The Better Chancery Practice Blog

State holiday

Courthouse closed

In the general election November 4, 2014 …

Eighth District (Hancock, Harrison and Stone), Place 2

• C. Stephen Benvenutti
• Jennifer Schloegel (incumbent)

Eighth District, Place 3

• Ronnie Cochran
• Sanford R. “Sandy” Steckler (Incumbent)

Eleventh District (Holmes, Leake, Madison and Yazoo)

• Barbara Ann Blunston
• Robert G. Clark, III

To fill the seat being vacated by Chancellor Janace Harvey-Goree

Thirteenth District (Covington, Jefferson Davis, Lawrence, Simpson and Smith), Place 1

• J. Larry Buffington
• David Shoemake (Incumbent)

Thirteenth District, Place 2

• Mary K. Burnham
• Deborah Kennedy
• Gerald M. Martin

To fill the seat being vacated by Chancellor Joe Dale Walker

Sixteenth District (George, Greene and Jackson), Place 1

• D. Neil Harris (incumbent)
• Paula S. Yancey

Sixteenth District, Place 3

• G. Charles “Chuck” Bordis (incumbent)
• Michael L. Fondren
• Gary L. Roberts

Eighteenth District (Benton, Calhoun, Lafayette, Marshall and Tippah), Place 1

• Glenn Alderson (incumbent)
• Carnelia Pettis Fondren
• Tina Duggard Scott

Eighteenth District, Place 2

• Helen Kennedy Robinson
• Robert Q. Whitwell (incumbent)

Should we split our Court of Appeals between civil appeals and criminal appeals? That’s one question raised by Anderson at this link.

Compare the language:

This from the COA on April 8, 2014, in Burnham v. Burnham:

¶15. Usually, the scope of review of a chancellor’s findings is limited in domestic-relations cases. “The chancellor’s determinations will only be reversed when they were manifestly wrong [or] clearly erroneous, or when the chancellor applie[d] an incorrect legal standard.” Greenwood v. Young, 80 So. 3d 140, 145 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012). “Questions of law are reviewed de novo.” Marin v. Stewart, 122 So. 3d 153, 156 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013).

¶16. In the case at hand, the trial court essentially adopted the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law [PFFCL] submitted by Dana. We have previously held that “[w]here the chancellor adopts, verbatim, findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared by a party to the litigation, this Court analyzes such findings with greater care[.]” Brooks v. Brooks, 652 So. 2d 1113,1118 (Miss. 1995) (citing OmniBank of Mantee v. United S. Bank, 607 So. 2d 76, 83 (Miss.1992)). Further, “the deference normally afforded a chancellor’s findings of fact is lessened.” Id. This does not mean that the appellate court is the fact-finder, nor does it change ourstandard of review. This means that the Court will take a closer look to make sure that our law is followed as interpreted by our courts. Chancellors are charged with the duty of being independent fact-finders, and the adoption of an opinion written by one of the attorneys is not the finding of the chancellor based on his independent reasoning, even though the chancellor may have a similar opinion.

And this from the MSSC in Bluewater Logistics LLC v. Williford, 55 So.3d 148, 157 (Miss. 2011):

I. This Court is not required to apply a different level of deference to the chancellor’s factual findings.

¶24. We review a chancellor’s legal conclusions de novo; that is, we reach our own conclusions as to the applicable law.FN2 But we ordinarily accept a chancellor’s factual findings unless—given the evidence in the record—we conclude that the chancellor abused his or her discretion, and no reasonable chancellor could have come to the same factual conclusions. FN3

FN2. Corporate Mgmt., Inc. v. Greene County, 23 So.3d 454, 459 (Miss.2009).

 FN3. Limbert v. Miss. Univ. for Women Alumnae Ass’n, Inc., 998 So.2d 993, 998 (Miss.2008) ( citing Hamilton v. Hopkins, 834 So.2d 695, 699 (Miss.2003)).

¶ 25. But as to our review of the factual findings in this case, Defendants argue we must apply a different and higher standard of review because the chancellor adopted, verbatim, the plaintiff’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. That may be so, and probably is—Williford responds to the argument without denying it. But we cannot compare the two documents, because Williford’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law were not included in the record. Nevertheless, we shall address the issue.

¶ 26. When a chancellor adopts verbatim, or nearly verbatim, a party’s proposed findings of fact, our precedent provides that we should apply “heightened scrutiny” FN4 to the chancellor’s findings of fact. This rule is fairly well-settled and accepted. Yet our precedent provides little guidance as to how we are to comply with our duty to “heighten” our scrutiny—which could be read to require us to review a case more carefully or, perhaps, to apply a different, more stringent standard to our review of the facts.

