The Better Chancery Practice Blog

MCA § 43-19-101 is the statute that prescribes the formula for calculating child support.  I’ll leave it to you to re-read it (or to actually read it for the first time, if you’ve never bothered). I do suggest you read it, because from the questions I get about the statute, it’s clear that not all of you have done so.

There are two provisions in the statute that deal with how to consider child support for the payor’s other children:

• § 43-19-101 (3)(c) provides that any amounts due for prior court-ordered child-support for other children must first be deducted.
• § 43-19-101 (3)(d) provides that if the payor is parent of other children who live with him, and there is no other court order for the other children who live with him, the chancellor may deduct an amount “appropriate to account for the needs” of the other children who live with him.

The statute does not address the situation that arises when the payor has other children who do not live with him, and for whom there is no court-ordered child support. That was the situation that presented itself in Knighten v. Hooper, handed down by the COA on September 6, 2011.

Hooper and Knighten lived together for a brief time, and their relationship produced a son, CJ. After CJ was born, Knighten had relationships with two different women that resulted in three children.

Hooper sued Knighten for for child support for CJ. After a hearing on the matter, the chancellor ruled that neither party had overcome the presumption that the statutory child support guidelines were applicable. She calculated that guideline child support for CJ should be 14% of Knighten’s adjusted gross income, or $526.21. The chancellor went on to say that, ” [t]he court does consider that Mr. Knighten has three other minor children that he has to provide for … The court further considers all other factors and finds that it is reasonable for Mr. Knighten to pay … $400 per month.”

Knighten appealed, complaining that the chancellor had failed to make findings of fact sufficient to support the reduction of child support. Reading between the lines, it appears that he felt that the reduction for the outside children should have been greater than the 24% of adjusted gross income that the chancellor allowed.

The COA found no error in the chancellor’s approach. The court noted that the two statutory deductions for other children did not apply, and then stated, beginning at ¶ 11:

“Although the deductions did not apply, the chancellor decided that it was equitable to consider Knighten’s other children. Chancellors may deviate from the child-support guidelines if they determine, in writing, that application of the guidelines would be unjust or inappropriate in the particular case. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-101(2). When deciding whether a deviation is appropriate, chancellors may take into account, among other things: “[a]ny . . . adjustment which is needed to achieve an equitable result which may include, but not be limited to, a reasonable and necessary existing expense or debt.” Miss. Code Ann. § 43-19-103(i) (Rev. 2009).

¶12. Here, the chancellor wrote that “[t]he Court does consider that Mr. Knighten has three other minor children that he has to provide for . . . . The Court further considers all other factors and finds that it is reasonable for Mr. Knighten to pay . . . . $400 per month.” Thus, the chancellor determined, in writing, that a deviation from the guidelines was appropriate based on a reasonable and necessary existing expense – namely, Knighten’s obligation to support his other children.

¶13. Knighten correctly argues that the chancellor did not explain in detail how she settled on the precise amount of $400. However, he cites no authority that supports his proposition that such a detailed explanation was required. The chancellor was faced with great uncertainty in this case. Given the informal arrangement Knighten had with the mothers of his other children, it was unclear exactly how much Knighten paid to support the children. When there is no court-ordered child support for the other children, there will inevitably be uncertainty in this regard. In light of that uncertainty, chancellors must be afforded flexibility and discretion so that they may do equity under the circumstances.

¶14. The chancellor, in her discretion, determined that a downward deviation in the amount of $126.12 per month was appropriate and equitable in light of Knighten’s obligations to his other children. We find that the chancellor’s decision was within her discretion. This issue is without merit.”

In a footnote, the court declined to consider whether later-born children are entitled to any consideration in calculation of child support for earlier born children. Some jurisdictions take the position that payors should not be allowed to place the first-born children at a financial disadvantage by continuing to procreate.

The opinion seems to imply that it was doubtful whether Knighten was actually paying any support for the three after-born children. In that situation, any reduction would be a direct benefit to him and not to the children. The chancellor was obviously conflicted about what the COA described as this “uncertain” situation. The COA afforded her the flexibility and discretion she needed to address it.