July 15, 2019 § 1 Comment
Rodney Kimble and his wife Stepidy went through a divorce. Rodney didn’t like the way the chancellor divided the marital estate, and he particularly objected to the judge’s valuation of a 2006 Volvo truck, a 2000 Freightliner trailer, and a 2007 Transcraft trailer, all of which he complained were overvalued by the chancellor. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in not considering his testimony that the truck and trailers were inoperable and had not been used in several years.
Here’s how Judge Tindell, writing for the COA, addressed Rodney’s claims in Kimble v. Kimble, decided June 18, 2019:
¶8. “[T]he foundational step to make an equitable distribution of marital assets is to determine the value of those assets based on competent proof.” Dunaway v. Dunaway, 749 So. 2d 1112, 1118 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 929). “[I]t is incumbent upon the parties, and not the chancellor, to prepare evidence touching on matters pertinent to the issues to be tried.” Benton v. Benton, 239 So. 3d 545, 548 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). When “a party fails to provide accurate information, or cooperate in the valuation of assets, the chancellor is entitled to proceed on the best information available.” Id. The chancellor possesses sole authority to assess both the credibility and weight of witness testimony. Culumber v. Culumber, 261 So. 3d 1142, 1150 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018).
¶9. Here, as previously discussed, both parties submitted Rule 8.05 financial disclosures to the chancellor and testified at the hearing. Rodney’s initial Rule 8.05 disclosure, however, failed to reflect all his assets. During questioning by Stepidy’s attorney, Rodney admitted that his Rule 8.05 financial statement failed to include three bank accounts and five vehicles and/or trailers that he owned. Stepidy’s attorney also questioned Rodney about the values he listed for certain vehicles and the discrepancies between those values and the higher valuations reflected by the National Automobile Dealers Association (NADA). While subsequently questioning Rodney about his valuation of the marital home, the following exchange occurred:
STEPIDY’S ATTORNEY: Okay. And on the financial declaration, you say the house . . . [is] worth about [$]63,000; is that right?
RODNEY: I guess.
STEPIDY’S ATTORNEY: Well, I mean, that’s what you put down.
THE COURT: Hang on. Rule 8.05 requires the parties to exchange a financial statement that’s to be signed under oath. I’ve sat here for the last 30 minutes and listened to various and numerous discrepancies in your 8.05. I’m going to take a break, and at 9:45[a.m.], I’m going to return, and I want that 8.05 to reflect exactly what your knowledge is.
THE COURT: I’ve heard vehicles that aren’t listed. I’ve heard checking accounts that aren’t listed. Somebody hasn’t done . . . [his or her] job. I’m going to give you ten minutes to do it, or I’m going to hold you in contempt. Do you understand what I’m telling you?
¶10. On Stepidy’s Rule 8.05 statement, she listed the following values for the three vehicles now at issue on appeal: (1) $20,000 for the 2006 Volvo truck (VIN ending in 3635); (2) $17,000 for the 2000 Freightliner conventional trailer; and (3) $20,000 for the 2007 Transcraft trailer. Stepidy testified that she and her attorney obtained these values from NADA after inputting the vehicles’ VINs and title information. While Rodney’s initial Rule 8.05 statement failed to list any of the three disputed vehicles, Rodney testified that the 2006 Volvo truck (VIN ending in 3635) was inoperable and that he no longer used the 2000 Freightliner conventional trailer. Rodney further testified that he had tried and failed to sell the vehicles. As a result, Rodney claimed that both vehicles lacked any monetary value. As to the 2007 Transcraft trailer, Rodney stated that he rarely used the trailer, and he valued the item at $4,000.
¶11. Despite Rodney’s testimony that he had not driven or operated the 2006 Volvo truck (VIN ending in 3635) in three to five years, Stepidy’s attorney questioned him about two different tickets he had received for the vehicle within the last two years. (The first ticket was issued in August 2015, and the second ticket was issued in February 2016.) In response, Rodney stated that a mistake had occurred and that the VINs for his two 2006 Volvo trucks had been mixed up.
¶12. In rendering his bench opinion, the chancellor found that Rodney lacked credibility and that his testimony had been full of inaccurate and untruthful information intended to conceal his income and assets. Based on the evidence before him, the chancellor valued each of the now disputed items among the amounts provided by Stepidy’s Rule 8.05 statement and Rodney’s testimony and amended the Rule 8.05 statement. Because we find the record contains sufficient evidentiary support for the chancellor’s valuation of the three disputed assets, we refuse to find any manifest error. See Dunaway v. Dunaway, 749 So. 2d 1112, 1121 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (refusing to find error where “the chancellor, faced with proof from both parties that was something less than ideal, made valuation judgments that find some evidentiary support in the record. . . . [and] appears to have fully explored the available proof and arrived at the best conclusions that he could . . . .”). We therefore find this assignment of error lacks merit.
