Settlement Announcements: What Could go Wrong?
September 14, 2016 § 4 Comments
The COA’s memorable decision in Pearson v. Browning, 106 So.3d 845 (Miss. App. 2012), is notable for the fact that it reversed the trial court because the counterclaiming party had not been served with a R81 summons for trial. I think most chancellors up to then — and even now — believe that once you invoke the jurisdiction of the court by filing a pleading (particularly a pleading on offense), you have submitted yourself to the jurisdiction of the court, and no further process is necessary, only notice per R5.
The reversal did not resolve the dispute between the parties, though. They went right back at it, and found themselves back in trial on contempt issues before the same chancellor. On November 5, 2013, the chancellor again ruled against Dennis Pearson, who appealed yet again. This time he contended that the original judgment rendered October 13, 2005, although styled as an “agreed” judgment, included terms not embraced in the settlement announcement and was not signed either by him or his attorney, and so was ineffective.
The COA affirmed in Pearson v. Browning, handed down August 16, 2016. Judge Irving wrote for the court:
¶8. Dennis argues that the October 13, 2005 “agreed” modification order was invalid
because he did not agree to its terms and that neither he nor his attorney signed the order, as required by Uniform Rule of Chancery Court 5.03. Rule 5.03 states: “Every consent Judgment must be approved and signed by counsel for all parties to the suit who may be represented by counsel and interested in or affected thereby before being presented to the Chancellor for his signature. The Court may also require the parties to sign.”
¶9. Dennis argues that “[i]t is clear from looking at the transcript of August 16, 2005[,]
. . . that the agreement read into the record differed from the agreement as later written in the October 13, 2005 ‘Agreed Order.’” However, Dennis makes no specific argument regarding what is different. The chancellor’s findings of fact and conclusions of law on this issue state that the October 13, 2005 agreed order “is a mirror image of the parties’ agreement as read into the record.” Dennis only complains about the portion of the order granting Patricia all equity in the marital home. However, Dennis clearly agreed to this, as well as the other provisions of the order, during the August 16, 2005 hearing.
¶10. During the August 16, 2005 hearing, Dennis’s attorney stated into the record, “We
have reached an agreement regarding all issues contained in the pleadings.” Counsel then proceeded to detail modifications to the visitation schedule; the requirement that within sixty days, Patricia would refinance the marital home, Dennis would quitclaim his interest in the marital home to her, and she would be responsible for all mortgage payments on the home; the parties’ agreement to waive any contempt issues regarding past-due bills or visitation; and each parent’s right to claim one child as a dependent for tax purposes. The parties were then placed under oath and questioned by the chancellor about the modifications. Dennis’s testimony was as follows:
Q. [Dennis,] did you understand what the attorneys read into the record as
your agreement?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Was that your agreement?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Do you understand that this agreement will be put into writing and will
become the court’s order?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. And you understand that failure to follow the agreement could result in
a contempt charge against you?
A. I do.
¶11. In ruling on Dennis’s motion to set aside the agreed order as invalid, the chancellor found Dennis’s signature on the agreed order unnecessary as “surplusage,” since the agreement had been read into the record and agreed to under oath by both parties. Also, in finding no merit to Dennis’s argument that the order was inconsistent with the settlement agreement read into the record, the chancellor stated in his findings of fact and conclusions of law:
The next day after the hearing (October 14, 2005), Dennis signed a Quitclaim Deed at a bank. This act by Dennis is consistent with the agreement of the parties in the transcript. This Quitclaim Deed transfers Dennis and Patricia’s interest in the marital home and property to Patricia and her present husband, Steven. Dennis now claims that the property was conveyed to Patricia in exchange for Patricia waiving her interest in the Thrift Savings Plan and retirement. This is inconsistent with the August 16, 2005 transcript, the October 13, 2005 Agreed Judgment of Modification, and Dennis’s act of conveyance in signing the Quitclaim Deed one (1) day after the Judgment.