FN4. See, e.g., In re Estate of Grubbs, 753 So.2d 1043, 1046–47 (Miss.2000); Brooks v. Brooks, 652 So.2d 1113, 1118 (Miss.1995).

¶ 27. But our duty already requires us carefully to scrutinize every case, so we reject the former. And as to the latter, if “heightened scrutiny” requires us to abandon the reasonable-chancellor standard and apply a different, higher standard, we find no caselaw or other authority explaining that different standard, or suggesting how it should be applied.FN5 The dissent suggests that heightened scrutiny requires us to review a chancellor’s findings with “a heightened ‘sensitivity to the possibility of error….’ ” FN6 Yet our duty requires us in every case to be as careful and as sensitive to error as we can be, and we cannot condone a standard that allows us to be less sensitive to error in one case than in another.

FN5. Some possibilities include elevating the standard from “reasonable chancellor” to “very reasonable chancellor,” or from “manifest error” to “catastrophic error.”

 FN6. Dissent at ¶ 80 citing In re Estate of Grubbs, 753 So.2d 1043, 1048 (Miss.2000).

¶ 28. In Rice Researchers, Inc. v. Hiter, FN7 this Court provided the following interesting insight into the issue:

FN7. Rice Researchers, Inc. v. Hiter, 512 So.2d 1259 (Miss.1987).

Case complexities and crushing caseloads necessitate substantial reliance upon the submissions of trial counsel. Still, the judge is a judge and not a rubber stamp. He may not be able to afford the luxury of practicing his culinary art a la the Cordon Bleu. He should remember, however, that his oath precludes a McDonald’s approach to the judicial process. Where the trial judge wholly abdicates his judicial responsibilities—where, as it were, he abuses his discretion—we doubtless have authority to intervene. Here the Chancery Court quite properly requested that each party submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. These submissions were considered at an adversary hearing. Thereafter, the Court considered RRI’s motion to amend findings. These steps, coupled with the fact that this case is quite complex (in spite of its simplicity), leave us convinced that the Chancery Court acted within its authority. As indicated above, however, our obligation of appellate deference to such findings is necessarily lessened.FN8

FN8. Id. at 1266.

¶ 29. The Hiter Court’s “less deference” standard, the Brooks Court’s “heightened scrutiny” standard, and the dissent’s “heightened sensitivity” standard all suggest that this Court—if not completely, then to some unspecified degree—must become the finder of fact, imposing (again, to some degree) our own view of the facts. But that would be a tricky — given that we never saw or heard the witnesses.

¶ 30. One thing is clear. Applying a “heightened-scrutiny” or “lessened-deference” standard would require us to abandon the traditional standard (accepting a chancellor’s factual findings that the evidence supports), and employ some different standard. And although the new standard of review has been named (“heightened-scrutiny” or “less-deference”), this Court has yet to explain how it is to be applied.

[4] ¶ 31. While it is true that the United States Supreme Court has adopted various levels of scrutiny for particular kinds of cases—for instance, “intermediate-scrutiny” review of gender-based classifications FN9—the Court explains the difference in each level, and provides a specific test for its application.FN10

FN9. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976).

FN10. Intermediate scrutiny in gender-based discrimination cases requires that the challenged law or policy further an important government interest in a way that is substantially related to that interest. Id.

¶ 32. If we are to adopt and apply a “heightened-scrutiny” standard, simple fairness and justice requires us to publish that standard—in more than name—to the bench and bar. And because that has not been done—and because we decline to do it today—we shall continue to apply the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard to a trial judge’s factual findings, even where the judge adopts verbatim a party’s proposed findings of fact. And should a party suspect and suggest that the judge’s factual findings are somehow tainted or untrustworthy, we hold that the party—upon proper proof—may seek a new trial.

¶ 33. In the case before us today, we find not one sliver of evidence that the chancellor’s factual findings were untrustworthy or suspect. His bench opinion discussed his factual findings. And at the hearing on post-trial motions, he engaged in lengthy discussions with counsel concerning his view of the facts. Finally, his factual findings—whether or not identical to those submitted by the plaintiff—were supported by substantial evidence. So we are unable to say he abused his discretion, and this issue is without merit.

I could have sworn that Bluewater Logistics signalled an end to the “heightened scrutiny/less deference” concept, but that’s apparently not how the COA sees it.

