, 2014 § 4 Comments
Juries render verdicts. Judges in bench trials render judgments.
Thus, the proper motion after the plaintiff has rested in a jury trial is a motion for a directed verdict, per MRCP 50(a).
In a bench trial, which includes 99.9% of chancery matters, the proper motion is one for an involuntary dismissal, per MRCP 41(b), which states:
… After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The court may then render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence …
In the case of SKL Investments v. Hardin and Torrence, handed down November 18, 2014, the COA said this:
¶12. “[T]he appropriate motion in a case tried without a jury is not a motion for [a] directed verdict, but involuntary dismissal, pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure.” Gulfport-Biloxi Reg’l Airport Auth. v. Montclair Travel Agency Inc., 937 So. 2d 1000, 1004 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). “When reviewing a dismissal under . . . Rule . . . 41(b), we will not overturn the decision of [the chancery court] if [its] findings are supported by substantial evidence unless [the chancery court] abused [its] discretion, was manifestly wrong, or applied an erroneous legal standard.” Jones v. Jones, 101 So. 3d 731, 732 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citation omitted).
We discussed the different standards to be applied by the court in each of the two rules in a previous post. The distinction is substantial.
Legal nerd that I am, it irks me when I read a decision of the appellate court referring to a R41(b) motion in chancery court as one for a directed verdict. There are no verdicts in chancery court except in the relatively rare event of a jury trial — which now occurs only when one is requested in a will contest, and when the chancellor impanels an advisory jury (assuming that can still be done under the MRCP).
Likewise, you could conceivably lead an unsuspecting chancellor in a bench trial into error by casting your motion as one for a directed verdict. When the chancellor applies the proper legal standard to that motion, she is automatically in error, since it does not apply in bench trials.
Terminology can make a difference.
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