¶12. This Court addressed a similar issue in McDonald v. McDonald, 850 So. 2d 1182
(Miss. Ct. App. 2002), aff’d on cert., 876 So. 2d 296 (Miss. 2004). In McDonald, the wife
filed for modification of the visitation schedule that was established at the time of her and her husband’s divorce. Id. at 1185 (¶3). A hearing was held, and both parties agreed to the new schedule. Id. at (¶4). However, the husband later refused to sign an agreed order. Id. at (¶5). The wife filed a “Motion for Entry of Agreed Order.” Id. The chancellor signed and entered the order without the husband’s or his counsel’s signature. Id. at 1186 (¶5). The husband appealed, arguing the “agreed” order was invalid, as he did not sign it and did not agree with its terms. Id. at 1188 (¶18). We agreed with the husband “that there must be consent for a consent decree.” Id. at (¶21). However, we also noted that “[a] consent judgment is in the nature of a contract,” and is binding as such. Id. at 1189 (¶25). Despite the husband later changing his mind, we found that at the relevant time for consent—when the settlement terms were announced in open court—the husband did agree to the settlement, and his agreement at that time was sufficient to be contractually binding. Id.
¶13. Specifically, we held that the circumstances of announcing in open court the settlement of the dispute that is the purpose for that hearing, with a recital of the terms of the settlement into the record, followed by an agreement to end the hearing, reflects an intention to be bound at that time. Absent any showing that the final written order did not reflect the agreement announced in court, or any identification of a matter cognizable under [Mississippi] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 60 that could lead to setting aside a consent decree after [its] being entered—and neither showing exists here—we find that the parties were bound by their agreement even before it was reduced to a formal written order. McDonald, 850 So. 2d at 1189 (¶¶25-26).
¶14. While neither Dennis nor his attorney signed the agreed order, the hearing transcript reflects that Dennis understood the agreement that was read into the record and that he understood that the agreement would be put into writing and become the court’s order. His attorney made no objection at the hearing to the entry of the order. The supreme court has found that proceedings recorded by a court reporter are sufficient to prove agreement by the parties. See Samples v. Davis, 904 So. 2d 1061, 1066 (¶15) (Miss. 2004) (“If parties reach an agreement, the agreement containing the terms should be signed by the parties’ attorney(s) or in appropriate cases, the parties, or recorded by the court reporter.” (Emphasis added)). Dennis has not provided any proof that the agreed order did not reflect the terms of the settlement agreement read into the record. Therefore, the settlement agreement announced in court and later reduced to writing was sufficient evidence of the parties’ consent to be bound. This issue is without merit.
So the case would appear to turn on Dennis’s failure to spell out in detail exactly how the judgment varied from the announcement. I think it’s laudable that the chancellor went to the trouble of addressing Dennis’s attack on the then-eight-year-old-judgment, given the prior appellate history of this case. I am sure the chancellor was trying to ensure no more appellate ricochets.
Still, I wonder why no one pointed out that Dennis should have raised this issue of the validity of the 2005 judgment by filing a notice of appeal within 30 days of that judgment. ‘way back in 2005 — now more than ten years ago and counting. Is this really a jurisdictional argument he is making, or is this a ministerial omission that could have been cured with a R59 motion?
This case highlights why I don’t like settlement announcements. It seems that one party is always looking for a way to wriggle out of them, and they often find lawyers willing to take their money to aid them in the attempt. Words spoken are never as precise as words reduced to writing. Better to reduce the agreement to writing so all can see and edit, and then have everyone sign. That’s my position, and I’m sticking to it.
The Name Game
September 13, 2016 § 3 Comments
A contentious issue in many paternity cases is what the surname of the child will be. It is contentious between the parties, certainly, and often with the parents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, and siblings who sit in the cheering section. The law, though, is rather clear on what is to be done about the child’s name.
Jeremy Flynn and Madison Bland had a relationship that resulted in the birth of a daughter, Allyson. When she learned she was pregnant, Madison told Jeremy, who asked for a DNA test. Madison refused because she thought it could harm the baby.
Their contact continued sporadically through the pregnancy, including one occasion when Jeremy accompanied Madison to the Medicaid office to enroll her for prenatal care.