- The chancellor found that Rodney lacked credibility. Not surprising given the sorry state of his 8.05 and his slipshod answers to questions about values. When the chancellor bases her findings on credibility, her conclusions are well-nigh bulletproof on appeal because it is within the chancellor’s exclusive realm of responsibility to assess credibility and the weight to assign to testimony.
- You could just about hear the chancellor’s frustration over the incomplete 8.05. A frustrated chancellor is never a good thing when he is frustrated at you or your client.
- Rodney sort of self-destructed on the witness stand over his assertion that he hadn’t driven the truck and trailers but had been ticketed while operating them. The judge didn’t buy the mixed-up VIN excuse, and I don’t know anyone else who would have either.
- Contrast Rodney’s valuations with Stepidy’s. Hers had a rational basis that the chancellor could rely on, and were presented in an orderly and complete fashion.
November 17, 2010 § 3 Comments
In the case of Dean vs. Slade, et al., rendered November 9, 2010, Judge Larry Roberts of the Court of Appeals laid out a template of authority you should keep on hand for your next adverse possession case. Although the decision does not touch on all of the adverse possession factors, it touches on some important authority that you can use to your advantage. I simply stripped the material below right out of Judge Roberts’ opinion, making a couple of minor editorial changes.
THE ADVERSE POSSESSION FACTORS
MCA § 15-1-13(1) (Rev. 2003) provides the following: Ten (10) years’ actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land, uninterruptedly continued for ten (10) years by occupancy, descent, conveyance, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title[.] Thus, the party claiming adverse possession must prove by clear and convincing evidence that his/her possession was “(1) under claim of ownership; (2) actual or hostile; (3) open, notorious and visible; (4) continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten years; (5) exclusive; and (6) peaceful.” Stringer v. Robinson, 760 So. 2d 6, 9 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Rice v. Pritchard, 611 So. 2d 869, 871 (Miss. 1992)). “The ultimate question is whether the possessory acts relied upon by the would be adverse possessor are sufficient enough to place the record title holder on notice that the lands are under an adverse claim of ownership.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Black, 469 So. 2d 88, 90-91 (Miss. 1985)).
THE EVIDENTIARY STANDARD
Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as follows: that weight of proof which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the fact-finder to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts of the case. Moran v. Fairley, 919 So. 2d 969, 975 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Travelhost, Inc. v. Blandford, 68 F.3d 958, 960 (5th Cir. 1995)). “Clear and convincing evidence is such a high standard [of proof] that even the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not rise to the same level.” Id. (citing In re C.B., 574 So. 2d 1369, 1375 (Miss. 1990)).
Absent a finding of an abuse of discretion or manifest error, a chancellor is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to give to the evidence. Webb v. Drewrey, 4 So. 3d 1078, 1081 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009).
ACTUAL OR HOSTILE
“Actual possession is ‘effective control over a definite area of land, evidenced by things visible to the eye or perceptible to the senses.’” Warehousing Mgmt., LLC v. Haywood Props., LP, 978 So. 2d 684, 688 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Wicker v. Harvey, 937 So. 2d 983, 993-94 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006)). The adverse possessor must hold the property without the permission of the true title owner since “permission defeats adverse possession.” Gillespie v. Kelly, 809 So. 2d 702, 706-07 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (citing Myers v. Blair, 611 So. 2d 969, 971 (Miss. 1992)). “Adverse use is defined as such a use of the property as the owner himself would exercise, disregarding the claims of others entirely, asking permission from no one, and using the property under a claim of right.” Peagler v. Measells, 743 So. 2d 389, 391 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Cummins v. Dumas, 147 Miss. 215, 113 So. 332, 334 (1927)).
OPEN, NOTORIOUS AND VISIBLE
The mere possession of land is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the adverse possessor’s use be open, notorious, and visible. Wicker, 937 So. 2d at 994 (citing Craft v. Thompson, 405 So. 2d 128, 130 (Miss. 1981)). A claim of adverse possession cannot begin unless the landowner has actual or constructive knowledge that there is an adverse claim against his property. Scrivener v. Johnson, 861 So. 2d 1057, 1059 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (citing People’s Realty & Dev. Corp. v. Sullivan, 336 So. 2d 1304, 1305 (Miss. 1976)). “[A]n adverse possessor ‘must unfurl his flag on the land, and keep it flying, so that the (actual) owner may see, and if he will, [know] that an enemy has invaded his domains, and planted the standard of conquest.’” Wicker, 937 So. 2d at 994(citing Blankinship v. Payton, 605 So. 2d 817, 820 (Miss. 1992)).