New Discovered Evidence that Isn’t
August 2, 2016 § Leave a comment
In the divorce action between Paul and Laura Lacoste, the chancellor awarded Laura sole physical and legal custody of their two children, equitably divided the marital estate, and awarded Laura rehabilitative alimony.
After the final judgment was entered, Paul filed a R59 motion claiming that there was newly discovered evidence that: (1) Laura had moved to the Mississippi Gulf Coast, taking the children with her; (2) Laura had cashed out a retirement account, sticking him with a more than $13,000 tax bill; (3) the accounting bill for the 2013 taxes had increased; and (4) his income had decreased. The chancellor ruled that the issues raised in Paul’s motion were more properly modification issues, and denied him rehearing. Paul appealed on this and several other points.
In Lacoste v. Lacoste, decided July 19, 2016, the COA affirmed. Judge Barnes wrote for the majority:
¶55. A motion for a new trial under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59 based on newly discovered evidence “is an extraordinary motion, and the requirements of the rule must be strictly met.” McNeese v. McNeese, 119 So. 3d 264, 272 (¶20) (Miss. 2013). Newly discovered evidence is evidence that existed at the time of trial, but was discovered after trial; it does not include “evidence that did not exist at the time of trial.” In re V.M.S., 938 So. 2d 829, 834 (¶10) (Miss. 2006) (citing Gray v. Gray, 562 So. 2d 79, 82 (Miss. 1990) (stating that authorities interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3) “seem unanimous in holding that” newly discovered evidence “must have been in existence at the time of trial or at the time of the judgment which is allegedly in need of correcting”)).
¶56. None of Paul’s claims are newly discovered evidence. Laura’s alleged move occurred posttrial. Thus, Laura’s alleged move cannot qualify as newly discovered evidence. The additional tax burden resulting from Laura cashing out a retirement account is likewise not newly discovered evidence. Paul testified at trial that he was aware that Laura cashed out the account in 2013. He testified that he did not know if Laura had withheld taxes when she cashed out the account, but that he realized if she did not, it would “greatly” impact the parties’ tax liability if they filed jointly. Laura admitted at trial to withdrawing the money from her retirement account, and she testified there would be penalties and additional taxes as a result of her doing so. Paul had a CPA whom he typically contacted on a monthly basis who could have investigated the tax consequences of the retirement account’s liquidation. The fact that he failed to request the CPA to do so until after trial does not make this evidence newly discovered. Finally, Paul’s argument that his income had decreased in the first three months of 2014 is not newly discovered evidence, as this did not occur until after trial.
¶57. As to Paul’s arguments regarding Laura’s alleged move, the chancellor recognized his concern regarding this in her opinion, stating, “Paul was concerned about Laura moving from the Madison area to be near her family and friends in the Atlanta or Ocean Springs area.” So the chancellor was aware Laura’s moving was a possibility and was able to consider it when rendering her opinion. Regardless, none of Paul’s assertions are newly discovered evidence, and the chancellor correctly excluded them from consideration posttrial. This issue is without merit.
From this case you can take away at least the following:
- Evidence that is newly discovered must be evidence that was in existence at the time of the trial, but was unknown to or concealed from the movant so that it prevented from having been presented.
- Newly discovered evidence does not include matters which were known to the movant but, for whatever reason, were not presented at trial to the court, or which by due diligence could have been known and presented.
- Facts that arise after entry of the judgment are matters that are properly presented as a contempt or modification.
When is a GAL Required? (Part II)
August 1, 2016 § Leave a comment
Last November, we discussed the COA’s decision in Carter v. Carter, a child-custody modification case in which the chancellor had removed custody from Jennifer Carter because of her squalid living conditions and inattention to the child’s dental care.
Jennifer appealed, claiming that it was error for the chancellor to adjudicate the case without appointing a GAL. The COA affirmed, pointing out that neither Jennifer nor her ex had asked the court to appoint one.
Jennifer filed for cert, which the MSSC granted. Oral argument has been completed, and we are awaiting the court’s decision. Jane Tucker posted on the case with links to the cert petition, supplemental briefs, and video of the oral argument. You can access her post at this link.
Here’s hoping that the high court takes this opportunity to clarify just what allegations or proof are necessary to trigger appointment of a GAl, and how grievous the situation needs to be. As for allegations, Jennifer argued in her cert petition that the COA’s decision imposes too harsh a standard on litigants; in other words, she is arguing that once the proof is in the record the chancellor has a duty to appoint. The question remains, though, how serious the child’s circumstances must be to require a GAL. In his opinion for the COA, Judge Fair wrote that the supreme court has typically drawn the line at fact situations that would trigger youth court jurisdiction, and he found that the facts in Carter did not rise to that level. maybe the court can add some clarity.