On November 6, 2006, Allyson was born. Jeremy did not participate, and he was not listed on the birth certificate. Madison and the baby lived with Madison’s parents. When Madison attempted to show the new baby to Jeremy, he ran from them, according to the testimony.
Jeremy had little involvement in Allyson’s life. He claimed it was because he did not even know he was the father until 2010. The evidence was conflicting. He filed a petition for filiation, and an agreed DNA test established that he was, in fact, the father. Madison’s parents, the Blands, filed an intervening petition for custody. Following a trial, the chancellor found that Jeremy had deserted Allyson, and awarded the Blands custody and refused to change Allyson’s surname to Flynn. Jeremy appealed.
In Flynn v. Bland, decided August 30, 2016, the COA affirmed the award of custody, but reversed and rendered the chancellor’s denial of the name change. Judge Ishee wrote for the court:
¶15. Finally, Jeremy takes issue with the chancery court’s decision not to change Allyson’s surname to Flynn. Jeremy cites Rice v. Merkich, 34 So. 3d 555 (Miss. 2010), in support of his argument. We find Rice on point. Rice involved a child born to an unwed mother who failed to inform the father of the child’s birth. Id. at 558 (¶2). Accordingly, the child’s father was not given an opportunity to sign a paternity form. Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court quoted Mississippi Code Annotated section 41-57-23(2) (Rev. 2009), which provides:
If a child is born to a mother who was not married at the time of conception or birth, or at any time between conception and birth, and the natural father acknowledges paternity, the name of the father shall be added to the birth certificate if a notarized affidavit by both parents acknowledging paternity is received on the form prescribed or as provided in [Mississippi Code Annotated] [s]ection 93-9-9 [(Rev. 2004)]. The surname of the child shall be that of the father except that an affidavit filed at birth by both listed mother and father may alter this rule. Rice, 34 So.3d at 558 (¶10).
¶16. Ultimately, the supreme court in Rice determined that because the mother failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in the child’s best interest that the child’s surname not be that of the father, the child should bear the father’s surname. See id. at 559 (¶16). In doing so, the supreme court noted that, in addition to conforming with applicable statutes on the topic, the decision also adhered to the Rules Governing the Registration and Certification of Vital Events by the Mississippi State Department of Health. Id. at 558-59 (¶¶11-12).
¶17. Furthermore, “in the event of court-determined paternity, the surname of the child shall be that of the father, unless the judgment specifies otherwise.” Miss. Code Ann. § 93-9-9(1). As explained in Rice, “[a]lthough the statute does not delineate those circumstances where the ‘judgment specifies otherwise,’ it is reasonable to conclude that those circumstances should be examined in light of the best interest of the child, if, and only if, this is a contested issue.” Rice, 34 So. 3d at 557 (¶8).
¶18. Here, the record is clear the Blands did not contest the change-of-name request and have failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it is not in the best interest of Allyson to bear her father’s surname. We reverse the chancery court’s decision on this issue, and render the change of Allyson’s surname from Bland to Flynn in accordance with section 93-9-9(1).
That’s a pretty nifty recap of the law on name change in paternity cases. It might be just what you need to guide your client — and the cheering section — in deciding whether to litigate this issue.
Abandonment of the Marriage
September 12, 2016 § 5 Comments
Sarah Young Estes and Joe Howard Estes married in 2006, after a six-month courtship. Each had children by previous relationships.
Sarah had a separate home she owned before the marriage, and she allowed her children and minor grandchildren to live in it. She worked a revolving schedule as a caregiver for sick and elderly. She also lived in Joe’s home. So she divided her time among the three.
Shortly after the marriage, Joe suffered a series of medical calamities that resulted in amputation of his leg, as well as surgery to unblock neck arteries. Due to her work and grandchild-care duties, it was left to Joe’s family to care for him. It was disputed in the proof as to just how much time and attention she devoted to Joe after his medical condition worsened.
In January, 2007, Sarah filed an unsuccessful petition to have Joe subjected to involuntary mental commitment.