With all due deference to the COA, I am of the opinion that this statement from Burnham is a non sequitur: “Chancellors are charged with the duty of being independent fact-finders, and the adoption of an opinion written by one of the attorneys is not the finding of the chancellor based on his independent reasoning, even though the chancellor may have a similar opinion.” But what if the PFFCL is not only similar to, but entirely, accurately refIects my own conclusions? If the PFFCL submitted by one of the attorneys matches my conclusions on the facts and my opinion of the law, then why does it not reflect my independent reasoning? Does a change in words used to express the reasoning change the reasoning from dependent to independent, even when the conclusions and rationale are the same?

What about a situation where the trial judge is persuaded by the argument of counsel and adopts her legal reasoning and applies it in the case? Is that an impropriety that justifies heightened scrutiny or less deference?

I am with Justice Dickinson on this. Lawyers may not like it because it looks like the judge favored one side over the other, but actually that’s what the appearance is whenever the judge rules for one side over the other. It’s the nature of the thing. And, besides, if the high court wants to outlaw verbatim adoption of one side’s PFFCL because it could give an appearance of impropriety, that would be logical. But to conclude that adoption of one side’s PFFCL does not reflect the judge’s independent reasoning, thus justifying and triggering heightened scrutiny and less deference, does not make sense to me.

State Holiday.

Courthouse closed.

Spring Judges’ Meeting.

Spring Judges’ Meeting.

Spring Judges’ Meeting.

The anniversary of the Boston Marathon bombing has brought with it reruns of those horrific hours. We have borne witness again to that cataclysmic moment when the explosion ripped Boylston Street, followed in only a minute or two by a second blast within feet of the first. Victims are fallen and bleeding, there is shattered glass and shards of metal. People are dying, bleeding out, gasping for life, in shock, limbs torn off. Chaos is everywhere.

Within seconds of the explosions we see people throwing twisted barricades aside off of the victims, applying tourniquets, comforting, calling for help, picking up broken bodies and running with them to find aid. They did all this with the uncertainty whether they might be in danger from even more blasts.

There was a news report this week from the west coast in which a young father, hanging out with some friends, intervened to stop a group of men from roughing up a homeless person. For his trouble, the young man, only 39, was stabbed in the chest and killed. His wife said that he was only ” … trying to help somebody who needed help.”

I heard a minor’s settlement a few days ago that arose from the Deepwater Horizon disaster. It was the last claim from among those of the eleven workers who were killed. The evidence was that this particular worker, a crane operator, was not killed by the first blast, but he turned back from the rescue boats and climbed up into his crane, repositioning and “cradling” it so that the rescue boats could get away. As he scrambled down from the crane, there was a second explosion, and he was blown off the ladder and killed.

In each of these events, people ran toward danger when any sane person would have run away. What impels them to do this?

Some might say it is simple heroism. Others may attribute it to extreme courage that most people don’t possess. Still others may see in their actions the hand of God, or destiny, or fate, or karma, or predestination, or any number of motivating factors. There are as many possibilities as there are possible human actions.

To me, though, the evidence lies in the testimony of the witnesses who knew these people best. In the aftermath of a catastrophe, relatives, neighbors and friends often reminisce that the person who ran toward was an ordinary person who led an ordinary life, doing all of the ordinary things that folks like you or I do every day.

I believe that’s because those people who run toward danger are really no different than you or I. I believe that each of us carries inside the gene for courage and selflessness that impels us to lay aside our first instinct for self-preservation in favor of an overriding desire to help, or to rescue, or to avert a greater disaster with full knowledge that we may not come through it alive or intact.

Still, the question remains: what makes these people act on what that gene drives us to do, while others do not. Why do some run toward, while some run away? It’s hard to know what any of us would have done in those fearsome and fatal events. If you’re like me, you’d like to believe that you would be one who ran toward, not away. But we can’t be certain until we are ourselves faced with a similar situation, God forbid.

Most times, I am sure, running toward is a spur-of-the-moment, reflexive decision made when there simply is no time for rational thought or reflection on the pros and cons. The individual’s character structure and personality, then, influence whether one allows the courage and selflessness impulse to trump the survival instinct.

That is not to say that there is anything wrong in wanting to escape harm. Animals are hard-wired to do that very thing, to survive at almost any cost.

But the idea that some will somehow cancel their fear and run toward the chaos to try to bring help, rescue, redemption, and humanity to a situation where all those things have been torn violently away from others is an uplifting and consoling thought. It’s comforting to know that there are people like that. It’s comforting to know that we have the same ingredients within each of us.

Reprise replays posts from the past that you may find useful today.

NOTE: Some of these links have been affected by later case law and amendments to statutes. Always search for later posts and later case and statutory law before relying on these link.

A COMPENDIUM OF ESTATE POSTS

July 5, 2011 § 4 Comments