ABA Blawg 100
July 28, 2016 § Leave a comment
The ABA Journal every year publishes its list of the top 100 legal blogs (“Blawgs” in their terminology).
If you think this blog is worthy of being listed, you can submit a nomination by clicking on this link. Deadline is August 7, 2016.
[I am republishing this once each week until August 7]
An Order is Not a Judgment …
July 25, 2016 § 1 Comment
… and vice versa.
Chancellors are presented with all manner of documents to sign as acts of the court. They are styled variously such as Order, Judgment, Decree, and others. But there are really only two forms of court actions provided for in the MRCP: judgments, and orders.
A judgment is different from an order.
R54(a) states that a judgment is “a final decree and any order from which an appeal lies.”
R6(b)(1) states that an order is made upon an application to the court by motion.
So a judgment is appropriate when it concludes or finally adjudicates the case.
An order is appropriate while the case is pending and the court is addressing matters brought before it by motion.
Correct: Final Judgment of Divorce; Judgment Closing Estate; Judgment Quieting and Confirming Title; Temporary Order; Order Granting Authority to Pay Expenses of the Ward; Order Compelling Answers to Interrogatories, Order Granting Divorce, etc.
Incorrect: Temporary Judgment; Order Approving Final Accounting and Closing Conservatorship; Judgment on Motion to Compel Answers to Discovery, etc.
The term “Decree” is the ancient, traditional term for a final judgment in chancery, especially in a divorce. I think it is still an appropriate term to use for a chancery court judgment, particularly since R81 specifies that the MRCP has “limited applicability” in some chancery matters.
ABA Blawg 100
July 20, 2016 § 2 Comments
The ABA Journal every year publishes its list of the top 100 legal blogs (“Blawgs” in their terminology).
If you think this blog is worthy of being listed, you can submit a nomination by clicking on this link. Deadline is August 7, 2016.
[Note: I’m going to republish this every week until August 7]
Payment of Funeral Expenses in an Estate
July 19, 2016 § 3 Comments
You represent the administratrix in an estate (or she could be an executrix). She paid the funeral expenses and would like to be reimbursed. Does she have to probate a claim?
This is a frequent question, and the answer is pretty clear. No, she does not.
Here is your authority:
¶ 9. The Mississippi Supreme Court established in 1938 that a claim for funeral expenses is not required to be probated because funeral expenses are considered to be part of the cost of the administration of an estate. Tom E. Taylor Undertaking Co. v. Smith’s Estate, 183 Miss. 45, 46, 183 So. 391, 391 (1938). The supreme court noted that the requirement to probate a claim “applies alone to obligations incurred by the decedent in his lifetime.” Id. The case has never been overruled or modified. The holding and the general notion was, in fact, discussed and upheld as recently as 2010 by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, and later affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 2012. Bell v. Texaco, Inc., No. 5:09cv192KS-MTP, 2010 WL 1490144, at *1 (S.D.Miss. April 13, 2010); Bell v. Texaco, Inc., 493 Fed.Appx. 587, at 592 (5th Cir.2012).
¶ 10. The law is clear that the ninety-day time limit in which creditors must probate claims against an estate does not apply to claims for reimbursement of funeral expenses …
In re Estate of Whitley: Whitley v. Love, 129 So.3d 260, 261 (Miss. App. 2013).
Reprise: The Laws of Stupidity
July 15, 2016 § 1 Comment
Reprise replays posts from the past that you may find useful today.
The Laws of Stupidity
August 8, 2014 § 2 Comments
My posts have taken on a somewhat sententious tone lately, so I am going to temper that for a while. But before I do, I want to address a subject that lawyers and judges deal with every day: stupidity.
One might expect that stupidity is a force that ricochets through human nature unconstrained by the basic principles of physics and rationality that underlie the affairs of humankind.
Not so, says Italian Economic Historian Carlo Maria Cipolla (1922 – 2000), who came up with the idea that there are actually laws that govern the operation of stupidity. By stupidity in this context, we are talking about conduct that involves unthinking and irrational behavior, willful ignorance, brutishness, obtuseness in the face of overwhelming evidence that such a course of action is self-destructive or destructive to others, and senseless activity.
Cipolla posited five fundamental Laws of Stupidity:
- Always and inevitably each of us underestimates the number of stupid individuals in circulation.
- The probability that a given person is stupid is independent of any other characteristic possessed by that person.
- A person is stupid if they cause damage to another person or group of people without experiencing personal gain, or even worse causing damage to themselves in the process.
- Non-stupid people always underestimate the harmful potential of stupid people; they constantly forget that at any time anywhere, and in any circumstance, dealing with or associating themselves with stupid individuals invariably constitutes a costly error.