A month later, Joe filed for a restraining order against Sarah. In March, 2007, she filed for divorce. The parties agreed to mutual injunctions, and a final trial date was set for the divorce trial. In May, 2007, Joe shot and killed himself.
Joe died testate, but the will made no provision for Sarah. She filed for a widow’s allowance and contested the will. The chancellor granted her a $12,000 widow’s allowance and a child’s share worth nearly $69,000. The executor appealed, and the COA reversed and remanded, concluding that Sarah was not entitled to a widow’s allowance because she was not living with Joe at the time of his death. The case was remanded for a determination whether Sarah had deserted and abandoned the marriage, which would disqualify her for a child’s share if so. On remand the chancellor found that she had not deserted and abandoned the marriage, and that she was, indeed, entitled to a child’s share. The executor again appealed.
In Estes and Estes, Co-Executors of the Estate of Estes v. Estes, handed down April 19, 2016, the COA reversed and rendered. Judge Ishee wrote for the majority:
¶18. When determining whether a spouse clearly deserted and abandoned a marriage, Mississippi caselaw provides a spectrum of factual scenarios for comparison. Most notably, Tillman v. Williams, 403 So. 2d 880 (Miss. 1981), serves as a benchmark case providing guidelines for determining abandonment. In Tillman, Narvel Tillman challenged the will of his wife, Ada Broadnex Tillman, after her death, and petitioned the trial court to recognize him as an heir to the estate. Id. at 880. The Tillmans were married for approximately twenty-nine years at the time of Ada’s death, but had been separated for approximately fifteen or twenty years. Id. Neither party had made any attempt to divorce the other or remarry. Id. Specifically, “[t]here was no evidence of any attempted remarriage or disclaimer of the marriage by either party during the years of separation. There was no evidence that either party attempted to secure a divorce.” Id. Ultimately, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated: “A thorough review of the record reveals that not only was an abandonment uncertain, . . . [t]here was, at most, just a separation proven. As stated, there [were] no marriage or divorce proceedings by either party . . . .” Id. at 882.
¶19. In sum, to prove desertion or abandonment in cases such as this, a clear indication that one party is no longer committed to a marriage is necessary. While we recognize that separation alone is not proof enough that a marriage has been abandoned, Mississippi courts have recognized qualifying indicators to include filing for divorce, filing for remarriage, and evidence of bigamy. See id.; Rowell v. Rowell, 170 So. 2d 267, 271-72 (Miss. 1964).
¶20. Here, it is undisputed that Young filed the first petition for divorce between the parties in March 2007. The chancery court cited the possibility that Estes’s petition for a restraining order against Young may have incited Young to file for divorce. The chancery court further stated that it could not determine that Young “willfully left and had the intention of permanently separating from the marital relationship. Mere absence from the home, without more, does not show willfulness.”
¶21. We find the chancery court’s conclusions to be in conflict with the evidence. A summary of the undisputed chronological series of pertinent events during the parties’ nine month marriage consists of the following: (1) Estes becomes ill; (2) Young slowly reduces the amount of time spent with Estes; (3) Young attempts to involuntarily commit Estes; (4) Estes seeks a restraining order against Young upon his release from the commitment proceedings; (5) Young files for divorce and restraining orders; (6) Estes counterfiles for divorce; and, (7) Estes takes his own life after receipt of notice for a final hearing on the divorce proceedings. Regardless of any other factors present in this case, the most glaring evidence of Young’s abandonment of the marriage was her petition for divorce. Again, the supreme court has clearly noted that filing for divorce serves as an indicator that a party intends to leave the relationship. Furthermore, nothing in the record following Young’s petition for divorce signals that the parties reconciled in any manner. Conversely, it would appear that the parties remained estranged and set on divorcing from one another.
¶22. As such, we find that the chancery court abused its discretion in determining that Young did not desert and abandon her marriage to Estes. In doing so, we reverse and render the chancery court’s award to Young of a child’s share of Estes’s estate.
You can take this case as a reminder that, if the proof establishes that the spouse has deserted and abandoned the marriage, she or he loses the right to revoke the will and assert a claim to a child’s share. That is a fact determination.
What bothers me somewhat here is that our law allows the chancellor, and the chancellor alone, to choose whom to believe and what weight to give testimony. Here, the facts were in dispute, and the chancellor gave more weight to Sarah’s side of the story, as was his prerogative. From the recitation of facts in the decision, I am not convinced that the testimony was as clear-cut as spelled out in ¶21, above.
How Low Can We Go?
September 9, 2016 § 2 Comments
This from the online ABA Journal …
Two more lawyers are permanently disbarred for DUI setup of opposing counsel
POSTED AUG 26, 2016 10:39 AM CDT
BY DEBRA CASSENS WEISS
The Florida Supreme Court has permanently disbarred two Tampa lawyers for setting up their opposing counsel for a DUI arrest in the middle of a trial.
The court disbarred Robert Adams and Adam Filthaut on Thursday, saying their actions were “among the most shocking, unethical and unprofessional” that the court had ever witnessed. The Daily Business Review (sub. req.), the Tampa Bay Times and the Legal Profession Blog have stories. The decision is here (PDF).
Adams and Filthaut had argued any disbarment should not be permanent. A third lawyer involved in the setup, Stephen Diaco, was permanently disbarred in January after dropping his appeal.
The lawyers were accused of sending a paralegal to a Tampa steakhouse where the opposing lawyer was having drinks. The flirtatious paralegal seated herself next to the opposing lawyer and later persuaded him to drive her car, resulting in his arrest by a waiting police officer. The targeted lawyer had originally planned to walk home to his nearby apartment.
The court said the actions of the disbarred lawyers “constituted a deliberate and malicious effort to place a heavy finger on the scales of justice for the sole benefit of themselves and their client.”
Filthaut’s lawyer, Mark O’Brien, told the Daily Business Review that his client “is obviously very disappointed, but he has moved on and is actually very happy in his current endeavors.” Filthaut now runs an auto-glass business.
The headline reads “Two more lawyers …” as if this is the latest in a developing Zika-like epidemic. I know it refers to the two latest in addition to the one who dropped his appeal. Still, as unsettling as this story is, it’s scary to think it could be replicated anywhere else.
As I said earlier in the week, stories like this make it hard to defend the profession.
A Saga of Bad Behavior
September 8, 2016 § 1 Comment
Every attorney I know bridles when the conversation turns to questioning the general honesty of lawyers. We tend to get indignant and insist that ours is an honorable profession.
It is. Certainly. Yet some of our colleagues do things that tar all of us.
Consider what happened in the case of Newton v. Brown, et al., decided by the COA May 24, 2016. The case at the trial level involved dissolution of a two medical partnerships; one to purchase a building and parking lot, and the other to operate a medical clinic out of the purchased building. The partners were Drs. Brown and Matthews. When Matthews was convicted of failing to file tax returns, they began the process of dissolution. Each engaged the services of a lawyer to represent him. The dissolution involved exchanges of payments, deeds, and instruments. Brown was to buy out Matthews’ interest in the property and clinic.
Brown’s attorney handled the property transaction. He was given a check payable to the Mississippi State Tax Commission to satisfy its lien against the partnership property. At ¶8, Judge Griffis describes how Brown’s attorney handled his share of the responsibilities:
- He did not forward the check to the tax commission;
- He incorrectly drafted the quitclaim deed from Matthews to Brown by omitting the parking lot;
- He failed to record the quitclaim deed, and to compound the calamity …
- He lost the deed;
- He did not find or disclose a judgment lien on the property at the time of conveyance, which caused mischief later.
As head-shaking as is all of that, it just does not hold a candle to the conduct of Matthews’ attorney. Since Matthews at that time was already incarcerated, his attorney proceeded to collect the money due the doctor. The attorney visited Blakeslee, a CPA for the partnership. Blakeslee had two checks payable to the attorney as representative for the jailed doctor: one, a Hancock Bank check for more than $55,000 for the doctor’s share of the partnership’s liquid assets; and another, drawn on on an A.G. Edwards account, in the amount of more than $49,000 for the doctor’s share of the cash surrender of a whole-life insurance policy.