- A stupid person is the most dangerous type of person there is.
You can reflect on these and come up with your own thoughts. Mine:
- Law #1. As the old saying goes, “Never ascribe to malice what can be adequately explained as stupidity.” Most people who operate rationally assume that everyone else does also. That’s simply not so. Many people bumble along unthinkingly, leaving a wake of damage on themselves and others. The only way to protect yourself from stupid people is to recognize them and neutralize or protect yourself from their impact on your life as much as you can.
- Law #2. Just because a person is suave and urbane, or shares your religion or political party, or is extremely likeable or has a forceful, commanding personality, does not mean that that person is not stupid. Also, bear in mind that there are stupid people who do stupid things, and there are non-stupid people who do stupid things. The former are dangerous; the latter are unfortunate (and, alas, include most of us).
- Law #3. There are serious ramifications when we vest authority in stupid people. These are the people who clamor that the house needs to be burned down because it needs painting. In the name of principle or dogma or doctrine they ignore the possibility of unintended consequences and exhort their followers to embrace self-destructive ways. If reason conflicts with their convictions, reason be damned.
- Law #4. See Law #3. Too often, we realize only in hidsight that we have made the costly error of placing our welfare in the hands of stupid people, or have allowed them to lead us into a swamp that is hard to get out of.
- Law #5. Collateral damage from stupid people can be especially galling. Despite our best efforts to protect ourselves, the ripple effect of stupidity can blindside us, capsizing us into waters that can threaten to overwhelm us.
While we’re on the topic, it’s important to distinguish between ignorance and stupidity. Knowledge cures ignorance; knowledge is irrelevant to the stupid. Many of us make the mistake of wasting time and effort to address stupidity by elucidating facts and posing rational arguments. That approach will avail for the ignorant person, but it is absolutely ineffective on the stupid.
A grizzled, old lawyer told me in my youth that, “If they ever stop making stupid people, the legal profession will be doomed.” Cynical, yes. Inaccurate, no.
Questioning the Child Witness
July 14, 2016 § 1 Comment
Children are often called as witnesses in chancery court. It should go without saying that some children, due to various factors, have to be handled gingerly in how they are questioned. Age, emotional maturity, emotional content of the testimony, education and cognitive development, and the courtroom environment all affect a child’s effectiveness as a witness. Other factors may as well.
The Children’s Advocacy Centers of Mississippi have published a booklet entitled A Guidebook for Accommodating Children in Court that includes some helpful information on the subject. Here are some key points:
- Use simple grammar and concrete words; the child can better understand the questions.
- Children have a right to be asked questions they understand and should be informed that they should let the court know if they do not understand. Even so, some children may be reluctant to admit they do not understand if they think it is a question that they should understand, and some children may think they understand the question when they really do not. Every now and then a check question like “What do you think I just asked you?” may help make sure there is no misunderstanding.
- Children use the vocabulary they have. For instance, a child may describe having been “stabbed” in an episode when there was no knife used or even present; what the child is describing is what the experience felt like, because there are no other words in his or her vocabulary for it.
- Young children may not organize their thoughts logically, and often have limited understanding of space and time.
- To promote more accurate answers, use common, everyday words and phrases, and avoid legal words and jargon such as attorney, deny, subsequent to, take the witness stand, court (in reference to the judge), allegation, defendant, statement, oath, testify.
- Use names and places instead of pronouns and adverbs. Instead of “Was he there then?” ask “Was John at the apartment when you arrived?” Instead of “Were they all there?” ask “Were your mom, aunt Sue, and your brother Bill at the park with you?”
- Negative questions are most often misinterpreted. Avoid no, not, and never in your questions. “Did you go into the house?” is better than “Did you not go into the house?” And avoid double negatives.
- Start questions off with the main idea. “Did you hear the bell go off when you were eating with your family?” is more effective than “When you were eating with your family, did you hear the bell go off?”
- Avoid multi-part and multi-idea questions.
- Pausing is productive. Pausing between phrases, sentences, and after questions allows children to process their thoughts, which aids comprehension for more accurate communication.
- Cultural and ethnic differences can lead to differences in demeanor on the witness stand. Native Americans, for instance, may have long pauses in communication that can be incorrectly interpreted negatively.
If you can get a copy of this booklet, I think you will find it helpful. CAC’s address is P. O. Box 5348, Jackson, MS, 39296. Phone 601-940-6183. Their website is at this link.
ABA Blawg 100
July 12, 2016 § 3 Comments
The ABA Journal every year publishes its list of the top 100 legal blogs (“Blawgs” in their terminology).
If you think this blog is worthy of being listed, you can submit a nomination by clicking on this link. Deadline is August 7, 2016.
The Better Chancery Practice Blog 