When Blakeslee left the room for a moment, the attorney took the checks, a folder, and some papers from Blakeslee’s desk and put them in his car. Blakeslee demanded return of the checks because Brown wanted to retain the money to offset the lien that he had belatedly discovered after he bought the property from Matthews. Newton refused, and negotiated the Hancock Bank check. He attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate the A.G. Edwards check.
Brown got an injunction and pursued a conversion action against the lawyer. You can read about how it turned out at the link above.
My interest in this case is the behavior of the attorneys:
On one hand, we see an attorney who committed compound blunders in handling the land transaction. Blunders that cost his client some serious money, and are continuing to do so.
On the other hand, we have what Judge Griffis characterized as “egregious behavior” by the attorney who took the checks without authorization and refused to return them. Egregious indeed.
These are the kinds of behaviors that make our words ring hollow when we try to defend the profession.
Week before last, I sat down with some entering law school students and discussed with them the gravity of the honor and dignity of the profession, and how the public places immense trust in our hands. We pondered some case studies involving ethical and professionalism considerations. It was gratifying to see their almost instinctual grasp of what is right and wrong, of what is to be expected of them when they are admitted to practice. I hope they avoid blunders and “egregious behavior” when their time comes.
Pending R 59 Motion = No Appeal
September 6, 2016 § 2 Comments
Carla Magee and William Darnell were divorced from each other in 2012. The chancellor awarded William custody of the parties’ six-year-old son during the school year. There was evidence of precocious sexual knowledge on the part of the child. Carla appealed.
In Darnell v. Darnell, 167 So.3d 195 (Miss. 2014), the MSSC reversed because the chancellor had erroneously excluded two statements from evidence. The case was remanded with directions for the court to admit the two statements, and to make new findings of fact and conclusions of law taking the statements into account.
On remand, the chancellor entered an amended final judgment of divorce on April 23, 2015, apparently again ruling against Carla on the issue of custody. Eight days later, Carla filed a R59 motion seeking to alter or amend the judgment, or for a new trial. Without waiting for the trial court to rule on the R59 motion, Carla filed a notice of appeal on May 19, 2015. William filed a timely cross-appeal.
In the latest Darnell v. Darnell, decided August 25, 2016, The MSSC dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal. Justice Maxwell wrote for a unanimous court:
¶4. When timely post-trial motions are filed, “the time for appeal for all parties runs from the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion outstanding.” M.R.A.P. 4(d). This particular provision “applies to a timely motion . . . (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; [or] (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial.” Id. So a notice of appeal only becomes “effective when the Rule 59 motion is disposed of.” Mallery v. Taylor, 792 So. 2d 226, 228 (¶7) (Miss. 2001). Until disposal of the Rule 59 motion, there is no final appealable judgment. [Fn 1]
[Fn 1] See M.R.A.P. 4(d) (“A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of the judgment but before disposition of any of the above motions [contemplated in M.R.A.P. 4] is ineffective to appeal from the judgment or order, or part thereof, specified in the notice of appeal, until the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion outstanding.”).
¶5. Carla’s motion to alter or amend the judgment, or alternatively for a new trial, was filed eight days after entry of the final judgment. Thus, her Rule 59 motion was timely. However, Carla has not yet brought her motion for hearing, and it remains pending. So this court lacks appellate jurisdiction. [Fn 2]
[Fn 2] When Mississippi adopted its present constitution, this Court’s precedent recognized that an appeal from a chancellor’s order—when a motion to set aside the order had been filed, but not decided, in the chancery court—did not fall within this Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Perryman v. Gardner, 42 Miss. 548, 549-50 (1869). Facing a similar situation here, this case does not fall within “such jurisdiction as properly belongs to a court of appeals.” Miss Const. art. 6, § 146.
Conclusion
¶6. Because Carla’s timely Rule 59 motion is still pending in chancery court, we dismiss the appeal and cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
¶7. APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED.
Not a lot to chew on here. Pretty straightforward: A timely-filed R59 motion not only stays the time for filing an appeal, it keeps jurisdiction in the trial court until it is disposed of by the trial court.
It’s nice to see the court cite to the 1869 Perryman case. Sometimes we lose sight of the fact that old, old law is still good law unless it has been reversed or was based on statutory law that has been changed or repealed. I once got an adultery judgment against my client reversed based on a 1916 case that was still good law. Sometimes those venerable, white-haired cases can be a trove of helpful authority. .
Uh oh
August 31, 2016 § 6 Comments
Reminder always to sleep on it before sending. This from the COA’s hand-downs for August 30, 2016 …
EN BANC
2015-CA-00534-COA
Claudia Joan Hill Renfro v. John Malcolm Renfro; Grenada Chancery Court; LC Case #: 11-cv-018 PL; Ruling Date: 02/27/2015; Ruling Judge: Percy Lynchard, Jr.; Consolidated with 2012-CA-00616-COA Claudia Joan Hill Renfro v. John Malcolm Renfro; Grenada Chancery Court; LC Case #: 11-01-018 PL; Ruling Date: 04/04/2012; Ruling Judge: Percy Lynchard, Jr.; Disposition: The appellant’s initial and reply briefs are stricken. Within twenty days of the entry of this order, the appellant may refile her briefs, which shall contain language rephrased in a manner that is not disrespectful to the trial court. Within thirty days of the entry of this order, the appellant’s attorney shall file a response showing cause why he should not be sanctioned. Order entered.
How You do it Back Home
August 30, 2016 § 1 Comment
Back in the early 70’s (that’s 1970’s, BTW), when I lived and worked in the Atlanta Metro area, I traded at a service station (that was before self-service) that had its own service and repair garage. It was off I-75, a favorite route for the millions of snowbirds on their way to Florida from Michigan, Indiana, Ohio, and points north. Over the service area was a prominent sign that read, “WE DON’T CARE HOW YOU DO IT UP NORTH.”
That comes to mind from time to time when a lawyer, usually from a larger metropolitan area to our west, encounters our way of doing business here and whines, “But that’s not how we do it in ____________ (fill in the blank for your favorite whining locale).”
The insinuation is either:
“We do it right back home, and you don’t do it the same, so you are wrong,” or
“I hate to have to adapt to your stupidity.”
Well, as much as you are loathe to have to adapt to our stupidity way of doing things, the deal is that we simply follow the rules and statutes as best we understand them. If you do that, too, you will find that your business will glide smoothly through our courts with nary a snag or delay. Don’t follow the rules and statutes and you will be hung up until you do.
And as for how you claim that you do it back home, I’m sorry, but some of the things that lawyers tell me about how they do business back in the Promised Land seems to have a soupçon of, shall we say, bovine effluvium. In my many years’ experience as a lawyer in various chancery districts around the state, I never encountered a chancellor who didn’t expect everything to be just right. So I refuse to believe we sitting chancellors have lowered our standards as far as some would have me believe.
I got so exasperated a couple of years ago with a lawyer who insisted that I include two pages of language vesting title in various individuals and removing clouds from title in a muniment of title judgment because “that’s what my chancellors do,” that I suggested he file his pleadings in one of those mythical districts where the chancellors don’t follow the law. This of course, he could not legally do because the property was in my district. My thinking was that if the chancellors there are so lax, jurisdiction should not matter. (Footnote: I won the argument)
We’re not unique in this district with our ways. When I practiced in chancery districts across the state, I found a wide range of customs and practices, but the common thread was that the chancellor in each district was doing his or her dead-level best to ensure that it was done right.
As you gad about the state in your legal perambulations, keep in mind that every chancellor has his or her own take on what the law requires, but each and every one of us is zealous to see that business in our courts is handled correctly and according to the rules and the law. Believe it or not.
The Better Chancery Practice Blog 